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Abstract 
Neurological confabulation is a prototypical form o f false remembering and as such, it 
can provide insight into the nature o f human memoiy . The main aim o f the thesis was 
to empir ical ly investigate the neuropsychological hypothesis that the content o f 
confabulation is motivated. This was addressed by studying the neuropathologicai and 
neuropsychological profi les o f 13 neurological patients w i th severe forms o f 
confabulat ion, and by conducting three original experimental group studies and two 
single-case studies. Confabulat ing patients were compared w i th frontal and amnesic 
non-confabulat ing patients, as wel l as w i th neurologically healthy controls. 
Neuropathologicai f indings conf i rmed previous indications o f orbital and medial 
prefrontal cortex ( O M P F C ) damage or disconnection. Neuropsychological data 
showed that the presence o f amnesia and executive funct ion varied across 
confabulat ing patients. The f irst experimental study revealed that bilateral 
confabulat ing patients showed a positive emotional bias in their spontaneous 
confabulations. The second study, based on a recognit ion experiment, conf i rmed the 
presence o f this bias, over and above the deficits o f temporal i ty and reality moni tor ing. 
The third study was based on an emotional prose recall experiment, in which the self-
relevance o f the material was manipulated. This revealed that the emotional biases 
shown by confabulat ing patients were self-serving, and not expl icable by deficits o f 
amnesia or executive dysfunct ion. These self-serving biases were common to bilateral 
and unilateral confabulat ing patients, but their confabulations showed valence 
differences. T w o single-case studies provided further specif ication to these f indings 
and showed that confabulat ing patients form confabulations according to the values 
and goals o f their premorbid self-representation. 
In conclusion, this thesis provided experimental support for the hypothesis that the 
content o f confabulation is motivated. This f ind ing was conceptualised as a 
dis inhibi t ion o f emotional memory associations, most l ikely caused by damage or 
functional disconnection o f the OMPFC from adjacent l imbic structures. These 
conclusions have wider implicat ions about the role o f the O M P F C in mediating the 
relation between emotion and memory. 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
"You have to begin to lose your memory, if only in hits and pieces, to realise that 
memory is what makes our lives. Life without memory, is no life at all...our memory is 
our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our action, without it, we are nothing ". 
Luis Buhuel 
The main aim o f the thesis is to address the fo l low ing hypothesis: " Is neurological 
confabulation mot ivated?" The conceptual, cl inical and theoretical background o f this 
hypothesis, and more generally o f confabulat ion, is reviewed below. Based on this 
literature review, the above main hypothesis is broke down into several informed and 
more specific hypotheses. These are outl ined fo l low ing the literature review and w i l l 
be further discussed in the chapters that fo l low. 
1.1 What is Confabulation? 
1 • I. I Fragments o f Cl in ical Sessions: A f i r s t Glance 
A br ie f introductory v iew o f the cl inical nature o f neurological confabulat ion, as it 
presented in the patients o f the study, is presented in the fo l l ow ing examples: 
Dora's 'yesterday' 
Dora says she was walking out in the garden yesterday. Unfortunately, Dora is no longer able 
to walk on her own following her stroke. The previous week she dreamt that rats came into her 
house and she woke up screaming. Today, she told me yesterday rats were in her room. She 
insisted it happened in reality, as she clearly remembers her fear and panic. 
Larry's 'business' 
I am getting ready to leave the ward after a very long session with Larry. He was able to talk 
about his stroke today and he correctly identified some of the subsequent difficulties. Now he 
appears calm and happy. We chat as I collect the testing material. He offers to help me but he 
doesn't appear to recognise the equipment or even to pay much attention to them. He follows 
me to the door. His mood changes dramatically when the nurse reminds him he cannot leave 
the ward as I can. In vain I t iy to explain. Larry is perplexed, appears embarrassed and starts an 
endless monologue composed of inconsistent work- or holiday-related memories, now out of 
context, and other more bizarre associations. He is starting to become verbally aggressive. We 
try to calm him down but we only seem to increase his irritation. I leave my bag with the tests 
with the nurse and without prior warning I ask Larry about his profession in a jocular way: " I 
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heard, I say, you were doing so well lately you started to become lazy". His wife had informed 
me this was the way Larry himself perceived his professional position just before the stroke. 
Larry laughs, "You are becoming more and more direcf , he says. He then goes on to explain 
the circumstances of his premorbid professional life. He is smiling again. We walk calmly 
towards the dining room, where I hope his lunch wi l l distract him. As he sits down and the 
food is served he says to me, "This hotel is actually not that bad. A pity you have to go. You 
have to go, don't you?" Yes, I reply, I'll see you on Wednesday. " I can't make it Wednesday, 
he says. I am going hunting. Lets have lunch next week. You' l l have to excuse me now", he 
says and points to his food... 
Anna's 'holiday' 
Anna says her sister recently took her back to their childhood house in Scotland. They had a 
lovely time. Yet, in fact her sister died more than 20 years ago and Anna has not being to that 
house for more than 40 years. 
David's 'parents' 
David managed to escape his sister's attention and went back to his mother house. He was 
worried, he had not heard from her in a while. He was perplexed and upset when strangers 
opened the door. They seemed to recognise him. He did not recognise them. They told him that 
they had repeated this information to him several times: They bought the house 15 years ago 
when his mother and father died. He left. He did not believe them. He would know, wouldn't 
he? He had never been at the funeral. How could his mother be dead? 
Patrick's ' T V series' 
Patrick's hospital ward has a rare female name. But Patrick is not aware he is in a hospital 
ward. Even when he admits it, he is not able to remember the ward's or even the hospital's 
name. Yet this afternoon he remembered his ward's name. In fact, he told me a story involving 
this very name. Patrick said he saw this woman on television. She addressed him directly and 
told him to take care of his head. She told him things might try to slip out of the world and get 
lost. He must stop them and keep them on earth. Patrick said she had a friendly tone but in the 
end he felt uneasy. When women tell him what to do he feels weaker already, he said and 
laughed. 
Ron's 'girlfriend' 
Ron claims his girlfriend came to see him yesterday but in fact they never formally went out. 
They met shortly before his accident and became friends. He hasn't seen her since then. He is 
expecting her again tonight, he says. Yet, when the time comes, he isn't disappointed. He 
seems to have forgotten. 
Harry's 'quest' 
At the beginning of last month Harry had a glorious day, which he described to me in detail. 
The president of the US came to visit him at his office. After Harry showed him around and 
- I I -
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explained his business the president wanted to discuss politics. But Harry told him he feels 
more comfortable discussing sports or social matters. They ended up discussing golf news, 
which made Harry feel great. He felt his knowledge was comparable to that of the president's 
and he could have a conversation with him at an equal level. It was important to him to feel 
this way, he said. 
Tony's 'brain' 
Tony remembers his stroke. He says the images are clear in his mind. He felt a sudden intense 
pain in his head and then his brain exploded. He saw parts of it, including little bones, falling 
to the ground. He remembers his daughter picking them up with tweezers. 
Nancy's 'husband' 
Nancy says her husband is the most caring man. After a while, she says her husband is 
dangerous, selfish and bad mannered. I am perplexed. I point to the inconsistencies. Nancy 
suddenly takes her gaze away from mine. She appears perplexed too. " I ' l l tell you a story", she 
finally says. She tells me a story about a neighbour of hers. It is a confusing story but it seems 
to concern her friend's search for new furniture. In the end, a third friend assist them both and 
the neighbour's house is re-furnished. 1 ask i f this story is connected to her husband. " M y 
husband?", she asks in surprise. "He is a very caring man". 
1.1.2 The Term & the Concept 
Etymology 
The term 'confabulat ion ' originates f rom the Lat in verb confahulari 
(OED, 1971), meaning to talk together {con- together and fahulari - to talk, to 
chat). It is also associated w i th the word fahiila meaning tale, f ic t ion, myth , story, 
which is the root o f the English words fable and fabulous. The technical use o f the 
term is most commonly associated w i th Ko rsako f f s classic neuropsychological 
descriptions. In his investigations, which at the t ime, he characterised as 'medico-
psychological ' , Korsakof f (1889/1996) described a characteristic amnesic 
syndrome. It occurred in clear consciousness, compromised mostly recent but 
sometimes also remote memory and was frequently but not always associated 
w i th alcohol abuse. Korsakof f observed that a few o f his severely amnesic 
patients " invent some f ic t ion and constantly repeat it ....so that a peculiar del i r ium 
develops, rooted in false recollections (pseudo-reminiscences)" (p. 399). In their 
descriptions o f simi lar phenomena in the early I900 's other authors (Bonhoeffer, 
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1901; 1904; Kraepel in, 1910; Pick, 1905; Wernicke, 1906) substituted 
Korsakof f 's term 'pseudo-reminiscences' w i th the term 'confabulat ion ' , and thus 
established its use and its association w i th amnesic syndromes ( in Berrios, 1998). 
Nowadays, it is wel l established that confabulat ion is a prototypical form 
o f false-remembering, i.e. a neurological memory disorder. Its exact prevalence is 
unknown but confabulation occurs infrequently fo l l ow ing a variety o f 
neuropathologies, inc luding alcohol ic Korsako f f disease, ruptured aneurysms o f 
the anterior communicat ing artery ( A C o A ) , other types o f stroke, traumatic brain 
in jury, tumours and dementia (see Johnson, Hayes, D'Esposito, & Raye, 2000 for 
an extensive empirical review). Yet, even to this day, the technical usage o f the 
term confabulation is wide and its nosological borders are not always we l l -
defined. 
Wider Neurological Use 
The term confabulation is used to describe the false statements and 
inappropriate responses produced by patients, in many other memoir- independent 
neurological syndromes, such as Anton 's syndrome (unawareness o f blindness), 
unawareness o f hemiplegia, unawareness o f hemianopia, Wernicke's aphasia, and 
cerebral disconnection syndromes (Deluca, 2000; Feinberg & Giacino, 1997; 
Hirstein, 2004). In these syndromes, patients' memory abil i t ies are not typical ly 
compromised by the neurological damage. However, their abi l i ty to observe and 
draw correct inferences about themselves and their environment is defective. 
Thus, they can unintentionally produce erroneous statements about their 
condit ion, their abil i t ies, or their surrounding environment and often behave 
accordingly. For example, cort ical ly b l ind patients wi th Anton 's syndrome 
(Anton, 1983) may deny any subjective experience o f visual loss and act 
accordingly. These patients are not consciously aware o f such errors and therefore 
are not characterised as ly ing, but as confabulat ing (Dennet, 1991; Feinberg & 
Giacino, 1997; Hirstein, 2004). A common denominator in these syndromes is the 
relation between unawareness o f defici t and confabulation (see below). 
Psych iatric A pplications 
The American Psychiatric Associat ion's of f ic ia l Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual o f Mental Disorders ( D M D - I V - T R , 2000) defines confabulation as the 
- 13 -
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"recitat ion o f imaginary events to f i l l in gaps in memory " (p. 173). This def in i t ion 
is bu i ld upon the foundations o f a long tradit ion in psychiatry, wh ich describes 
and defines confabulat ion in relation to 'memory gap- f i l l i ng ' , a frequently used 
and misused description (Berrios, 1998; Deluca, 2000; Tal land, 1961; Whi t lock, 
1981; see also below). Wi th in this psychiatric context, confabulat ion is typical ly 
distinguished f rom other psychopathological forms o f ly ing . These include 
condit ions, in wh ich patients adopt imaginary qualit ies, experiences or even single 
or mult ip le identities, wi thout evidence o f any organic memory defici t (e.g. 
'pseudologia fantastica', Fish, 1967; false identity fo l l ow ing fugue episodes, 
Kopelman, Christiensen, Puffet, & Stanhope, 1994; Markowi tch , Fink, Thone, 
Kessler, & Heiss, 1997; dissociative identity disorder). In some o f these 
condit ions, as fo r example in pseudologia fantastica, the production o f false 
informat ion and experiences is considered intentional, albeit compulsive. The 
patient is, in principle, able to have access to the alternative and 'more accurate' 
version o f the misrepresented informat ion, irrespective o f the fact that in practice 
he might be motivated not to have access to this informat ion. Thus, the symptom 
is conceptually distinguishable f rom neurological confabulation (although see 
Berrios, 1998). However, some o f the other condit ions, do not include a conscious 
intention to deceive one's listener or even one's self, and thus are harder to 
distinguish f rom confabulation on a purely conceptual level (see Kopelman 1999, 
for a review). Instead, the dif ferentiat ion in current practice relies on the careful 
delineation o f associated symptoms and crucial ly the exact neurological or 
psychiatric history o f each patient. 
In addit ion, the term confabulat ion is also employed in the context o f more 
general psychiatric diagnostic categories, such as schizophrenia (e.g. Kramer, 
Bryan, & Fri th, 1998; Nathaniel-James & Fri th, 1996; Simpson & Done, 2002). 
However, the dist inction o f confabulation f rom other types o f false beliefs, such 
as delusions ( "A false bel ief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is f i rm ly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite 
what constitutes incontrovert ible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary'", 
D S M - I V - T R , p. 821) and delusional misidentif ications (condit ions in which a 
patient incorrectly identifies and reduplicates persons, places, objects or events, 
Feinberg & Roane, 1997b) in the context o f psychotic illness or delusional 
disorders ( D M S - I V - T R ) , is harder to establish (see Kopelman, 1999; 2002; 
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Feinberg & Roane, 1997b). Delusions, and particularly their more rare memory-
based fo rm, 'delusional memories' (Buchana, 1991), are generally described as 
thematical ly restricted, wel l-organised, stable, and resistant to correction. They are 
thus contrasted w i t h the typical ly ephemeral, mult i - thematic and disorganised 
character o f most confabulations (see Feinberg & Ciacino, 1997; Kopelman, 
1999; see also below). Yet thematically restricted, pervasive and organised 
confabulations have also been reported (e.g. Burgess & M c N e i l , 1999). Moreover, 
the two symptoms have been reported to overlap in several neurological patients 
(e.g. Baddeiey & Wi lson, 1986; Box, La ing & Kopelman, 1999; Dab, Claes, 
Morais, & Shallice, 1999; Mat t io l i , M iozzo & V igno lo , 1999; Marshal l , Hal l igan 
& Wade, 1995; O 'Connor et a l . , 1996; Stuss, Alexander, Lieberman, & Levine, 
1978; Tal land, 1965). Thus, some authors see certain forms o f confabulation as 
synonymous w i th delusions (e.g. Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; Johnson, 1991; 2001 ; 
Joseph, 1986a), wh i le others stress the possible cl inical and anatomical 
differences between the two symptoms (Baddeiey, Thorton, Chua, & McKenna, 
1996; Kopelman e ta l . , 1995; Weinstein, 1996). 
More generally, it is now well-established that delusions occur both in the 
context o f psychiatric illness and neurological pathologies (e.g. Cummings, 1985; 
Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Forst l , A lmeida, Owen et al., 1991a; Joseph, 1999; 
Singer, 1992). Moreover, the emergence o f interdiscipl inary fields such as 
'Neuropsychiatry ' has questioned tradit ional and r ig id distinctions between 
functional and organic conceptualisations o f these symptoms (e.g. see Box et al., 
1999; Benson & Stuss, 1990; Ell is & Young, 1990; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; 
Joseph, 1986b; Staff, Shanks, Macintosh, Pestell, Gemmel l , & Venneri , 1999). In 
conclusion, although the dist inct ion between confabulat ion and delusion is 
commonly accepted, its exact grounds remain unclear and await further 
investigation (see Berrios, 1998; Deluca, 2000; Kopelman 1999 for useful 
reviews; see also Chapter 7). 
Usage beyond Pathology 
Final ly, the term confabulation has been used to describe the unintentional 
memory intrusions, misrecognit ions or other memory errors o f neurological ly 
healthy individuals in everyday l i fe, in the laboratory or in forensic contexts (e.g. 
A c k i l , & Zaragoza, 1998; Nisbett & Wi lson, 1977; Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; 
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Read & Lindsay, 1997; Schacter, Norman & Koutstaal, 1998). Similari t ies 
between these types o f false memories and some less severe forms o f 
confabulat ion have been pointed out (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Johnson & 
Rayne, 1998; Kopelman, 1987). However, some authors have argued against 
grouping these behaviours under the common conceptual umbrel la o f 
confabulat ion wi thout appropriate demarcation (e.g. Delbecq-Derouesne et al. , 
1990; Gi lboa & Moscov i tch, 2002; Hirstein 2004; Kopelman, 1999; Schacter et 
al . , 1998). These vast discussions regarding the exact interdiscipl inary position o f 
the term confabulat ion l ie beyond the scope o f this study, which w i l l exclusively 
focus on confabulat ion in the context o f neurological pathologies. More 
specif ical ly, the present investigations w i l l address two types o f confabulat ion. 
Confabulat ion as a memory disorder, here heuristically referred to as 'memory-
related confabulat ion' and confabulat ion associated wi th anosognosia for 
hemiplegia fo l l ow ing right-hemisphere lesions, hereafter referred to as 'motor-
related confabulat ion' (see below for a description). 
An Operational Definition 
Given the above 'mul t ipurpose' and interdisciplinary use o f the term 
confabulat ion, it should not be surprising that more than 100 years since its 
introduction to neurology no single def in i t ion is universally agreed upon (Berr ios, 
1998; Deluca, 2000; Feinberg & Giacino, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Hirstein, 
2004; Koehler & Jacoby, 1978; Whi t lock, 1981). However, there are two aspects 
o f confabulat ion that most scholars o f the symptom wou ld agree upon. 
Confabulat ion is simi lar to normal ly ing at face value, in that it represents a 
statement that is not in accordance wi th reality, as perceived, remembered, 
interpreted or documented by others in the same social context. Nevertheless, 
confabulat ion differs f rom ly ing in at least one important aspect. Namely , the 
production o f false statements by confabulat ing patients is not motivated by a 
deliberate ef for t to deceive the listener (see Berlyne, 1972; Burgess & Shall ice, 
1996; Dalla Barba, 1993a; Hirstein, 2004; Johnson, 1991; Moscovi tch, 1989; 
Tal land, 1961). Most other characteristics o f confabulat ion, including its relation 
to amnesia, are sti l l debated as they are embedded in dif ferent theoretical 
conceptualisations (see corresponding section below). Thus in the present study, 
confabulations w i l l be broadly and heuristically defined as erroneous statements 
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or misguided behaviours that are made without a conscious effort to deceive 
(Feinberg & Giacino, ]997). 
1.2 Varieties, Clinical Features & Subtypes of Memory-Related 
Confabulation 
Several papers have been dedicated to the detailed description of the 
clinical features of memory-related confabulation. For the present purpose, a few 
influential reviews and original studies wil l be used as landmarks. In a series of 
groundbreaking publications in the i960's Tailand proposed a list of 
confabulation characteristics, based on an extensive review of the preceding 
literature and the study of new patients (1961; 1965; et a!., 1967). More than 
twenty years later, Moscovitch (1989) and Burgess & Shallice (1996) revisited 
this list. The conclusions of these studies, as well as new proposals based on more 
recent publications are summarised in Table 1-1 below. 
Table 1-1. The Characteristics of Confabulation 
Tailand (1965) Moscovitch (1989) Burgess & Shallice 
(1996) Reformulation 
a. Typically, but not exclusively, an 
account more or less coherent and 
internally consistent, concerning the 
patient 
Cites original 
a1. Most apparent 
when autobiographical 
recollection is required 
Tallands' comment includes two 
characteristics: i, context (a1) and 
ii. form 
a1. is redundant in context of c1/c2. 
ii. Not true for all confabulations. 
Some can be intemally inconsistent 
or, incoherent. 
b. This account is false on the 
context named and often false in 
details within its own context 
Cites original As original. As original. 
c. Its content its drawn fully or 
principally from the patient's 
recollection of his actual 
experiences, including his thoughts 
in the past 
Cites original 
c1. Not true for all 
confabulators 
c2. Some aspects are 
derived from semantic 
memory 
(c) Includes two components. The 
autobiographical content of 
confabulation (dealt with by 
Burgess & Shallice, 1996) and the 
obsen/ation that sources of 
confabulation can include, beyond 
past memories, thoughts, dreams 
or fantasies. 
d. Confabulation reconstmcts this 
context, modifies and recombines Its 
elements, employing the 
mechanisms of normal remembering. 
Cites original 
d1. Confabulations are 
not Intentionally 
produced - redundant 
in context of (i) 
d2. Produced by 
impaired memory 
processes and not 
compensatory 
mechanisms 
D1 is not necessary here 
d2 is partly true. Normal 
constoictive memory processes, 
damaged and intact, determine the 
exact nature of confabulation. See 
also g. 
e. This method is presented without 
awareness of its distortions or of its 
inappropriateness 
Cites original 
Redundant in context 
of(i) 
This is not necessarily redundant in 
the context of (i), as it also refers to 
the patient's inability to monitor the 
implausibility, or incoherence of his 
false statements. 
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Tal land(1965) Moscovitch (1989) 
Burgess & Shallice 
(1996) 
Reformulation 
f. serves no other purpose, is 
motivated in no ottier way ttian 
factual information based on data 
Cites original 
Evaluation impossible 
until further evidence 
available. 
Evaluation will be undertaken by 
the study 
CURREt^T ADDITION: 
Talland (1965) also agrees with g. 
proposed by Moscovitch (1989), but 
mostly in the case of the chronic 
state of the syndrome. "The amnesic 
deficit creates an occasion for its 
occun-ence, and dispositions 
characteristic of the individual patient 
detemiine its presence, rate and 
quality" (p. 57). 
ADDED IN 1989 
g. The readiness to 
confabulate maybe 
detemiined by the 
patlenf s 'personality 
stnicture', his traits 
evolved in dealing 
with the environment 
and in monitoring his 
self-image' 
Evaluation impossible 
until further evidence 
available. 
Evaluation will be undertaken by 
the study 
CURRENT ADDITION: 
Talland claims colliding verbal and 
visual or other behavioural forms of 
confabulation may lead to conceptual 
confusion (1965, p. 41-42). 
ADDED IN 1989 
h. Such patients at 
times act on their 
confabulations. 
As original. 
(IVIentioned and 
supported by 
Moscovitch (1989) but 
actually added to the 
list and described as 
'original' by Burgess & 
Shallice, 1996). 
The temi confabulation has being 
frequently employed to refer to non-
verbal behaviour that arbitrary 
exclusion of such descriptions from 
its definition would be ineffective. 
Use of additional criteria (e.g. 
vertjal, visual or acted upon 
confabulation) is useful. 
ADDED IN 1989 
i. All confabulating 
patients seem to 
CURRENT ADDITION: 
Also mentioned by Talland (1965), 
although it was not listed - apart 
from (e). 
suffer from 
anosognosia, an 
unawareness of their 
memory deficit, or, at 
best, a profound lack 
of concern and lack of 
appreciation of its 
severity and extent 
As original. 
As original. Yet the relation 
between confabulation and other 
non-memory related types of 
unawareness is less clear. 
Additions 
j . The duration of confabulation varies among patients. Typically the symptom disappears or is reduced in frequency and variety 
of content following an acute period but chronic states are also described. The issue awaits further investigation. 
k. The frequency and thematic range of confabulation varies across and within patients. Typically confabulation is considered 
ephemeral and multi-thematic Yet this issue awaits further exploration. 
I. The nature of confabulation is typically as described by (k) as well as easily directed by questioning and not necessarily 
consistent across time. However, across patients and within patients confabulations that border with delusional memories also 
occur. The issue awaits further investigation. 
m. Although confused and thus false memories are present during the acute confusional stage, confabulation proper should be 
identified if it persists beyond the initial delirium stage. 
Characteristic (a) in fact includes two components. The alleged internal 
consistency and coherence of confabulations and the fact that they concern the 
patient's life. Burgess and Shallice (1996) consider only the latter. This is dealt 
with below (see characteristic c). The alleged coherence is not true for all 
confabulations. On the contrary, confabulations often involve striking internal 
inconsistencies and their coherence can be extremely obscure. For exainple, 
Baddeley and Wilson (1986) described confabulating patient R.I who narrated 
detailed circumstances of his brother's alleged death in a car accident, yet, in the 
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next moment, he described his brother as being alive. Similarly, a patient 
described by Moscovitch (1989) claimed he had being married for four months, 
yet also had four children from this marriage. When these inconsistencies were 
pointed out to the patients, they confabulated further to support their claims. 
Moscovitch (1989) characteristically noticed that "confronted with the flagrantly 
inconsistent accounts that such a process will sometimes produce, the patients 
counters with an explanation that is sometimes more preposterous (and laughable) 
than the inconsistencies it was meant to reconcile (p. 138). Examples of such 
internal inconsistencies are found in many other clinical descriptions (e.g. Dalla 
Barba, 1993b, patient SD; Feinberg, 2001; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Kaplan-Solms 
& Solms, 2000; Mercer et al., 1977). In fact, Talland himself (1961) described 
confabulation as including internal inconsistencies. It seems his reason for de-
emphasising them was due to his effort to distinguish confabulation from delusion 
(see also characteristic (1) below), and what is today known as delirium or an 
acute confusional state (Lipowski, 1990): 
"the content even though coherent is often blurred in outline and 
frequently couched in general terms where normal discourse would have been 
specific. This quality as well as the imperfect articulation of any one unit of 
content with the preceding themes justifies Scheid's comparison of the Korsakoff 
patients' reminiscences with dream memories. Confabulations vary widely in their 
internal coherence....Undoubtedly the patient's communications gain in 
coherence as he progresses from the acute to the chronic phase, though complete 
incongruity between two or more serially presented themes maybe be found at 
every stage. In the acute phase total incoherent talk ought probably to be 
attributed to delirious fantasy...In comparison with the themes of delusion those 
of confabulation are stable and coherent as well as rational. Delay (10) obscured 
the definition of confabulation when he presented it as an example of delirium, as 
outside the realm of logical categories where the distinction between reality and 
imagination has been abolished" (Talland, 1961, p. 366). 
Berlyne (1932) also provides an impressive list of authors who compared 
the incoherent quality of confabulatory recollection with dream-like states and 
more recent authors have supported these observations (e.g. Damasio et al., 1985; 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). 
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Characteristic (b) is agreed upon by most scholars of the symptom. 
Confabulation seems to involve the distortion, misuse or misinterpretation of both 
context (including temporality) and content. However, little theoretical agreement 
exists between the authors, regarding the causative role of these deficits. Thus, 
while some see a temporal disorder as the primary deficit of confabulation (Van 
der Worst, 1932; Dalla Barba, 1993; Schnider, 2000), others argue that impaired 
temporality is merely the secondary effect of more general memory-control 
impairments (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Johnson, 1991; Moscovitch, 1989). 
These views are based on different theoretical conceptualisations and wil l be 
examined below. 
One of the components of characteristic (c), namely the autobiographical 
reference of confabulations, has been well-clarified by Burgess & Shallice (1996). 
Although the issue of whether autobiographical and semantic confabulations are 
caused by the same or different underlying mechanisms is stitl under investigation 
(e.g. see Dalla Barba et al., 1997b; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997), most recent 
authors would agree with the clinical observations cl and c2 (e.g. Dab et al, 1999; 
Dalla Barba, 2000; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000; Kopelman, 
Ng, & Van de Brooke, 1997; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). It also appears that 
although, in his summary, Talland (1965) emphasises the autobiographical 
memory content of confabulations, in the main part of the text and in other papers 
(e.g. 1961) he draws attention to the possible semantic memory elements of 
confabulation. For instance, he writes: "Confusion between memories of actual 
experiences and second-hand information or mere ideas also occurs" (p. 57). And 
a few years earlier "confabulation, according to our definition, would typically 
contain autobiographical reference, but would neither be restricted to that, nor 
would that content be a sufficient criterion for classifying a non-veridical narrative 
under the heading of confabulation" (Talland, 1961, p. 365). 
The second component of (c) implies that the source of the information 
that is used to construct confabulations could include, in addition to memories, 
other types of self-produced mental content, such as thoughts. This opens the door 
to include other mental categories among the potential candidates for 
confabulatory recollection, such as fantasies and dreams. Indeed, certain authors 
consider confabulation to include such elements and thus to occasionally acquire 
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bizarre or fantastic content (Berlyne, 1972; Damasio et al., 1985; Fotopoulou et 
al., 2004; Stuss et al., 1978). However, complications arise as Talland repeatedly 
argued against including instances of what he called 'fabrication' in the definition 
of confabulation. Several recent authors have followed his example and have 
defined confabulation as including exclusively distortions and misplacements of 
past experienced events (e.g. Schnider et al., 1996). Although on the surface this 
distinction seems to be merely a matter of conceptual classification, it has severe 
theoretical implications and thus requires careful delineation. Talland's writings 
will be once again used as a template in this effort. 
Talland's exclusion of fabrication from the definition of confabulation 
entailed two separate classes of phenomena. One referred to the process of false 
remembering, the other to the source of false memories. With respect to the first, 
he claimed that confabulation, as any act of remembering is constructive, but it 
should not be confused with imaginative elaboration. His grounds for these claims 
were mostly clinical. Korsakoff patients appeared to lack creativity and flexibility 
of thought. Thus, he emphasised that "the question to ask, then, is whether 
confabulation in the Korsakoff syndrome involves a creative or imaginative feat 
over and above that which goes into normal remembering". His answer was 
clearly negative and hence he emphasised that confabulation is caused by normal 
memory processes (see characteristic d below). The second notion of fabrication 
which Talland considers is that of the origins of fantastic false memories. He asks 
whether they originate from sources others than past experienced events. His 
answer is once again negative, but this time, is less categorical and is based on 
conceptual rather than clinical reasons. Thus, he reviews a number of instances of 
fantastic confabulation and writes: 
"Quite another problem is posed by instances of fantastic confabulation 
which involve the supernatural, the clearly fictitious or the historical past...and 
indeed examples of autobiographic information more appropriate to the patient's 
ideal than actual self are not uncommon in the chronic phase. It is possible to deal 
with these by including among the pre-morbid memories the patient draws on, his 
wishful fantasies and imaginary horrors as well as his real experiences. Another 
solution has been proposed by Williams and Rupp, who distinguish confabulation 
from fabrication, assigning all the fantastic content to the latter" (1961, p. 364-5). 
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Talland seems to favour the latter solution. However, he notices that 
"patient's behaviour does not respect these considerations" and "often the sorting 
out of one source of its content from another becomes a detective task insoluble 
with the information obtainable" (p. 365). Yet he insists in finding it "advisable to 
restrict confabulation...and to apply a second term, fabrication, to the more 
fantastic and incongruous material" (p. 365). Interestingly, Talland himself a few 
years later (Talland et al., 1967) is one of the first researchers to dismiss his own 
exclusion of fabrication from the notion of confabulation. In his descriptions of 
confabulation in the context of ACoA aneurysms, he uses the terms confabulation 
and fabrication almost interchangeably, e.g. "This lighthearted mood continued 
while confabulation in the sense of fabricating absurd or improbable tales gave 
way to more plausible errors in temporal or situational placement" (p. 181). Thus, 
although Talland proposed to separate confabulation from fabrication on a 
conceptual level, he faced difficulties in trying to clinically establish such a 
distinction. Similar difficulties are encountered in studies following Talland's 
review, and a number of distinctions, most often dichotomous in nature, have 
been proposed in order to separate the various manifestations of confabulation 
more clearly. 
Berlyne (1972), building upon previous work by Kraepelin (1904, cited in 
Talland, 1965) and Bonhoeffer (1901, cited in Berlyne, 1972) emphasised the 
importance of both the source of confabulatory material (minor distortions of 
time, place, events versus bizarre, exaggerated and florid verbalizations), as well 
as the different methods used to elicit confabulations. Thus, he distinguished 
between "fantastic" (i.e. bizarre, exaggerated and spontaneously produced) and 
"momentary" (i.e. minor and probed distortions). However, later on, Kopelman 
(1987) noted the doubtful correlation of such criteria and instead proposed to 
separate them. Thus, he established a more useful distinction, based exclusively 
on the method of evocation. "Spontaneous confabulation", was defined as a 
persistent, unprovoked outpouring of erroneous memories and was linked to the 
presence of frontal lobe dysfunction. It was distinguished from "provoked 
confabulation", in which intrusion errors or distortions are produced when 
memory is challenged. In this case, frontal lobe damage is not seen as a necessary 
prerequisite. Although, this terminology is still used by most current investigators, 
at least descriptively, several other proposals have been put forward. 
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From a different theoretical perspective (see below), Dal la Barba and his 
colleagues argued that the bizarreness of confabulations is influenced by the 
presence or absence of a semantic deficit. I f the semantic system is preserved 
(Dalla Barba, 1993a) confabulations are semantically appropriate and confined to 
episodic memory, whereas, when semantic processing is affected (Dalla Barba, 
1993b), confabulations became anomalous or bizarre. More recently, Schnider 
and his colleagues (1996) proposed yet another classification criterion. They have 
classified patients as spontaneous confabulators i f they ever acted according to a 
confabulation, irrespective of its content. Finally, Feinberg & Roane (1997b) have 
distinguished between 'neutral' and 'personal' confabulation. Neutral 
confabulation is defined as a non self-referential, domain-specific form of 
confabulation which can occur in amnesia as well as in other domains. The 
template for this form is perceptual completion or filling in. By contrast, the 
content of personal confabulation relates to the patient's self, it has the form of a 
delusional belief which cuts across sensory domains and it is refractory to 
correction. 
The above multiple classifications point to the fact that most authors 
would agree there are clinical differences between severe and mild forms of 
confabulation. However, there is limited consensus on the exact criteria upon 
which a classification of different manifestations of confabulation can be based. 
Characteristically, in a careful empirical review, Johnson and colleagues (2000) 
have placed emphasis on the difficulty of mapping these classifications onto each 
other, and comparing across studies which use different definitions and different 
descriptive criteria. Moreover, the proposed categories are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and they can overlap (see also Feinberg & Giacino, 1997). 
More generally, the question of whether these various manifestations represent 
different extremes of a common underlying disorder (Dalla Barba, 1993a,b; 
DeLuca & Cicerone, 1991; Fisher et al., 1995; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Shapiro 
et al., 1981) or distinct underlying pathologies and deficits (Berlyne, 1972; 
Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Burgess & McNeil, 1999; .lohnson et al., 1997; 
Kopelman, 1987; Schnider et al, 1996; Tailand, 1965) awaits further exploration. 
These discrepancies reflect the more general underlying theoretical disagreement 
about the cognitive mechanisms and brain regions that are impaired in 
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confabulation (see below), as well as the lack of standardization in assessing, 
eliciting and describing confabulation across different studies and patients. 
In the light of the above difficulties in this study severely confabulating 
patients wil l be distinguished from non-confabulating or mildly confabulating 
amnesic and frontal patients based on multi-dimensional qualitative ratings. These 
wil l include ratings of confabulation frequency, plausibility, novelty, conviction 
and provocation mode (see Chapter 2). 
Characteristic (d) refers to the description of the normal constructive 
meinory processes which are responsible for both memory accuracy and 
distortion. Talland (1961; 1965) considers confabulation as a dysfunction in this 
constructive process rather than an additional creative process, compensatory or 
not (see also characteristic c above). In this sense, d2 (Burgess & Shallice, 1996) 
is valuable in clarifying that compensatory processes in confabulation are 
secondary to other normal memory mechanisms. The dysfunction of the latter 
plays a causative role in confabulation (see also following section). However, the 
statement that confabulation is the result of exclusively impaired memory 
processes can be misleading. Confabulation is, by definition, the result of a 
combination of iinpaired and intact memoiy process, as the patient is actually 
reiTiembering something (even i f totally constructed), rather than nothing as in 
some cases of amnesia. On an aetiological level of analysis, several recent studies 
have been able to describe how particular forms of confabulation relate to 
particular combinations of iinpaired and preserved iTiemory, as well as other 
cognitive processes (Dab et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 1997; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; Kopelman et al., 1997). Interestingly, both Dab and colleagues (1999) and 
Burgess and McNeil (1999) also describe how the relatively rare forms of 
confabulation showed by their patients are explicable by a combination of 
damaged and intact ineinory control processes. However, this issue overlaps with 
debatable theoretical conceptualisations and therefore wil l be fully addressed 
below. 
Characteristic (e) is not redundant in the context of (i) as suggested by 
Burgess & Shallice (1996). This characteristic does not only refer to patients' 
inability to check their confabulatory statements with external reality and thus 
realise their implausibility or inappropriateness. It also refers to their inability to 
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monitor the incoherence of their statements (see characteristic a), as well as their 
potential inconsistency with other personal memories (Conway & Fthenaki, 
2000). This striking inability to notice and correct such conflicting beliefs (a self-
monitoring deficit) has been described by many as one of the hallmarks of 
confabulation (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Mercer et al., 1977; Moscovitch & 
Melo, 1997; Stuss et al., 1978; see below). 
Characteristic (f) includes the main focus of the present investigation. The 
related characteristic (g), wil l also be directly addressed by the present 
investigations in two case-studies. A review of theses hypotheses and their 
associated theoretical proposals wil l be undertaken in detail below, given the 
centrality of these characteristics to the present investigation. 
Characteristic (h) is described by several authors (e.g. Baddeley & Wilson, 
1986; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Moscovitch, 1989; Schnider et al., 1996). The 
reported acting out, as well as the unrealistic action plans confabulating patients 
often make about their future (e.g. Dalla Barba et al., 1997b; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004), seem to provide support for the observation that confabulating patients are 
convinced about the truthfulness of their recollections (see characteristic (i) 
below). For example, Moscovitch (1989) notes how the usual apathy with which 
confabulating patients react to confrontations of their false claims, shifts to 
strenuous defence, when the content of the confabulation is linked to some aimed 
action plan. As described above, Schnider and colleagues (1996) even considered 
the 'acting-upon confabulations' to be the defining factor of spontaneous 
confabulation. By contrast, other authors conceptualise confabulations exclusively 
as verbal statements, or more generally, as speech phenomena motivated by the 
presence of a listener (Berlyne, 1972; Berrios, 1998; Myslobodsky & Hicks, 1994; 
Talland, 1932). However, given that the term confabulation has by now so 
frequently been employed to refer to non-verbal memory and other behaviours 
(e.g. Chatterjee, 1995; Demery, Hanlor & Bauer, 2001; Joslyn, Grundvig & 
Chamberlain, 1978; Wyke & Warrington, 1960), it would ineffective to arbitrarily 
exclude these descriptions from its definition. In this light, the use of additional 
criteria (e.g. reference to verbal, visual or acted upon confabulation) would be 
useful, even when discussing exclusively memory-related confabulation. 
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Characteristic (i) is well-documented in the literature and axiomatic in the 
definition of memory-related confabulation (see above). In this context, 
anosognosia, i.e. unawareness of deficit, or anosodiaphoria, i.e. indifference 
towards one's deficit (Babinski, 1914), is most commonly described in relation to 
the patients' unawareness of their amnesia (Schacter, 1991). However, in 
principle it can refer to the unawareness of a variety of deficits, including memory 
and executive functions difficulties, emotional changes, confabulation and even 
anosognosia itself (Dalla Barba, Bartolomeo, Ergis, Boisse & Bachoud-Levi, 
1999). Moreover, patients may be unaware of their deficits at different cognitive 
levels. For example, Schacter and Prigatano (1991) have distinguished between 
the awareness of deficit itself and the awareness of its consequences (see also 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004). The more general issue of the relation between the 
awareness of deficit and non memory-related confabulation awaits further 
exploration (e.g. for reviews see Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; Feinberg & Giacino, 
1997). The issue wil l be further discussed below in specific relation to 
anosognosia for hemiplegia and its related forms of confabulation. 
Characteristic (j) refers to the duration of confabulation. Talland (1961; 
1965; Talland et al., 1967) described the course of confabulation in both alcoholic 
Korsakoff s patients and patients with ACoA aneurysms. At the very early stages 
of the disease, confabulation has the form of delirious and fantastic statements 
(see characteristic (m) below). During the acute stage of recovery confabulation 
mainly includes severe temporal and content distortions. Finally in the chronic 
stage, confabulation fades away or diminishes to less frequent and severe forms of 
provoked memory error. However, Talland also did observe exceptions to this 
pattern and described chronic cases of persistent, and even fantastic, 
confabulation. Although current clinical wisdom and some followed-up case-
reports (Box et al., 1999; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Mattioli, Miozzo, & Vignolo, 
1999; Schnider, Ptak, von Daniker, Remonda, 2000; Stuss et al., 1978) suggest 
similar patterns of confabulation duration, little systematic study has been carried 
out. Comparing across patients with different neuropathologies, Johnson and 
colleagues (2000) observed that surgical lesions of anterior cingulectomy patients 
typically produced temporary confabulation lasting several days. In contrast, basal 
forebrain lesions led to confabulation patterns lasting weeks to months and varied 
depending-on whether damage was restricted to orbitbfrofitar'regiohs" or exfended 
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to other basal forebrain regions and connections (Schnider, Ptak & Remonda, 
1999). Finally damage to various other frontal areas may last months to years. 
Despite these initial indications, further evidence is required regarding the exact 
duration of confabulation in the various pathologies. 
Characteristic (k) refers to the frequency and thematic range of 
confabulatory behaviour. The latter are reported to differ significantly both 
within- and across patients (Deluca, 2000; Johnson et al, 2000; Feinberg & 
Giacino, 1997). However, no systematic investigation of these issues has been 
undertaken and the neural and cognitive reasons for such diversity remain unclear. 
As mentioned above, the frequency and thematic range of confabulation may be 
reduced in time, but several different patterns have been observed. At one 
extremity, Moll (1915) characteristically described frequent, ephemeral and 
general confabulations at the initial stages of amnesic syndromes. Fie wrote that 
confabulations, to which he referred to as fabrications, "are more prolific in the 
beginning of the disease. The patients delight in stalling long tales, and spinning 
them out indefinitely. They forget at once what they have been talking about and 
repeat themselves, intermingling an astonishing mass of irrelevant detail" (p. 
429). Similarly, Kopelman (1999) described spontaneous confabulation as a 
"persistent, unprovoked outpouring of erroneous memories" (p. 197). Dalla Barba 
and colleagues (1997b) more recently highlighted that such patients confabulate 
for autobiographical material, which extends from the remote past to present 
information and even future plans. 
By contrast, patients have been described who confabulate only following 
provocation (Kopelman 1987), exclusively in everyday contexts (Papagno & 
Muggia, 1996), only regarding particular personally significant information 
(Conway & Tacchi, 1996) or even only regarding a single topic (Burgess & 
McNeil, 1999; Downes & Mayers, 1995). The issues of frequency and range are 
not necessarily correlated, e.g. a patient may be continuously confabulating 
regarding only one isolated topic (e.g. Downes and Mayers, 1995). However, in 
the present context, they are considered together, given insufficient evidence of 
the determining factors that underlie their differences and also due to their 
common relevance to the distinction of confabulation from delusion (see 
following characteristic). 
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Characteristic (I) refers to the distinctive clinical characteristics of 
confabulation in relation to delusional memories. As inentioned above, 
confabulation is typically described as disorganised (characteristic a) and 
ephemeral (characteristic j ) , as well as multi-thematic (characteristic k). These 
characteristics contrast with the more organised, persistent, resistant to correction, 
domain- and theme- restricted nature of delusional memories (Kopelman, 1999; 
Feinberg & Giacino, 1997). Yet, as delusional-like confabulations have been also 
described in the literature (see characteristic (k) above) and, as the conceptual 
borders between the terms confabulation and delusion remain unclear (see above 
section), the distinctive clinical characteristics of confabulation and delusional 
memories require further investigation. 
Characteristic (m) refers to the differentiation of confabulation from 
similar symptoms, found in the acute confusional states of various 
neuropathologies (Lipowski, 1990). The description of confabulation during these 
states has been frequently integrated in discussions of confabulation. For example, 
the investigations of Whitty and Levy (1957; 1960), who examined transient 
confabulation states lasting 24 to 72 hours following anterior cingulectomy, are 
included in the recent influential review of Johnson and colleagues (2000) without 
appropriate differentiation. Yet the different clinical and potentially aetiological 
nature of confabulation during and following such acute states has been 
repeatedly stressed by several authors (Berlyne, 1972; Deluca, 2000; Talland, 
1961; 1965). Characteristically, Deluca and Cicerone (1991) showed that while a 
number of disorientated haemorrhagic stroke patients confabulated during acute 
confusional states, only ACoA patients continued to confabulate following the 
return of orientation. In conclusion, confabulation is shaped by the following 
clinical features: 
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(a) . Varying content coherence and internal consistency, ranging from plausible and coherent 
narratives to dream-like recollections. 
(b) . Falsification range including both content distortions and context displacements. 
(c) Content that is most commonly based on autobiographical memory sources but can also contain 
semantic elements (c1/c2); Content that includes both the distortion of previous experiences and 
information, as well as the weaving of thoughts, fantasies, dreams and other internally-generated 
mental representations (c3). The latter characteristic is not universally accepted and thus It will form 
part of the secondary hypothesis of this study. 
(d.) Its exact nature is determined by the combination of damaged and presen/ed normal 
constnictive memory processes. The latter characteristic is based on aetiological grounds and thus it 
will be reconsidered in the following section. It is an intrinsic part of the primary hypothesis of this 
study. 
(e) Patients are typically unable to monitor the inapproprialeness, implausibility, or incoherence of 
their false statements (over and above their falsehood) and vMen confronted appear perplexed, 
indifferent or simply confabulate further to support their claims. 
(f) Confabulation is not restricted to intentional gap-filling but the role of motivation awaits further 
investigation. It will form the main hypothesis of the present study. 
(g) The role of premorbid personality traits in confabulation awaits further investigation. It will form a 
secondary hypothesis in the present study 
(h) Memory-related confabulation maybe accompanied by associated actions and other forms of 
confabulation, such as visual or constructive confabulation. 
(i) All confabulating patients seem to suffer from anosognosia, an unawareness of their memory 
deficit, or, at best, a profound lack of concern and lack of appreciation of its severity and extent. The 
more general relation betw/een confabulation and anosognosia for other related deficits awaits further 
investigation. 
(j) The duration of confabulation varies among patients. Typically the symptom disappears or is 
reduced in frequency and variety of content following an acute period but chronic states are also 
described. The issue awaits further investigation. 
(k) The frequency and thematic range of confabulation varies across and within patients. Typically 
confabulation is considered ephemeral and multi-thematic. Yet this issue awaits further exploration. 
(1). The nature of confabulation is typically as described by (k) and also easily sidetracked by 
questioning or environmental cues. However, across and within patients confabulations occur, which 
have delusional characteristics. The issue awaits further investigation and conceptual clarification, 
(m). Confabulation is distinct from the similar phenomena observed in acute confusional states. 
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Characteristics c3, d, f and g (in italics above) are not widely accepted. 
Instead, they are central to discussions of the aetiological grounds of memory-
related confabulation and thus they wil l be presented in further detail in the 
corresponding section below. Crucially, their validity will be directly addressed 
by the experimental (see Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and clinical investigations of the 
thesis (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7). The rest of the characteristics wil l be considered 
in the clinical description of the patients' behaviours and perforinance in 
neuropsychological tests (see Chapters 2, 6, and 7). However, these characteristics 
wil l not be at the focus of the study's experiinental investigations, as they do not 
concern the main hypotheses of the study. In particular, they are unrelated to the 
role of motivation in confabulation (see below). 
1.3 The Neuropathology of Confabulation 
Memory-related confabulation in its severe forms has been most 
cominonly reported in Korsakoff patients, individuals who suffered rupture and 
repair of an aneurysm of the anterior communicative artery (ACoA), other types 
of stroke, and traumatic brain injury (for extensive empirical reviews see Gilboa 
& Moscovitch, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000). More rarely, confabulation has been 
associated with lesions resulting from thalamolysis (Watkins and Oppenheiiner, 
1962), i.e. a surgical intervention for treatment of Parkinsonian tremor, multiple 
sclerosis (Feinstein, 2000), tumor (Cunninghain et al., 1997; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; Luria, 1967; Morris et al., 1992), rupture of the posterior communicative 
artery (Dalla Barba et al., 1997a; Mercer, 1977), Alzheiiner's disease (Kern et al., 
1992; Kopelman, 1987; Dalla Barba, 1999), fronto-temporal deinentia (Nedjam et 
al., 2000), herpes simplex encephalitis (Moscovitch & Melo, 1997) and anterior 
cingulectoiTiy for the treatment of obsessive compulsive disorder (Whitty & 
Levin, 1957; 1960). However, the presence of confabulation in some of these 
latter reports may be including descriptions at the conceptual borders of 
confabulation, such as memory intrusions and inemory errors during acute 
confusional states (see previous section). 
30-
Chapter I: Introduction 
Most Common Pathologies 
Patients with ACoA aneurysms typically have lesions in the basal 
forebrain and the frontal lobes, with possible associated damage to the stratum 
(e.g. Alexander & Freedman, 1984; Beeckmans, et al., 1998; Damasio et al., 
1985; Diamond etal., 1997;Irleet al., 1992; Phillips et al., 1987). in a recent and 
extensive review of published confabulation cases Johnson and colleagues (2000) 
identified ACoA patients as the fourth most common aetiology of confabulation, 
following alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome, trauma and stroke (see also Gilboa & 
Moscovitch, 2002). These patients do not typically show lesions in the structures 
traditionally implicated in amnesia (i.e. mesial temporal and diencephalic 
structures). However, confabulation is thought to occur as a consequence of the 
memory impairments caused by the disruption of the significant cholinergic 
projections of the basal forebrain nuclei (Alexander & Freedman, 1984; 
Beeckmans, et al., 1998; Damasio et al., 1985; D'Esposito et al., 1996; Diamond 
et al., 1997; Parkin et al., 1988; 1996; Phillips et al., 1987; Volpe & Hirst, 1983). 
Nevertheless, following Luria and colleagues (Luria et al., 1970) several 
investigators have noted that the nature of the resulting confabulatory amnesia 
may be qualitatively different from classic amnesic presentations and subject to 
the influences of executive dysfunction, which is also common in ACoA patients 
(see also Deluca, 1993; Fisher et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 2000; Kopelman, 2002). 
Confabulation in alcoholic Korsakoff patients is also very frequent 
(Johnson et al., 2000). It is thought to relate to the extensive retrograde amnesia 
and the severe learning difficulties accompanying the characteristic 
neuropathology of this syndrome (Korsakoff, 1889/1996; Victor et al., 1971). The 
latter is mainly caused by thiamine deficiency and it includes pathological 
abnormalities in the paraventricular and peri-aqueductal grey matter, the walls of 
the third ventricle, the floor of the fourth ventricle, and the cerebellum (for 
reviews see Kopelman, 1995; Verfaellie, 1997). Although debates have ensued 
regarding the exact critical sites (e.g. the anterior versus the medial dorsal 
thalamic nucleus) necessary for the development of the chronic memory disorder, 
the mammiliary bodies and the thalamus are among the most commonly identified 
sites of neuronal loss and atrophy (for review see Kopelman, 2002). 
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However, there is also increasing neuropathological and neuroimaging 
evidence, demonstrating that there is additional general cortical atrophy in 
Korsakoff patients, particularly involving the frontal lobes (Colchester et al., 
2001; Jacobson & Lishman, 1990; Jernigan et al., 1991; Harper et al., 1987; 
Shimamura et al., 1988; Torvik et al., 1982). The latter is also supported by 
neuropsychological findings of 'frontal' dysfunction in Korsakoff patients (e.g. 
Leng & Parkin, 1988; Jacobson et al., 1990; Shoqeirat et al., 1990; Kopelman, 
1991). ft thus appears that in this case, as in ACoA patients, superimposed frontal 
lobe dysfunction may have a critical role in the resulting neuropsychological 
profile. More specifically, features that have been proposed as distinguishing 
between Korsakoff patients and patients with amnesia from other aetiologies 
include the increased propensity of the former to commit prior-item intrusions, 
their failure to demonstrate release from proactive interference, their deficit in 
temporally contextualising memories, their severe retrograde amnesia, and their 
confabulation (for review see Verfaellie, 1997). Despite the increasing support for 
this view, it is of note that a number of studies have cast doubts on the exclusivity 
of the above features in Korsakoffs amnesia and their relation to frontal 
dysfunction (for reviews see Kopelman, 1995; 2002; Verfaellie, 1997). Thus, the 
issue awaits further exploration. 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) appears to be one of the most frequent 
aetiologies of confabulation (Johnson et al., 2000), although confabulation is 
present less frequently in the chronic stage of TBI (e.g. Weinstein & Lyery, 1968; 
Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Demery et al., 2001; Stuss et al., 1978; Weinstein & 
Lyery, 1968). The neuropathology caused by severe close head injury frequently 
entails a significant degree of generalised cerebral damage, mainly caused by 
rotational and acceleration-deceleration forces giving rise to axonal injury 
(Povlishok, 1992; Oppenheimer, 1968), but focal lesions may also occur. These 
most frequently result from localised skull fracture, contre-coup damage, 
intracranial haemorrhage and focal contusion. Most frequent areas of such lesions 
are the frontal and anterior temporal lobes (Teasdale and Mendelow, 1984) and 
thus focal TBI can result in profound impairments in memory, executive functions 
and attention. Furthermore, secondary brain damage may be caused, including 
swelling (edema), increased intracranial pressure, hypoxic-ischemic injury, 
haematoma and seizures (Povlishok, 1992). Given the multiple neuropathologies 
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that can result from severe TBI it is not always possible to determine which kind 
of lesion and which site are responsible for lasting amnesia and confabulation (for 
discussions see Hoofien, Gilboa, Donovick, & Vakil, 2001; Kapur, 1994). 
Finally, it is important to note that the structural damage caused by the 
above pathologies is not sufficient to explain the evolution of confabulation. As 
described above, confabulation is a dynamic phenomenon; typically its frequency, 
quality and content evolve with time and confabulation progressively dissolves. 
Such a dynamic presence cannot be explained by structural lesions alone and 
might require neurochemical considerations, as suggested by similar phenomena 
in cases of more generalised disorders (Deluca & Cicerone, 1991) or metabolic 
dysfunctions (Kopelman et al., 1997). However, very few studies have examined 
the evolution of confabulation in time (Benson et al., 1996; Box et al., 1999; 
Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Mattioli et al., 1999; Schnider, Ptak, von Daniker, 
Remonda, 2000; Stuss et al., 1978) and most o f the proposed neurocognitive 
accounts are static and therefore fail to accommodate such characteristics. 
1.3.1 Implicated Neuroanatomical Circuits 
Although some consensus regarding the neuroanatomical basis of 
confabulation has been achieved through the years, the variety of its associated 
neuropathologies and clinical forms has led to the development of several distinct 
proposals regarding the neuroanatomical regions associated with confabulation. 
As reviewed above, the most common neuropathologies of confabulation involve 
distinct yet highly interconnected areas of the basal forebrain, the orbital and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex regions and diencephalic regions such as the 
mammillary bodies and the thalamus. Some authors have reported that 
confabulation can occur following damage to any of these regions. Other authors 
have argued that only one of these areas is critical for confabulation to occur, 
while a third approach postulated the requirement of a combination of distinct 
lesions (for reviews Deluca, 2000; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002). 
Damasio and his colleagues (1985) studied a subset of confabulating 
patients with aneurysms of the ACoA or anterior cerebral artery, which typically 
resulted in damage to basal forebrain structures (septal nuclei and related 
structures). They argued in favour of the significance of the damage to these areas 
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for confabulation. These researchers also emphasised the bi-directional 
connectivity between the basal forebrain and the medial temporal lobes and the 
role of such connections in the formations of memories. Similarly Deluca (1993; 
2000), in what he termed the 'dual-lesion hypothesis', argued that confabulation 
results from amnesia associated with basal forebrain damage, or other lesions, in 
combination with prefrontal cortex damage. Benson and his colleagues (1996) 
reported a confabulating patient, who presented decreased perfusion of the 
orbitofrontal cortex bilaterally. Crucially in this patient, the decrease of 
confabulation severity was accompanied by increased frontal lobe perfusion, 
while the severity of his amnesia remained the same. Other researches showed 
that both mild and severe confabulation involves damage to septal areas, yet 
severe confabulation also requires medial frontal damage (Kapur & Coughlan, 
1980; Kopelman, 1987) and possible damage to the striatum, precisely the head of 
the caudate (Fisher et al, 1995). 
Moscovitch and Melo (1997) identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
given its neuroanatomical proximity to basal forebrain and medial temporal 
regions, as responsible for confabulation. More controversially, they claimed that 
even discrete lesions to this area were sufficient to cause severe confabulation, 
while lesions in other associated regions (e.g. the basal forebrain) might not be 
sufficient or necessary to cause confabulation. In a more recent literature review, 
Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002) re-asserted this hypothesis, as they found no basal 
forebrain lesions in 28 out of 47 ACoA patients who had lesions to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In addition, 10 of them presented no other lesions. 
Nevertheless, this result should be treated with caution, given the 
neuroradiological difficulties in detecting basal forebrain lesions beyond the 
surgical artefact in such patients. 
Other investigators have implicated similar but wider functional circuits in 
the production of confabulation. Johnson and her colleagues, in drawing on a 
great amount of research on memory-related confabulation, concluded that 
confabulations of increasing duration and severity are associated respectively with 
lesions in anterior cingulate, basal forebrain, and prefrontal cortex structures, 
particularly in the ventromedial and orbital regions (Johnson, 1991; Johnson et al, 
2000). Schnider and his colleagues (Schider et al, 1996; Schnider & Ptak, 1999) 
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have highlighted that spontaneous confabulation, as measured by the patient's 
readiness to 'act upon' his confabulations, is associated with lesions involving one 
or more anterior limbic structures. In particular, critical lesion sites involve the 
orbitofrontal cortex or its connections to the basal forebrain and, less often, the 
amygdala and the contralateral perirhinal cortex, the anteromediai hypothalamus, 
or even just the genu of the right internal capsule. Crucially, this group (Schnider 
et al, 2000a) also studied the impact of lesion site on the clinical course of the 
confabulatory syndrome. They found that duration of confabulation decreases as 
damage varies from extensive orbitofrontal and contralateral perirhinal cortex 
lesions to basal forebrain lesions and finally to isolated orbitofrontal lesions. 
Finally, Markowitsch and his colleagues (Kroll et al, 1997) put forward 
the so called "temporofrontal hypothesis". According to this framework, 
confabulation results from damage to a memory circuit, involving the inferolateral 
prefrontal cortex, temporopolar cortex, unicinate fascicle and mediodorsal 
thalamic networks. However, as Conway and Fthenaki (2000) note, the difference 
between this hypothesis and other proposals mentioned above, such as the studies 
by Damasio and colleagues (1985) or Moscovitch and Melo (1997) could merely 
reflect the investigation of behaviourally different patterns of confabulation. In 
particular, Kroll and colleagues (1997) have described cases of dense retrograde 
amnesia but mild confabulation. The other two studies refer to patients who freely 
confabulate, whilst presenting some remaining retrograde memory abilities. 
1.3.2 Laterality 
Similar discrepancies have been observed regarding assumptions made 
about laterality in confabulation. There have been suggestions that confabulation 
is more often associated with right rather than left hemisphere damage (Belyi, 
1988; Joseph, 1986). However, Johnson's et al. (2000) extensive review found no 
evidence in support of this claim or the claim that confabulation is more common 
after bilateral than unilateral damage (see also Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002). In 
fact, these conclusions may not be as contradictory as they might appear at first 
sight. They may merely reflect observations made on different subpopulations of 
confabulatory patients. The various investigators who have associated 
confabulation primarily with right hemisphere damage studied patients whose 
confabulations related to their perceptual difficulties e.g. confabulation in the 
35 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
context of anosognosia for hemiplegia, hemianopia and Caprgas syndrome. 
However, Joiinson and colleagues' review (2000) focused on memory 
confabulation and thus had excluded such patients. 
In conclusion, some of the differences in the various neuroanatomical 
models put forward to explain confabulation might stem from the different 
measures and criteria used to behaviourally assess the presence and the type of 
confabulation observed. Thus, these models may not necessarily represent 
controversial and competing accounts, rather they may be regarded as 
complementary in describing different patterns of confabulation. The various 
lesions or combinations of lesions that lead to different forms of confabulation 
remain to be specified. The following section discusses the implications of the 
above neuroanatomical hypotheses for the neurocognitive and motivational 
models of confabulation. 
1.4 Theoretical Explanations 
The several proposed aetiological accounts of memory-related 
confabulation can be summarised under three main types: (a) Those explanations 
which consider confabulation as a dysfunction of the normal memory retrieval 
mechanisms and tiy to identify the cognitive impairment(s) responsible for 
confabulation; (b) Those accounts which consider confabulation as a 
compensating, mechanism resulting from memory loss or distress and try to 
explain the motivational aspects of the symptom; and finally (c) those models 
which aim to explain both the negative and positive features of confabulation (in 
the Jacksonian sense, 1932). In other words, they try to assess the aetiological role 
of both cognitive and emotioal mechanisms. 
1.4.1 Damage to "Normal" Cognitive Mechanisms: Deficit Theories 
Memory Deficit 
Confabulation is traditionally linked with severe amnesia, yet the exact 
aetiological role of amnesia in confabulation is debated among researchers. 
Certain authors have considered amnesia as the necessary prerequisite for some 
forms of memory-related confabulation (e.g. Talland, 1965; Berlyne, 1972; 
Deluca, 2000). Characteristically, the descriptive use of the expression 'memory 
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gap-filling' has been employed by some authors in this sense, i.e. to highlight the 
association of confabulation to organically-produced amnesia (see Berrios, 1998 
for discussion; see also below). However, it has also being argued that in order to 
explain confabulation, particularly in its more severe forms, amnesia is not 
sufficient (e.g. Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Benson et al., 1996; Johnson et al., 
1997; Kapur & Coughlan,1980; Kopelman et al., 1997; Talland, 1965; Wyke & 
Warrington, 1960) and perhaps not even necessary (Dalla Barba, Cipolotti, & 
Denes, 1990; Dalla Barba, 1993a; Papagno & Baddeley, 1997; Nedjam, Dalla 
Barba & Pillon, 2000; Villiers, Zent, Eastman & Swingler, 1996). The simplest 
evidence against the impaired memory explanation of confabulation is the fact 
that not all amnesic patients confabulate. This is particularly true for patients with 
discrete lesions of limbic and medial temporal lobe regions (e.g. Parkin, 1984; 
Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). In addition, patients have been reported whose 
confabulation cleared after a few weeks, while their memory impairment 
remained unaffected (Benson et al., 1996; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980). 
Furthermore, patients have been reported who confabulate without being 
clinically or globally amnesic (Nedjam et al., 2000; Papagno & Baddeley, 1997; 
Villiers et al., 1996) or who do not confabulate in tasks in which their memory is 
defective (Dalla Barba et al., 1990; Dalla Barba, 1993a). 
Thus, it appears that although the clinical association of amnesia and 
memory-related confabulation is well-established, general memory impairment is 
not sufficient to explain the presence of confabulation in certain patients and 
clinical amnesia maybe not be necessary for confabulation to occur. The 
possibility remains that certain specific memory processes, e.g. control of retrieval 
or temporal confusion, have an aetiological role in the production of 
confabulation. These wil l be addressed below. 
Executive Functions Deficit 
Spontaneous confabulation has by some authors been attributed to general 
executive dysfunction, resulting from frontal lobe lesions and leading to 
disinhibition, perserveration, defective self-monitoring, lack of awareness and 
other related deficits (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Benson et al., 1996; Joseph, 
1999; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Luria, 1976; Papagno & Baddeley, 1997; Stuss et 
al, 1978). Commonly this view explains the degree of incidence and bizarreness 
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of confabulation, or the spontaneity of its production (Kopelman, 1987) as 
determined by the degree of executive ("frontal lobe") dysfunction, superimposed 
on amnesia (Stuss et al, 1978; Deluca, 1993; Fisher et al, 1995). This explanation 
has not gone unchallenged. For example, Dalla Barba (1993a) described a patient 
showing profound confabulation in the absence of any direct evidence of frontal 
lobe pathology, although further testing might have indicated otherwise (see also 
Dalla Barba et al., 1990; 1997a; 1999; Delbecq-Derouesne et al., 1990). 
Moreover, performance on standardised tests of executive functions has been 
known to vary significantly both within- and across patients with frontal lesions. 
Thus, frontal tests cannot be used to differentiate between patients who do and do 
not confabulate (Schnider et al., 1996; Stuss & Benson, 1986; Vi lkki , 1985). Most 
importantly, the lesions of confabulating patients frequently involve ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and associated regions (see below). Such lesions have been most 
frequently associated with disinhibited or socially inappropriate behaviour, 
impairments in decision making and emotional regulation (e.g. Bechara et al., 
2000; Berlin, Rolls & Kischka, 2004; Stuss & Benson, 1986). However, 
standardised frontal tests are not sensitive to such impairments. Crucially, a 
general executive dysfunction is not sufficient to explain content specitic 
confabulation (Burgess & McNeil, 1999). Indeed, more recent studies have 
argued that frontal lobe damage, i.e. a constellation of various and potentially 
dissociable functional circuits, is not sufficient to explain confabulation (Burgess 
& McNeil, 1999; Benson et al, 1996; Cunninham et al, 1997; DeLuca, 1993; 
Kopelman et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1997; 2000; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). 
Thus, some have argued in favour of assuming specific rather than general 
executive dysfunction as causative of confabulation. These approaches wil l be 
examined next. 
Deficit in the Control of Recollection ('Retrieval Theories') 
According to the memory control explanations, confabulation arises when 
the executive components of memory recollection are specifically impaired 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Schacter et al., 1998). 
These models emphasise that confabulation is associated with the retrieval rather 
than the encoding or the storage stages of memory (Moscovitch, 1995; although 
see below, Schacter et al., 1998). This is mainly based on the observation that 
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patients tend to give erroneous accounts of events that occurred prior to their 
lesion, i.e. events that were normally encoded and stored. Thus, for example, 
Moscovitch (1989) postulated a deficit in the strategic component of retrieval 
processes. This results in memory retrieval being guided solely by associative 
cue-dependent rules, instead of by the appropriate effortful and goal-directed 
processes of editing and monitoring stored information. Somewhat similarly, 
Kopelman (1987) attributed spontaneous confabulation to the "completely 
incoherent and context-free retrieval of memories and associations". These views 
also approximate Luria's descriptions of the phenomenon of "equalization of 
excitability" of traces, i.e. the lack of selectivity of traces, leading to confusion 
and confabulation (Luria, 1973). 
In Burgess and Shallice's (1996) variant of this hypothesis, confabulation 
may occur in various forms, depending on the damage to the three principal 
memory control systems. Specifically, these include "description" mechanisms 
(specifications of what it is that is being asked of the memory store); "editing" 
operations (i.e. verification, checking and comparison operations); and "mediator" 
processes (i.e. pure problem-solving routines involved in reasoning). Hence, 
according to this model, bizarre or fantastic confabulations are evidence of 
damaged 'mediator' processes and more generally reasoning errors, while the 
possible lack o f self-correction can be linked to impaired 'editor' processes. 
Finally, impaired cue retrieval (ambiguous and misleading cues) is evidence of 
damaged 'descriptor' processes (see also Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Dab et al., 
1999). 
Similarly, Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal (1998) have recently put 
forward a general "constructive memory framework" (CMF), emphasising both 
encoding operations (binding the different features of events to form a coherent 
representation and also representing similar features in distinguishable ways) and 
retrieval processes (focusing retrieval descriptions of the sought-after event and 
also monitoring retrieval information according to source and contextual 
information). Confabulation in this framework would result from a deficit in 
either focusing processes (failure to discriminate between the sought-after trace 
and competing episodes) or monitoring processes (verifying or rejecting 
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information according to the individual's present internal and external 
environment). 
These explanations are particularly informative with regard to the 
specification of the memory processes affected and unaffected by confabulation. 
For example, they have been employed to explain why recall tests and episodic 
tasks pose greater challenges for confabulating patients than recognition or 
semantic tasks. According to Moscovitch and Melo (1997) the latter pose fewer 
challenges to memory search mechanisms and are thus less likely to be affected in 
confabulating patients (Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Dab et al, 1999). More 
generally, theses accounts are able to explain why specific memories cannot be 
appropriately identified, selected, monitored and even "deactivated". However, 
they cannot explain which memory traces are actually selected and activated. 
These are eventually turned into simple or more elaborate confabulations, which 
patients believe are real and even part of their own personal history. In other 
words, such models have difficulty in addressing some of the positive features of 
confabulation and lead to the assumption that confabulatoiy content is random. 
More recently, some of these theorists acknowledged that certain features 
of confabulation, e.g. the potential selectivity and stability of confabulations 
(Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996), require a change of 
emphasis within these models. Specifically, both preserved and impaired 
recollective processes need to be considered and assumed to be responsible for 
confabulation (see Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Dab et al., 1999 for discussions). 
Thus, for example. Burgess and McNeil (1999) proposed that "the marked 
personal significance for the individual" (Burgess & McNeil, 1999, p. 179) of 
some generic memories render them capable of "motivating the emergence of this 
particular generic memory over others" and thus lead to the 'intrusion' and 
'schematisation' of certain specific confabulations (e.g. Burgess & McNeil, 
1999). Yet, as Fotopoulou and colleagues have argued (2004), this process is not 
specifically anticipated by the hypothesised descriptor mechanism dysfunction 
proposed by these authors (although see Costello, Fletcher, Dolan, Frith & 
Shallice, 1998, for a more specific consideration of the relation between memory 
and motivational factors). Instead, descriptor failure seems to result in generic 
memories of any possible emotional valence and significance dominating memory 
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search. This is achieved by their power as "starting values" of the recollection 
process (Burgess & McNeil, 1999), i.e. without the need for further "motivafion", 
or "personal significance". Hence, the specific issue of selection between the 
various possible generic memories remains unexplained by the descriptor process 
dysfunction itself Therefore, their model can address confabulation content 
specificity and constancy. However, it does not provide an adequate explanation 
of potential emotional specificity and constancy in the content of confabulation 
(Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 2004a). 
More generally, although some of these models allow for preserved 
memory processes to be implicated in the construction of confabulations, their 
conceptualisations tend to emphasise the observed cognitive impairments, in 
parallel, they tend to deemphasise some of the emotional features of confabulation 
and their potenfial explanafion. 
Tetnporal Context Deficit 
In this type of model, "context" or "source" information forms the core 
element in explaining confabulation. This is a persistent view in the literature on 
confabulation. Korsakoff (1889/1996) had first placed emphasis on the temporal 
confusions observed in confabulating Korsakoff patients and this explanation was 
taken up by many other authors (e.g. Moll , 1915; Talland, 1961; 1965; et al., 
1967; Van der Horst, 1932). More recently, Dalla Barba and his colleagues 
(1993a; 2000; Dalla Barba et al, 1997b) described dysfunctions in the subjective 
experience of temporality. This led patients to make temporal judgments based 
only on information about temporality, well established in their long-term 
memory stores, but irrelevant to their present situation or to specific points in 
episodic memory. 
Somewhat similarly, Schnider and his colleagues (1996) emphasised 
temporal context memory impairments, resulting in confusion about the temporal 
relevance of memory information. Indeed, in a series of more recent studies, 
Schnider and his colleagues (see Schnider, 2001 for review) demonstrated that 
confabulating patients with obritofrontal and basal forebrain lesions showed 
increased temporal memory confusion in comparison with amnesic patients of 
other aetiologies. This emanated from the inability of the confabulating patients to 
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suppress previously activated, but currently irrelevant memory traces. 
Furthermore, in a recent high resolution event-related potential study, Schnider 
and colleagues (Schnider, Valenza, Morand & Michel, 2002), have provided 
evidence for the assumption that normal subjects filter, or deactivate, currently 
irrelevant memory traces (e.g. memories of a different temporal source), before 
the conscious stages of learning and recognition. On this basis they have argued, 
that the deactivation of currently irrelevant memories is a pre-conscious 
mechanism, intervening before the content of a memory is consciously recognised 
and consolidated. These findings were confirmed by PET investigations that 
demonstrated circumscribed posterior medial orbitofrontal activation in healthy 
adult volunteers, during a specific experimental task which required the sorting 
out of mental associations that pertain to ongoing reality (Schnider, Treyer, & 
Buck, 2000). 
However, not all patients with temporal context memory impairment show 
confabulation (Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990; Kopelman, 1989) and 
some confabulating patients do not show temporal confusion (e.g. Dab et al., 
1999; Johnson et al., 2000). Thus, as Kopelman has supported (Kopelman et al, 
1997) context memory impairment may be a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for spontaneous confabulation to occur. Moscovitch (1995) has even 
more controversially supported that deficits in chronology are prominent yet 
secondary features of confabulation. They merely represent the consequences of 
other primary retrieval impairments. Crucially, deficits in temporality alone would 
not easily account for the bizarre, unrealistic stories told by some confabulating 
patients (e.g. Damasio et al., 1985). Dalla Barba (1993a; 1993b) has explained 
these on the basis on an additional impairment in semantic abilities. This proposal 
however would only explain confabulations which are internally inconsistent and 
incoherent, but it does not explain confabulations which are bizarre in their 
content and irrelevant with one patient's life, without being incoherent, e.g. 
alleged trips to space (Damasio et al., 1985), or even previously desired, but never 
actualised trips to other counties (Villiers et al., 1996; see also Kopelman et al., 
1997). Thus, this type of explanation, as the previous one, is capable of explaining 
some of the 'negative' characteristics of confabulation (e.g. temporal 
displacement), but it cannot address some of the 'positive' features of the 
symptom (e.g. bizarre content and motivation). 
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Source Deficit 
More generally, Johnson and her colleagues (for reviews see Johnson, 
1991; Johnson et al., 2000) proposed an explanation of confabulation based on a 
"source monitoring framework" (SMF). This model emphasises the role of a set 
of "source or reality monitoring" processes, involved in making attributions about 
the origins of memories, knowledge and beliefs. More generally, source 
monitoring is defined as the ability to attribute a mental representation to its 
appropriate source (e.g. a past true experience, a dream etc). Its related 
dysfunction in memory has been termed 'source amnesia' (Schacter, Harbluk, & 
McLachlan, 1984). Johnson proposed that confabulation is not caused by the 
inability to monitor the correct chronology of events, as the previous explanations 
have. Confabulation is caused by a more general inability to monitor the source of 
mental representations that reach consciousness (e.g. internal mental association 
versus external perception, past versus current representation). In Moscovitch's 
terms (1989) "confabulation is source amnesia magnified and extended to include 
an entire life-time of experience" (p. 138). In this framework, confabulation may 
result from a wide range of source monitoring deficits such as ( I ) inadequate 
feature binding, (2) disrupted reactivation and consolidation processes, (3) failure 
to engage in evaluation processes or to use situationally appropriate feature 
weights and criteria, (4) poor self-initiated cuing and retrieval of supporting 
information, (5) failure to access or to use general knowledge generating 
appropriate retrieval cues, weighting features, and crucially distinguishing 
between "the real" and "the imagined" (Johnson & Raye, 1998). This hypothesis 
initially emphasised specific processes of reality and source monitoring, over and 
above other memoiy processes and influences. However more recently, Johnson 
and colleagues have acknowledged that the exact nature of confabulation depends 
on a constellation of different intact and preserved memory control processes as 
well as other emotional and social factors (Johnson et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 
2000). Thus, this view wil l be reconsidered in section (C) below. 
1.4.2 Compensatory Psvchological Mechanisms 
In the beginning of the 20th century several clinicians observed the 
presence of motivational and emotional biases in confabulation. These fell under 
five different, yet at times overlapping, categories which are still discussed in 
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recent studies on confabulation, (a). The motive of embarrassment; (b). The 
motive of suggestibility; (c). Motives based on patients' premorbid personality; 
(d). The motive of denial; (e). Other psychodynamic models. 
The Motive of Embarrassment 
The "gap-filling" hypothesis is perhaps the oldest motivational theory of 
confabulation. According to it, confabulation occurs as a purposive act contrived 
by the patient to spare him from the embarrassment of not being able to remember 
the events of his life (Bonhoeffer, 1901, cited in Talland, 1961). This perspective, 
explains confabulation as the result of some compensatory motivational 
mechanism, which is essentially unrelated to normal memory processes. However, 
as we have seen this hypothesis is untenable even at a conceptual level, as 
confabulation is by definition exclusive of conscious intention to deceive one's 
listener. Furthermore, given the associated unawareness of deficit, it is clinically 
invalid to describe confabulating patients as consciously attempting to conceal 
what they seem to ignore, i.e. their memory deficit. Finally, this hypothesis has 
been countered by experimental evidence. A number of confabulating patients did 
not show a tendency to increase their confabulation rate when they were 
confronted with questions to which they did not know the answer (e.g. Dalla 
Barba et al., 1997b; Kopelman et al., 1997; Mercer et al., 1977; Schnider et al., 
1996). Despite all these counter indications, the gap-filling hypothesis has had a 
lasting impact in the literature on confabulation. It has persisted and has 
dominated definitions of confabulation for decades (see Whitlock, 1981) and it is 
still mentioned in most recent papers, even i f only to be rejected. This rather 
unusual persistence of a highly controversial hypothesis relies on the multiple and 
often conflicting uses of the gap-filling notion (see Berrios, 1998). A brief 
clarification will be undertaken below. 
At least four other interrelated, yet distinct, uses of gap-filling have been 
described in the literature, (a) On a first descriptive level, 'gap-filling' has been 
used to highlight the occurrence of confabulation against the background of 
amnesia, i.e. confabulation appears when accurate memory is absent. More 
recently, these gaps have been conceptually extended to include not only 
memories, but other types of unavailable or inaccessible knowledge (e.g. .loseph, 
1986a; Hirstein, 2004); (b) on a related aetiological level, the tendency to fill 
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memory or knowledge gaps with false answers has been considered as evidence 
for the aetiological role of amnesia in confabulation (see Berrios, 1998; Deluca, 
2000 for discussions). This view has been addressed in detail above; (c) on a 
second descripfive level, the nofion of 'gap-filling' is used to provide a 
classification of confabulation severity. Gap-filling confabulations represented 
simple, momentary, passive or reactive, i.e. provoked only by questioning, 
confabulations (e.g. see Berlyne, 1972; Whitlock, 1981). These are contrasted 
with fabrications or fantastic confabulations produced spontaneously (e.g. 
Bonhoeffer 1901 in Talland, 1961; Berlyne, 1972; see also above). More recently, 
Moscovitch (1989; see also Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002) has noted that such gap-
filling confabulations do in fact make their appearance in confabulating patients. 
They represent efforts to correct or further support their previous claims. 
However, they should not be identified with provoked or less severe forms of 
confabulation. Instead, they should be considered as secondaiy forms of the 
symptom and explained as such. Interestingly, almost 100 years ago in a 
systematic exploration of types of confabulation Moll (1915) had ascribed a 
similar and peripheral role to ad hoc concoctions, i.e. gap-filling confabulations; 
(d) on a second aetiological level, the tendency to confabulate by filling memory 
gaps has been linked to the potential aetiological role of suggestibility in 
confabulation (Pick, 1905 in Talland, 1961). This view wil l be addressed below. 
In light of the above, any theoretical or empirical consideration of the gap-
filling hypothesis that does not carefully clarify whether it addresses the 
motivational claims of embarrassment, the descriptive or aetiological association 
to amnesia, the clinical description of a secondary form of confabulation or the 
causative role of suggestibility, is likely to cause conceptual confusion. This is 
exactly what has taken place in the literature (for critical reviews see Deluca, 
2000; Berrios, 1998; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002). This conceptual confusion has 
also, at least in part, contributed to certain superficial rejections of any type of 
motivational aetiology in confabulation (e.g. Schnider, 2003; Whitlock, 1981). 
Suggestibility Motives 
Pick (1905, 1915 in Talland, 1961) and Korner (1935 in Talland, 1961) 
noticed that the statements of confabulating patients can be easily steered by 
leading questions. Thus, they argued that 'suggestibility' has a causal role in the 
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gap-filling forms of confabulation. This explanation relates to the above 
discussions about the complex connotations of the gap-filling notion. Specifically, 
the motive of suggestibility has been treated as synonymous with the 
embarrassment gap-filling motive. Furthermore, it has been rejected as such, i.e. 
by asking confabulating patients to answer questions with generally 'unknown' or 
'hard to access' answers (e.g. Berlyne, 1972; Dalla Barba, 1993a,b; Mercer et al., 
1977; Schnider et al., 1996), or by measuring the amount of prompting patients 
require, before confabulating (e.g. Moscovitch & Melo, 1997). However, this 
hypothesis also includes a different component. Berlyne (1972) notes how 
suggestibility in Pick's descriptions, is dependent on clouded consciousness, 
weakened judgement and lively fantasy. The latter has been supported by Johnson 
and colleagues (1997) who recently have reported a patient who among other 
deficits showed 'a propensity towards detailed imaginations' (Johnson et al., 
1997, p. 203; see also Johnson et al., 2000). In this sense, suggestibility may be , 
seen as part of one's personality structure, or more generally an individual 
predisposition to external suggestion and compliance. 
The only study, known to the author that directly addressed suggestibility 
in this context is by Mercer and colleagues (1977). They deceived their patients 
into believing that they had responded earlier to questions, in which in reality they 
had responded ' I don't know' and asked them to re-answer the questions. The 
results indicated that severe confabulators changed their replies on 3 1 % of the 
occasions, while mild confabulators did so on 28% of the occasions. Based on this 
similarity, the authors concluded that their results did not support the 
suggestibility hypothesis. However a re-examination of their results leads to a 
more complex interpretation. First of all, the study does not report the percentage 
of change of responses in non-confabulating patients. I f the latter did not change 
their responses at all, then suggestibility might have a role in confabulation, albeit 
a secondary one. In addition, the authors report that mild confabulators never 
produced a confabulation when altering their responses, while severe 
confabulators did so at every question. The latter finding suggests that the 
production of confabulations is influenced by suggestion. However, the question 
of whether the influence of suggestibility is causative of confabulation across 
patients or whether it is a secondary phenomenon (e.g. Moscovitch, 1989) 
requires further investigation, interestingly, similar phenomena have been 
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observed and studied in a forensic context (e.g. Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 1995; 
see also Kopelman, 2002 for review). Although confabulation in these contexts 
may represent a different phenomenon, the conclusions of these studies about the 
partial role of suggestibility in 'forensic confabulation' warrants direct 
investigation of the phenomenon in the case of neurological confabulation. Thus, 
the role of suggestibility wi l l be directly investigated in the present study in two 
case-reports. 
Motives Based on Premorbid Personality 
Williams and Rupp (1938) attributed the occurrence of confabulation, in 
part at least, to tendencies inherent in the patient's premorbid personality 
structure. They emphasised that confabulating patients combine the extremes of 
introversion and extraversion, including uncommunicativeness and apathy at the 
one end, and superficial sociability and realism, at the other. Talland (1961) noted 
that confabulation is "an interaction effect of the amnesic syndrome and basic 
personality structure" (p. 380). More specifically, he concluded that confabulation 
was secondary to amnesic derangement. The latter "creates an occasion for each 
occurrence, and dispositions characteristic of the individual patient will determine 
its presence, rate and quality". Berlyne (1972) confirmed the above views. He 
obsei-ved that five out of the seven Korsakoff patients he studied were 
premorbidly extraverts and "no less than four showed features of Schneider's 
'hyperthymic' personality type (Schneider, 1958)". He also observed three cases 
of fantastic confabulation of paranoid content in patients with senile dementia. Al l 
three had a 'sensitive' premorbid personality. Berlyne concluded that premorbid 
personality traits may determine the content of confabulation. 
In a study on confabulation in the context of senile dementia, Gainotti 
(1975) conducted what remains until today the most systematic study of this 
hypothesis. He asked relatives to describe the premorbid personality of eight 
confabulating patients and 22 non-confabulating control patients. Specifically, he 
investigated the following features: (i) attitudes towards work, health and illness; 
(ii) interpersonal patterns, e.g. need for prestige and superiority, tolerance or 
hypersensitivity to criticism; and (ii i) reaction to stress, e.g. depression, overt 
anxiety. The results indicated opposite personality traits between the two groups. 
More specifically, 75% of the target patients were described as having a strong 
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tendency to deny, ignore or rationalise illness. In addition, the predominant 
feature of their interpersonal relationships was the need for prestige and 
domination, over emotional and intimacy concerns. None of the confabulating 
patients were hypochondriacal or concerned with their somatic functions but five 
of them were described as having violent reactions to anxiety. The control group 
showed a very different balance of personality characteristics along all three axes. 
Gainotti concluded, similarly to Talland (1961), that although the memory and 
intellectual deterioration observed in this neuropathology is necessary for 
confabulation to occur, the presence of confabulation in some, but not other 
patients, suggests a role of personality traits and coping mechanisms in the 
emergence of the symptom. Finally, given that most of the confabulating, but not 
the control, patients of the study came from particular social and national 
backgrounds, the study also highlighted the influence of cultural norms and 
expectations in the formation of confabulation (see also Kopelman, 1997). 
Similar conclusions about the role of premorbid personality traits in 
confabulation have been drawn by Weinstein and his colleagues in a series of 
clinical studies (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; Weinstein, Kahn & Malitz, 1956; 
Weinstein & Lyerly, 1968). They found that the patients most likely to show 
confabulation and denial of deficit, were the ones characterised by their relatives 
as premorbidly stubborn, introverted with regard to their feelings, prestige- and 
power-seeking. In addition, these patients had premorbidly been using coping 
mechanisms such as denial and minimisation, when confronted with other health 
issues. This view wil l be considered in detail below. 
Finally, in a more recent case report, Conway and Tacchi (1996) 
investigated mood and personality changes in a selectively confabulating patient. 
While these authors did not report any specific premorbid personality pattern, they 
did argue that the patients' current goals and preoccupations had influenced the 
content of her confabulations (see below). In conclusion, although this hypothesis 
has received some support, it remains unclear how, and at what aetioiogical level, 
the individual's personality interacts with the neurocognitive dysfunction in order 
for confabulation to occur, or in order for the content of confabulation to be 
coloured in a particular way. Thus, the issue awaits further investigation. In the 
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present study the role of premorbid personality in confabulation wil l be 
investigated in two single case studies. 
The Motive of Denial 
Lidz (1942 in Talland, 1961) had discussed confabulation as a response to 
overwhelming anxiety and Zangwill (1953 in Berlyne 1972) had conceptualised 
confabulation as a defence against 'a catastrophic reaction', i.e. a depressive 
reaction to one's illness. However, the hypothesis that confabulation is a form of 
'psychological denial', i.e. a compensatory coping mechanism instigated by 
excessive anxiety, is mostly related with the work of Weinstein and his colleagues 
(for a review see Weinstein, 1996). It was their studies on anosognosia and a 
number of other related syndromes that led to the formulation of this 
psychodynamic hypothesis. This theory did not only focus on the premorbid 
predispositions of certain individuals to confabulate (see above), but further 
emphasised two aspects of the syndrome; the symbolic nature of its content and 
the accompanying implicit awareness of deficit (see also Feinberg, 2001). Thus, 
Weinstein and colleagues claimed that although confabulations frequently involve 
references to past events, they are to some degree, symbolic representations, 
dramatisations, or explanations of some current persona! experience, 
preoccupation or disability (Weinstein, Kahn & Malitz, 1956). These symbolic 
functions are based on kernels of awareness of deficit, i.e. confabulations 
implicitly express illness preoccupations and anxieties, which the patient is not 
capable of fully appreciating and explicitly expressing. More generally 
confabulation itself represents an indication of a selective and partial awareness of 
detlcit (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). Finally, the symbolic function of 
confabulation, although is at face value aberrant with reality, it seems to have an 
ultimate adaptive role. Weinstein observed, following Bonhoeffer (1901, cited in 
Weinstein, 1996) that during the narration of confabulations, patients become 
engrossed in detail, lose their previous irritability and then appear utterly relaxed. 
Although these views have highlighted the positive aspects of 
confabulation, there has been little experimental evidence in their support. 
Moreover, these psychological coping mechanisms are considered independent of 
the specific neuropathologicai features of the syndromes they aim to explain. 
Thus, their explanatory power with regards to the syndromes themselves is 
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limited. Indeed, Weinstein (1996) acknowledged that the above descriptions are 
less likely to be relevant to spontaneous confabulation with vivid imagery, as 
reported in patients with ACoA aneuryrms and anterior cingulectomy. 
Other Psychodynamic Models 
In the early explorations of the nature of confabulation a series of 
clinicians observed motivational biases in the manifestations of confabulation. For 
example, Moll (1915) noted the influence of former habits and emotional 
complexes. Some psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians recognised in the content 
of confabulation the mark of psychodynamic mechanisms (for reviews see, 
Berlyne, 1972; Betlheim & Harman, 1924; Davidson, 1948). For example, 
Betlheim and Hartman (1924) noted " I f we start out from the general view that 
there is a close relationship between-organic-cerebral and psychic mechanisms, it 
seems justified to raise the question whether the psychologically well-described 
and well-known processes of repression, displacement and condensation have 
their counterpart in the realm of organic disorders" (p. 288). Most importantly, the 
disorganised, a-temporal, free of counter-ideas, and at times, wishful and vivid 
quality of confabulations was reminiscent of the recollective quality of dreams 
(Berlyne, 1972; Betlheim & Hartman, 1924; Pick, 1905; 1915 in Talland, 1961; 
Scheid, 1934 in Berlyne, 1972; Van der Horst, 1932; Whitty & Levin, 1957; see 
also Damasio et al., 1985; Stuss et al., 1978). This led some authors to suggest 
that the individual's wishes and interests guided confabulation in the same way as 
they controlled dream fantasy (Berlyne, 1972; Betlheim & Hartman, 1924; Van 
der Horst, 1932). 
However, these explanations, unlike the ones examined above, did not 
consider these emotional mechanisms in isolation. Instead, they regarded the 
emotional manifestations as the direct consequence of the cognitive dysfunction. 
For instance, Bertlheim and Hartman (1924) argued that the characteristic amnesic 
derangement of the Korsakoff syndrome, caused a lack of cognitive restraint. This 
in turn, allowed the normally implicit effect of primitive, emotion-based forms of 
cognition to become more explicit and colour recollection even under controlled 
experimental conditions. These views echoed Korsakoff s (1889) initial 
suggestion that the frequency of death and funeral themes in these patients" false 
memories was based on unconscious associations (in Talland, 1961). 
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Although at first sight, these psychodynamic views appear similar to the 
denial hypothesis, in fact they are significantly different in at least one 
fundamental aspect. Confabulation in these psychodynamic theories is not 
conceived as caused, nor coloured, by any compensatory defence, filling-in 
tendency, or personality-related mechanism. Instead confabulation, including its 
negative and positive features, is regarded as the direct result of an organically-
caused dysfunction of the normal mechanisms of remembering. Given this 
dysfunction, the necessary mixing and editing of memory material, has now 
produced an almost grotesque outcome. Yet it still bears the influence of its basic 
ingredients, including basic emotional tendencies and cognitive elaborations. In 
Bertlheim and Hartman's (1924) terms, 
"that the memory disorder of the Korsakow syndrome is organically 
founded is conceded by all investigators. But one can assume as Bonhoeffer did 
long ago, that there is also a functional factor and that only its interaction with the 
organic-cerebral factor yields the total psychological picture of the Korsakow 
syndrome. The functional factor of the memory disorder seems clearest in post-
traumatic cases. Even i f we consider the functional factor secondary, it is 
permissible to assume that in our cases too, psychologically demonstrable 
tendencies make use of organically pre-formed distortion mechanisms. The aim of 
our investigation was to demonstrate through the study of symbolic distortions 
how the deliberate application of psychological insight affords a partial glimpse 
into the operation of these organic mechanisms" (p. 307). 
Yet in the following decades this perspective received little experimental 
attention. Perhaps given that the neurocognitive basis of confabulation remained 
obscure until a few decades ago (Schnider, 2003), this early and rather ambitious 
effort to explain the emotional features of the syndrome in organic terms fell into 
a theoretical vacuum. Instead, the more simple defence or filling-in explanations 
were established as the motivational hypotheses, only to be deemphasised and 
largely dismissed as more sophisticated neurocognitive models of confabulation 
came to the foreground (for review see Deluca, 2000). The subsequent revision of 
some of the above psychodynamic hypothesis wil l be addressed in the following 
section. 
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1.4.3 Combinations of Damaged and Spared Mechanisms 
The discussion of the aforementioned controversial theoretical 
explanations of confabulation has hinted at the fact that the endeavour to define a 
single cognitive deficit, or a single compensatory mechanism, underlying 
confabulation has proven far from straightforward. Indeed, more recently various 
investigators have noted that the variety of reported features of confabulation 
requires a theoretical account capable of incorporating multiple contributing 
factors (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Johnson, et al., 1997; 
2000; Kopelman et al., 1997; Shapiro et al., 1981). Crucially, any appropriate 
theory should be in the position to integrate both 'negative' and 'positive' features 
of confabulatory manifestations, since positive or adaptive aspects of 
confabulation have been reported in confabulation case studies in parallel with 
negative ones (e.g. Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Downes & 
Mayes, 1995; Jorn & Rybarczyk, 1995; Sabhesan & Natarajan, 1988; Villiers et 
al., 1996). 
For example, Villiers and his colleagues (1996) report a patient who was 
found confused in his hotel room and who, although presenting no amnesia or 
confabulation upon formal neuropsychological testing (see also Papagno & 
Muggia, 1996; Conway & Tacchi, 1996), repeatedly described an alleged one-day 
trip to Tokyo on the day before his admission. Relatives verified that, although the 
patient had always wished to work at Tokyo, he had never been there. Therefore it 
appears that in such cases, although confabulation may involve 'some kernels of 
truth of genuine experience' misattributed in time and space (Talland, 1965), it 
may also be influenced by factors of great affective stamp (Mercer et al, 1977), 
marked personal significance (Burgess & McNeil, 1999), or, wish-fulfilments 
(Berlyne, 1972; Betlheim & Haitman, 1924; Downes & Mayes, 1995; Van der 
Horst, 1932; Flament , 1957 cited in Berlyne, 1972; Clarke, Wyke, & Zangwill, 
1958 cited in Talland, 1961). 
As described above, initial attempts to address these 'positive' features 
and adaptive functions within neurology and psychiatry have been rather 
unsuccessful. However, recent advances in neuroscience and the broadening of its 
interests to topics which were once considered not amenable to empirical research 
(e.g. affective regulation) have allowed emotional features of confabulation to be 
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reconsidered. This happened within two different traditions, cognitive 
psychological research on 'normal' memory distortion and a small branch of 
psychodynamical ly-informed neuroscience. 
'Combination Models' 
Following the pioneering studies of Bartlett (1932), a tradition within 
cognitive psychology focused on the constructive nature of memory. Within this 
paradigm, memories are understood as dynamic, fluid and situationally-bound 
constructions, which are influenced by the context in which they are produced 
(Conway, 1992). A number of emotional and cognitive factors render memories 
prone to distortions and misattributions (Johnson & Raye, 1998). More generally 
errors of commission are considered as defining for the nature of memory as 
errors of omission (e.g. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Christiansen, 1992; 
Gudjonsson, 1992; Johnson et al, 2000; Loflus, 1993; Ochsner & Schacter, 2000; 
Schacter, Norman & Koutstaal, 1998). 
Similarly, investigations of autobiographical memory within cognitive and 
social psychology (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Ross, 1989; Pillemer, 2001; 
Singer & Salovey, 1996; Woike, 2003) have put forward an equally dynamic 
conceptualisation of remembering. For example, in a series of studies McAdams 
(for review see McAdams, 2001), argued that individuals reconstruct the past in 
terms of an internalised and evolving self-story, a coherent narrative of self that 
weaves together diverse experiences and creates a sense of unity over time and a 
defined purpose for future action. Crucially, "these life stories are based on 
biographical facts, but they also go considerably beyond the facts as people 
selectively appropriate aspects of their experiences and imaginatively construe 
both past and future to construct stories that make sense to them and to their 
audiences, that vivify and integrate life and make it more or less meaningful" (p. 
101). 
Stemming from these traditions, certain models have proposed equally 
dynamic conceptualisation of memory distortion and falsification in neurological 
syndromes (for review Conway & Fthenaki, 2000). They suggest that memory 
following brain damage, wil l remain constructive in nature and show similar 
patterns of source misattributions, distortions, and fabrications as observed in 
normal memory distortion, albeit in an exaggerated form. Thus, confabulation 
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may he best understood as the magnification of existing 'normal' misremembering 
experiences, rather than a dysfunction of the previously flawlessly functioning 
memory system (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Johnson, 1991; Schacter et al., 1998). Moreover, the 
particular combination of preserved and impaired memory processes, wil l 
determine the exact form and content of confabulatory memories, including both 
'positive' and 'negative' features. Indeed, as also described above, some studies 
have already begun to recognise and address such complexities in the production 
of confabulation (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Johnson et 
al., 1997; Kopelman et al, 1997). For example, Kopelman and his colleagues 
(1997) concluded that frontal lobe pathology and context memory disorders are 
not sufficient to produce confabulation. Instead, factors such as a high rate of 
perserverations and a tendency to respond indiscriminately to the immediate 
social and environmental context may have some role in causing confabulation. 
However, while some of the above models have focused on the cognitive 
mechanisms of memory distortion, other emphasised both cognitive and 
emotional critical factors (Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; 
Johnson et al, 2000). For instance within the proposed source monitoring 
framework (SMF), Johnson and colleagues (for reviews see Johnson et al., 2000; 
Johnson, 2001) have recently broadened their conceptualisation of confabulation. 
They (Johnson et al, 1997) emphasised that source-monitoring deficits alone 
could not account for all the instances of confabulation in their patient, since the 
latter is based on a confluence of factors, such as source monitoring deficits, 
impoverished autobiographical memory retrieval and a propensity towards vivid 
imagination. More generally, in their model, the retrieval of memories is not 
described as a process o f search and identification of memory traces. Rather 
mental experiences and representations are attributed to memory by ongoing 
judgment processes (Johnson, 1991). In a recent review paper, Johnson (2001) 
outlined four key features of these complex attribution mechanisms, (a) They are 
depended upon the qualitative characteristics of mental experience, including 
perceptual, spatial, temporal and emotional details; (b) They are influenced by the 
embeddedness of mental experiences, i.e. the availability of supporting memories, 
the consistency with previous knowledge, and their internal consistency; (c) They 
are based on flexible criteria, which may vary according to the context in which 
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mental experiences are judged; (d) Goals, beliefs, motivational and social factors 
influence what characteristics are looked for, how much embedding occurs and 
which criteria are applied. In other words, motivational factors have a 
determining role on all three other key aspects. More generally, all these 
components are imperfect and interact in a dynamic way to produce both accurate 
and faulty attributions. Based on this framework, Johnson and colleagues (e.g. 
Johnson and Raye, 1998) proposed that deficits in one or more of these 
components wil l lead to confabulation. The nature of the latter wil l depend on the 
exact amount and combination of processes impaired and preserved. 
In a similar model, Conway and colleagues (for a review see Conway, 
2001) stressed the interdependence of motivation and autobiographical memory. 
They have conceptualised autobiographical memory as a database of information 
in the service of the 'working-self, which is conceived as a hierarchical template 
of currently active goals. The latter, in conjunction with input from the 
autobiographical memory base, sets goals, determines accessibility to 
autobiographical memory and supervises its output. Within this model, 
confabulation is regarded as resulting from a combination of preserved and 
damaged memory processes in autobiographical memory 'construction' (Conway 
& Tacchi, 1996; Conway & Fthenaki, 2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2004). 
Dysfunctional executive control processes compromise both the search in 
autobiographical memoiy and the evaluation of long-term memoiy output. Thus, 
patients are unable to distinguish between memory constructions created by the 
'current self, and the ones grounded in and constrained by autobiographical 
knowledge. As a consequence, the degree of involvement in memory construction 
of the wished-for-self (ungrounded goals and plans) is disproportionately larger 
than of the "actual" self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For example, the 
frontal patient OP, reported by Conway & Tacchi (1996) persistently maintained a 
set of plausible but confabulated memories. These rewrote the disappointments in 
familial interactions of her past into a history of successful and supportive 
intimacy with certain family members. 
From a different perspective, Solms and his colleagues (for review see 
Solms, 2000) have proposed a neuroscientiflc revisiting of old psychodynamic 
hypotheses of confabulation. More generally this approach, summarised under the 
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term 'neuro-psychoanalysis', aims to assess the validity and scope of fundamental 
psychoanalytic hypotheses using empirical neuropsychological and 
neuroscientific research. This endeavour has met with significant obstacles, 
mainly due to the scepticism of clinical and experimental neuroscience towards 
psychoanalysis, as well as the retreat of the latter into scientific isolation (see for 
discussion Solms & Turnbull, 2002). This mutual avoidance of the two fields is 
also rooted in the historical discrediting of psychoanalysis by biologically 
orientated psychiatry during the second half of the twentieth century. However, as 
misleading concepts such as the rigorous distinction between 'functional' and 
'organic' have recently become outdated, various scientific authorities have begun 
to recognise the benefits of reconciliation (e.g. Nobel-laurate Eric Kandel, 1999). 
Simultaneously, the softening of positivism within neuroscience has allowed the 
study of topics such as emotions and 'the self, on which psychoanalysis has 
traditionally focused, to gain scientific credibility (e.g. Adolphs, Tranel & 
Damasio, 2003; Ledoux, 2000; Markowitch, 2003; Panksepp, 2003). 
Confabulation has served as a particularly useful arena for this 
interdisciplinary exchange (e.g. Deluca, 2000; Fotopoulou & Conway, 2004; 
Johnson, 2000; Feinberg, 2004; Kinsbourne, 2000; 2004; Schnider, 2004; 
Turnbull, 2004b). Based on the description of a series of severely confabulating 
patients with bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions, Solms and 
colleagues (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; see also Turnbull et al., 2004b) 
proposed that the characteristics of confabulation result from the combined effect 
of executive disinhibition, disorganisation of memory recollection and the release 
of primitive mental mechanisms. This view is grounded in traditional 
psychodynamic models (Freud, 1915). In such models, mental functioning is 
conceived as dominated by mature conscious and unconscious cognitive functions 
of self-representation and organisation, termed 'ego functions', which include 
processes of inhibition, selectivity, binding, pacing, organisation and control. 
These are further conceived as built upon the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
foundations of more primitive and largely unconscious mental functions. 
According to this perspective, the latter are persisting in implicit form and under 
the dominating supervision of 'ego functions'. Nevertheless, unconscious mental 
processes continue to exert an effect on more mature cognitive operations, 
particularly when the latter are defective or simply overwhelmed. 
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Solms (2000) focused on the similarity of these primitive unconscious 
processes and the clinical characteristics of confabulation. These include tolerance 
of mutual contradiction, timelessness, attribution of internal representations or 
emotions to external sources, associative thinking, i.e. frequent superficial 
displacements and condensations of thoughts and memories. These very 
characteristics, observed directly by several neurologists and neuropsychologists 
in confabulating patients, have been also described in traditional psychodynamic 
models. However in the latter case, these characteristics had been inferred from 
psychoanalytic inquiry into psychopathological symptoms and certain everyday 
phenomena such as dreams (Freud, 1915). Based on this similarity, Solms (2000) 
proposed that in confabulating patients damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex and the resulting lack of executive control of memory recollection (a deficit 
hypothesis), leaves memory at the mercy of disproportionally powered inner 
needs and desires, with little regard for adaptive considerations (a complementary 
motivational hypothesis). 
In a recent case-report, Fotopoulou and colleagues (2004) provided 
experimental support for the above motivational hypotheses. The study 
investigated patient ES, who developed a striking confabulatory syndrome 
following removal of a meningioma in the pituitary and suprasellar region. ES's 
executive and memoiy abilities were severely compromised, and he confabulated 
continuously, spontaneously and bizarrely. Naive raters presented with 
transcriptions of his confabulations found them to represent significantly more 
pleasant experiences than their corresponding, misrepresented realities (see also 
Turnbull et al., 2004a). This finding suggested that confabulations include 
motivated (or 'wishful ' ) contents. The influence of this motivational feature of 
confabulation was considered in parallel with the memory and executive deficits 
which contributed to the occurrence of confabulation. The study concluded that a 
complex combination of damaged (poor retrieval control) and spared (emotionally 
driven retrieval) processes apparently interacted in generating false beliefs and 
memories in this patient. 
Despite this increased theoretical attention to the potential motivational 
nature of confabulation, there has been little experimental work investigating 
these issues (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 2004a). Instead the 
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motivational accounts outlined above are based mostly on anecdotal clinical 
descriptions of a few confabulating patients (e.g. Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). The present study aims to place the cognitive and 
the emotional features of confabulation under direct empirical scrutiny and to 
provide further experimental support for the above models, based on group 
investigations, albeit of a small number of severely confabulating patients. Before 
turning to the specific aims and hypotheses of the present study, it is necessary to 
consider the literature on a different form of confabulation, namely confabulation 
in relation to anosognosia for hemiplegia. This wi l l constitute an additional focus 
of the present study. 
1.5 Motor - Related Confabulation 
Confabulation is associated with a number of other neurological 
syndromes in which amnesia is not directly implicated. In the present study we 
will consider the relation of confabulation to anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) 
(Babinski, 1914). Although there might be many forms and degrees of 
unawareness, in this study the term 'anosognosia' wi l l be used to refer to 
"diminished awareness of the existence of a neuropsychological deficit i tself . 
The term 'implicit knowledge, or awareness' of deficit wil l refer to "knowledge 
that is expressed in task performance unintentionally and with little or no 
phenomenal awareness" (Schacter, 1990, p. 157). In addition, the distinction 
between unawareness of deficit itself, and unawareness of its consequences, will 
be taken into account when necessary (Schacter & Prigatano, 1991). More 
generally, the term awareness wil l be used to refer to "the running span of 
subjective experience" (Dimond, 1976, in Schacter, 1990, p .157). 
The first descriptions of AHP coincide in time with the first descriptions of 
confabulation in the Korsakoff syndrome. Von Monakow (1885), Anton (1893) 
and Pick (1898) first described patients who denied their left-sided hemiparesis 
(in Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991). In 1914 and 1918, Babinski described further 
patients and coined the terms anosognosia and anosodiaphoria. The latter referred 
to the apparent indifferent attitude certain patients show in acknowledging their 
hemiparesis. A variety of clinical and experimental reports of this relatively rare 
condition have followed (for reviews see McGlynn & Schacter, 1989; Heilman et 
al., 1998). These have showed that AHP is a complex syndrome with several 
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manifestations. While some patients appear simply unaware of their paralysis, 
their false claims may turn out to be refractory to correction and supported by a 
number of false beliefs. Even upon demonstration patients might insist the limb 
moved. In addition, they may confabulate supporting 'memories' o f recent 
activities involving their limb, or even confabulate irrelevant excuses of why the 
limb did not move, e.g. it was tired or lazy. In more extreme cases the patients 
might reject ownership of the limb (asomatognosia) and even attribute it to 
someone else. Alternatively, they might treat and address their own limb with 
apparent hostility and hatred (misoplegia) (Critchley, 1974). 
AHP is most frequently associated with right-hemisphere lesions in 
parietal, and less frequently, frontal and temporal lobe regions. Possible 
subcortical involvement, e.g. basal ganglia, thalamus, has also been noted 
(Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; Heilman et al., 1998). Beyond the limits set to 
investigation by severe aphasia, the syndrome has also been observed following 
corresponding left-sided lesions. However, this issue remains poorly investigated 
(for reviews see Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Heilman et al., 1998; Vuilleumier, 2004). The 
association of AHP and confabulation is frequently reported. Specifically, patients 
with AHP often confabulate, i.e. their confabulations support their explicit 
unawareness of their hemiparesis and they appear unaware of the inaccuracy of 
their confabulations (Babinski, 1914). Similarly, as described above, amnesic 
confabulating patients of various pathologies are typically unaware of their 
memory gaps and confabulatory tendencies (Luria, 1976; Moscovitch, 1989; 
Talland, 1961). In addition, although anosognosia for hemiplegia, like 
confabulation, is most commonly transient, less frequent chronic types have also 
been described (Berti, Lavadas, & Delia Corte, 1996; Berti, Lavadas, Stracciari, 
Giannarelli, & Ossola, 1998; Cocchini, Berschin, & Delia Sala, 2002; Gold, 
Adair, Jacobs, & Heilman, 1994; Rode, Perenin, Honore, & Boisson, 1998; 
Venneri & Shanks, 2004). Despite this co-occurrence and the common duration of 
confabulation and anosognosia, the direct relation between the two symptoms and 
their potential interdependence remains controversial (see Feinberg & Roane, 
1997b; Heilman et al., 1998 for reviews) and it has received limited systematic 
study (Feinberg et al., 1994; Lu et al., 1997; Venneri & Shanks, 2004). Finally, no 
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clear distinction exists between the two types of related confabulatory behaviour, 
i.e. memory- versus motor-related confabulation. 
Furthermore, the theoretical history of confabulation and anosognosia 
bears some similarities. Although there is no generally accepted theory of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Frith, Blakemore, & 
Wolpert, 2000; Heilman et al., 1998; Vuilleumier, 2004), the symptom has been 
explained from both motivational and neurocognitive perspectives. More 
specifically, some clinical reports have described emotional and motivational 
contributions to anosognosia and have postulated compensatory defence 
mechanisms of denial (Goldstein, 1939; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). By contrast, 
neurocognitive models have proposed single or multiple cognitive deficits to 
explain anosognosia (Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991; Frith et al., 2000; Heilman et 
al., 1998). Although experimental investigations thus far have mainly targeted 
such cognitive impairments (e.g. see Vuillemier, 2004 for discussion), little 
agreement exists even between cognitive models of anosognosia. The latter have 
implicated modular (Bisiach et al, 1990; Levine, Calvanio & Rinn, 1991), or 
centralised (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989) higher order systems capable of 
generating bodily awareness or allocating attention. Alternative cognitive models 
have explained anosognosia as a disconnected verbal response (Geshwind, 1965; 
Joseph, 1986a). In more recent hypotheses, anosognosia is thought to result from 
a lack of the intention to move and an associated perceptual mismatch (Heilman et 
al, 1998). Similarly, anosognosia has been described as the result of dysfunctional 
motor intentions and related anticipations, which in turn influence the perception 
and monitoring of motor difficulties (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002). 
Nevertheless more recently, a series of authors have argued that 
anosognosia is, like confabulation, a multi-component phenomenon, consisting of 
a number of different patterns of emotional and cognitive disturbances that are not 
likely to be explained by a single mechanism (Cocchini et al., 2002; Marcel et al., 
2004; Venneri & Shanks, 2004; Vuilleumier, 2004; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 
2000; Turnbull et al., 2005a). Thus, an integration of cognitive and motivational 
abnormalities might provide a more comprehensive understanding of at least some 
unavvareness phenomena. Flowever thus far, direct experimental investigation of 
motivational influences in anosognosia remains scarce (e.g. Marcel et al., 2004; 
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Ramachandran, 1995; Turnbull et al, 2005a). More generally, few studies have 
focused on the nature of confabulation in the context of anosognosia for 
hemiplegia. The present study aims to provide some insight into these 
complicated discussions by studying the confabulatory behaviour and the related 
anosognosic statements of right-hemisphere patients with left-sided hemiplegia. 
Furthermore, their neuropsychological profile and their performance in 
experimental investigations wil l be explicitly compared with the corresponding 
behaviour of amnesic confabulating patients. 
1.6 Main Aims & Hypotheses. 
In conclusion, significant progress has been achieved in the last hundred 
years in defining, describing and explaining confabulation in neurobehavioural 
terms, but several key issues remain unclear and controversial. By investigating a 
small number of severely confabulating patients, the present study aims to 
carefully describe the clinical manifestations of confabulation, explore its 
corresponding neuropsychological deficits and most importantly experimentally 
investigate the potential role of emotional and motivational influences. As the 
above review described, such influences have received very little systematic 
study. Thus, their relation to the cognitive deficits associated with confabulation 
remains elusive. The present study aims to experimentally assess the potential 
manifestations of such influences in confabulation, i.e. to document the 
phenomenon, as well as empirically investigate the mental and neural mechanisms 
that might contribute to such influences. 
More specifically, the first three hypotheses of the present study are 
mainly concerned with the neuroanatomical and cognitive basis of confabulation 
and are based on the 'retrieval theories' outlined above: 
1) Direct damage or functional disconnection, involving the ventromedial 
and orhitofrontal cortices, is implicated in confabulation. This hypothesis wil l be 
addressed in Chapter 2 by examining the neuropathological and neuroradiological 
findings of confabulating and non-confabulating amnesic and frontal control 
patients. 
2) Severe memory impairment commonly, but not necessarily accompanies 
confabulation and it is not sufficient for its occurrence. This hypothesis wil l be 
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addressed in Chapter 2 by assessing the performance of confabulating and non-
confabulating control patients on standardised tests of memory. 
3) Executive dysfunction is a common, hut variable component of 
confahulatory syndromes. This hypothesis wil l be addressed in Chapter 2 by 
assessing the performance of confabulating and non-confabulating amnesic and 
frontal control patients on standardised tests of executive function. 
The following four hypotheses focus on the potential motivational aspects 
of confabulation and are consistent with the 'combination models' of 
confabulation outlined above. 
4) The content of spontaneous confabulation is wishfid, i.e. it shows a 
positive emotional bias. This hypothesis wil l be addressed in Chapter 3 by 
comparing the valence of false statements produced spontaneously by 
confabulating patients and the ones induced experimentally in amnesic non-
confabulating patients and normal controls. 
5) The content of memory-related confabulation shows a positive bias, 
over and above temporal source confusions. This hypothesis wil l be addressed in 
Chapter 4 by comparing the recognition errors of confabulating and non-
confabulating amnesic patients on a temporal source memory task, which controls 
for the emotional valence of memories to be recognised. 
6) The content of confabulation is self-serving, over and above the 
memory and executive deficits that might influence memory recall. This 
hypothesis wi l l be addressed in Chapter 5 by comparing performance of 
confabulating and non-confabulating amnesic and frontal control patients on an 
emotional prose-recall experiment, which manipulates the self-reference of the 
information to be remeinbered. 
The above primary hypotheses, as well as a number of secondary 
hypotheses, e.g. the role of suggestibility and premorbid personality traits in 
colouring the content of confabulation, will be addressed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
These chapters wi l l describe in detail the neuropsychological profile and the 
confabulation characteristics of two patients; one with memory-related 
confabulation (Chapter 6) and one with motor-related confabulation (Chapter 7). 
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Chapter 2 : Patients & Their 
Neuropsychological Assessment 
2.1 Introduction 
The experimental investigations undertaken in the present thesis wil l be 
presented in the following chapters. However, before proceeding to these 
experiments, it is necessary to include a separate chapter that aims to describe the 
inclusion and classification criteria of the confabulating and control patients 
recruited in the study, as well as their demographic, neuropathologicai and 
neuropsychological characteristics. Two main hypotheses were addressed by the 
neuropsychological assessments of the present chapter. These involved the 
potential association of confabulation with amnesia and with executive functions 
impairment. Finally, a third hypothesis was addressed by the neuroradiological 
and neuropathological data presented in this chapter. This concerned the potential 
association of confabulation with lesions in the OMPFC and associated areas (see 
Chapter 1 for discussion of these hypotheses). 
2.2 Participants 
Twenty three neurological patients in total participated in the study. These 
included 17 in- and out-patients o f Newcastle General Hospital, and six in- and 
out-patients of Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, SA. The patients were 
selected from a large, mixed group of brain-damaged patients according to the 
inclusion criteria described below, the availability of collaborating carers and the 
availability of satisfactory medical files. These were the only patients observed 
over a period of 21 months who met these criteria and who agreed to participate in 
the study. Another eleven patients (two with indications of confabulation, four 
with indications of severe memory problems and Ave with indication of executive 
functions problems) were invited to participate in the study but they refused (four 
patients), or medical and time-restrictions on their part prevented them from 
participating (seven patients). Data reported for each patient were gathered within 
20 - 45 days. Neurologically intact individuals were also tested as control 
participants in each experiment. Their demographic characteristics and 
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performance are reported in the corresponding chapters below. Al l subjects gave 
written informed consent. The study was approved by the local NHS Trust and the 
University of Durham's Ethical Committee. 
2.3 Confabulation Recruitment Criteria 
Thirteen confabulating patients in total participated in the study. These 
were in- and out-patients of Newcastle General Hospital (nine patients), or in- and 
out-patients of Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, SA (four patients). Most 
patients were hospitalised at the time of assessment and remained hospitalised 
until the end of the study. The three patients who were not hospitalised were 
living under residential 24-hour care. In each case, substantial care was taken to 
ensure as undisturbed a testing environment as possible. Patients were recruited i f 
they met the following recruitment criteria: 
General Inclusion Criteria: 
(a) Adults with confirmed diagnosis of brain pathology. 
(b) Indication of confabulation as described by carers, medical files or by the 
referring consultant. 
(c) Available neuroimaging examination (CT or MRI head scan). 
General Exclusion Criteria: 
(a) Less than seven years of education, or an estimated premorbid Full Scale 
Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) based on the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading 
(WTAR) less than 70. 
(b) Severe impairments in language (unsatisfactory communication). 
(c) Presence of a delirium or acute confusional state (forward digit span < 5, 
abnormal sleep-wake circle, see also Schnider et al., 1996). 
(d) Previous psychiatric history, other than Korsakoff s psychosis. 
(e) Presence of dementia, or other degenerative brain conditions. 
( f ) Current medication with known effects on mood or cognition. 
2.4 Ciassification: Confabulating Versus Control Patients 
The classification of confabulation has been a source of difficulty for 
previous studies and has necessitated the establishment of arbitral^ qualitative or 
quantitative criteria (see DeLuca, 2000; Hirstein, 2004; Schnider et al., 1996 for 
discussions). Specific issues of difficulty are (i) the observed dissociations 
between the presence of confabulation in neuropsychological assessment and in 
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everyday situations (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Papagno & Muggia, 1996); (ii) the 
presence of confabulation in different neurological syndromes, e.g. patients with 
aneurysms of the ACoA and patients with right-hemisphere syndrome; (i i i) the 
complications involved in identifying and quantifying reliably the presence of 
'spontaneous', i.e. experimentally un-triggered, versus provoked confabulation 
(e.g. Cunningham et al., 1997; Fisher et al.,1995; Kern et al., 1992; Kopelman, 
1987; Schnider et al., 1996; see also Chapter 1); (iv) finally the previous use of 
single dichotomous and arbitrary distinctions of confabulatory types, which 
compile different, and possibly dissociable, qualitative labels (e.g. 'momentary' 
versus 'fantastic'; Berlyne, 1972; see also Chapter 1). 
2.4.1 Classification Interview 
In the present study, a preliminary unstructured interview was conducted 
with each patient and his relatives in order to verify the presence and nature of 
confabulation. Caring staff and medical files were also consulted. Questions of 
interest included patients' personal and medical history, current medication, 
premorbid personality traits, professional and personal habits and attitudes, 
current personality changes, orientation, memory and executive functions 
abilities, as well as confabulation examples. During the preliminary interview, 
patients were also asked to recall the prose material of the Logical Memory 
Wechsler Memory Scale -3'^ '' Edition subtest (see below). 
2.4.2 Scoring 
In order to classify confabulating patients a set of behavioural criteria was 
applied to the information collected by the interview. These criteria did not 
attempt to quantify confabulations, as in some previous studies (e.g. Kopelman, 
1987; Kern et al., 1992; Cunningham et al., 1997). Instead, the use of these 
criteria allowed the qualitative description of confabulatory behaviours. Each 
patient's overall confabulatory behaviour was rated on a number of scales. The 
extreme points of these scales were based on descriptions of 'extreme' forms of 
confabulation as previously noted in the literature and in their 'opposite' milder 
forms (Berlyne, 1972; Bonhoeffer, 1901; Damasio et al., 1985; Kopelman, 1987; 
Schnider et al., 1996; Talland, 1961; Stuss et al., 1978). The five-point scales 
included measurements of: 
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I . Confabulation Frequency: Rare (1) - Dominant (5) 
Dominance was defined as: Confabulations were dominating the patient's speecii during 
unstructured interviewing, and/or similar observations of confabulation dominance were noted by 
relatives or professionals in the everyday management of the patient, and/or the tendency to 
confabulate constantly and unselectively was noted during the prose recall testing. 
I I . Confabulation Plausibility: Plausible (1) - Bizarre (5) 
Bizarreness was defined as: The patient produced 'bizarre autobiographical memories' 
(unrealistic or, non-logically valid events, e.g. a 46-year old lawyer stated: "I was brought into the 
hospital to join their rugby team. I threw the ball backwards last WK but they won't let me go") 
during unstructured interviewing, and/or the patient produced 'bizarre autobiographical memories' 
in everyday life contexts, and/or the patient produced 'bizarre intrusions' (intrusion of impossible 
events or details of non-logical implications) in the LiVI subtest of the Wi\4S-lll investigation 
(immediate or delayed recall). 
I I I . Confabulation Novelty: Distortion ( ] ) - Fabrication (5) 
Fabrication was defined as: The patient produced 'autobiographical memory fabrications' (events 
apparently and according to relatives unrelated to his/her life, e.g. "I had lunch with G. Bush last 
week") during unstructured interviewing, and/or the patient produced 'autobiographical memory 
fabrications' in everyday life contexts, and/or the patient produced 'fabrications' (intrusion of 
categorically, semantically and phonemically unrelated infomiation; see Cunningham et al., 1997) 
in the LM subtest of the WMS-III investigation (immediate or delayed recall). 
IV. Confabulation Conviction: Non-Acted Upon (1) - Acted-Upon (5) 
Actinq-Upon was defined as: The patient appeared convinced about the truthfulness of his claims 
to the point that he acted according to his confabulations (Schnider et al., 1996) during 
unstructured interviewing, and/or in everyday life contexts (e.g. a patient tried in vain to find the 
way to the second floor. He was in a single-floor building. He was convinced beyond persuasion 
that his wife was waiting for him upstairs with his favourite meal). 
V. Confabulation Production: Mode: Provoked (1) - Spontaneous (5) 
Spontaneity was defined as: The patient produced apparently spontaneous confabulations (i.e. 
unprovoked by apparent environmental cues; see also Kopelman, 1987) during unstructured 
interviewing (e.g. During the first meeting and without any verbal probe from the examiner a 
patient started nan'ating how he had lunch that day with an alleged close friend of the examiner) 
and/or during formal assessment, and/ in everyday life contexts. 
These qualitative criteria were used to establish the presence of 
confabulation and to characterise its nature. An arbitraiy criterion of confabulation 
severity was established in order to distinguish between confabulating and non-
confabulating patients, who nevertheless might produce memory errors during 
testing or in everyday life. Patients were classified as confabulating i f they were 
rated as equal or above the scale's middle point (> 3) in one or more of the above 
dimensions. 
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Given the specialised knowledge required for these ratings, as well as the 
necessary acquired familiarity with each patient, the examiner was the sole rater. 
Although this decreased the reliability of the rating, every possible effort was 
made to consult relatives and professionals and ensure their perspectives were 
taken into consideration. Four clinicians, familiar with the patients, were also 
consulted for their clinical impressions on their confabulatory behaviour. These 
were clinical neuropsychologists, Dr. Pippa Griffiths and Dr. Shannaz Awan, who 
were directly involved in the management of the British patients, clinical 
neuropsychologist Prof Solms, who examined the South African patients and 
consultant physician Dr. Tim Cassidy, who was the head of the clinical stroke 
service in Newcastle General Hospital. 
2.4.3 Results 
Thirteen patients met the above classification criterion, and formed the 
'Confabulation Group' of the study. Their confabulation ratings are shown in 
Table 2-1 below (see Appendix A2 for individual ratings). 
Table 2-1. Confabulation Ratings of the Confabulation Group 
Group Frequency Plausibility Novelty Conviction Production Mode 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Confabulation 
Controls 
4.1 (0.8) 
1 
4.4 (0.7) 
1 
4.6( 0.5) 
1.5( 0.6) 
4.5(0.5) 
1.2 (0.5) 
4,5 (0.7) 
1 
Note. Higher scores indicate more severe contabuiatory beliaviour 
Among the referred cases only one patient (patient A l ) did not meet such 
criterion and he was classified as a non-confabulating control amnesic patient (see 
below). During the initial weeks post-injury he was severely confused, but at the 
time of assessment (eight months post-injury) he showed only occasional and 
non-severe memory errors. This observation was also confirmed by relatives, 
caring staff and medical notes and by the fact that the patient was living 
independently, under the care of his partner, at the time of assessment. By 
contrast, the 13 confabulating patients, were still hospitalised or living under 24-
hour care at the time of their assessment. The severity of each patient's 
confabulation was also explicitly confirmed by relatives and caring staff and was 
consistent with medical notes. 
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2.5 Confabulation Group 
The demographic and the neuropathological characteristics of the 
confabulation group are presented in Table 2-2 below. 
Table 2-2. Demographic and Neuropathological Characteristics of the 
Confabulation Group 
Patient/ 
Sex Age Educ. Profession Months Lesion Lesion Locus Pathology Subgroup 
Years From onset U/B Kind Lesion 
LH/M 60 9 Salesman 4 B SAH F ACoA CI 
RM/M 19 11 Window Fitter 6 B SAH FT TBI C1 
OT/M 41 9 Salesman 9 B SAH F ACoA CI 
BA/M 46 15 Lawyer 8 B Hypoxia Gen atrophy/ L F Ml CI 
MS/M 55 15 Lawyer 2 B Diffuse 
Gen atrophy/ 
R T contusion 
TBI CI 
IR/F 45 9 Household 3 B SAH F ACoA CI 
PT/M 64 17 Veterinary Surgeon 8 B SAH F Basal Cistern CI 
WM/M 56 11 Upholsterer 12 B ETOH/I Gen/RF Alch.Korsakoff C2 
FM/M 71 9 Builder 240 B ETOH Gen atrophy Alch.Korsakoff C2 
CM/F 67 11 Hairdresser 246 B ETOH Gen atrophy Alch. Korsakoff C2 
AO/F 87 11 Civil Clerk 24 U 1 R ic (ACA) CVA C3 
DO/F 71 14 Teacher 5 U 1 R (MCA) CVA C3 
JO/M 73 9 Football Coach 3 U H R In (MCA) CVA C3 
Mean 58.7 11.53 
SD 17.46 2.78 
43.8 
88.57 
Note. Lesion: U = Unilateral, B = Bilateral; Lesion Kind: I = Ischaemic, H = Haemorragic, 
SAH = Subarachnoid Haemorrhage, ETOH = Ethanol; Locus: F = Frontal, P = Parietal, T = 
Temporal, nb = Basal Ganglia, ci = Internal Capsula, In = Lentiforni Nucleus, R = Right, L = 
Left, ACA = Anterior Cerebral Artery Territory, MCA = Middle Cerebral Artery Territory; 
Pathology: ACoA = Aneurysm of the Anterior Communicating Artery, CVA = 
Cerebrovascular Accident, Alch. Korsakoff = Chronic Alchoholic Korsakoff Syndrome, TBI 
= Traumatic Brain Injury, Ml = Myocardial infraction; Classification: Subgroup CI = patients 
with bilateral or diffuse lesions meeting confabulation criteria. Subgroup C2 = Korsakoffs 
patients with bilateral or diffuse lesions meeting confabulation criteria; Subgroup 3 = Right 
hemisphere patients meeting confabulation criteria. All patients were right handed except 
patient RM. 
Nine confabulating patients were British citizens, while the three 
Korsakoff patients and patient MS were Caucasian, English-speaking South 
Africans, tested in Groote Schuur Hospital, Cape Town. Nine patients were male 
and four were female and all patients, except patient RM, were right-handed. 
Neuroradiological reports and copies of the original CT or MRI scans were 
available for all confabulating patients, except patient CM, for whom only a report 
was available. Dr. Daniel Birchall, neuroradiologist at Newcastle General 
Hospital was consulted for the analysis of the brain scans. Given that these 
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confabulating patients showed distinct neuropathologies they were divided into 
confabulation subgroups based on neuropathological findings. The behavioural, 
neuropsychological and experimental investigations of the study took into account 
the potential differences between these subgroups. These subgroups are presented 
in turn below. 
2.5.1 Confabulation Subgroups: Neuropathological Characteristicss 
/ " Subgroup: Bilateral Patients 
Medical History 
Seven patients with bilateral prefrontal cortex lesions, as detected in CT or 
MRI scans or as inferred from their neuropathologies (See Table 2-2 above), 
formed the first confabulation subgroup (hereafter referred to as CI ) . Five of these 
patients had suffered subarachnoid haemorrhages (SAH). In patient RM this was 
caused by a road traffic accident (see Case Report 1 in Appendix A3). Three 
patients (LH, OT and IR) had ruptured and operated aneurysms of the anterior 
communicating artery (ACoA). Patients LH and IR underwent left fronto-
temporal craniotomy and clipping of aneurysm. In patient LH, haemorrhage was 
also seen in the medial right frontal lobe (see also Chapter 6). Patient OT had a re-
current saccular aneurysm at the junction of the A l segments of the right anterior 
cerebral artery with the anterior communicating artery. He had a coil 
embolisation. The fifth patient had a lumbo-peritoneal shunt inserted, following a 
basal cistern SAH, complicated by hydrocephalus and by a secondaiy 
interventricular haemorrhage. Al l these patients had detectable lesions in the 
orbital or and medial area of the prefrontal cortex bilaterally. The ACoA patients 
could have also sustained damage to the basal forebrain but this was not 
detectable on CT scans, as the artifact from the nearby surgical clip obscured the 
areas of interest (see also Alexander & Freedman, 1984; Deluca, 1993). Patient 
MS was involved in a high-velocity road traffic accident and sustained a severe 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) leaving him in a coma for one week. He remained in 
an acute confusional state for approximately another two weeks. His radiological 
investigations upon admission revealed a diffuse picture comprising widespread 
generalised atrophy, with right temporal lobe contusion. Patient BA suffered 
hypoxia, secondary to myocardial infarction. His CT examinations revealed 
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generalised atrophy and an area of marked low density in the posterior left frontal 
region. 
Summary of Lesion Localisation 
Five of the seven patients (patients LH, RM, OT, IR, and PT) had 
detectable lesions in the medial and orbital area of the prefrontal cortex bilaterally, 
and two (patients RM and MS) also showed indications of additional detectable 
damage to the medial temporal-lobe structures. Thus, not all patients had focal 
lesions and lesion localisation, based on available CT or MRI scans, was not 
equally precise across patients. However, the confirmed and the pathology-
deferred lesions were consistent with that reported by other investigators to be 
associated with confabulation (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Deluca & Diamond, 
1995; Fisher et al., 1995; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Luria, 1976; Moscovitch & 
Melo, 1997; Schnider, 2003; Shapiro et al., 1981; Stuss et al., 1978). This issue is 
further addressed in the discussion section below. 
Clinical Progress 
All of these patients were in-patients at the time of the assessment, 
undergoing rehabilitation following brain injury and requiring 24-hour care. Their 
confabulation, cognitive and behavioural changes were evident to staff and 
relatives and a source of difficulty in their management. Al l patients had 
undergone a period of acute confusional state and as they emerged from it their 
severe amnesia and persisting confabulation had become apparent. Telephone 
communications and visits three to six months following the end of the study 
provided some brief information about their progress. Al l patients were 
discharged to their homes under the full-time care of relatives and professional, 
except patient OT who was transferred to a 24-care nursing home. Information on 
his confabulation state was not available. The same applied to patients MS and 
BA, who were still severely confabulating when discharged, one month following 
the completion of the study. Confabulation was reported as minimised in all other 
patients and as present only in the 'provoked' form and in situations of over-
stimulation or anxiety. Patient RM was the only patient able to live independently 
and to find paid employment, although he still faced everyday memory 
difficulties. 
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2"'' Subgroup: Korsakoff Patients 
Medical History & Clinical Progress 
Given the distinct pathology and the chronic nature of the three Korsakoff 
patients recruited (see above Table 2-2) they were considered a subgroup of the 
confabulation group and examined separately when necessary (hereafter referred 
to as C2 Group). Al l three patients had a history of heavy and prolonged alcohol 
abuse over a period of mean duration of 18 years (range 16 to 26 years). Al l three 
patients were hospitalised and treated soon after (maximum three weeks) an acute 
episode of disorientation, confusion, and marked confabulation. In patient FM this 
was also accompanied by ataxia. Patients CM and FM were in a 'dry' period for 
about 20 years, since their initial hospitalisation. They were still severely affected 
by their mental disorder and were unable to live independently (see Appendix A3 
for a case description). 
Patient W M was temporarily admitted to the hospital one year previously 
following an acute episode of disorientation and confabulation. He was equally 
incapacitated and was living under the 24-hour care of his sister. His more recent 
admission was initiated by the latter who found it increasingly difficult to cope 
with his care. According to his relatives, W M had not abused alcohol in the last 
year, but his exact consumption prior to this period was less clear. Two months 
following the study his relatives reported his mental and physical condition was 
unchanged. The same applied to the other two hospitalised patients. It should be 
noted that given that two of these patients were first treated 15 to 20 years prior to 
the study, it was impossible to verify with certainty the circumstances of their 
illness prior to admission, other than what was reported by hospital files and 
relatives' accounts, it thus remains possible that their severe confabulatory state 
relates to insufficient initial treatment of their disease. 
Lesion Localisation 
The CT scans of all three patients demonstrated indications of generalised 
cortical atrophy involving the frontal regions bilaterally, as well as indications of 
peri-ventricular white matter density changes. No focal lesions were noted, 
although in the CT of patient W M low density was most marked in the right 
frontal region. Although these findings are not informative with respect to the 
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exact localisation of brain structures responsible for confabulatory behaviour they 
were consistent with the literature on the characteristic neuropathology of the 
'Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome. The latter is thought to involve neuronal loss, 
micro-haemorrhages and gliosis in the paraventricular and peri-aqueductal grey 
matter (Victor et al., 1971), particularly in certain diencephalic and frontal 
structures (see Kopelman, 2002 for review). This issue is further addressed in the 
discussion section below. 
3rd Subgroup: Unilateral Patients 
Medical History & Clinical Progress 
Three patients of the confabulation group had exclusively right-
hemisphere lesions following stroke. These patients showed classic right parietal 
symptoms, such as left-sided neglect and left-sided hemiplegia, for which they 
were anosognosic (see case report in Appendix A3). Given their unilateral lesions, 
these patients were considered a subgroup of the confabulation group and 
examined separately when necessary (hereafter referred to as C3 Group). JO and 
DO were tested three and five months following their strokes, respectively (see 
Table 2-2 above). On the contrary, AO was tested two years post-onset. Three 
months following the completion of the study the contacted relatives and staff 
members reported that the mental condition of AO and DO was unchanged. JO's 
confabulation was noted to be reduced and more plausible. Al l three patients 
required 24-hour care. 
Lesion Localisation 
The lesions of the patients of this subgroup involved the territories of the 
anterior and middle cerebral arteries. Affected areas in DO's presentation included 
anterior and lateral regions of the right temporal lobe, posterior regions of the 
right frontal lobes and anterior regions of the right parietal lobe. .lO's CT scans 
demonstrated an acute lacunar haematoma in the right lentiform nucleus and AO's 
CT scan detected only a small lesion in the right internal capsule (see also 
Schnideretal., 1996). 
In summary the confabulation group included three distinct subgroups, CI 
patients with bilateral lesions, excluding Korsakoff patients; C2 the Korsakoff 
patients group; and C3 the unilateral, right-hemisphere confabulation group. 
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Groups CI and C2 included patients with bilateral lesions and thus together they 
formed the Bilateral Confabulation Group (BC) of the study. Figure 2-1 below 
depicts the schematic representation of these groups. 
Confabulation Group (C) 
(N = 13) 
Confabulating Patients 
Bilateral Confabulation Group Unilateral Confabulation 
(BC = C1 + C2) 
Patients with bilateral lesions (N = 10) 
C2 
Group 
C3 
C1 
I 
Patients with bilateral lesions, | j Patients with Alcoholic Right-hemisphere patients 
excluding Korsakoff's patients Korsakoffs syndrome (N = 3) 
(N = 7) I (N = 3) 
Figure 2-1. Schematic Representation of Confabulation Subgroups 
2.5.2 Demographic Characteristics 
Differences between the three confabulation subgroups on (i) age, 
measured in years, ( i i ) education, measured in years and (ii i) time lapse from 
onset, measured in months were analysed. Given the groups' small and unequal 
number of patients, non-parametric tests were used to analyse these differences. 
The critical level of significance was set at .05 for ail analyses (see below for 
justification). The three subgroups differed in age, x- (2) = 8.4, p < .05. They also 
showed non-significant differences in their time lapses from onset, (2) = 5.7, p 
= .06. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests revealed that the patients of the C3 
subgroup were significantly older on average than the patients of the CI group, Z 
= 2.3, p < .05. Mean age of the C1 group was 47.1 (SD = 14.1), while mean age 
of the C3 subgroup was 77 (SD = 8.7). The CI differed froiTi the C2 subgroup on 
the average amount of months elapsed from onset, Z = 2.4, p < .05. In the CI 
subgroup mean number of months-from-onset was 5.7 (SD = 2.8), while in the C2 
group mean number of months-from-onset was 166 (SD = 133.4). These 
differences were taken into account in the following experimental investigations. 
There was no other significant difference on demographic characteristics between 
these confabulation subgroups (See Table 2-4 below for mean scores). 
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2.5.3 Qualitative Confabulation Ratings 
Table 2-3 below presents the mean ratings of confabulation quality in each 
subgroup. 
Table 2-3. Ratings of Qualitative Confabulation Characteristics 
Group Frequency Plausibility Novelty Conviction Production Mode 
Total 
Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Confabulation 4.1 (0.8) 4.4 (0.7) 4.6( 0.5) 4.5(0,5) 4,5 (0,7) 4.4 (0.6) 
Subgroup 1 - 01 
Subgroup 2-02 
Subgroup 3-03 
4.6(.5) 
4 
3(0)* 
4.3(.5) 
4.3(1.2) 
4.6(0.5) 
4.9 (0.3) 
4* 
4,7 (0.6) 
4,4 (0.5) 
4.7 (0,6) 
4,7(0,6) 
4,9 (0,4) 
3.3 (0.6)* 
4.7 (0.6) 
4.6 (0.4) 
4.1 (1.3) 
4.3 (0.5) 
Controls 1 1 1,5( 0,6) 1,2(0.5) 1 1.1 (0.2) 
Note. Higher scores indicate more severe confabulatory behaviour *Significant differences between the 
confabulation subgroups at p < .05 
Although all confabulating patients showed severe forms of confabulation, 
the statistical association, analysed using Pearson's correlation, between their 
ratings on the above qualitative criteria revealed only one significant correlation. 
More specifically, confabulation Novelty was found to correlate with Production 
Mode, /• = .1, p < .01. This finding suggests that possible dissociations may exist 
between different forms of confabulation. In this study, qualitative differences in 
confabulation were examined between three confabulation subgroups, as divided 
based on neuropathological data. Given the small and unequal number of patients 
in the confabulation subgroups, these differences were analysed using non-
parametric statistics, Kruskal-Wallis tests. The critical level of significance was 
set at .05 for all analyses (see below for justification). The groups differed 
significantly on ratings of frequency, (2) = 8.7, p < .05, novelty, (2) = 6,p< 
.05, and production mode, x^ (2) = 7.6, p < .05. Post hoc Mann-Whitney tests 
revealed that the CI differed from the C2 subgroup on ratings of novelty, Z = 2.4, 
p < 05, and production mode, Z = 2.5, p < 05, while the CI differed from C3 on 
ratings of frequency, Z = 2.5, p < 05. No other difference between the subgroups 
was significant. The qualitative character of the confabulations of each subgroup 
is briefly described below. 
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Confabulation Quality in the CI Subgroup 
These patients showed on average the highest score on qualitative criteria 
of confabulation (see Table 2-3 above), and scored lower than the other subgroups 
only on ratings of conviction. These patients confabulated constantly and both 
their verbal output and their behaviour appeared totally contaminated by their 
false memories. Although their confabulations were occasionally unrealistic or 
even illogical, did not always take the form of strenuously believed claims. 
Hence, this subgroup scored lower than other groups on measures of 
confabulation conviction (see Table 2-3 above). Often they accepted their errors 
but showed utter indifference for both their implausible claims and the counter 
evidence. In other occasions they gave the momentary impression of trying to 
correct their mistakes only to relapse in alternative confabulations in a few 
seconds. More generally, although they would defend their confabulations i f 
challenged, they gave the impression of not remembering their own false 
memories, of being easily sidetracked from what they intended to remember and 
of constantly engaging in chaotic thought processes and poorly organised memory 
searches. For more details see exemplary case-report in Appendix A3. Although 
this finding, i.e. their lower ratings in confabulatory conviction than in other 
confabulation measures, was not significant in the present study, future work 
could ascertain whether this is a dissociable feature of this type of extreme 
confabulation. 
Confabulation Quality in the C2 Subgroup 
The confabulatory behaviour of this group was equally striking as that of 
the CI subgroup in that their confabulations were frequent, often bizarre in 
content, and defended with actions. For example, patient W M , who confabulated 
recent events involving his interactions with his mother, would frequently leave 
his residence without permission only to be found several days later wandering in 
the location of his mother's former house. The latter had died more than 10 years 
previously and the house was occupied by different owners who were often 
confronted by WM and treated like intruders (see also Chapters 1 and 8). 
However, these patients appeared to produce confabulations mainly when asked 
memory questions and mainly regarding certain self-relevant issues, e.g. their 
character, their close relatives, their profession, their pre- and post-morbid 
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abilities. Hence, these patients scored significantly lower than the other bilateral 
confabulating patients (CI subgroup) on measures of confabulation Frequency 
and Production Mode (see above). In addition, these patients gave the impression 
of remembering their own false memories and of having progressively created a 
set of consistent, almost delusional, set of false beliefs by which they described 
and apparently experienced their self-identity. This was often depicted in a 
grandiose manner. For more details see exemplary case report in Appendix A3. 
Finally, it should be stressed that the patients of this group were assessed while in 
the chronic stage of their disease, and thus generalisations about these qualitative 
characteristics should take this factor into consideration (see below). 
Confabulation Quality in the C3 Subgroup 
The confabulatory behaviour of these patients presented some qualitative 
differences from the one of the other subgroups. Their memory was not 
dominated by confabulation during interviewing or, in everyday settings. Instead, 
during initial interviewing they presented as cognitively intact. Only occasionally 
and when issues relating to their whereabouts, their disabilities and their 
pathology where discussed, they showed extreme confabulation which extended 
to their autobiographical memory, could be bizarre and novel in content and was 
strenuously defended. Hence these patients received significantly lower ratings of 
confabulation Frequency than the other confabulation subgroups (see above). 
Moreover, these right hemisphere patients did not show 'fabrication' in the L M 
subtest of the WMS-III , while the patients of the CI and C2 confabulation 
subgroups did. The right-hemisphere patients produced only distortions and 
source misattributions during the task, similarly to the control participants. For 
more details see the corresponding case-report in Appendix A3. 
2.6 Control Groups 
The two deficits most commonly associated with confabulation in 
previous studies are memory and executive functions impairment (for reviews see 
Deluca, 2000; Hirstein, 2004; Johnson et al., 2000; see also Chapter 1). Thus, 
patients with indications of amnesia or dysexecutive syndrome were also recruited 
to the study. The first 10 consecutive patients with lesions involving the prefrontal 
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cortex, medial temporal lobe cortex or diencephalic areas, who did not meet the 
above general exclusion criteria (see list above) or confabulation criteria (ratings 
< 3) and who agreed to participate in the study were recruited as control 
participants. These were further classified into amnesic and frontal control groups 
based on neuropsychological investigations (see below). The demographic 
characteristics of these control groups are presented in Table 2-4 below. These 
characteristics, as well as their neuropathological and clinical characteristics of 
these groups are presented in turn below. 
Table 2-4. Demographic Characteristics by Group 
Group Age In Years Education in Months from 
Years Onset 
Confabulation Groups M SD M SD M SD 
Total 58.7 17.5 11.5 2.8 43.8 88.6 
C1 47.1 14.1 12.1 3.4 5.7 2.8 
C2 64.7 7.8 10.3 1.15 166 133.4 
C3 77 87 11.3 2.5 107 11.6 
Control Groups 
Frontal 52 22 12.4 17 7,1 7.5 
Amnesic 44.3 19 10.7 2 6.3 2 
2.6.1 Amnesic Control Group 
Recruitment 
Neurological patients with lesions in diencephalic and medial temporal 
lobe structures and indications of amnesia were classified as 'amnesic' control 
patients. In previous studies of confabulation the degree of memoiy impairment 
has been classified on the basis of verbal memory performance in anterograde 
memory tasks (e.g. Schnider et al., 1996). This approach fails to take into account 
the visual anterograde memory component of amnesia, which has been implicated 
in confabulation studies (e.g. Demery, Hanlon & Bauer, 2001) and may lead to 
variability within and between groups. Thus, for the purposes of this study, 
amnesic patients were selected on the following criterion: a score of > 2 SD below 
the mean on the WMS-l l I Auditory Delayed Memory Index Score, as well as on 
the corresponding Visual Delayed Memory Index Score (Scores < 69). 
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The selected patients were the first three consecutive patients observed 
who agreed to participate in the study, met the above criteria for amnesia and did 
not meet any of the criteria for confabulation described above. Instead, these 
patients showed only occasional, provoked and selective confabulation, which 
often took the form of distortions in memory tests or easily reversible confusion in 
everyday life (see Table 2-3 above). Another four amnesic patients were invited to 
participate in this study but two of them refused and two discontinued the study 
following medical complications. Although this sample is small (N = 3), it was 
decided to include these patients in the experimental investigafions and compare 
their perforinance with the other larger experimental groups using non-parametric 
statistics which are appropriate for testing small and unequal samples. In addition, 
this small sample warranted limited generalisation and this was taken into 
consideration in the interpretation of the experimental findings. 
Neuropathological Data 
The lesions of the patients of this group, caused by stroke, meningitis and 
traumatic head injury, involved mainly bilateral regions of the thalamus, 
hippocampus and medial temporal lobes. The pre-operative CT examination of 
patient A l showed acute parfalcine subdural haemorrhage, blood in third ventricle 
and associated contusions involving areas of the frontal and occipital lobes (post-
operative scans were not available). The patient was initially confused, but during 
the assessment period, eight months post-injury, he was fully alert and 
cooperative. MRI structural iinaging of patient A2 demonstrated bilateral 
infarction of the hippocampi and peri-hippocampul gyris in addition to posterior 
thalamic infarctions. Patient A3 showed bithalamic and cerebellar infarcts on MRI 
examination. These findings are summarised in Table 2-5 below. 
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Table 2-5. Characteristics of the Amnesic Control Patients 
Patient/ 
Sex Age Educ. Profes. Months Lesion Lesion Locus Pathology Confab Group 
Years From onsel U/B Kind Type 
A1/M 45 9 Builder 8 B H F,0 TBI No A control 
A2/M 63 10 Joiner 7 B 1 Hipp.Th CVA No A control 
A3/F 25 13 Chef 4 B 1 Th.Cer Meningitis No A control 
Mean 
SD 
44.33 10.66 
19 2.08 
6.33 
2.08 
Note. Lesion: U = Unilateral, B = Bilateral; Lesion Kind: 1 = Ischaemic, H = Haeniorrhagic; Locus: F = 
Frontal, P = Parietal, T = Temporal, O = Occipital Lobe, Mipp = Hippocampal region, Th = Thalamus, 
Cer = Cerebellum, R = Right, L = Left; Pathology: C V A = Cerebrovascular Accident, T B I = Traumatic 
Brain Injury; Classification: A Control = Control Group of amnesic, non confabulating patients. All 
patients were right handed. 
Demographic Data 
One patient was female and two were male and all were right-handed. 
Mean age was 44.3 (SD = 19), mean years of education were 10.7 (SD = 2) and 
mean number of months from onset was 3.6 (SD = 1.5) (see Table 2-5 above). 
These demographic characteristics differed from the confabulation group in that 
amnesic non-confabulating patients were younger on average than the 
confabulation group and much younger on average than the C2 and C3 
confabulation subgroups. However, non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests revealed 
that these differences were not significant. The only difference in age that 
approached significant levels was between the C3 subgroup and the amnesic 
group, Z = 1.9, p = .05. In addition, less time had elapsed from the onset of 
neuropathology when the amnesic patients were tested then when the above 
confabulation groups were tested (see also Table 2-4 above). Non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney tests revealed that these differences were not significant. The only 
difference that approached significant levels was between the C2 subgroup and 
the amnesic patients, Z = 1.9, j C = .05. Given the small samples of the study these 
differences, although not significant, were taken into account in the experimental 
comparisons of the following chapters. 
Clinical Progress 
Patient A3 was assessed in hospital during a rehabilitation phase, while 
patients A l and A2 had just return to their homes under the care of their partners. 
They both made substantia! progress in orientation and learning in the following 
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two months but they remained severely amnesic. Patient A3 also eventually 
returned home, although she too had to be substantially supported by her relatives, 
as her memory abilities remained very poor. 
2.6.2 Frontal Control Group 
Recruitment 
Neurological patients with indications of frontal lobe damage were also 
recruited as 'frontal' control patients. The selected patients were the first seven 
consecutive patients seen, who agreed to take part in the study, showed 
indications of frontal lobe lesions and performed accordingly in tests of executive 
functions, such as the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System Battery (D-KEFS, 
2001). These patients did not meet any of the confabulation or amnesia 
classification criteria outlined above. Although these control patients did perform 
memory errors these were mainly occasional, plausible distortions, or other errors 
provoked by questioning and produced without extreme certainty by the 
participants (see Table 2-3 above). 
Neuropathological Data 
Three of the patients in the frontal group had suffered SAH following 
rupture and surgical repair of aneurysms of the ACoA. Their damage included 
bilateral frontal lesions, and possible, although not detectable, involvement of the 
basal forebrain (see above). In the case of patients F3 and F4, the frontal damage 
was more prominent on the left than on the right. Patient F3 was tested two years 
following her operation while the rest of the patients in this group were tested 
within 6 months of onset. Two patients (F5 and F6) showed predominately right 
hemisphere lesions, mostly affecting fronto-parietal regions, caused by anterior 
circulation strokes. These patients also showed left-sided motor impairments and 
left-sided visuospatial neglect. Finally, two patients (Fl and F7) suffered severe 
traumatic brain injuries (TBI) following motor accidents and were recruited and 
tested in Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. Both of them were 
in coma for seven and four days respectively and patient F7 underwent surgery. 
CT examination of patient Fl upon admission demonstrated soft tissue swelling 
overlying the left frontal region and possible fracture of the left frontal bone. 
Findings of the post-surgery CT scans of patient F7 revealed depressed skull 
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fracture of the left frontal bone with contusion of the underlying left frontal lobe 
and mild dilatation of the temporal horn of the right lateral ventricle. Both patients 
were assessed three months post-injury, when their initial confusion and post-
traumatic amnesia had cleared. However, during interviewing both patients 
showed signs of frontal lobe damage, including distractability, naming difficulties, 
inappropriateness, blunt affect and disinhibition (see below for formal assessment 
scores). The neuropathological and demographic characteristics of this group are 
summarised in Table 2-6 below. 
Table 2-6. Characteristics of Frontal Control Patients 
Patient/ 
Sex Age Educ, Job Months Lesion Lesion Locus Pathology Confab Group 
Years From onset U/B Kind Type 
F1/M 19 13 Student 3 B Contusion LF.bg TBI No F control 
F2/F 55 13 Teacher 6 B SAH FT AcoA No F control 
F3/F 61 9 Clerk 24 B SAH FT AcoA No F control 
F4/M 70 14 Salesman 5 B SAH FT AcoA No F control 
F5/F 59 12 Musician 5 U H RF,P CVA No F control 
F6/M 76 12 Mechanic 4 U 1 RF,P CVA No F control 
F7/M 24 14 IT consultant 3 B Contusion IF TBI No F control 
Mean 
SD 
52 
22 
12.4 
1.7 
7.1 
7.5 
Note. Lesion: U = Unilateral, B = Bilateral; Lesion Kind: SAH = Subarachnoid Haemorrhage, 
I = Ischaemic, H = Haemorrhagic; Locus: F = Frontal, T = Temporal, bg = Basal Ganglia, R = 
Right, L = Left; Pathology: TBI = Traumatic Brain Injury, AcoA = Aneurysm of the Anterior 
Communicating Artery; C V A = Cerebrovascular Accident; Classification: F control = non 
confabulating patients with dysexecutive syndrome; Confabulation Type, No = not meeting 
any of the established criteria for confabulation. All patients were right handed. 
Demographic Data 
All patients were right-handed and their first language was English. 
Further demographic characteristics of this group are summarised in the Table 2-6 
above. These characteristics were compared to those of the confabulation and 
amnesic groups using non-parametric Mann-Whiney tests. These revealed that 
there was no significant difference between the characteristics of the 
confabulation and frontal groups. However, there was a significant difference in 
the amount of months elapsed post-onset between the frontal group and the C2 
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confabulation subgroup, Z = 2.1, p < .05. In addition the difference in age 
between the frontal and the C3 groups approached significant levels, Z = 1.9, /? = 
.05, as did the difference in education between the frontal group and C2 group, Z 
= 1.8, p = .07. Given the small sample sizes in the present study, these 
differences, although not significant, were taken into account in the experimental 
comparisons of the following chapters. 
Clinical progress 
At the end of assessment period, four of these patients ( F l , F3, F5 and F7) 
were already living independently under the partial care of family members, 
friends or social workers and carers. However, none of them had returned to paid 
employment. The remaining three patients (F2, F4, and F6) were released from 
hospital after the end of the study. Al l three patients were capable of living 
independently under the care o f relatives or friends, but due to lack of such 
support they were transferred to residential care units. 
In summary, the patients of the study were classified in the following 
groups: The Confabulation Group consisting of 13 patients and subdivided in 
three groups, C I , C2 and C3; and the Control Group consisting of 10 patients and 
subdivided into two groups, the Amnesic and the Frontal group. The Figure 2-2 
below offers a schematic representation of these groups. 
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Figure 2-2. Schematic Representation of the Experimental Groups 
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2.7 Neuropsychological Investigations 
Confabulation has been associated witii a variety of underlying cognitive 
dysfunctions (see Chapter 1). In order to examine the possible cognitive 
components of confabulation, several neuropsychological measures were 
employed to asses the performance of confabulating patients and to compare it 
with that of the control groups. Tests that required knowledge of British or 
European facts (e.g. WMS-IIl subtests) were adjusted appropriately as to 
minimise cultural bias. This involved simple substitutions as opposed to 
fundamental alterations to the materials, e.g. 'Pounds' was changed to 'Rands'' in 
the L M subtest of the WMS-III . The cognitive abilities tested and the tests used 
were as follows: 
2.7.1 Materials & Methods 
Intelligence. 
Premorbid intelligence estimations were mainly assessed using the 
Wechsler Adult Reading Test (WTAR) (2001). They were also based on the 
patients' education level and profession; particularly in the few cases the WTAR 
test could not be administered. Postmorbid verbal and performance intelligence 
was accessed using the third Edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, UK 
adaptation (WAIS-l l l ' "^ , 1998). These tests allowed direct comparisons between 
predicted and actual intelligence, as the WTAR was specifically developed and 
co-normed with the WAIS-III in order to provide normative data on such 
comparisons. 
Anterograde Memory 
The third Edition of the Wechsler Memory Scale, UK adaptation (WMS-
l l l " " ^ , 1998) was used to assess working memory, verbal and visual anterograde 
memory. The latter was further examiner using the Rey Complex Figure Test 
(RCFT) (Meyers & Meyers, 1995; see also Rey, 1941; Osterrreith, 1944). These 
tests, reliably standardised and widely used in both neuropsychological research 
and clinical practice, have been also specifically used in a variety of recent 
confabulation studies (e.g. studies that employed WMS or, WMS-R subtests: 
Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Cunningham et al., 1997; Dalla Barba, 1993a; Dalla 
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Barba et al., 1997b; Demery et al., 2001; Kopelman 1987; Moscovitch & Melo, 
1997; Stuss et al., 1981; studies that included versions of the Rey Complex Figure 
Test: Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Hashimoto, Tanaka & Nakano, 2000; Schnider et 
al., 1996; or studies that included version of both tests: Benson et al., 1996; 
Destreri et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 1987; Ptak et al., 2001). 
Autobiographical Memory 
Autobiographical memory was assessed using the Autobiographical 
Memory Interview (Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1990), which assesses the 
recollection, in response to specific cues, e.g. "a wedding in your early 20s", of 
both personal semantic information (i.e. 'facts from one's own past l ife ' , 
Kopelman et al., 1990), and autobiographical memory experiences (i.e. personally 
experienced events) across different life periods. Responses are scored in terms of 
the descriptive richness of the memories produced and their specificity in time and 
place. This test has been used in previous studies on confabulation and was 
proven sensitive to confabulation (Dab et al., 1999; Kopelman et al., 1997; Kroll 
et al., 1997). Most crucially, the presence of confabulation in everyday life seems 
to correlate with the presence of confabulation in assessments of the 
autobiographical memory domain, even in cases where the symptom is not present 
during the formal testing of other memory domains, such as new learning 
(Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Papagno & Muggia, 1996). In order to have a solid 
basis for scoring the patients' answers their relatives were interviewed following 
the assessment and asked to verify their answers. Responses which included 
information impossible to verify, e.g. events taking place during patients' early 
childhood years were accepted at face value, provided the patient gave a similar 
account in the same question posed in a following session. Medical and nursing 
notes were also consulted when necessary. 
Executive Functions 
A variety of executive dysfunctions has been associated with 
confabulation (Berlyne, 1972; Cunningham et al., 1997; Fisher et al., 1995; 
Kopelman, 1989; Luria, 1977; Mercer et al., 1977; Shapiro et al., 1981; Stuss et 
al., 1978; Talland, 1961). Thus, a detailed battery of executive tests, the Delis-
Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS) (Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001) 
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was used to assess confabulating and control patients. When testing time 
constraints or the patient's medical condition did not permit ful l administration of 
the D-KEFS (see below for description), only selective tests were administered 
and efforts were made to complement the assessment using other less time-
consuming tests (e.g. the BADS battery). 
Given that the D-KEFS is a relatively new test, a brief description of it 
follows. The battery includes a set o f standardised tests for comprehensively 
assessing higher-level cognitive functions and offers wide normative data. It 
consists of nine tests, derived from previously developed procedures (e.g. the 
'Tower building', 'Card-Sorting' and 'Stroop' procedures), which are adapted to 
provide a diverse and relatively comprehensive set of tests for testing this 
multifaceted domain of cognition (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Following the 
convention of the WAIS and WMS batteries raw scores of the D-KEFS are 
converted to age-corrected scale scores, with a mean of 10 and a standard 
deviation of three. The tests and some of the main functions they tap are the 
following: Trail Making (cognitive flexibility in visuo-motor sequencing, 
simultaneous processing, multi-tasking, divided attention). Verbal Fluency 
(cognitive flexibility, strategic retrieval search, initiation, rule following, 
processing speed), Design Fluency (cognitive flexibility, response inhibition, 
initiation of problem solving, non-verbal creativity, simultaneous processing), 
Color-Word Interference (inhibition of over-learned verbal responses, cognitive 
flexibility). Sorting Test (concept formation, reasoning skills, problem-solving 
initiation, abstract thinking), Twenty Questions Test (abstract thinking, concept 
formation). Word Context Test (deductive reasoning, abstract thinking), Tower 
Test (spatial planning, rule learning, inhibition of impulsivity, problem solving). 
Proverb Test (concept formation, abstract thinking) (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 
2001). Most of these functions, although potentially dissociable, have been 
associated with confabulation and particularly the extreme form of the symptom, 
e.g. spontaneous or severe confabulation (e.g. Beekmans et al., 1998; Burgess & 
McNeil, 1999; Dab et al., 1999; Damasio et al., 1985; Fisher et al., 1995; Kapur & 
Coughlan, 1980; Kern et al., 1992; Kopelman, 1987; Luria, 1976; Moscovitch & 
Melo, 1997; Shapiro et al., 1981; Stuss et al., 1978). 
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Most of the above D-KEFS tests measure both the basic cognitive skills 
that each task requires, as well as the higher-level executive function that the task 
taps. For example, the primary executive function measured by the Color-Word 
Interference Test (based on the 'Stroop' procedure) is the examinee's ability to 
inhibit an overlearned verbal response (reading printed words) in order to generate 
a conflicting response of naming the dissonant ink colours in which the words are 
printed. The test has also two baseline conditions that measure key component 
skills of the high-order tasks: basic naming of colour patches and basic reading of 
colour-words printed in blank ink. Figure 2-3 below includes the various primary, 
contrast (contrast between baseline and high-level conditions) and error measures 
used for each subtest. The contrast measures included were considered important 
in order to delineate between the potential difficulties confabulating, frontal or 
amnesic patients might have in fundamental cognitive abilities and their more 
higher-order cognition difficulties. 
The D-KEFS was also complemented in most patients by the Cognitive 
Estimates Test (Shallice & Evans, 1978), which has been directly linked to the 
presence of bizarre and spontaneous confabulation in some studies (e.g. Burgess 
& McNeil, 1999; Dab et al., 1999; Kopelman et al., 1997) but not others (e.g. 
Kroll et al., 1997; Shapiro et al., 1981). The Hayling Test (1997) was also 
administered as a verbal measure of task initiation speed and response 
suppression. In the first part of the test, the patient is asked to complete the 
sentence with an appropriate word, while in the second the patient has to complete 
the sentence with a word unrelated to the sentence (e.g. 'Most cats see very well 
at....tree'). Response latencies and potential errors are recorded and transformed 
into scale scores. The functions tapped by the latter test have been implicated in 
the production of certain types of confabulation (e.g. see Burgess & McNeil, 
1999; Dab et al., 1999 for discussions). Although these measures are not 
exhaustive of the long list of abilities included under the conceptual 'umbrella' of 
executive functions, they were selected to assess, both in the verbal and visual 
domains, a relatively wide range of deficits associated with executive dysfunction, 
such as inhibition, flexibility, abstract thinking and reasoning. 
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Subtest Conditions Measures: Raw Score Computation 
Trail Making 
i 1: Number Sequencing 
2: Letter Sequencing 
' 3: Number-Letter 
^ Sequencing 
Primary Switching Measure: Condition 4 Completion 
Time (in seconds) 
Switching Errors: Total Number of Omission & 
Sequencing Errors 
Contrast Measure: Condition 4 Scaled Score minus 
Conditions 2 + 3 Composite Scale Score 
Verbal 
Fluency 1: Letter Fluency (LAT) 2: Category Fluency 
Primary Fluency Measures: Number of Correct 
Responses Summed across Three letter trails and two 
category trials respectively 
Errors: Total Number of Repetition and Set-loss Errors 
Design 
Fluency 
1: Filled Dots Design 
2: Empty Dots Only 
; Design 
3: Switching 
1 
Primary Switching Measure: Number of Correct 
Designs 
Contrast Measure: Condition 3 Scale Score minus 
Conditions 1 & 2 Composite Scale Score 
Errors: Total Number of Repeated Designs Summed 
across Conditions 1 -3 
Color-Word 
Interference 
1. Color Naming 
2. Word Reading 
3. Inhibition 
4. Inhibition/Switching 
Primary Measures: Naming and Reading: Sum of 
Scaled Scores on Conditions 1 & 2 
Condition 3: Seconds to Complete 
Condition 4: Seconds to Complete 
Contrast Measure: Condition 4 Scale Score minus 
Condition I Scale Score 
Errors: Sum of Corrected and Uncorrected Errors in 
Conditions 3 & 4 
Sorting Test 
I. Free Sorting & 
Describing of 2 Sets of 
6 Cards 
Primary Measures: Sorting: Total Number of Initial 
Target Sorts with at least I correct description 
Description: Sum of Correct Description Scores 
Errors: Number of Sorts Repeated within a Card Set 
Twenty 
Questions 
1. Identification of 4 
Items by Yes/No 
Questions 
Primary Measures: Total Number of Questions Asked 
Summed Across Items 1-4. 
Sum of Weighted Achievement Scores Across Items 1-4 
Word Context 1. Identification of 10 words by combining 5 
clue sentences per word 
Primary Measure: Total Consecutively Correct Score 
Summed Across Items I-10 
Tower Test 
1. Building 9 designated 
Towers in the fewest 
number of moves 
possible 
Primary Measures: Item Achievement Scores Summed 
Across All Items Administered 
Errors: Total Number of Rule VioIationsA'otal Number 
of Items Administered 
Proverbs 1. Interpretation of 8 Proverbs 
Primary Measures: Accuracy Score Plus Abstraction 
Score Summed Across Items I -8 
Figure 2-3. Primary and Contrast Measures of the D K - E F S . 
Visiiospatial Neglect 
The Letter, Line Cancellation and Line Bisection, Sub-tests of the 
Behavioural Inattention Test (BIT) were used to assess visuospatial neglect in 
right-hemisphere patients. Their copying abilities were also examined through the 
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Rey Complex Figure Copy, administered to all patients. Additional information 
about the patients' motor, sensory, perceptual, spatial, and constructional abilities 
was taken from recent neurological reports. Identified difficulties were further 
explored (see results of C3 group below). 
Mood 
The Fiospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983) was used to assess patients' mood following their injury. When patients' 
clinical presentation included aberrant (e.g. euphoric) or exaggerated (e.g. high 
levels of anxiety) mood states additional information was taken from recent 
psychiatric evaluations (see groups C2 and C3 below). These were carried out in 
most instances due to caring staffs concerns about patients' emotional lability. 
Confabulation 
Collecting systematic data on confabulating patients presents several 
difficulties, especially as regards quantifying and characterizing the confabulatory 
material (for discussion see Johnson & Raye, 1998). Very few formal measures of 
confabulation have been used across studies, and thus comparison between 
patients is complicated by tests differences. The Dal la Barba Confabulation 
Battery (1993a) has been used in a number of studies by different authors (e.g. 
Dalla Barba, 1993a; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 1997) and can thus 
provide a common basis for comparing patients' confabulatory characteristics 
across different studies. 
The batteiy was administered to all patients. This test consists of six 
subsections of questions, concerning episodic, personal, and general semantic 
memoiy, orientation in time and place and "1 don't know" semantic and episodic 
memory sections. The last two sections include questions whose answer is 
generally unknown or difficult to access e.g. "What was the profession of Marilyn 
Monroe's father?" or "How did you spent Christmas in 1985?" It has been shown 
that confabulating patients try to provide answers for these questions more 
frequently than controls (Dab et al, 1999; Dalla Barba, 1993a; Kopelman et al., 
1997; Mercer etal., 1977; Papagno & Baddeley, 1997). 
The test was administered in one session. Questions were read out to 
patients and their answers were recorded verbatim. In order to corroborate 
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patients' memory statements, interviews were conducted with the patients' 
relatives. In cases where relatives could not confirm an answer the patient was 
asked the same question on a different session. Repeated answers were considered 
truthful (see also Moscovicth & Melo, 1997). Finally, additional verification 
information was collected from medical records. Dalla Barba's (1993) scoring 
criteria were followed as closely as possible and comparisons between groups 
were based only on their 'confabulation' scores. The criteria for distinguishing 
confabulations from wrong answers were the insertion of new material and other 
intrusions. In the case of orientation items, answers were considered "wrong" i f 
they were out by less than 10 years, 2 seasons, 3 months, 15 days, 3 days, or 6 
hours to questions concerning the current year, season, month, date in month, day 
of the week, and hour of the day, respectively. Beyond this, errors in orientation 
were considered to be confabulations. " I don't know" answers referred to 
responses in which the question was not really addressed or when no response 
was given. The last two sections do not have correct answers since appropriate 
responses are considered the " I don't know" ones. 
2.7.2 Results 
Given the groups' small and unequal number of patients, non-parametric 
tests were used to analyse differences in neuropsychological performance between 
the groups. Overall differences between the three main groups of the study, 
namely, confabulation, amnesic and frontal control groups, as well as between the 
three confabulation subgroups of the study, i.e. C I , C2 and C3 subgroups, were 
analysed using the Kruskall-Wallis Test. Meaningful post hoc comparisons were 
performed using the Mann-Whitney test. Despite the use of multiple measures to 
assess neuropsychological performance, the level of significance was set at .05 for 
all analyses. Although this measure did not control for family wise error rate and 
thus increased the probability of Type I error, it ensured that minor differences 
between groups would be noted (i.e. it reduced Type II error) and taken into 
consideration in the following experimental chapters. This increased statistical 
power was considered preferable for the analyses of this chapter, as the latter's 
main aim was to explore the neuropsychological characteristics of groups already 
formed based on neuropathological differences. Significant findings and single 
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non-significant findings are reported in fu l l . Only the probability value of multiple 
non-significant results is reported. 
Intelligence 
The performance of the patients in pre- and post-morbid tests in 
summarised in Table 2-7 below. 
Table 2-7. The WAIS- l I I and W T A R performance across experimental groups. 
Patients WAIS-IIIIQ Scores (WTAR Prediction) 
WQ P/Q FS/Q 
Confabulation Groups M SD M SD M SD 
Total (N = 13) 87.5(92.6) 14.7(10.1) 70 (95.9) 11.1 (9.4) 79,9 (94.5) 10,2(11) 
C1 Bilateral (N = 7) 85 (93.1) 11 (12.5) 72 (97.6) 11 (11,7) 79.2 (96) 12.1 (13.5) 
C2 Korsakoff (N = 3) 79 (87.6) 3.6 (6.7) 76.5 (90) 9.1 (5,2) 76 (88.3) 7(7.2) 
C3 Unilateral (N = 3) 107.7(96.3) 15(6,8) 57.7 (98)* 4,5 (5,2) 83.7 (97) 10,5(7,6) 
Control Groups 
Amnesic (N = 3) 91.7(98) 11 (10.6) 87.7(100) 10,2(9,6) 88,7 (99) 11,7(11.3) 
Frontal (N = 7) 97.4 2.2(11.9) 81.7 12,1 91,9 6 (9,9) 
(90.25) (93.25) (6,6) (91,25) 
Note. VIQ =Verbal IQ Score; PIQ = Perfonnance IQ Score; FSIQ = Full Scale IQ Score. W T A R 
Prediction = Score.s in parentheses represent the premorbid IQ scores as predicted by the W T A R and 
demographic characteristics. * = Scores more than 2 SD below the normative mean. 
Both the confabulation and control groups showed a mild intellectual 
deterioration (mean FSIQ > 2 SD below the general mean) from their mean 
estimated premorbid intelligence level (mean FSIQ > I SD below the mean). 
None of the groups showed a marked intellectual deterioration in general 
intellectual abilities, although typically the deterioration from their premorbid 
intellectual level was more marked on the PIQ score, than the VIQ score. This 
was particularly true for the confabulation groups and the frontal group. The C3 
confabulation subgroup showed a marked deterioration in abilities tested by the 
peiformance tasks of the WAIS-III (see Appendix A l for individual scores). This 
finding could be at least in part explained by the impaired visuo-spatial abilities 
these patients showed (see below). Non-parametric, Kruskall-Wallis tests were 
used to assess differences between the intelligence abilities of the groups. There 
was no difference between the groups on verbal, x^{2) = 4.2, p = .1 , performance 
x^{2) = 3.3, p = .2, or fu l l scale WTAR predicted scores, x\2) = 3.9, p= .\. There 
was a difference in Full Scale IQ between the main groups (confabulation, frontal 
and amnesic groups) but it failed to reach significant levels,x^{2) = 5.\,p= .08. In 
addition, there was no significant difference in Full Scale IQ between the three 
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subgroups of the confabulation group, x"(2) = .9, p = .6. Finally, there was no 
significance difference in Full Scale IQ between the subgroups of the 
confabulation group and the two control groups, x^(4) = 5.8, p = .2. 
Significant differences between the performances of the confabulation, 
amnesia and frontal groups were observed on scores of PIQ, x^{2) = 13.4, p < 
.001, with the amnesic group scoring higher than the other groups. Similar 
differences in the VIQ scores were not significant, x^(2) = 3.2, p = .2. By contrast, 
differences in the VIQ scores of the three confabulation subgroups were 
significant, x^{l) = 6.06, p < .05, with the unilateral subgroup showing higher 
performance than the other groups. By contrast, this subgroup performed worse 
than the other groups on measures of PIQ, but this effect failed to reach 
significant levels, x^(2) = 5.8, p = .05. The implications of these differences are 
discussed below. 
Orientation and Information 
Confabulating patients performed worse than the non- confabulating 
control groups on correctly recalling orientation and other personal or general 
semantic information, as measured by the WMS-III Information and Orientation 
subtest, x~(2) = 10.6, p < .005. In addition, there were no significant differences 
between the three confabulation subgroups, x^{2) = 2.3, p = .2. Confabulating 
patients mainly lost points in the temporal and spatial orientation questions of this 
task, as well as the questions about the current and past Prime ministers as some 
patients named politicians that held office in the past. Neither amnesic, nor frontal 
control patients showed this tendency and thus the scores of the confabulation 
group were significantly lower than both the ones of the amnesic, Z = 2.5, /? < .01, 
and the frontal control groups, Z = 2.6, p< .0]. 
Memory 
The performance of the experimental groups on neuropsychological tests 
of memory are summarised in Table 2-8 below. 
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Table 2-8. Group Performances on Neuropsychological Tests of Memory 
Test Confabulation Group & Subgroups Control Groups 
Total Bilateral- Korsakoff- Unilateral- >^ mnes;c Frontal 
CI C2 C3 
N= 13 N=7 N=3 N = 3 N=3 N= 7 
WMS-n index Scores Mean(SD) Mean (SO) Mean (SO) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Auditory immediate 68.4 (20.2)* 55.5 (5.5)* 63 (9.6)* 99.6 (8) 58 (7.5)* 83(13.6) 
Visuai immediate 73.5(16.7) 77.3(19.4) 60.3(15)* 79 (3.4) 59.7 (4.6)* 77.9 (8.3) 
immediate Memory 63.5(16.9)* 58.5(15.1)* 55(12.5)* 82(12.1) 50.3 (4.6)* 76.5(10.1) 
Auditory Deiayed 69(19.7)* 58.2 (6.4)* 64.3 (6.5)* 95.7 (23.2) 55.3 (3)* 81.2(13.9) 
Visuai Deiayed 66.2(16.9)* 72.5(17.9) 56.3(11.5)* 63.3(18.9)* 54 (4.5)* 72.5 (5.6) 
Auditory 70(18) 617 (7.5)* 61.7(11.5)* 96.7 (5.8) 62.5(10.6)* 85 (8.2) 
Recognition Deiayed 
General Memory 63(16)* 57.8(12.1)* 55(12.5)* 80.3(17.7) 48.7 (4.7)* 73(8) 
Woridng Memory 82(13) 86 (16.4) 76.3 (4.6) 80.3(14) 79 (22.9) 83(7.1) 
WMS-III 
info & Orientation 50.5(13.5)% 43.2(15)% 56% 57(18)% 81 (8.7) % 82.8(16.5) 
R-CFT 
Copy 18.4(12.7)** 24.9(10.3)** 25 (4.2)" 3.2 (3.9)** 31.3(3.6) 30.3 (3.4) 
Immediate 3.4 (3)** 4.2 (3.9)** 3** 2(1.4)** 4 7 (4.7)** 16.3(9) 
Deiayed 
AMI 
Personal Semantic 
2.1 (2.7)** 2.6 (3.6)** 2** 1(1.4)** 3.3 (4.9)** 15.6(10,2) 
Childhood 13.5 (3.4) 12.9 (4.1)* 13(3.5) 14.8 (2.9) 17.5(1.3) 17(1.9) 
Adult life 11.6 (4)* 10.1 (2.3)* 9 (3.6)* 18.5(16.8) 16.2 (3.5) 17,8(1,6) 
Recent life 9.3 (5.7)* 77(5.1)* 6.2 (3.6)* 15(5.1)* 9.2 (3,3)* 18(1,7) 
Total 34.3(10.3)' 30. 7(7.5j* 28.2(9)' 46.7 (3.7j* 42.8(3.7)' 52,8 (3.2j 
Autobiographical 
Childhood 3.4(2.7)* 1.8(1.9)* 27(1.5)* 6.7(2.3) 3 (3.6)* 5.6(2,4) 
Adult life 3.4 (2.2)* 2.2 (1.3)* 3.3 (3)* 5.3(1.2) 2(1)* 6,5(1,3) 
Recent life 2.9 (2.4)* 1.4(1.5)* 2.3(1.2)* 6(1.7) 17(1,5)* 5.5(1) 
Total 9.6 (6.2)* 5.4 (3.5)* 8.3 (3.2)* 18 (2.6) 6.7 (4,7)* 17.5(3) 
Note. WMS-III = Wechsler Memory Scale-3^Edition; R-CFT = Rey Complex Figure 
Test; A M I = Autobiographical Memory Test; * = Indicates mean scores more than 2 
SD below the normative mean. ** = Indicates mean scores below the 1^ ' percentile. 
Although all groups showed some degree of memory impairment on the 
WMS-III this was more prominent in the confabulation and amnesic groups. Non-
parametric Mann-Whitney Tests confirmed that there was no difference between 
the latter two groups in degree of memory impairment, ps ranging from .1 to .8. 
By contrast, frontal non-confabulating patients showed milder memory 
impairment (within 2 SD from the mean) across all index scores. Mann-Whitney 
tests revealed that there were significant differences between the memoiy scores 
of this group and those of the amnesic control patients on all WMS-III measures, 
Z = 2.2 - 2.4, ps < .05, except index scores of Auditory Delayed Memory (Z = 
1.49, p = .07), Auditory Recognition Memory (Z = 2.09, p = 0.6), and Working 
Memory (Z = .34, p - 0.8). Working memory was relatively preserved in all 
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groups, irrespective of poor performance on other measures of memory. For 
example, there was a marked discrepancy between the performance of amnesic 
patients on working memory subtests and that on subtests that assess immediate 
and general memory. The same applied to the CI and C2 confabulation 
subgroups. Such dissociations have been observed before in the literature and the 
issue is further discussed below. 
Differences in memory performance were also observed among the 
patients of the confabulation group. Non-parametric, Kruskall-Wallis tests 
revealed that these differences were significant for index scores of Auditory 
Immediate Memory, x' (2) = 7.5, p < .05, Auditory Delayed Memory, x~ (2) = 7.1, 
p < .05, and Auditory Recognition Memory, (2) = 6.8, p < .05. Korsakoff 
patients (C2) showed marked anterograde memory impairment across most 
memory domains, as tested by the WMS-IIl subtests. The same was true for the 
CI confabulation subgroup, although they showed higher scores in visual than 
verbal subtests. The unilateral confabulation group showed substantially milder 
memoi-y impairment in verbal immediate and delayed memory (within 2 SD from 
the mean) but their performance in visual memory subtests was more impaired, 
approximating the one of amnesic and confabulating patients in delayed visual 
memory. In particular, the delayed visual memory of right-hemisphere patients 
with confabulation was extremely low on average (more than 2 SD below the 
mean) in comparison with their verbal memory abilities, although it did show 
substantial variability between patients. This low performance could be explicable 
with respect to these patients' more general impairment in perceptual and visuo-
constructional skills, as also shown on the WAIS-III (low Performance IQ and 
Perceptual Organisation Index Scores) and other visuospatial tests (see below). It 
should however, be noted that some of these patients also suffered from non-
neurological visual problems (e.g. operated cataracts) which were only partially 
corrected and thus could influence their performance on visual tests. 
These findings were consistent with the performance of the groups on 
another test of visual learning, the RCFT. This test was not administered to two 
patients of the CI group (SA and PT) due to time restrictions and to one patient of 
the C2 group (FM) due to his visual difficulties. The confabulating patients and 
the amnesic control group showed abnormal levels of immediate and delayed 
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recall during the RCFT test, while the frontal control patients scored within the 
normal range. A non-parametric Kruskail-Wallis test revealed that there was a 
significant difference between the three main groups of the study (Confabulation 
group, Amnesia and Frontal control groups) on Immediate, x^{2) = 9.8, p < .0\, 
and Delayed Recall, x^(2) = 10.5, p < .01. Although there were not significant 
differences between the recall performance of the three confabulation subgroups, 
ps > .7, their memory impairment maybe related to different underlying problems. 
More specifically, the poor performance of right-hemisphere confabulafing 
patients could be attributed to their defective visual and perceptual abilities, as 
well as their markedly impaired visuo-constructional abilities, as shown by their 
extremely low score on the copying component of the task. The other 
confabulating subgroups also showed impaired performance on the Copy 
condition of the RCFT. Although this impairment was less severe than that of the 
C3 group, the difference between the three confabulation subgroups on the 
copying component of the test did not reach significant levels, x'{2) = 5.8, p = .06. 
Amnesic and frontal control patients performed better on average on the copying 
part of the task but there was no significant difference between these groups and 
the confabulation group on this component of the task, x^(2) = 4.2, p = A. 
Patients' Autobiographical Memory as measured by the A M I showed 
different patterns of impairment between groups. This test was not administered to 
patients MS and F7 due to time restrictions. The total scores of confabulating, 
amnesic and frontal patients were compared using non-parametric Kruskall-Wallis 
tests. These revealed the groups differed significantly on personal semantic, x^(2) 
= \2A, p < .005, and autobiographical memory total scores, x"(2) = 7.5, p < .05, 
with the frontal control group performing better than the other two groups on both 
measures. Significant differences were not observed between the confabulation 
and amnesia groups on any life-time period. Significant differences were observed 
between the three confabulation subgroups on total personal semantic, x^{2) = 6.1, 
p < .05, and total autobiographical memory scores, x'{2) - 6.6, p < .05, with the 
unilateral confabulation group performing better than the other two groups. 
More specifically, frontal control patients and unilateral confabulation 
patients showed borderline scores across most of the sections of the battery (i.e. 
scores falling between one and two standard deviations below the mean of 
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controls) and did not show a temporal gradient. By contrast, confabulation 
subgroups CI and C2 and amnesic control patients showed abnormal recollection 
of personal semantic information and autobiographical incidents for most lifetime 
periods. These groups showed a mild temporal gradient in recollecting personal 
semantic information. This appeared as steeper in the amnesic group, which also 
showed a temporal gradient, albeit milder, in the recall of autobiographical 
incidents. However, the performance of this small group on the A M I should be 
interpreted with caution, particularly given the fact that one of its patients was 
only 24 years old and hence some of the battery sections were not applicable. In 
addition, the difficulty of these groups (amnesic and confabulatory) in recalling 
recent information and events may reflect their anterograde ainnesia, with patients 
having difficulty recalling events that took place following the onset of their 
illness. This is pailicularly applicable to the Korsakoff patients of the study who 
were tested on average more than 10 years following the onset of their disease. It 
also applies to the unilateral confabulating patients, who were particularly 
impaired in the recollection of recent personal semantic information. 
Patients from all groups showed a small amount of memory distortion and 
produced intrusions during the verbal subtests of the WMS-III and the A M I . 
However, confabulation subgroups, with the exception of the right-hemisphere 
patients, showed also fabrications (see above for definition) during testing. For 
example, in the L M immediate and delayed recall tasks they distorted the facts of 
the story, usually by combining them in erroneous ways, as well as by inventing 
information that was unrelated semantically and phonemically to the tests' prose 
material. E.g. patient LH in response to the 'Joe Grant' story, 'recalled' how 
"John somebody was short of cash and he decided to get some by stealing 
somebody else's wallet. He was very fond of eating, you see (perserveration and 
fabrications". Right-hemisphere groups did not produce fabrications during the 
WMS-III but they did so in the A M I , particularly in relation to questions relating 
to their recent life, e.g. the period of their hospitalisation following the onset of 
their pathology (postmorbid period). For example, patient JO described how 
hospital staff were refusing to give him exercise and laughing at his expense. He 
insisted the examiner was present during this event. 
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In summary, confabulating patients w i th bilateral lesions, including 
Korsakof f syndrome patients, and non-confabulating amnesic patients showed 
comparable degree o f anterograde memory impairment and impoverished 
autobiographical memory recall including distortions. The confabulation 
subgroups produced also fabrications. Frontal non-confabulating patients showed 
greater preservation o f memory abilities, better orientation and less tendency for 
confabulation, and unilateral right-hemisphere patients w i t h confabulation (C3 
subgroup) showed better preservation o f verbal memory abilities and less 
tendency fo r fabrication dur ing testing, although they had selective deficits in 
visuospatial memory and showed marked confabulation fo r postmorbid events. 
Executive Functions 
The f u l l administration o f the D-KEFS battery was not always possible 
due to time-restrictions or, patients' visual problems. Only a small selection o f 
verbal subtests o f the D-KEFS was administered to patients o f the C3 
confabulation subgroup. However, data f r o m the Behavioural Assessment o f the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome ( B A D S , 1996) were also available fo r patients A O and 
DO and these w i l l be described below. Patient F M could not complete four o f the 
tests due to visual problems. Patients PT and IR completed only f ive subtests o f 
the battery. A l l patients except frontal patient F7 completed the cognitive 
estimation task. A l l patients except f r o m two patients o f the C I group (SA and 
PT) completed the Hay l ing Test. The performance o f all groups on tests o f 
executive functions is summarised in Table 2-9 below. 
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Table 2-9. Groups ' Performance on Tests of Executive Functions 
resf Confabulation Group & Subgroups Control Groups 
7ofa/ C Bilateral - Korsakoff Urtilateral- Amnesic Frontal 
C1 -C2 C3 
N= 13 N=7 N=3 N=3 N = 3 N= 7 
Mean(SDj Mean (SDj Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SDj 
Hayling Test 2(1.3)** 2.4(1.3)** .j ** 2,3(1.5)** 5,7 2.5 
(1,5)** (1.4)** 
Hayling Errors Score 2(1.5)** 1.4 (.9)** 2.3 (2.3) 2.6 (1.5) 6,3 (,6) 3.5 
(1.9)** 
Cognitive Estimates 12(5.4)** 12.8(4.6)** 13(4.3)** 9.3 (8.5)* 4,7 (1,2) 8.8 (3.5)* 
BADS Profile Score - - 8(1)* - -
D-KEFS 
Trail Makina 
Switching 2.4** (2.3) 1.8**(1.6) 4* (4.2) n.a. 6* (5) 2.3** (3) 
Errors in Switciiing 7.5* (3.6) 7* (4.3) 9(1.4) 13,3(4,2) 8(3.3) 
Switcliing Vs Number & 
Letter Reading 
8.6 (3.7) 8.5 (4.3) 9(1.4) 11 (2,6) 7.1*(2.9) 
Verbal Fluency 
Letter 6.2* (2.6) 6.3* (2.7) 4.3* (2) 8(1.7) 8(3) 6.6* (3) 
Category 2.8** (2.4) 3** (2.6) 1.3** (0.6) 3.7** (0.6) 6*(1,7) 6* (2) 
Set-Loss Errors 
Repetition Errors 
7.8* (3.1) 8.1 (3.2) 6* (4.3) 9(1) 10,6(2,5) 10.1 (0.8) 
7.7* (3.7) 7.1* (4.6) 7.3* (2) 9.3 (2.3) 7,3* (5,7) 10,6(2) 
Desian Fluencv 
Switctiing 4.1* (2.2) 4.2* (2.5) 4* (1.4) n.a. 7,3* (1,2) 7,6* (3,6) 
Switctiing Vs Filled & 
Empty Dots 
Repetition Designs 
8.4 (2.5) 8.7 (2.7) 7.5* (2.1) 12(1,7) 10.5(3) 
10.1 (2.4) 10.2(2.7) 10(1.4) 9 10.3(3.4) 
Color-Word Interference 
Naming & Reading 5.8* (3.9) 6.8* (3.9) 2.5** (0.7) n.a. 4,7* (3,2) 6.6* (2.5) 
Intiibition 
Inhiibition/Switctiing 
Iniiibition Vs Naming 
Iniiibition Errors 
Switciiing Errors 
4.5* (4.3) 
3.2** (4.6) 
8.6 (3.9) 
5.6* (4.3) 
4* (5.3) 
8.3 (4.5) 
-j ** 
•| ** 
9.5 (0.7) 
9(2) 
7,7(5,7) 
11 (3,6) 
6.8* (3.4) 
5.8* (3.4) 
10.4(4.1) 
4.4* (4.1) 4.3* (4.5) 5* (4.2) 6,7* (4.9) 7(1.8) 
1.3** (1) 1.4** (1.1) -j ** 6* (4.4) 4.8* (2.7) 
Sortina 
Correct Sorts 7.6 (2.6) 7.2(1.3) 8.7 (4.7) n.a. 13(5.7) 7.5(3.1) 
Description Score 5.2* (2.1) 6.3* (1.6) 3** 5.7* (2.5) 6* (3.6) 
Repeated Sorts 1.6** (1.1) 1.5** (0.8) 2**(1.7) 7.3(4,1) 6.8* (2.3) 
20 Questions 
Questions Asl<ed 3.2** (2.7) 3**(2.5) 6* •|**a 11 (1) 10.8(1,6) 
Achievement Score 5* (4.7) 5.2* (5.3) 6* 2**a 10,3(2,1) 9,5(1,5) 
Word context 
Consecutively Correct 4* (4.1) 3** (2.3) 2.3** (1.2) -14a n,a. 7,8(2.2) 
Tower 
Achievement Score 5.5* (1.5) 5.4* (1,9) 5.6 (0,6) n.a. 9(3,6) 6,8* (1,2) 
Rule Violations/Item 5.2* (1.2) 5*(1.4) 5.6 (0,6) 6,3*(1.5) 5,3* (1,5) 
Proverb 
Achievement Score 6* (4.9) 5.4* (5.7) 3,5** (3,5) 9.3 (2) 10.3(1.5) 7,3(1,6) 
* Indicates scores < 2 SD and > I SD below the general mean 
** Indicates scores > 2 SDs below the general mean 
^ Only patient DO was assessed 
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The scores o f the groups were compared using non-parametric Kruskal l -
Wall is tests for between-subjects comparisons and Mann-Whitney tests fo r planned 
contrasts between groups.The overall performance o f the confabulating patients on 
the D-KEFS was sl ightly worse than that o f the frontal control patients, who in turn 
performed worse than the amnesic patients on most subtests o f the battery. The latter 
group showed m i l d to no impairment on most subtests, whi le the former groups 
performed more than one or two SDs below the general mean on several subtests. 
However, not ail o f the differences between the groups reached significant levels 
and great variabil i ty was observed between the subtests o f the battery. Confabulat ing 
patients and frontal controls performed worse than amnesic patients on the Tria l 
M a k i n g , Tower and Proverb subtests but there was no significant difference between 
the scores o f these three groups on any o f the corresponding performance or error 
measures, / J S > .3. By contrast, there was a significant difference between the 
confabulation, frontal and amnesic groups on both measures o f the 20 Questions 
subtest, y?(2) = 12.3, p < .005 and x-{2) = 6.3, p < .05 respectively, w i th 
confabulating patients performing worse than the frontal control, Z = 3.1, p < .005, 
and the amnesic control group, Z = 2.5, p < .05 on the number o f questions asked. In 
addition, there was a significant difference between the confabulation and the frontal 
control group on the Word Context subtest, Z = 2.4, p < .05, w i th confabulating 
patients performed worse than the frontal group. 
Whi le confabulating patients performed worse than amnesic and frontal 
controls on all tasks o f f luency there was no significant difference between the 
performance o f the three main groups (confabulation, amnesic and frontal groups) 
on verbal (phonemic) fluency scores, ps > .7, although the confabulating patients 
performed signif icant ly more set-loss errors than the frontal control patients, Z = 
2.2, p < .05. The former group also produced more repetition errors than frontal 
controls but this difference was not significant, Z = \ p= .08. The latter finding 
could be related to the better performance o f the C3 group than the C I and C2 
groups in this condit ion (see below). 
By contrast differences in category (semantic) fluency scores and on 
design fluency scores between the three main groups were significant, x' (2) = 9.9, 
/ ; < .01 and .v" (2) = 8.4, p < .05 respectively, wi th the confabulating patients 
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performing worse than both control groups on both measues. Post hoc 
comparisons revealed that the performance o f the confabulating patients d i f fered 
signif icantly f r o m that o f that the frontal group, Z = 2.7, p< . 01 , but not f r o m that 
o f the amnesic control group, Z = 1.5, p = . 1 . Interestingly the difference in 
design fluency between confabulating and frontal control patients ceased to be 
significant when primary scores o f design f luency were contrasted wi th the scores 
o f the more basic sequencing components o f the task (empty and f i l l e d dots non-
switching conditions), Z = I . I , p = .3, whi le the difference between confabulating 
patients and the amnesic control group remained significant, Z = ].9, p < .05. 
Finally, although unilateral confabulation patients (C3) performed better than C I 
and C2 bilateral subgroups on all measures o f verbal and semantic f luency there 
were no significant differences between the performances o f the three 
confabulation subgroups in these measures, ps > .2. 
Dur ing the Sorting subtest confabulating and frontal patients performed 
less sorts than amnesic control participants but this difference was not significant, 
x'{2) = 3.9, p = .]. By contrast the tendency o f the confabulating patients to 
produce repeated sorts during the task was signif icant ly greater than those o f the 
two control groups, x^{2) = 12.7, p < .005. Post hoc comparisons revealed that the 
performance o f the confabulating patients d i f fered significantly f r o m that o f both 
the amnesic group, Z = 2.6, p < .0\ and the frontal group, Z = 3.2, p < .001. 
Confabulat ing patients and frontal controls were impaired on the critical 
Inhibi t ion conditions (primary and error conditions) o f Colour-Word Interference 
subtest (a 'Stroop' variation), whi le amnesic patients performed wi th in the normal 
range (scores > I SD below the general mean). However, this difference was not 
significant, x^(2) = 3 .1 , p = .2, and neither was the difference in performance 
between the confabulation, frontal and amnesic groups on the more demanding 
Inhibi t ion-Switching condition o f this subtest, x"(2) = 3.7, p = .2. Al though, 
confabulating, frontal control patients and, to a lesser degree, amnesic control 
patients showed low primary measures' scores on this test, it is important to note 
that patients, and particularly the Korsakof f patients, performed poorly also on the 
fundamental components o f this task, namely the naming and reading conditions 
o f the test. Thus, their impaired performance on the primary inhibi t ion and 
switching conditions o f the te.st is at least partly attributable to impairments in 
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more fundamental cognitive impairments, as also suggested by their much higher 
scores on the contrast measure o f the test. Indeed, no difference was found 
between the three main groups on this measure, x"(2) = J , p = .7. However, the 
confabulation group produced more errors in the inhibi t ion and in the 
inhibi t ion/switching conditions than both control groups. In the latter condit ion 
this difference was significant, (2) = 7.4, p < .05, and confabulating patients 
produced more errors than frontal control patients, Z = 2.6, p < .01 and amnesic 
control patients, Z = 2 .1 , p < .05. 
The performance o f the groups on the Cognit ive Estimates test revealed 
that both confabulating and frontal control patients performed signif icant ly worse 
than the amnesic group, x~{2) = 62, p < .05. Bilateral confabulating patients 
(subgroups C I and C2) performed worse on average than the frontal control 
group, Z = 2.\, p < .05, and the unilateral confabulating patients, but there no 
significant differences between the performance o f the confabulation subgroups, 
. r ( 2 ) = .7 ,p = .7. 
The performance o f groups on the Hayl ing Test showed that although all 
groups were impaired (scores fa l l ing below c u t - o f f levels) the confabulation 
subgroups and the frontal control group performed worse on this task and they 
showed the highest suppression error scores in the second part o f the test. Indeed, 
there were significant differences between the performance o f the three main 
groups on the overall Hayl ing test score, x~ (2) = 7.2, p < .05 and the 
corresponding error score, x~ (2) = 9.6, p < .01, wi th the confabulation group 
performing worse than the amnesic, Z = 2.5, p < .05 and Z = 2.7, /? < .01 
respectively, but not worse than the frontal controls, Z = .8, /? = .4 and Z = \ .l,p 
= .8 respectively. Also there were no significant differences between the total and 
error scores o f the confabulation subgroups, . r (2) = 2.8, p= .2 and x^ (2) = \ .6,p 
= .4 respectively. 
Although the patients fo rming the C3 subgroup were generally cooperative 
during assessment, several d i f f icul t ies occurred during assessment o f executive 
functions. Patient JO was particularly sensitive to poor performance during testing 
and discontinued most attempts to assess his executive functions, including 
several subtests o f the D-KEFS and the B A D S battery. He was also experiencing 
non-neurological visual d i f f icu l t ies at the time o f his assessment and he was 
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await ing an ophthalmologist 's appointment. Al though patients A O and D O also 
experienced visual problems these were partially corrected by spectacles. Their 
performance on the remaining subtests o f the B A D S was also defective (Profi le 
Scores ranging f r o m 0 to 2 on all subtests except the Temporal Judgement subtest 
on which A O ' s Profi le score was 3; see also DO ' s b r ie f case report below and 
Chapter 7). 
In summary, although all groups showed some degree o f impairment in the 
D-KEFS subtests and other frontal tests, confabulating patients and frontal control 
patients were severely impaired on a variety o f executive functions, whi le the 
three amnesic patients showed m i l d impairment and this was present only in f ew 
tests (see also Kopelman et al., 1997). The performance o f the confabulating 
patients d i f fered signif icant ly f r o m that o f the amnesic patients on the Switching 
Errors measure o f the Tra i l M a k i n g Test, the 20 Questions and the Design 
Fluency subtests, the perserveration score o f the Sorting subtest, and the error 
score o f the Inhibi t ion/Switching condit ion o f the Colour -Word Interference 
subtest. These two groups also d i f fered signif icant ly in their performances on the 
Cognitive Estimates and the Hayl ing test. The performance o f the confabulation 
group di f fered signif icant ly f rom that o f the frontal control group only on the 
Word Context, the Categoiy Fluency condition and the error scores o f the Verbal 
Fluency subtest, the perserveration score o f the Sorting subtest, and the error score 
o f the Inhibi t ion/Switching condit ion o f the Colour -Word Interference subtest. 
The interpretation o f these differences and their implications fo r the production o f 
confabulation are discussed below. 
Other Assessments 
A l l patients underwent standard neurological examination and were 
administered selective tests o f visuo-spatial neglect. Five patients had severe 
motor deficits f o l l o w i n g their neuropathology. These included the three patients 
o f the C3 group, which all had contralesional motor deficits. .10 and D O had 
paralysis o f both lower and upper limbs, whi le A O ' s had left upper l imb paralysis 
and hemiparesis o f the lower l imb. Tactile sensation o f left l imbs was impaired in 
all patients. Right- lef t identif icat ion, f inger recognition and semantic abilities as 
assessed w i t h bedside tests were intact in all three patients. A O and D O showed 
homonymous hemianopia and all three patients showed visuospatial neglect, 
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without extinction. As expected these right-hemisphere patients showed higher 
amount o f neglect on average than the other groups. T w o o f the frontal control 
patients (F5 and F6) also showed left-sided hemiplegia fo r both upper and lower 
limbs and left-sided neglect on the tests administered. The patients o f all other 
groups did not show visuospatial neglect on the tests administered and none o f 
them had any motor deficits at the t ime o f assessment, except patient F M who 
showed mi ld ataxia. The performance o f thegroups on tests o f visual neglect are 
summarised in Table 2-10 below. 
Table 2-10. Groups ' Performance on Tests of Visuo-spatial Neglect 
resf Confabulation Group & Subgroups Control Groups 
Total Bilateral- Korsakoff- Unilateral- Amnesic Frontal 
C1 C2 C3 
N= 13 N=7 N = 3 N=3 N = 3 N= 7 
Mean(SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SDj Mean (SD) Mean (SDj Mean (SD) 
Line Cancellation 
Left 15.2(5.1) 17.7 (0.5) 18 7.7 (5.6)* 18 16.3 (3.1) 
Right 16.5(3.2) 17.6 (0.8) 18 13(5.6) 18 17.4(1.5) 
Letter Cancellation 
Left 17.4(5.7) 19.9 (0.4) 20 6 (2.8)* 19.3(1.2) 17.4 (4.4) 
Right 19.1 (1.8) 19.9 (0.4) 20 15.5(0.7) 19.7(0.6) 19(1.7) 
Line Bisection 8.4(1.1) 8.9 (0.4) 8.7 (0.6) 7(1.7) 8.7 (0.6) 8.3(1.2) 
Mood d Related Behavioural Observations 
Formal assessment o f experienced depression and anxiety levels ( H A D S 
questionnaire) showed differences between the three experimental groups and also 
in the confabulation subgroups. The groups' performance on the H A D S are 
summarised in Table 2-11 below. 
Table 2-11. Groups ' Performance on the H A D S 
resf Confabulation Group & Subgroups Control Groups 
Total Bilateral - Korsakoff- Unilateral- Amnesic Frontal 
CI C2 C3 
N= 13 N=7 N=3 N=3 N = 3 N= 7 
Mean(SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
HADS 
Depression 6.6(5.1) 6.3 (5.2) 5.5 (6.4) 10 (4)* 4.3 (4.2) 7(5.5) 
Anxiety 9.8(4.8)* 8(1.8)* 7(9,9) 13(3.6)* 0.6(1.6) 9(3.7)* 
Non-parametric Kruskal -Wal l i s tests revealed that the differences in 
anxiety and depression between the main experimental groups, as wel l as between 
confabulation subgroups wei^e not significant, ps > . 1 . However, the observed 
tendencies are noteworthy. Confabulat ing and non-confabulating groups scored 
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wi th in normal l imits on the depression scale, except f r o m the C3 confabulation 
group that showed borderline scores. T w o o f the three patients o f this group 
reported experiencing very negative emotions, although neither o f them was 
diagnosed as c l in ica l ly depressed when psychiatricaily evaluated. A l l groups 
scored higher on the Anxie ty scale wi th the exception o f the amnesic group. A l l 
other average group scores showed borderline levels o f anxiety (Borderline 
Normat ive Scores: 8-10), whi le the C3 confabulation subgroup scored clearly 
wi th in the abnormal level. These patients reported experiencing intense feelings 
o f fear and anxiety. 
Clinical Observations: Mood & Awareness 
These mood assessments were also consistent w i th the behavioural 
observations o f patients' everyday mood and the corresponding reports o f 
psychiatric or clinical psychology evaluation. Bilateral confabulating patients 
showed marked flattening o f emotions and apathy, intermitted by emotional 
labil i ty and particularly episodes o f emotional outburst expressing mostly anger, 
anxiety or despair. Patients R M and F M were mostly euphoric and inappropriately 
jocular. Restlessness, distractability, disinhibi t ion and stimulus-bound behaviour 
was common among these patients, particularly patients R M , L H , B A , M S , IR 
and W M . The latter was also true fo r patients OT , C M and PT but they were less 
hyperactive and less disinhibited in their verbal output and their actions. A l l 
patients o f the C I group were also generally unmotivated and unable to care fo r 
themselves or engage in everyday activities wi thout constant external prompting 
and monitoring. In great contrast, these patients constantly and persistently 
mentioned ' intended' , 'scheduled' or 'planned' actions, duties, and activities that 
they had to attend to next. For example, patient L H constantly believed he had to 
leave the ward to find his stolen car, or that he had to pick-up his car f r o m the 
garage or that he had to drive a colleague somewhere etc. This tendency was also 
evident in one o f the patients o f the C2 group, patient W M . By contrast, the 
anticipations and plans o f the chronic patients C M and F M appeared to include 
only their release f r o m the hospital, which according to them they had been 
admitted to only because o f ' f a l s e allegations' (see also case reports in Appendix 
A3) . 
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A l l confabulating patients appeared as either totally unaware o f their 
circumstances or as min imis ing their importance or medical relevance, e.g. patient 
W M claimed he was in perfect health and offen treated his assessment sessions as 
interviews fo r a job , whi le patient C M claimed she was in hospital because 
doctors were against her religious beliefs and thus falsely ' thought she was not 
right in her head'. Occasionally, patients further 'dramatisised' the circumstances 
o f their injuries. For example, patient JO claimed he was in hospital due to an 
explosion to his head. He further repeatedly described how he saw blood and 
bones coming out o f his head and f a l l i ng to the ground. On one occasion he also 
mentioned his daughter was present and 'she pick-up his head bones wi th a pair o f 
tweezers' (see Clinical examples in Chapter 1). 
The emotional presentation o f the patients o f the C3 confabulation 
subgroup was generally different f r o m that o f the other confabulation subgroups, 
as also indicated by their different H A D S results. These three patients appeared 
more aware o f their general circumstances and whereabouts, yet they showed 
impaired awareness o f selective deficits, e.g. their paralysis, their confabulations, 
and they ignored or misinterpreted their implications. Moreover, they constantly 
expressed negative emotions such as sadness, anxiety and mostly anger. They 
continuously stated that they were dissatisfied wi th the service provided by 
medical and nursing s taf f and demanded immediate satisfaction o f their needs. 
Patient D O expl ic i t ly stated that she fel t she was unable to tolerate the slightest 
delay in service, although she wished she could. A l l three patients described 
profound and constant feelings o f loss and sudden feelings o f panic and anxiety. 
Yet, none o f these patients ident i f ied the source o f such emotions being their 
medical condition. Instead, in an almost paranoid manner, they attributed the 
'cause' o f their profound everyday dissatisfaction to the behaviour or the 
intentions o f others. For instance, D O felt that caring s taf f were verbally and 
physically abusing her, A O often claimed that her relatives, nursing and medical 
s taf f were deliberately t ry ing to prevent her f r o m l iv ing an independent l i fe (see 
also Chapter 7) and JO, in a series o f bizarre allegations, claimed that "Arabs were 
to blame" for his condition and that the stoke unit was responsible for his lack o f 
improvement, as 'they are refusing to give [h im] any exercise" (at the time he had 
physiotherapy sessions approximately fou r times a week). 
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The patients o f the frontal group also showed apathy, distractability, 
dis inhibi t ion and lack o f motivat ion but these were less extreme than in 
confabulating patients. Moreover, all patients were aware o f the circumstances o f 
their neuropathologies. Patients A1 and A3 o f the amnesic control group were 
also aware o f their circumstances and showed appropriate emotional reactions o f 
sadness. However, patients A 2 and A3 also showed episodes o f uncontrolled 
tearfulness, o f sudden onset and progressive disappearance. Patient A 2 identif ied 
the or igin o f his unpleasant emotions to his stroke and to relevant sad experiences 
in his past. By contrast, patient A 3 repeatedly stated she was unaware o f the origin 
o f her extreme feelings o f sadness and described she had no control over them 
When it was pointed out to her that tearfulness seemed to appear during 
conversations related to her stroke or her disabilities, she conf i rmed the 
observation but was unable to provide further informat ion. Her awareness about 
her memory, language and vis ion problems fluctuated, but she was able to accept 
the information given to her by rehabilitation s taf f and progressively learned to 
compensate fo r her d i f f icu l t ies by using the suggested strategies. 
Confabulation 
The performance o f the confabulation and control groups as assessed wi th 
the Confabulation Battery is summarised in Table 2-12 below. The battery was 
administered to all patients except patients M S ( C I group) and F7 (frontal group). 
The latter were not assessed due to time restrictions. 
Table 2-12. Groups ' Performance on the Confabulation Battery. 
Confabulation Group & Subgroups Control Groups 
Sections Total C Biiateral- Korsakoff- Unilateral- Amnesic Frontal 
C1 C2 C3 
N= 12 N=6 N = 3 N = 3 N=3 N^6 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
% % % % % % 
Personal 19.6(10.1) 20(10) 26.7(10.4) 11.7 (5.8) 3.3 (2.9) 0 
Semantic 
Episodic 37.2(19.4) 51.17(15) 22.3 (8.1) 24.3(15) 15.3(4) 2.3 (3.6) 
Orientation 31.7(15.9) 36.7(18.7) 33.3(11.5) 20(10) 13.3 (5.8) 1.6(4.1) 
General 16(9.2) 21 (6.5) 13.3(11.5) 8.7 (7.5) 4.7(4) 5.6 (7.8) 
Semantic 
DK Semantic 30(15.3) 38.3(16) 20(10) 23(11.5) 0 15(15.2) 
DK Episodic 26.7(19.2) 31 (25.6) 20 (0) 23.3 (15.3) 3.3(5.8) 18.3(26,3) 
Total 27.2 (8.2) 33(11.7) 22.6 (6.8) 18.5(6.6) 7.3 (6.8) 7.1 (7.6) 
Note. ' D K ' = 'Don't Know' Sections 
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Non-parametric tests were used to compare the performances o f the 
experimental groups across the battery. The confabulation group confabulated 
across all sections o f the battery and more often than the non-confabulating 
groups. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wall is test revealed significant overall 
differences between the groups, x^{2) = 14.1, < .005. Planned contrasts revealed 
that the performance o f the confabulation group signif icant ly d i f fered f r o m that o f 
the amnesic, Z = 2.6, p < .005 and the frontal control group, Z = 3, p < .005. 
A m o n g the confabulation subgroups, the highest amount o f confabulation overall , 
was observed in the bilateral subgroup ( C I ) , whi le Korsakof f patients 
confabulated less across all sections o f the battery except Personal Semantic 
M e m o r y . In addifion, right-hemisphere patients confabulated overall less than 
both bilateral confabulation groups. Al though, the overall differences between the 
three confabulation subgroups did not reach significant levels, x'(2) = 5A,p= .08, 
the difference between the amount o f confabulation produced by bilateral and 
unilateral patients was significant, Z = 2, p< .05. 
The amount o f confabulation produced by patients varied across battery 
sections. Confabulation patients showed the highest amount o f confabulation in 
the Episodic Memory , Orientation and the two ' D o n ' t K n o w ' sections o f the 
battery, although the C I and C2 groups also showed high confabulation scores in 
the Personal Semantic Memory section. A within-subject Friedman test revealed 
that these differences between sections were significant in the confabulation 
group, x~{5) = 13.1, p < .05. Al though the two control groups confabulated less 
than the confabulation groups they also showed variabi l i ty in the degree o f 
confabulation between the different sections o f the battery. Amnesic patients 
confabulated mainly about episodic memories and orientation information, whi le 
the frontal controls confabulated mainly dur ing the two DK sections o f the 
battery. These differences were significant as analysed by a within-subject 
Friedman test, x ' ( 5 ) = 12.1, p < .05 and x-(5) = ]\.2,p< .05 respectively. 
In summary, confabulating patients confabulated across all the sections o f 
the battery. Overal l , they also produced more confabulations than both amnesic 
and frontal control groups. More generally, the amount o f confabulation produced 
by patients varied significantly across the section o f the battery. Confabulat ing 
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and amnesic patients showed a tendency to mostly confabulate in response to 
Episodic memory questions, whi le frontal controls confabulated mostly in 
response to ' D o n ' t know ' questions. Finally, bilateral confabulating patients 
confabulated on average s ignif icant ly more than unilateral confabulating patients. 
Summary of Neuropsychological Findings 
The bilateral confabulation groups showed, s imilar ly to the amnesic 
control group, only mi ld deterioration o f general intellectual abilities, marked 
anterograde and autobiographical memory deterioration. However, the former also 
showed severe executive dysfunct ion in certain tasks and high amount o f 
confabulation during formal testing, which were less severe in tiie amnesic control 
group. The unilateral confabulation group showed only mi ld deterioration in 
verbal intellectual, anterograde and autobiographical memory abilities but 
presented wi th marked impairments in perceptual organisation, visual memory 
and deficits in specific executive functions. Frontal control patients showed better 
performance in tests o f memory and less confabulation but severe impairment in 
certain executive functions. 
One typical patient o f each confabulation subgroup is br ief ly presented in 
Appendix A3 to illustrate the neuropathological, neuropsychological and 
behavioural characteristics o f each group. T w o additional, f u l l case descriptions o f 
one bilateral and one unilateral confabulating patient are presented in Chapters 6 
and 7 below. 
2.8 Discussion 
The investigations o f the present chapter aimed at presenting the 
confabulating and control patients recruited f o r the study and at examining their 
neuropathological and neuropsychological characteristics. The f i rs t major step 
towards these aims was the classification o f confabulation according to 
multidimensional qualitative behavioural criteria. Subsequently, confabulating 
patients were classified in distinct confabulation subgroups according to 
neuropathological and neuroradiological data. Furthermore, the demographic and 
neuropsychological characteristics o f each o f these subgroups were examined in 
detail and direct statistical comparisons were performed in order to contrast these 
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confabulating patients ('target' groups) w i th non-confabulating patients (control 
groups). Final ly, a quantifiable investigation o f the verbal confabulatory 
behaviour o f these groups was undertaken using an established Confabulation 
Battery (Dal la Barba, 1993b). The f indings o f these investigations, as wel l as the 
three specific hypotheses they addressed (see also Chapter 1), are discussed in 
turn below. 
2.8.1 The Qualitative Features o f Confabulat ion 
In the present study confabulation was observed f o l l o w i n g both amnesia-
related disorders (e.g. A C o A syndrome, Korsakof f syndrome) and 
neuropathologies typical ly associated w i t h 'right-hemisphere symptoms' , such as 
neglect and anosognosia fo r hemiplegia. These observations are consistent wi th 
previous studies on confabulation, which associate the symptom wi th 
neuropathologies causing amnesia, e.g. alcoholic Kor sako f f syndrome, A C o A 
aneurysms, as wel l as wi th a wide variety o f other syndromes, some invo lv ing no 
or minor memory defici t (Deluca, 2000; Hirstein, 2004; Johnson et al., 2000; see 
also Chapter 1). 
The present study applied multidimensional criteria to classify 
confabulating patients. These criteria, based on a combination o f various 
dichotomous distinctions o f confabulatory features described in previous studies 
(e.g. see Berlyne, 1972; Kopelman, 1987; Kraepelin, 1904; Schnider et al., 1996), 
included ratings o f confabulation frequency, plausibil i ty, novelty, convict ion level 
and production mode. It is noteworthy that these ratings corresponded to 
informat ion collected f r o m professionals and carers, as wel l as the subsequent 
quantitative investigation o f confabulation (see below). In addition, this 
classification permitted the study o f correlations between the ratings o f the 
confabulating patients on these behavioural measures. In particular, it was found 
that only confabulation novelty positively correlated w i t h production mode, 
suggesting that patients that produced false informat ion spontaneously, i.e. 
wi thout explici t probing, were also the ones more l ike ly to confabulate about 
novel informat ion, i.e. information unrelated to their l i f e or the experimental 
conditions and visa versa. These two dimensions have been associated before, 
albeit under different terms (Berlyne, 1972; Bonhoeffer, 1901 in Berlyne, 1972), 
but their association was not systematically studied (see Kopelman, 1987). The 
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fact that no other correlation was significant suggests that the various forms o f 
severe confabulation may be dissociable and simple dichotomous distinctions may 
not be suff ic ient to adequately classify confabulating patients. 
Furthennore, significant differences in certain confabulatory features were 
observed between the confabulation subgroups o f the study, as these were formed 
based on neuropathological data (see below). The confabulations o f Korsakof f 
patients seemed to be spontaneously produced less often than in the other groups 
and their content involved less novel informaf ion, although it is unclear how the 
chronic state and the prolonged hospitalisation o f these patients had influenced the 
quality o f their confabulations. The unilateral confabulating patients produced 
confabulations less frequently than the other groups. Final ly, bilateral 
confabulating patients showed high ratings o f confabulation across all measures, 
except f r o m Convic t ion , in which they showed a non-significant difference f r o m 
the other groups in being prone to easily abandon, mod i fy or even forget their 
false claims. These qualitative differences between the confabulation subgroups 
were accompanied by underlying neuroanatomical and neuropsychological 
differences (see below). 
2.8.2 Ouantitative Differences in Confabulation 
The formal assessment o f the memory domains affected by confabulation 
and the frequency o f its presence among patients were consistent w i th the 
behavioural ratings o f confabulation applied in the study, as described above. 
More specifically, confabulating patients confabulated in response to episodic, 
semantic memory and orientation questions, and although control participants also 
showed some confabulation during the battery, this tendency was signif icantly 
lower than that o f the confabulating patients. The small number o f control patients 
assessed in this study does not a l low definite conclusions, yet some tentative 
observations can be made based on the performance o f these groups. 
More specif ical ly, there was a tendency wi th in amnesic patients to 
produce more confabulations in response to Episodic Memory and Orientation 
questions, whi le frontal subjects tended to produce more confabulations in the 
' D o n ' t know ' sections. In the former case, one may assume that confabulations in 
episodic memory and orientation represented severe memory errors due to 
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amnesia. In the latter case, one may speculate that the poor executive control o f 
frontal control patients did not assist them in evaluating the d i f f i cu l t y o f the 
' D o n ' t know ' questions and compelled them to try to answer them (see also 
below). In both instances the outcome was similar. Patients were unable to access 
the appropriate informat ion to answer the questions (or not answer them). 
Based on the above, one may further speculate that confabulation 
represents the exaggerated and combined effect o f the above two tendencies, as 
both cognit ive d i f f icu l t ies , i.e. amnesia and executive dysfunction are present in 
confabulating patients (see below), indeed, confabulating patients produced the 
highest amount o f confabulation in these four sections and showed less 
confabulation in general and personal semantic questions (see also Dalla Barba, 
1993a; Dalla Barba et al., 1998; Fotopoulou et al . , 2004; Kopelman et al., 1997), 
In addition, one could assume, as Kopelman and colleagues have (1997), that 
these two impairments have related, yet distinct roles in the formation o f 
confabulatory tendencies, i.e. amnesia affects the availabili ty o f memories and 
executive dysfunction affects the selection and thus accessibility o f appropriate 
memories and the moni tor ing o f inappropriate responses. 
However, others have claimed that such differences in confabulation 
frequency are explained by a single impairment. More specifically, Moscovitch 
and Me lo (1997) argued that confabulating patients perform better in response to 
semantic than episodic questions because the former include specific probes and 
require less narrative description (e.g. 'When d id the 1 '^ Wor ld War start?' versus 
'What d id you do yesterday?'). Thus, they make fewer demands fo r e f fo r t fu l and 
goal-directed retrieval. According to these authors and others (Burgess & Shallice, 
1996; Conway & Tacchi, 1996) it is precisely this type o f 'strategic' or 
'generative' retrieval which is impaired in confabulating patients and thus leads 
them to confabulate predominately in response to episodic questions. More 
generally, the exact relation o f confabulation to the interaction o f memory and 
executive dysfunct ion is a complex issue which w i l l be further addressed in the 
f o l l o w i n g sections. However, it should be noted here that the utilisation o f both 
amnesic and frontal control patients (see also Kopelman et al . , 1997) appears to be 
an informative practice in the study o f confabulation. 
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The confabulation battery also showed that bilateral confabulating patients 
confabulated more than Kor sako f f patients who in turn confabulated more than 
right-hemisphere patients. This finding is also consistent w i th the behavioural 
ratings o f confabulation frequency described above, which had differentiated the 
amount o f confabulation produced by these three groups. Moreover, the results o f 
the battery revealed that bilateral confabulating patients d i f fered signif icant ly 
f r o m unilateral patients on the amount o f confabulation they produced. The 
difference between groups C I and C2 are not explicable by different ial cognitive 
deficits as these groups performed s imilar ly on most neuropsychological tests (see 
below), but the possibili ty remains that it relates to their different underlying 
neuropathologies, as wel l as to the chronic state o f the C2 patients' disease. The 
difference between unilateral and bilateral patients was supported by several 
differences in tests o f intelligence, memory and executive functions, and mostly 
by the relatively preserved verbal memoi^ and the impaired visuo-spatial abilities 
o f the C3 group (see below). Furthermore, the patients o f the unilateral 
confabulation subgroup showed lower mood than the other groups and described 
intense negative feelings o f anxiety. Given these observations, the f o l l o w i n g 
chapters w i l l investigate the role o f laterality in confabulation and the relation o f 
the two syndromes w i l l be further addressed by two respective case studies (see 
Chapters 6 and 7). The f o l l o w i n g sections examine the neuroanatomical and 
neuropsychological differences between confabulating and control patients, as 
wel l as between the confabulation subgroups wi th the aim o f addressing three 
main hypotheses (see also Chapter I ) . 
2.8.3 Hypothesis 1: Direct damage or functional disconnection, invo lv ing the 
ventromedial and orbi tofrontal cortices, is implicated in confabulation. 
This hypothesis was partly conf i rmed by the present study, in that 
confabulating patients had lesions invo lv ing mostly the orbital and medial 
prefrontal cortex and associated areas (see also .lohnson et al., 2000; Moscovi th & 
Melo, 1997; Schnider et al., 1996). However, the lesion localisation was not 
precise enough to a l low meaningful conclusions about the precise role o f this area 
in the production o f confabulation, over and above the role o f other adjusted or 
funct ional ly connected areas, such as the basal forebrain and other 'anterior l imbic 
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areas'. This issue is discussed below in the context of each the specific 
neuropathologies observed in the recruited confabulating patients. 
The orbital prefrontal cortex, including its medial and lateral portions, has 
received increased neuroscientific attention in the last decades. In humans, this 
region includes parts of Brodmann areas B A l I , B A I 2 , and BA47. Some regions 
of the orbitofrontal cortex (posterior parts of BAT 1-13) also form part of what is 
frequently referred to as 'the medial frontal lobes' (Mesulam, 2000). This is a 
heterogeneous cortical region and may be functionally segregated (Elliot et al., 
2000; Knight & Stuss, 2002; Ongur & Price, 2000). The region represents a 
confluence of the orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate complex (BA32 and BA35), 
and the dorsolateral heteromodal prefrontal cortex (BA9-I0) (Mesulam, 2000). 
Previous studies have used a number of different terms to describe these regions. 
In the following discussion, the term 'orbital and medial prefrontal cortex' 
(OMPFC) wil l be used to emphasise the overall function and organisation of the 
ventral surface of the frontal lobes and the ventral regions of the medial prefrontal 
cortex, and its difference from other regions, such as the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(see also Bechara et al., 2000; Rule et al., 2002). 
Various types of brain pathology were associated with confabulation in the 
present study. These included TBI, SAH haemorrhage caused by surgical 
treatment of ACoA aneurysms, or other causes such as TBI , alcoholic Korsakoff 
syndrome and anterior circulation strokes leading to isolated right-hemisphere 
lesions. Although these findings do not exhaust the list o f neuropathologies 
associated with confabulation, they are consistent by previous studies which 
identify them as among the most frequent causes of the symptom (for reviews see 
Feinberg & Roane, 1997; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002; Hirstein, 2004; Johnson et 
al., 2000). 
ACoA patients are known to have lesions in basal forebrain and the 
prefrontal cortex, with possible associated damage to the striatum (e.g. Alexander 
& Freedman, 1984; Beeckman, et al., 1998; Damasio et al., 1985; Diamond et al., 
1997; Irle et al., 1992; Phillips et al., 1987). However, the affected regions may 
vai7 significantly across patients (see Chapter 1). In the present study, the lesion 
localisation appeared similar to previous studies on confabulation in that the 
affected areas included mostly the OMPFC and associated areas (Johnson et al., 
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2000; Moscovith & Melo, 1997; Schnider et al., 1996). However, the lesion 
localisation was not precise enough to allow meaningful contrasts between the 
confabulating ACoA patients and the ACoA patients without confabulation or 
amnesic and frontal controls of other aetiologies. The same applied for the 
Korsakoff patients of the study, whose scans revealed mostly generalised changes. 
Thus, the lesion localisation was not precise enough to allow meaningful contrasts 
between the three amnesic confabulating Korsakoff patients and the amnesic 
patients of different aetiologies, which seemed to have lesions involving medial 
temporal lobe and diencephalic areas. 
One of the confabulating patients of the study had suffered severe hypoxia 
following cardiac arrest (patient BA). Hypoxia, caused by cardiac or respiratory 
arrest, as well as by various forms of poisoning, can give rise to a chronic and 
severe amnesic syndrome, recently thought of as caused by associated 
hippocampal and thalamic lesions (e.g. Aggleton & Saunders, 1997; Kopelman et 
al., 2001; Press, 1989; Kesler et al., 2001; Zola-Morgan et al., 1986). However, as 
a recent review highlights the sequelae of hypoxia includes variable and often 
widespread neuropathological and cognitive consequences (Caine & Wilson, 
2000; See also Kapur, 1994) and further detailed study is required before 
concluding which are the most likely circuits responsible for the occurring 
memory disorder and which is the exact nature of the latter (see also Kopelman, 
2002). In the present study the patient's extreme confabulation tendency was 
accompanied with indications of widespread atrophy and a focal lesion in the left 
frontal lobe. 
Two confabulating patients of the present study had suffered severe closed 
head injuries following road traffic accidents and continued to floridly confabulate 
following the acute stage of their recovei^y and a period of PTA (two and six 
months post-injui^). The neuropathology caused by severe close head injury 
frequently entails a significant degree of generalised cerebral damage, but focal 
lesions may also occur (see Chapter 1). TBI appears to be one of the most 
frequent aetiologies of transient confabulation (Johnson et al., 2000). In the 
present study, both patients showed extreme and persistent confabulation beyond 
an initial period of more generalised confusion and despite their neuropathological 
differences (e.g. RM showed a secondary SAH and underwent craniotomy for 
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increased intracranial pressure). Neuroimaging investigations revealed generalised 
changes but also focalised lesions in the medial aspects of the prefrontal cortex 
bilaterally (patient RM), as well as in the temporal lobes (both patients). 
Thus, although most of the patients of the bilateral confabulation group 
showed lesions involving the OMPFC, the additional presence of generalised 
damage or focal lesions in the temporal lobes and the inconclusive evidence of 
basal forebrain lesions did not allow meaningful conclusions regarding the 
specialised involvement of these areas (e.g. OMPFC versus basal forebrain or 
temporal lobe lesions) in confabulation. Informative differences in the 
neuropsychological performance of these groups wil l be discussed below. 
However, before discussing the neuropsychological performance of these 
bilateral patients, it is important to note that the third confabulation subgroup of 
the study presented a distinct underlying neuropathology. The three patients 
forming the unilateral confabulation group had isolated lesions in the right-
hemisphere, mostly involving the frontal and parietal lobes as well as basal 
ganglia structures. They showed the corresponding typical motor and cognitive 
symptoms: self-sided hemiplegia, left-sided visuo-spatial neglect and anosognosia 
of such deficits (see below). Transient anosognosia for hemiplegia is quite 
common following acute RH lesions but the chronic type described in two of the 
three right-hemisphere patients of the present study is less frequent (Berti et al., 
1996; Berti et al., 1998; Cocchini et al., 2002; Gold et al., 1994; Rode et al., 
1998). Confabulation has been linked with the right-hemisphere syndrome in 
previous studies (e.g. Critchley, 1953; Feinberg et al., 1994; Ramachandran, 
1995). Yet, no clear distinction exists between the two types of confabulatory 
behaviour (see Chapter I ) . Crucially, it is not understood whether the presence of 
confabulation in these two distinct syndromes is attributable to common 
neuroanatomical and neuropsychological factors, or whether it represents a 
common outcome caused by a combination of different lesions and deficits. Some 
authors propose a differentiation of these confabulatory syndromes (Deluca, 2000; 
Feinberg & Giacino, 1997; .lohnson et al., 2000) while other studies group 
together such patients (Schnider et al., 1996; Stuss et al., 1978). 
For example, Schnider and colleagues (1996) grouped together amnesic 
confabulating patients with right-hemisphere lesions, left-sided hemiplegia, hemi-
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neglect and corresponding AHP and confabulating patients of various other 
neuropathologies and bilateral lesions. They distinguished between patients based 
solely on their potential tendency to act upon their confabulations. Interestingly, 
they presented a spontaneously confabulating patient with a similar discrete right-
hemisphere lesion in the internal capsule. They claimed confabulation in the latter 
case was the result of a disconnection of the dorsomedial thamamic nucleus from 
the orbitofrontai cortex (see also Chapter 7). However, AO and the rest of the 
patients of the C3 group were not severely amnesic (see below), as Schnider's 
patients. In addition, as discussed above, the confabulatory behaviour of this 
group presented with different qualitative characteristics. It is possible that these 
behavioural differences relate to the different underlying neuropathology (see also 
Chapter 7), but given the small number of patients assessed in this study further 
investigation is required. The section below examines the neuropsychological 
basis of these differences. 
2.8.4 Hypothesis 2: Severe memory impairment commonly, but not necessarily 
accompanies confabulation and it is not sufficient for its occurrence. 
This hypothesis was confirmed. More specifically, bilateral confabulation 
subgroups showed severe deficits in memory. These deficits were not sufficient to 
cause confabulation, as the patients of the amnesic control group showed similar 
degree of impairment, but they did not confabulate. Moreover, these severe 
memory deficits were not necessary for the production of motor-related 
confabulation, as unilateral confabulating patients showed only selective memory 
problems. These results are discussed below. 
Bilateral confabulation subgroups showed severe deficits in memory, 
including orientation, learning of new information and autobiographical memory. 
Although the degree of their memory impairment was similar to that of the 
amnesic group, the nature of this deficit presented some differences from that of 
the latter control group. These results are consistent with previous studies on 
ACoA and Korsakoff patients, which have found memory impairments following 
such pathologies, yet they have shown that amnesia following these pathologies 
may differ in nature from classical descriptions of'temporal lobe or diencephalic 
amnesia' (for reviews see Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Kopelman, 2002; O'Connor 
& Veifaillie, 2002; Parkin & Leng, 1983; Victor et al., 1971). 
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Specifically, the CI and C2 groups were worse in orientation than the 
amnesic group and their answers were contaminated by confabulation. Their poor 
performance may be linked to their tendency to produce responses in a fast and 
automatic way, without apparently taking the time and effort to initiate 
appropriate retrieval searches, to place their answers into the right temporal 
context or to monitor and inhibit inappropriate responses. These observations 
would be consistent with the performance of these groups on tests of executive 
function (see below), and their neuropathologies which typically include lesions 
to the frontal lobes. However, confabulating patients performed worse than frontal 
control patients in orientation tasks suggesting that, in general terms, 
'dysexecutive' behaviour is not sufficient to explain their poor performance in 
orientation. The possibility of their defective performance on orientation tests 
being caused by specific temporal and spatial contextualisation difficulties (e.g. 
Korsakoff 1889; Van der Horst, 1932; Talland, 1961; 1965; Dalla Barba et al., 
1997) versus more severe or more specific executive dysfunction (than those of 
frontal non-confabulating patients, see below) remains an open question which 
cannot be addressed by the simple WMS-III measure and instead requires specific 
experimentation (see Dab et al., 1999; Dalla Barba et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 
1997; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Schnider et al., 1996; see also Chapter 4 below). 
The CI and C2 groups, as well as amnesic patients, also showed severe 
impairment in autobiographical memory. All three groups showed minimal recall 
of autobiographical events, with only the amnesic group showing some 
indications of a temporal gradient. This was more marked in the recollection of 
personal semantic information for all three groups. Interestingly bilateral 
confabulating patients appeared to recall personal semantic information slightly 
worse than amnesic patients. This finding could relate to their observed tendency 
to answer such questions with the wrong life-time period in mind and without the 
necessary abilities to monitor and correct such errors. However, the above 
differences between the groups should be interpreted with caution as the 
Autobiographical Memory Test could be sensitive to groups' age differences and 
the varying times of assessment following onset. For example, the marked 
difficulties of the Korsakoff group to remember events and information from their 
recent life could be associated with their anterograde amnesia given the fact that 
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these patients were assessed on average 10 years following the onset of their 
disease. 
Interestingly, bilateral confabulating patients showed significantly greater 
impairment than the frontal control group across all orientation, anterograde and 
autobiographical memory measures. This was particularly evident in the WMS-III 
orientation, auditory delayed recall and recognition measures, as well as all 
measures of personal semantic and autobiographical memory recall. By contrast, 
the frontal control group showed impaired performance on the immediate and 
delayed recall conditions of the Rey Complex Figure, but this could at least partly 
attributed to the perceptual organisation difficulties these patients showed during 
the copying condition. Such difficulties have been shown to be attributable to 
organisational problems, secondary to executive dysfunction (Diamond et al., 
1997). 
In summary, both bilateral confabulating patients and frontal controls 
showed some degree of new learning and remote memory impairment. However, 
this was more marked in the confabulating than the frontal control patients and in 
the former it appeared similar in degree to that of the amnesic group. These results 
indicate that confabulation in these patients was linked with severe retrograde and 
anterograde amnesia and hence are consistent with previous studies which 
indicate that amnesia is necessary for confabulation of this type to occur (Talland, 
1965; Talland et al., 1967; Vilkki et al., 1985; Deluca, 2000 for review). However, 
the present results also indicate that the presence of amnesia is not a sufficient 
condition for memory-related confabulation to occur. Instead, some specific 
memory dysfunction (e.g. temporality or strategic retrieval deficit) or the 
combination of additional deficits (e.g. see discussion on the Confabulation 
Battery above) may be causative of memory-related confabulation. 
By contrast, amnesia did not appear as a necessaiy condition for the 
occurrence of motor-related confabulation. The C3 group showed only selective 
memory deficits, including problems in orientation and new learning of visual 
information. Their defective performance in visual memory could be caused or at 
least exaggerated by their confirmed visual difficulties of non-neurological origin, 
as well as by their impaired perceptual organisation and visuo-constructional 
abilities. The latter is supported by their defective performance on the copying 
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component of the Rey Complex Figure and their low scores on the corresponding 
WAIS-III subtests. Thus, it appears that right-hemisphere patients did not show a 
generalised memory deficit, and thus their confabulation could not be explained in 
the same way as the one of the bilateral groups. However, one could argue that 
their impairment in perception and construction, and its resulting deficit in visual 
memory, may have led to the emergence of confabulation. This would also be 
consistent with the finding that in two out of three of the right-hemisphere patients 
assessed confabulation was accompanied by delusional misidentifications (See 
DO's case report in Appendix A3 and AO's case-study in Chapter 7). However, 
the findings of the present study do not fully confirm such hypothesis. First, these 
patients also showed problems in orientation comparable to the ones of bilateral 
amnesic patients. More crucially, the confabulations of these patients were not 
limited to their motor (hemiplegia) or perceptual (neglect) deficits (see also 
Confabulation Battery section below). Although impairment in visual memory 
could have contributed to the development of delusional misidentifications, 
further neurocognitive mechanisms need to be postulated in order to explain the 
recall of false autobiographical events in everyday life and during formal testing. 
2.8.5 Hypothesis 3: Executive dvsfunction is a common, but variable component of 
confabulatory syndromes. 
Bilateral confabulation groups showed a wide-ranging executive functions 
impairment as compared to normative data and amnesic controls. This was true 
for both the CI and C2 groups. Despite some demographic differences between 
these two groups they showed comparable degree of impairment in executive 
functions, although the pattern of impairment varied across tests. These findings 
imply that the neuropathologies of both groups caused structural or functional 
damage to frontal circuits, even though this was not detectable by neuroimaging 
investigations in every case. Similar impairments in executive functions have 
been noted in previous studies of confabulation (e.g. Beeckmans et al., 1998; 
Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Cunningham et al., 1997; Dab et al., 1999; Damasio et 
al., 1985; Fisher et al., 1995; Johnson et al., 2000; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Kern 
et al., 1992; Kopelman, 1987; Luria, 1976; Mercer et al., 1977; Moscovitch & 
Melo, 1997; Shapiro et al., 1981; Stuss et al., 1978). However the issue of whether 
confabulating patients can be distinguished from other frontal or amnesic non-
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confabulating patients on the basis of their performance in 'frontal' tests is less 
clear in the literature (see Dalla Barba et al., 1997; 1998; Kopelman et al., 1997; 
Moscovitch, 1995; Schnider, 2003; for discussions), as is the question of which 
aspects of the 'dysexecutive syndrome' are critical for confabulation to occur (see 
Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Kopelman et al., 1997; 
Moscovitch, 1995 for discussions; see also Chapter 1). 
In the present study, confabulating patients performed worse than frontal 
control patients on a variety of tests of executive functions but these differences 
were significant only on certain tests and conditions. These included measures of 
cognitive flexibility, such as verbal fluency (semantic fluency measure and error 
measures) and set-shifting errors (sorting perserveration measure), certain aspects 
of inductive and deductive reasoning, concept formation and abstract thinking 
(Word Context, 20 Questions D-KEFS subtests and the Cognitive Estimates Test, 
but not the Proverbs subtest or the description condition of the Sorting subtests) 
and a demanding test of simultaneous application of inhibition and switching 
abilities. This complex pattern of impairment does not allow precise behavioural-
anatomical conclusions, as the above deficits have being linked with lesions to 
distinct prefrontal cortex areas. However, according to the proposal of Stuss and 
colleagues (2002), the striking difference in the performance of confabulating 
patients between the semantic and letter fluency tasks, not shown by the frontal 
controls, suggests that the confabulating patients had lesions in the 'anterior 
medial' (OMPFC) and not the superior medial or the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex. These observations are consistent with both the neuropatholoical data of 
this study (see above), as well as previous studies on confabulation (Damasio et 
al., 1985; Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Schnider et al., 1996). Crucially, these 
findings are consistent with the clinical observations about the poor emotional 
inhibition and self-regulation of these patients, their lack of insight into their 
postmorbid condition and their poor social conduct. These impairments are less 
understood than other prefrontal cortex symptoms and very few assessment tools 
have been developed for their investigation (see Bechara et al., 2000; Knight & 
Stuss, 2002, for discussion). Nevertheless, recent studies have linked such 
behavioural problems with the orbitofrontal and ventromedial regions of the 
prefrontal cortex (see Bechara et al., 2000; Berlin et al., 2004; Rolls et al., 2000; 
Shimamura et al., 2000; Tranel et al., 2002). The following experimental chapters 
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of this thesis wi l l address the potential functional role of these regions in 
confabulation (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
Finally, although the assessment of executive functions in the three 
unilateral confabulating patients was complicated by their visual, visuo-
constructive and emotional problems, the main executive functions impairment of 
the patients of this group appeared to be their difficulty to inhibit and monitor 
automatic responses and their ability to systematically search and repeatedly 
retrieve information from a given semantic category. These deficits were also 
observed in bilateral confabulating patients. Most crucially, this group also 
showed difficulties in insight, social conduct and emotional regulation. While 
bilateral patients showed generalised indifference and lack o f motivation, with 
spells of euphoria or irritability, unilateral patients were constantly overwhelmed 
by anxiety and negative feelings, and were extensively preoccupied with their 
surroundings and their treatment (despite denying their disabilities). Both groups 
showed socially inappropriate behaviour. 
In conclusion, executive dysfunction as measured by standardised 'frontal 
tests' was associated with both memory- and motor-related confabulation, but the 
pattern of impairment across tests and across patients was too varied to allow 
reliable differentiation of confabulating patients from other non-confabulating 
frontal patients and it was not sufficient to explain its occurrence (Hypothesis 2). 
Instead, confabulation may relate to a more specific impairment in affective 
regulation, linked with lesions to the OMPFC. Finally, it is important to note, that 
given the small number of amnesic and frontal patients addressed in the present 
study and the varied results of the tests administered, these findings should be 
treated as indications for further study rather than reliable conclusions. 
2.8.6 Summary & Conclusions 
The study assessed thirteen patients with indications of confabulation. All 
patients showed severe forms of confabulation, as rated on a number of qualitative 
dimensions, including frequency, novelty, plausibility, conviction and production 
mode and were differentiated from a number of frontal and amnesic controls 
based on these behavioural criteria. These qualitative distinctions were confirmed 
by quantitative investigations, which also revealed that confabulating patients 
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confabulated mostly about autobiographical information and facts, but also in 
response to semantic memory questions. Among the confabulating patients 
confabulation tendencies were more pronounced in patients with bilateral lesions, 
although these patients showed less conviction in their confabulations. The 
symptom disappeared or was substantially reduced in most of these patients 
following a few months. Confabulation was less frequent in Korsakoff patients 
and produced more often by questioning. However, these patients were tested 
while in the chronic state of their disease. Finally, in patients with isolated right-
hemisphere lesions confabulation was mostly motor-related and it extended to 
autobiographical memory less frequently. It also showed a number of other 
qualitative differences, it was accompanied by delusional false beliefs and in two 
out of the three recruited cases the symptom was persistent several months 
following its onset. 
The neuroanatomical region most commonly identified by neuroimaging 
investigations as damaged in confabulating patients was the OMPFC and 
associated areas of the anterior limbic system. However, lesion localisation in 
some patients was not precise enough to allow definite conclusions regarding the 
neuroanatomical basis of confabulation. Thus, these findings provide only partial 
support for the first hypothesis of the study. However, this hypothesis received 
additional support from the clinical observations and the neuropsychological 
assessment of the confabulating patients, which revealed deficits in emotional 
regulation and 'frontal functions' associated with the OMPFC. More general 
executive dysfunction was present in all confabulating patients, but great 
variability was observed across tests and between patients. In addition, no clear 
pattern of executive functions deficit differentiated confabulating patient from 
non-confabulating frontal controls, although some interesting differences were 
observed. Thus, executive dysfunction as measured by 'frontal tests' might be a 
necessary, but not a sufficient component of confabulation. Finally, some degree 
of memory impairment was observed in all confabulating patients, but clinical 
amnesia was not sufficient to explain confabulation and it was not even necessary 
for the production of motor-related confabulation. 
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Chapter 3 : Positive Emotional Bias in 
Confabulation 
Wishful Reality Distortions in Confabulation 
"Since the syndrome occurs in relation to an exogenous cause, and since 
definite neuropathology' is present, it is easy to "see" that the mental 
symptoms are strictly related to the organic fmdings of the brain; 
consequently, one loses sight of the possible emotional aspects of the disorder. 
Indeed, the voluminous literature on the subject carries only scattered 
references to the role of affectivity in the problem. However, having observed 
patients with Korsakojf syndrome daily in hospital over a period of many 
years, I became first conscious - and later - convinced of the role of 
affectivity in the release of the syndrome. " 
G. M. Davidson, M.D., 1948 Psychiatiy Quarterly 
3.1 Introduction 
Classic neurological and psychiatric descriptions of confabulation include 
several indications of wishful, grandiose or self-serving content (e.g. Berlyne, 
1972; Betlheim & Hartman, 1924; Clarke, Wyke, & Zangwill, 1958 in Talland, 
1961; Flament, 1957, in Berlyne, 1972; Moll, 1915; Weinstein, Kahn, & Malitz, 
1956; see also Chapter I : Introduction). Flowever, most recent models of 
confabulation do not directly address this issue (Fotopoulou et al., 2004 for 
review). Evidence from recent single-case studies (e.g. Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004) suggest that confabulation may be motivated and subject 
to emotional biases. In addition, these studies emphasise the significance of 
considering the relation between impaired cognitive functions and emotional or 
'self biases in confabulation (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Downes & Mayes, 1995; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 
2004a). 
The following experiment, based on a methodology developed by 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2004), aims to address one crucial aspect of 
confabulatory content, namely its emotional valence. Although different 
laboratories have observed positive self-bias in single-case studies (Conway & 
Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000) and in a 
metaanalysis (Turnbull et al., 2004a), the valence of confabulation has never been 
directly investigated in a group study. In addition, potential differences in valence 
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between different confabulatory syndromes (e.g. memory-related versus motor-
related confabulation) have not been examined. 
The method developed below also addresses the complex issue of 'control ' 
investigations in confabulation: confabulation in neurologically healthy subjects 
or neurological non-confabulating subjects, e.g. amnesic non-confabulating 
controls, can only be studied in experimental condifions which guide the 
production of false memories. However, existing experimental paradigms that 
elicit false memories in controls (Barclay & DeCooke, 1988; Loftus, 1993; 
Loftus, Miller ,& Burns, 1978; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Suengas & Johnson, 1988) 
do not require the controls to generate material from their own autobiography. 
Typically, all (Heaps & Nash, 2001; Hyman & Billings, 1998; Hyman & 
Pentland, 1996; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988; Kopelman, 1987; 
Suengas & Johnson, 1988) or only some of (Conway, Collins, Gathercole & 
Anderson, 1996) the false and true events tested are chosen, constructed and/or 
manipulated by the experimenters (see also Lampinen, Neuschatz & Payne, 1998; 
Pezdek, Finger & Hodge, 1997). To address this problem, the present study 
proposes a method of eliciting false memories in control subjects that allows them 
to spontaneously choose the theme, temporal reference, importance, amount of 
detail and emotional valence of each memory produced. 
In summary, this experiment will address the fourth main hypothesis of the 
study, namely the content of spontaneous confabulation is wishful, i.e. it shows a 
positive emotional bias (see Chapter 1). With this aim, the study will compare the 
valence of confabulations in three experimental groups (confabulating patients, 
non-confabulating amnesic controls and healthy controls). 
3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Ten confabulating patients of the thirteen forming the Confabulation 
Group (see Chapter 2) were tested (it was not possible to test patients MS, IR and 
PT due to time restrictions). This group was also subdivided into three subgroups 
based on neuropathological data, confabulation criteria and neuropsychological 
performance (see Chapter 2): The Bilateral Group (N = 7), consisting of the three 
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Korsakoff patients of the confabulation group (C2 subgroup) and the rest of the 
bilateral patients (CI subgroup) and the C3, Unilateral Confabulation subgroup (N 
= 3). The amnesic (N =3) control groups (see Chapter 2) were tested as control 
subjects. The frontal control group was not included in this experiment as the 
control task was judged as cognitively too demanding for the patients in this 
group. Ten healthy subjects, individually matched to the confabulating patients for 
sex, age and educational level, were also recruited as control subjects. They were 
3 females and 7 males, with mean age 58.4 years (SD 18.3) and mean years of 
education 10.8 (SD 1.8). Al l subjects, including raters (see below), gave written 
informed consent. 
3.2.2 Materials 
Confabulations were elicited and measured in both confabulating patients 
and controls using and adapting the method developed by Fotopoulou and 
colleagues (2004): 
Confabulating Patients: Each patient underwent one 45- to 90-minute 
interview. These interviews were unstructured and minimally guided. The 
examiner's role was restricted to introducing her interest in the patient's life and 
memory and setting initial everyday conversational questions. The patients were 
allowed to choose the theme, temporal reference, amount of detail and emotional 
valence of each topic discussed. During the interview the examiner refiected 
patients' statements and asked for clarifications when necessary but did not 
confirm or contradict their claims, and maintained a neutral reaction to all 
statements. The intei-views aimed at obtaining representative samples of the 
patients' confabulations, as these spontaneously occurred in their everyday 
interactions. The interviews were digitally recorded on a mini-disk recorder and 
fully transcribed. 
An unselected, consecutive list of the first 20 confabulations, as these 
occurred in the transcripts of each patient, was selected with the aid of relatives, 
staff and medical files. Inclusion criteria were false memories or beliefs stated by 
the patient regarding any past, present or future object (event or fact), as 
determined by the verified information provided by relatives, caring staff and 
medical notes. Exclusion criteria included correct information (non-confabulatory 
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valid memories or thoughts) or information impossible to check by available 
corroboration sources and contradicting the corresponding 'true' information. 
However, incoherent or obscure confabulatory statements were not excluded from 
the list, since this would require arbitrary decisions by the experimenter. Instead, 
the raters themselves were given the option to characterise statements as 'unclear/ 
impossible to judge' (see below). The sequence of the confabulatory material was 
preserved for each patient as the natural unfolding of the conversations often 
revealed the bizarreness of a memory, or helped establish its implausibility. 
Ten different lists of 20 confabulations were formed, one for each patient. 
The confabulated statements were set in bold letters, for purposes of 
identification. Each confabulation was accompanied by information about the 
context in which it arose, e.g. the more general topic of discussion at the moment, 
as well as (verified) 'real' information, set in parentheses. Relatives, staff or 
medical files provided the 'real' informafion distorted or replaced by the 
corresponding confabulation. For example, when patient BA claimed that he has 
only one child, his wife and his medical notes indicated that he in fact has two. 
Similarly, when RM claimed he was 'player of the year' for three consecutive 
years at school his mother confirmed that this was true, but only for one year (see 
Appendix B l for more examples). 
Controls: Amnesic control patients and healthy controls were asked to 
'simulate' confabulations in the following way: Initially, they were instructed to 
recall 20 self-referential memories of their choice. Participants were told that their 
memories could involve any topic of their lives, could be recent or remote, short 
or long, important or trivial, emotional or neutral. After each subject had 
completed this task their statements were read out back to them and they were 
asked to alter each statement consecutively in a way that led to the creation of 
false memories. These were defined as self-referential events or facts, which 
distorted the past experience in some way or which were completely incongruent 
with the original memory statement. Participants were told that the 'falsification' 
of their memories could be performed by distorting the existing facts, inventing, 
adding or subtracting information, mixing different events or thoughts between 
them, or by placing events in a wrong temporal or spatial context. Thus, the 
resulting false memories could have vaiying degrees of consistency with the 
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participants' previous statements, depending on their choice. The essential 
requirement was that their second statements altered the first ones in at least one 
aspect. The goal of this procedure was to 'teach' control subjects how to produce 
self-referenfial false memories that were similar in nature to spontaneous 
confabulations (as produced by patients) and yet had content that was chosen at 
wi l l . 
To assist controls further in understanding and appropriately carrying out 
the task, confabulation examples were randomly selected from the transcripts and 
read out to them. These included one confabulation from each patient's transcripts 
and were presented to controls accompanied by 'verification' information. The 
latter true statements about each patient were first read out to controls followed by 
the corresponding confabulation each patient had produced (see Appendix B2). 
These showed great variability in content and other memory characteristics e.g. 
emotional valence, temporal reference and degree of reality distortion. These 
differences were pointed out to the subjects, and it was explained that they could 
construct false memory statements in any, some or all of these possible ways 
depending on their preferences. The goal of this procedure was to provide control 
participants with a random and rich repertory of confabulation types. 
Controls' statements were recorded verbatim and for each of the 13 
control participants (3 amnesic and 10 healthy participants), a list of 20 false 
statements, each followed by corresponding reality information, was constructed. 
The overall questionnaire format was identical to that of confabulating patients 
(see Appendices B3 and B4). 
3.2.3 Scoring 
The 23 'confabulation' lists, here referring also to false statements 
generated by controls, were assembled together in random order and presented to 
two nai've raters (judges) as 'false memories that different neurological patients 
have produced'. The judges were two postgraduate students at the University of 
Durham (non-psychology students), one male and one female, ages 33 and 29 
years respectively. They were volunteers, blind to the hypotheses of the 
experiment and were paid for participating in the study. 
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The judges were asked to rate whether the 'self (in this context defined as 
self-representation, i.e. the representation of one's own identity, character, social 
image and position, psychological and physical state etc) in the confabulated 
events described by patients and controls, in comparison with the 'self in the 
corresponding reality (i.e., the events and facts distorted or replaced by 
confabulations), was described as positive (enhanced self-representation) or 
negative (diminished self-representation). Self-enhancement and diminution were 
defined based on a long tradition of measuring self-representations in 
autobiographical memory (e.g. McAdams, 2001; Nelson, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 
2003). More specifically, self-enhancement was defined as a self-representation 
that included a positive outcome for the self or a decidedly positive-affect state. 
Examples included: pleasure, growth, efficacy, confidence, understanding, 
recoveiy, gain, praise, recognition, learning, improvement, gratification, and 
strengthening of desired interpersonal relations or ultimate concerns (e.g. religious 
beliefs). By contrast, self-diminution was defined as a self-representation that 
included a negative outcome for the self or a decidedly negative-affect state. 
Examples included: displeasure, reduction, decrease, incompetence, fear, anger, 
sadness, fall, loss, deterioration, insult, offence, abuse, annoyance, and weakening 
of desired interpersonal relations or ultimate concerns. Ratings were given on a 7-
point Likert-type scale, anchored at 1 = Extremely Negative to 7 = Extremely 
Positive. In cases when the raters were unable to make a judgement, they were 
asked to characterise these 'confabulations' as "Impossible to judge". Finally, the 
option was provided for the raters to make any qualitative comments regarding 
their judgement. 
The following example illustrates the format and rating procedure of the 
confabulation questionnaire. Thus, in the following instance the judges had to 
decide, using the 7-point scale, whether WM's false statement regarding his 
reason for hospital attendance that morning was more positive or more negative 
for his self-representation than the corresponding reality, which in this case was 
the fact that he was in the hospital for a neurological examination: 
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Example: WM, Confabulation 4 
The patient believes his deceased parents are alive but lost. While talking to the 
examiner about them he suddenly asks: 
"Would you be able to help me find them? This is what I am here for, isn't it" 
[No, I am afraid I wouldn't be able to help you. Is that why you are here today?] 
"I've come for my sister, bringing er, the child. To help her, you know. She is 
ill". 
[In reality, the patient had an out-patient appointment with the neurologist that 
morning and a subsequent session arranged with the examiner. His sister and her 5-
year old daughter were accompanying him. They were not present during this 
examination and neither of them was i l l . ] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or 
more negative in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative 1—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
1(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positivel 
This particular confabulation received a mean rating of 5 (see Appendix 
Bl for more examples). 
In summary, this experiment used the above method of collecting and 
rating confabulation material, in order to compare the valence of confabulations 
(dependent variable) in three experimental groups (confabulating patients, non-
confabulating amnesic controls and healthy controls) (independent variable). 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Inter-rated Reliability 
Inter-rated reliability, calculated using Pearson's correlation, resulted in a 
satisfactory reliability coefficient for self-representation rating of + .84. In order 
to avoid confounding the data analysis with confabulations that raters had 
evaluated as "Impossible to judge", i f a confabulation was scored as such by both 
raters this was excluded from the analysis. In the case that only one of the raters 
could not judge a confabulation they discussed their different perspectives. More 
generally, in cases of disagreement the following rules were followed: I f the two 
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raters had judged a particular confabulation as positive or as negative, but their 
ratings differed in degree (e.g. rater A = 5 and rater B = 6, or rater A = 1 and rater 
B = 2) then the mean was calculated. The same applied to the cases where one of 
the raters had judged a given confabulation as neutral and the other had rated it as 
positive or as negative (e.g. rater A = 4 and rater B = 5). When, however, the two 
raters had rated a confabulation on opposite sides of the scale (e.g. one as positive 
and the other as negative) then they were asked to discuss their differences. The 
same applied to cases when only one rater had found a confabulation impossible 
to judge. 
Kruskal-Wallis, non-parametric tests were used to analyse the differences 
in valence ratings for the three experimental groups (Confabulation, Amnesic and 
Healthy Controls). Planned contrasts between the bilateral confabulation 
subgroups and the controls groups and between the unilateral confabulation 
subgroup and the control groups were also performed to locate the origin of the 
overall differences between the groups. These were based on the differences in 
quality of confabulation and neuropsychological performance observed between 
the bilateral and unilateral confabulation subgroups (see Chapter 2). The critical 
level was corrected for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni adjustments. 
Frequencies were calculated based on the 7-point scale. Mean ratings 
equal or below 4.5 (approximating the 4/7 Likert mid-point) were considered non-
positive, while mean ratings above 4.5 were considered positive. Chi-square 
goodness-of-fit tests were performed for the ratings of each group to assess 
whether the groups showed valence preferences. 
3.3.2 Amount of Positive Versus Non-positive Confabulations 
The frequencies and corresponding percentages of positive versus non-
positive confabulatory self-representations for each group were calculated. Figure 
3-1 below depicts the percentages of positive and non-positive self-
representations in each of the experimental groups. 
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Figure 3-1. Percentages of positive and non-positive self-representation ratings 
across groups 
Confabulating patients produced in total 113 positive confabulations and 
only 65 non-positive confabulations; 22 of their statements were judged as 
impossible to rate (see Appendix B5 for patients" individual scores). Binomial 
goodness-of-fit tests for each group revealed significant differences in valence for 
the confabulation group, /; < .05, but not for the amnesic, p = .3, or the healthy 
controls, p = .9. Frequencies of positive versus non-positive self-representations 
were also calculated for the confabulation subgroups. Binomial goodness-of-fit 
tests revealed significant differences in valence for the CI subgroup, p < .0001, 
and the C2 subgroup, p < .005, but not the C3 subgroup, p = .3. These results 
indicate that the statistically significant difference in the number of positive 
versus non-positive confabulatory self-representations found in the confabulation 
group was mainly attributable to the behaviour of bilateral confabulation 
subgroups. Interestingly, while unilateral confabulating patients produced more 
positive self-representations in their confabulations these were accompanied by an 
almost equal number of negative confabulations and very few neutral 
confabulations. 
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3.3.3 The Degree of Emotional Bias 
The mean valence ratings of each of the confabulating patients with 
bilateral lesions (subgroups CI and C2) was greater than 5, except patient CM 
whose mean was 4.5. By contrast the three unilateral patients had means that 
ranged between 3 and 5, while amnesic patients had means ranging between 4 and 
5, as did most of the healthy participants (see Appendix B6 for individual scores). 
The mean valence ratings of each group are shown on Table 3-1 below. 
Table 3-1. Mean valence ratings by group. 
Group Valence 
N Mean SD 
Confabulation Group & 
Subgroups 
Total 10 4.8 0.8 
C1- Bilateral lesions 4 5,4 0.4 
C2- Korsakoff 3 5.1 0.7 
C3- Unilateral lesions 3 3,8 0.5 
Control Groups 
Amnesic Controls 3 4.4 0.1 
Healthy Controls 10 4.6 0.3 
The confabulation group showed on average higher valence ratings than 
amnesic and healthy control participants. However, a non-parametric, Kruskal-
Wallis, test with Group (Confabulation, Amnesic and Healthy Control groups) as 
the between-subjects factor, revealed these differences were not significant, x'(2) 
= 1.9, p = .4. The bilateral confabulation groups showed on average higher 
positive ratings than unilateral confabulating patients and a Kruskall-Wallis test 
with Subgroup as the between-subjects factor ( C I , C2 and C3) showed that these 
differences were significant, x'(2) = 9, p < .05. Thus, the three subgroups were 
compared with control groups in a subsequent different analysis. A Kruskall-
Wallis test with group as the between-subjects factor ( C I , C2, C3, amnesic 
patients and healthy controls) revealed significant differences in valence between 
the groups, x'(4) = 14.2, p < .01. Planned contrasts, using corrected critical alpha 
level a = .025, further revealed that the bilateral confabulation subgroups (CI and 
C2) showed significantly higher valence than the control group.s, x~ (3) = 9.8, p < 
.025, while the valence ratings for the unilateral confabulation subgroup (C3) 
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were not significantly lower than those for the control groups, (2) = 14.2, p = 
.06. 
3.3.4 Valence & Mood 
In order to assess whether the above valence ratings of spontaneously 
produced confabulations related to patients' mood, as measured by the HADS, 
(see Chapter 2 and also see Appendix B7 for individual scores) Pearson 
correlational analysis were performed. There was no significant statistical 
association between the valence ratings and the depression HADS scores in the 
confabulation, r = - . 1 , n = 10, jC = .7 or in the amnesic group, r = .6, = , p = .6. 
There was also no significant statistical association between the valence ratings 
and the depression HADS scores in the confabulation, r = - .2, n = 10,>p = .7 or in 
the amnesic group, r = .9, = , p = .4. 
In summary, the above results indicate that whilst most groups showed a 
bias in including more positive self-representations in their false memories than in 
their real memories, there was a statistically significant difference in the number 
of positive representations that confabulating patients included in their false 
statements. This was mainly attributable to the bilateral confabulation subgroups 
(CI and C2), which produced more positive rather than negative or neutral self-
representations in their confabulations than any other group. In addition, the 
confabulations of these subgroups were more positive in degree than those of the 
control groups. Amnesic non-confabulating patients and healthy controls did not 
show emotional biases of such magnitude in their results, although similarly to the 
bilateral confabulating patients they did show a tendency to represent themselves 
in more positive terms during false memory construction. By contrast, unilateral 
confabulating patients produced more negative confabulations than any other 
group and the overall valence mean of their confabulations was more negative 
than that of the control groups, although not significantly so. These differences in 
confabulation valence were not associated with differences in mood. 
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3.4 Discussion 
The findings of the above study confirm the hypothesis that confabulating 
amnesic patients show a positive emotional bias in their confabulations 
(Hypothesis 4, Chapter 1). In particular, in their false memories patients show the 
tendency to present themselves in more positive (self-enhancing) terms. This 
tendency was also observed in the false memories constructed by healthy control 
participants and amnesic non-confabulating patients but to a significantly lesser 
degree. This investigation represents the first group study, known to the author, to 
demonstrate experimentally a positive emotional bias in confabulation. In 
addition, these results supplement the similar findings of a previous single-case 
study of wishful confabulation (Fotopoulou, et al., 2004) and a retrospective study 
of published cases (see Turnbull et al., 2004a). Finally, these findings provide the 
grounds for meaningful comparisons between emotional bias in neurological 
confabulation and normal memory distortion. These issues wil l be briefly 
discussed in turn below and further addressed in the final Discussion chapter of 
the thesis (Chapter 8). 
3.4.1 Wishful Content: Positive Emotional Bias in Confabulation 
The hypothesis that confabulation is motivated is almost as old as the 
description of the symptom itself and has taken various, but not always equivalent 
forms (See Chapter 1: Introduction). For example, Bonhoeffer already in 1901 (in 
Berlyne, 1972) stated that confabulation represents a motivated ad hoc attempt to 
cover up memory gaps and escape the embarrassment introduced by amnesia. 
Williams and Rupp (1938) argued in favour of premorbid personality influences 
in confabulation and Weinstein and colleagues (1955; 1956) saw the symptom as 
a purely psychopathological mechanism serving to deny the devastating facts of 
injury. A series of other authors ascribed motivation a primary, or at least 
secondary, role in the production of confabulation (e.g. Betlheim & Hartmann, 
1924; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Davidson, 1948; Gainotti, 1975; Linz, 1942 in 
Berlyne, 1972; Moll , 1915; Van der Worst, 1932). 
More importantly for the present chapter, whether the above studies 
consider confabulation motivated or not (i.e. they consider motivation as causative 
of confabulation or not), several studies have presented clinical observations of 
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emotionally biased confabulations (i.e. they have documented the phenomenon). 
These descriptions emphasise that the produced falsifications involve mostly 
issues of great affective stamp (Mercer et al, 1977) or marked personal 
significance (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Clarke, Wyke, 
& Zangwill, 1958; Downes & Mayes, 1995). Confabulations also include personal 
grandiose references (Berlyne, 1972; Clarke, Wyke, & Zangwill, 1958, in 
Talland, I96I) , metaphorical representations of current problems (Betlheim & 
Hartman, 1924; Jorn & Rybarczyk, 1995; Sabhesan & Natarajan, 1988; 
Weinstein, 1996; Weinstein et al, 1956), "autobiographic information more 
appropriate to the patient's ideal than actual s e l f (Talland, 1961) or, aspects of 
past experience that have been important sources of self or social identity and that 
have provided significant channels of social relatedness (Conway & Tacchi, 
1996; Gainotti, 1975; Moscovitch, 1989; Moll , 1915). 
Nevertheless, until recently no direct experimental evidence supported 
such clinical descriptions. The findings of the present group-study, building upon 
recent case-repoits (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Solms, 
2000; Turnbull et al., 2004a), show that the content of confabulation is indeed, as 
some clinicians have reported, largely pleasant and self-enhancing. Furthermore, 
this emotional bias appeared to be independent of patients' mood. This finding 
further suggests that the role of emotions in confabulation requires further 
investigation. Moreover, as psychological and neuroscientific knowledge of both 
emotions and of memory has progressed significantly, the issue of motivation in 
confabulation could be updated, re-defined and re-addressed in the context of 
current perspectives on the relation between memory and emotion. This 
perspective wil l be further elaborated in Chapter 8. 
3.4.2 Valence & Confabulation Subgroups 
Before proceeding to the following chapter it is important to highlight and 
discuss that despite the overall valence effects, not all confabulation subgroups 
showed positive emotional bias in their false memories. Confabulating patients 
with bilateral lesions with (CI subgroup) and without (C2 subgroup) Korsakoff 
syndrome showed marked positive einotional biases in their confabulatory self-
representations, despite their demographic and neuropathological differences and 
consistently with their similar performance in relevant neuropsychological tests. 
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This bias was positive on average across patients but also across each patient's 
confabulations. Instead, the above findings indicate that there was a difference in 
confabulatory content between confabulating patients with amnesia and bilateral 
prefrontal cortex damage and confabulating patients with unilateral lesions and 
without generalised amnesia. The latter showed on average, as well as 
individually a negative emotional bias in their confabulations, albeit not 
significant in comparison with controls. Despite the small number of unilateral 
confabulating patients assessed in this study this finding calls for attention and it 
wil l be further investigated in Chapters 5 and 7. 
3.4.3 Valence & Mood 
Turnbull and colleagues (2004b) have suggested that the production of 
wishful confabulations is most frequently associated with instances of decreased 
mood. However, in the present study there was no association between 
confabulation valence and negative mood (anxiety and depression levels). 
Nevertheless, the assessment of mood in the present study was limited to the 
HADS results. Further study with wider assessment of mood states, including 
positive dimensions, is required in order to investigate the relationship between 
mood and valence in confabulation. This issue is further addressed in Chapter 5. 
3.4.4 Summary 
The findings of this experiment confirmed the hypothesis that 
confabulating patients show a positive emotional bias in their spontaneous 
confabulations. In particular, in their false memories bilateral prefrontal patients 
patients show the tendency to present themselves in more positive (self-
enhancing) terms. This tendency was also observed in the false memories 
constructed by healthy control participants and amnesic non-confabulating 
patients but to a significantly lesser degree. There was a valence difference in 
confabulatory content between confabulating patients with amnesia and bilateral 
prefrontal cortex damage and confabulating patients with unilateral lesions and 
without generalised amnesia. These issues are further investigated in the 
following two experimental group-studies (Chapters 4 and 5) and are further 
discussed in the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8). 
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Chapter 4 : The Role of Emotions in Temporal 
Confusion 
'The stuff that confabulations are made of 
"1 ha\>e done that' says my memory. 7 cannot have done that' says my pride, and 
remains inexorable. 
Eventually-memoiy yields ". 
Nietzsche (Beyond Good & Evil. 19H6/1966, p. 80) 
'Who controls the past", ran the Party Slogan, "controls the future: who controls the 
present controls the past". 
Onvell (•1984\ 1949 p 32) 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the earlier explanations of confabulation stresses the inability of 
confabulating patients to retrieve events in their appropriate temporal context 
(Korsakoff 1889/1996; Van der Horst, 1932; see also Talland, 1961). More 
specifically, it suggests that confabulating patients may have lost the 'temporal 
signposts' that normally allow individuals to retrieve events in their proper 
temporal order and context. Instead, confabulating patients tend to retrieve 
experiences of irrelevant chronological frames and falsely combine events and 
information relating to separate experiences or even lifetime periods. This 
hypothesis has been recently revived and further developed in two different 
versions (see Chapter 1 for detailed description of these theories). In a series of 
studies Dalla Barba and colleagues (see Dalla Barba, 2001 for review) have 
suggested that it is not chronology itself that is impaired in confabulating patients. 
Instead, the critical impairment in confabulation is the experience of time flow in 
consciousness, i.e. subjective temporality. In a compromised state, patients' 
consciousness cannot complete the adequate tasks required to utilise normally a-
temporal information and memory traces to set up a personal temporal framework. 
Relying on a well-replicated experimental design, Schnider and colleagues (see 
Schnider, 2003 for review) proposed a similar view of confabulation. In a series 
of experimental studies they showed that confabulating patients could not 
distinguish between memories that pertained to ongoing reality and memories that 
did not. More specifically, confabulators appeared unable to inactivate evoked 
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memories that did not pertain to current reality and therefore they continuously 
retained in consciousness presently irrelevant memories. 
Despite their potential differences the above models share three underlying 
assumptions, which wil l be addressed by the present study: 
1. Confabulations always derive from actual past experiences misplaced in time 
or erroneously assorted with events from different periods. 
2. Severely confabulating patients do not differ from amnesic, non-confabulating 
controls on executive functions tests (Schnider et al., 1996; Schnider, 2003) 
and 'frontal lobe' pathology is not necessary for confabulation to occur (e.g. 
Dalla Barbaetal., 1993b; 1999) 
3. The cognitive impairment that restrains confabulating patients from retrieving 
temporally appropriate information should lead to a random selection and 
retrieval of currently irrelevant and thus false events (or at least to a random 
selection within the limits of habitual and personal semantic information; 
Dalla Barba et al., 1997). 
The first assumption, which lies at the heart of distinctions between 
confabulation and fabrication (Talland, 1961), or between simple versus fantastic 
confabulation (Berlyne, 1971), is not supported by a number of studies which 
documented confabulations unrelated to patients' previous experiences (Damasio 
etal., 1985; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 1997; Moll , 1915; Villieurs 
et al., 1996; see Chapter 1 for discussion). By contrast, the similar yet less 
restrictive theory put forward by .lohnson and colleagues (Johnson et al., 1997; 
2000) maybe more appropriate for describing confabulation in both forms, i.e. as 
true memories misplaced in context and as false memories erroneous in 
themselves (Kopelman, et al., 1997). This theory postulates that is not only 
temporal context or conscious temporality that is erroneously attributed to 
confabulated memories. Instead, confabulations could derive from a variety of 
source or context misattributions, including the misattribution of 'reality' to 
events never experienced, such as those included in dreams or fantasies (see also 
Chapter I) . 
The second assumption is countered by a number of studies which have 
shown distinctive frontal lobe lesions and corresponding impairments in 
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confabulating patients (see Chapter 1). However, several of these authors have 
also emphasised that executive impairment is a conceptualisation too varied to be 
reliably measured by corresponding tests and applied to explanations of 
complicated syndromes such as confabulation (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Gilboa 
& Moscovitch, 2002; Kopelman et al., 1997; Deluca, 2000; see also Chapter 2). 
The third assumption is contradicted by clinical (e.g. Conway & Tacchi, 
1996; Berlyne, 1972; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Weinstein, 1996) and 
experimental (Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 2004) studies, as well as 
results of the present investigations (see Chapter 3) which show that 
confabulatory content may be highly specific, constant and emotionally biased 
(see also Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Downes & Mayes, 1995). Thus, it appears that 
although the retrieval of information from memory may no longer be constrained 
by current reality and temporality criteria as these models postulate, it may not be 
randomly retrieved. Instead, other mechanisms may determine which memories 
are selected for retrieval and which are attributed to reality. Burgess & McNeil 
(1996) and Dalla Barba and colleagues (1997) have shown how personal habits, 
personal semantic information or personally significant themes may guide 
confabulatory recollection. More specifically, Conway and Tacchi (1996) 
suggested that personal goals and emotions may have a particularly salient role in 
confabulatoiy retrieval. Johnson (2001) has argued that personal and social goals, 
as well as beliefs may influence which memories qualify as real and which not. 
Kopelman (1999) emphasised the role of social context is shaping or even causing 
confabulation. Solms (2000) suggested that in the absence of appropriate reality 
criteria, desires and inner needs may have auxiliary capacity to override other 
representations in the competition for recollection. Finally, in a critical review 
Myslobodsky and Hicks (1994) have heuristically summarised this argument as 
follows; confabulations are "memories that want to get themselves recalled" (p. 
225). 
However, despite these proposals and clinical obsei-vations, the direct 
relation between motivational influences and impaired reality monitoring in 
confabulation has never been addressed in an experimental study. With this airn, 
an experiment was designed which manipulated the effects of emotional valence 
(positive versus negative), temporal source (past, present, future) and selection 
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agent (self versus other) on memory recognition. The experimental material was 
based on patients' own memories to increase the ecological validity of the study. 
Given the unique personal relevance of autobiographical memories, various recent 
experimental and neuroimaging studies have used patients' own autobiographical 
memories as experimental material (e.g. Fink et al., 1996; Heaps & Nash, 2001; 
Levine et al., 2002; Loflus, 1993; Markowitch et al., 2000; Piefke et al., 2003). In 
brief, the following experiment was designed to test the specific hypothesis that 
confabulations are constructed according to motivational self-serving biases that 
influence confabulatory content, over and above the cognitive impairments of 
reality monitoring and temporality. 
4.2 Materials & Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
The experimental participants were seven severely amnesic patients. These 
were four confabulating amnesic patients, from the Bilateral Confabulation 
Subgroup and the three non-confabulating amnesic patients of the Amnesic 
Control Group (see Chapter 2). Relatives' participation in this experimental 
procedure was essential. Thus, these patients were the only patients, whose 
relafives were also available at the time of the assessment for the lengthy 
interviewing required by this experiment. Frontal non-amnesic controls (see 
Chapter 2) were not tested in this experiment, in which amnesia was a 
prerequisite. The amnesia classification criteria were based on participants' 
performance on the WMS-Il l Auditory and Visual Delayed Memory Index Scores 
and the confabulation classification was based on the developed qualitative 
criteria of confabulation frequency, conviction, novelty, plausibility, and 
production mode. These classifications are fully defined in Chapter 2. Although 
the demographic characteristics and neuropsychological scores of the 
Confabulation Group and the Amnesic Control Group were presented in detail in 
Chapter 2, only a subgroup of the Confabulation Group participated in this 
experiment. Thus, the performance of the present subgroups (Confabulation 
versus Amnesic) on these measures was compared in a preliminary analysis. In 
summary, the following experimental design contrasted the performance of 
amnesic confabulating patients (N = 4) and amnesic control patients (N = 3). 
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4.2.2. Materials 
The study used autobiographical memory materials. The selection of these 
materials was based on a preliminary interview with each patient (self-selected 
memories) and a subsequent interview with at least one relative of each patient 
(other-selected memories). In this way, the factor Selection Agent was 
manipulated. The factor Time Reference was manipulated as follows: Each patient 
was asked to generate 42 self-referential autobiographical statements, 14 from 
each of the following three temporal categories (life-time periods): (1) 'recent 
past' (two to five years before), (2) 'present' or 'very recent past' (last two 
months) and (3) 'future' (any hypothetical time in the future). The Valence of 
these statements was also manipulated, in that each temporal category was divided 
into two valence categories: seven pleasant and seven unpleasant memories. 
Preliminary Interviews: Self-Selected Items 
In order not to fatigue patients with repeated questioning and to conduct 
the selection interview in a flexible way the various temporal and valence 
categories were mixed and the corresponding questions were asked in random 
order. Most importantly, these categories were mutually exclusive. Thus, it was 
explained and stressed to participants that the memory statements they produced 
in each temporal category should be unique in time and thus incongruent with the 
rest of the categories. For example, when a participant was asked to generate a 
memory statement about a pleasant past event that was no longer true and he did 
not anticipate it to be true again in the future he gave this statement: " I won a 
dancing competition some years ago", adding that this was no longer true as he 
had not taken part in such a competition ever since and he could never participate 
again given his age. In a different example, when he was asked to generate a 
statement about an autobiographical experience that was never true in the past, 
was not true currently but he anticipated might be true in the future the patient 
said: "Although he has been being lucky so far, my grandson might break his legs 
the way he rides the bicycle". Finally, the patient gave this statement when he was 
asked to produce a pleasant memory about his current (very recent) experiences 
that was never true in the past and he did not anticipate to be true in the future: 
"My daughter bought her first car last week". 
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Although the task did not require patients to retrieve details of the 
remembered events, it was anticipated that given their amnesia patients might 
show some difficulty in retrieving information from their past (see also A M I 
scores above). Thus a number of measures were taken to assist them further to 
complete the task. The interview was conducted in an informal, conversational 
tone and the patients' efforts were explicitly acknowledged throughout the task. 
To ensure further that patients could freely retrieve gist information about true 
events and facts from these periods there were no time constraints in this phase 
and patients were allowed to think about the various experiences they would 
recollect at their own pace. They were given explanations repeatedly when 
necessary and each of them received a fixed list o f general prompts during the 
experiment (see Appendix C1). The goal of this procedure was to aid patients to 
recollect autobiographical events of their choice under experimental control. 
In addition, to ensure that the events retrieved by patients were accurate 
and correctly placed in time, at least one relative or carer of each patient was 
present during the interview. Following each memory generated by patients their 
relatives signalled silently to the examiner whether the memory was correct or not 
within each condition. The patient was not informed of this feedback and his 
statements were not contradicted. Moreover, the patient was not informed, 
initially or during the interview, regarding the number of statements he would 
have to generate within each category. Instead, the patient was asked to generate 
one memory statement at a time until the appropriate number of statements was 
recorded. This procedure aimed at allowing the patient to generate appropriate 
memories without confrontation or emotional distress, i f relatives could not attend 
the initial interview, they were asked to corroborate doubtful statements in a 
subsequent interview. Due to time limitations and to avoid patients' fatigue, the 
interview with three of the confabulating patients and one of the amnesic control 
patients had to take place in two successive sessions scheduled in successive days. 
In order to ensure that the remembered events were balanced in valence, 
arousal and rehearsal frequency, and to eliminate potential outliers, following 
their initial recollection, the selected memories were read back to each patient. 
Each patient was asked to rate their valence (pleasantness rating), their emotional 
intensity (arousal rating) and their rehearsal frequency (thought or discussion 
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frequency). These ratings were given in 7-point Likert-type scales. The final 
questionnaire of each patient included 36 of the initial 42 memory statements (6 
events in each condition) balanced for valence, arousal and rehearsal frequency 
(see Appendices C2 and C3 for analysis and results). 
Other-Selected Items 
Subsequently the examiner, based on information collected directly from 
relatives, staff medical files and her observations, constructed another 36 memory 
statements of matched temporal, arousal and valence characteristics. These 
included (i) 12 (six pleasant and six unpleasant) true statements about very recent 
events (in the last two months) in each patient's life that had never occurred 
earlier in the patients' past (e.g. 'My sister came to see me in hospital yesterday'), 
(ii) 12 (six pleasant and six unpleasant) true events about the patients' recent past 
(between two and five years ago) that were not mentioned by the patient and that 
had occurred only once in the patients' past and were no longer true, (i i i) 12 
statements were constructed (six pleasant and six unpleasant) which referred to 
plausible yet untrue events in the patients' lives, i.e. events that could have taken 
place in the past, but never did and it was feasible that they could take place in the 
future (e.g. '1 had an argument with Bi l l ' ) . Thus, these statements were matched 
with the future, plausible but untrue, events that the patients themselves had 
generated (see above). Although information provided by relatives could not fully 
correspond with patients' self-ratings, every possible effoit was made to ensure 
that each of the 'implanted' events was matched in valence, arousal and rehearsal 
frequency to one of the events remembered by the patients themselves. 
Overall Questionnaire 
The overall questionnaire for each patient included 72 self-referential 
events, expressed in first person and in present tense. Thus, for example, i f a 
patient had produced this following future pleasant event " I wish my girlfriend 
would come to see me" (Patient RM) this was altered to "My girlfriend came to 
see me recently". Similarly, the following event referring to the patient's past "My 
car was stolen some years ago" (Patient A2) was transforined to "My car was 
recently stolen". The various characteristics of the memory statements collected 
are illustrated in Table 4-1 below and accompanied by corresponding examples. 
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Table 4-1. Schematic Representation of Experimental Conditions 
Currently 
Relevant 
Selection 
Agent 
Time 
Reference 
Valence No Examples of Memory Statements (Changed to present tense) 
Yes 
Self Present 
+ 6 
6 
"My sister visited me for the first time this week" 
"Yesterday, my parents had to take my cat 
away" 
Other Present + 
6 
6 
"1 performed my first internet search last week" 
"1 broke a glass this morning" 
Self Past + 6 
6 
"1 attended my brother's wedding recently" 
"1 was recently hired as a waitress in Newcastle" 
+ 6 "1 went to a rock concert in London last week" 
Other Past 
- 6 "1 lost my leather wallet last week" 
No 
+ 6 
6 
"1 bought a catering business" 
"My mother was admitted to the hospital" 
Other Future + 
6 
6 
"It is my parents' silver anniversary this week" 
"1 burned our dinner last week" 
Total 72 
4.2.3 Procedure 
A second interview with each patient was scheduled two weeks after the 
first one. Patients were informed that a number of statements about currently true 
and false autobiographical events would be read out to them. In addition, they 
were told that these statements were based on true or false information collected 
during previous sessions and during interviews with their relatives. Their task was 
to judge the veridicality of each statement in their current life. Al l 72 items were 
read out to each patient in random order. It was particularly stressed to them that 
they had to judge whether each statement was true or not in their current life, 
defined as the last two months, irrespective of whether they had been true in the 
past or not. Thus, for every memory statement patients had to respond using one 
of the following answer choices: 
1. This event is true in my current life (last two months) 
2. This event is not true in my current life (last two months) 
3. 1 do not know whether this event is true or not in my current life (last two 
months) 
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4.2.4 Experimental Design 
The experimental investigations o f the study assessed patients' abihty to 
distinguish between currently relevant and currently irrelevant 'memories ' in a 
recognition task. The main design measured the effects o f three main independent 
variables on memory recognition scores ( two dependent variables; false positive 
and don' t know responses). This design included one between-subjects factor, 
Group (confabulating versus amnesic patients) and three within-subjects factors, 
Valence (pleasant versus unpleasant memories). T ime Reference (memories 
original ly der iving f r o m the 'past' versus an imaginary ' f u tu re ' ) and Selection 
Agent (memories selected by the ' s e l f versus the 'o ther ' ) . This design al lowed 
for 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 comparisons. The effects o f these factors on false positives (false 
recognition o f past or future events as currently relevant) and ' D o n ' t know ' 
responses to past or future, i.e. irrelevant, events were analysed separately. 
A separate design applied to the effects o f the factors Group, Valence and 
Selection Agent on correct responses (recognition o f currently relevant events), as 
in this analysis, the variable T ime Reference was by def ini t ion constant and 
therefore not manipulated. Thus, 2 x 2 x 2 comparisons were al lowed. 
4.3 Results 
Given the small number o f patients assessed, data were analysed using 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests fo r the between-subject differences and 
Wi lcoxon Signed Ranks tests fo r the within-subject interactions 
4.3.1 Patients Characteristics 
Demographic Characteristics 
Confabulat ing patients were all male whi le the amnesic control 
participants were two males and one female. Al though the groups showed great 
variabil i ty in age (range in years 19-64) the age o f individual participants was 
matched as closely as possible. Thus, both groups included one participant o f 19-
20 years old, one o f 60-64 years o ld and the remaining three participants were in 
their early forties. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests revealed the two groups 
did not d i f f e r in age, Z = .4, p = .9, education, Z = 0, /? = 1, or post-onset 
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assessment t ime, Z = .4, p = .9. The groups' demographic characteristics are 
summarised in Table 4-2 below. 
Table 4-2. Demographic Characterist ics and IMemory Performance of the 
Experimental Groups . 
Confabulating Amnesics Non-Confabulating Amnesics 
Patients L H , R M , OT, BA A l , A2 , A3 
N 4 3 
Age in Years M = 41.5, SD = 17 M = 44.3, S D = 19 
Education in Years M = 11,SD = 2.8 M = 10.7, SD = 2 
Months from Onset M = 6,7, SD = = 2.2 M = 6.3, SD = 2 
Male: Female Ratio 4 : 0 2 : 1 
Pathology A C o A / SAH; T B I / SAH; ACoA/ T B I ; C V A ; Meningitis respectively 
SAH; M I / Hypoxia respectively 
Lesion Sites F: FT; F; gen atrophy/L F F.O; Hipp.Th; Th.cer respectively 
respectively 
l/WWS-/// Index Scores M ( S D ) M ( S D ) 
Auditory Immediate 53.8 (3.8) 58 (7.5) 
Visual Immediate 71.8(15) 59.7(4.6) 
Immediate Memory 54(10.9) 50.3 (4.6) 
Auditory Delayed 55.8(1.5) 55.3 (4.6) 
Visual Delayed 66 (9.3) 54 (4.5) 
Auditory 57.6(5) 62.5(10.6) 
Recognitior) Delayed 
General Memory 52.5(5.4) 48.7 (4.7) 
Working Memory 88.5 (14.5) 79 (22.9) 
AMI 
Personal Semantic 
Total 
Autobiographical 
Total 
Childhood 14.3 (3.3) 17.5(1.3) 
Adult life 9 . 4 ( ) . 9 ) * 16.2(1.3) 
Recent life 7.1 (5.8) 9.2(3.3) 
30.8(8 .7)* 42.8(3.7) 
Childhood 1.8 (2.2) 3 (3,6) 
Adult life 2 ( 1 . 4 ) 2 ( 1 ) 
Recent life 1 (1.4) 1.7(1.5) 
5 (4.2) 6.7 (4.7) 
Note. Pathology: AcoA = Aneurysm of the Anterior Communicating Artery, TBI = Traumatic 
Brain Injury, M l = iVIyocardial infraction, CVA = Cerebrovascular Accident, TBI = Traumatic 
Brain Injury, SAH = Subarachnoid Haemorrhage ; Locus: F = Frontal, P = Parietal, T = 
Temporal, O = Occipital Lobe, Hipp = Hippocampal region, Th = Thalamus, R = Right, L = 
Left, N on CT = no lesion visible on CT scan; A l l patients were right handed except patient 
RM. * = Significant difference between Confabulating Patients and Amnesic Control Patients. 
Memory 
The performance o f the groups on standardised neuropsychological tests 
o f memory are summarised in Table 4.2 above (see Chapter 2 for further details). 
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As expected, both groups performed on average below c u t - o f f scores on most 
sections o f the W M S - I I I and the A M I , w i th the mari<ed exception o f the W M S - I I I 
Work ing Memory index Score, which was wi th in normal l imits in both groups. In 
addition, the confabulating patients performed better than the amnesic patients in 
the Visual Immediate Memory sections o f the W M S - i l l but this difference was 
not significant, Z = 1.1, = .3. Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that the two 
groups did not d i f fe r s ignif icant ly in any other W M S - I I I Index scores, ps > . 1 . In 
the A M I both groups remembered personal semantic informat ion o f their 
childhood relatively w e l l , but their scores dropped signif icantly when they had to 
recall such informat ion f r o m their recent l i fe . The confabulating patients showed 
an additional d i f f i c u l t y in recalling personal semantic informat ion f r o m their adult 
l i fe , i.e. they showed a steeper temporal gradient in the recall o f personal semantic 
facts. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that there was a significant 
difference between the groups in the Adu l t l i fe and Total Personal Semantic 
Information Scores o f the A M I , Z = 2 .1 , p < .05 and Z = 2.1,/? < .05, respectively. 
There were no other significant differences between the two groups on the A M 
measures, ps > . 1 . These results imply that despite some partial differences the 
two groups had overall s ignif icant and comparable memory loss f o r both recent 
and remote information and events. Most importantly, given that the present 
experiment used experiences and facts f r o m the patients' recent lives, it should be 
emphasised that both groups showed severe impairment in the recall o f recent 
events and facts f r o m their autobiography. 
Executive Functions 
Confabulating patients were impaired on most ' f r on t a l ' tests administered 
(see Chapter 2 for tests' details), whi le the amnesic control patients performed 
wi th in normal limits on most tests. Thus, overall the confabulating patients 
performed worse than the amnesic control participants in most but not all o f the 
assessed frontal tests. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests revealed that the 
performance o f the two groups di f fered signif icant ly on the Hayl ing test's Total 
and Error scores, Z = 1.9, p < .05 and Z = 2.2, p < .05 respectively, the Proverb 
test, , Z = 2 . 1 , p < .05, the Category Fluency measure o f the Verbal fluency 
subtest, Z = 2.2, p < .05, the Perserveration Errors measure o f the Sorting Test, Z 
= 2.3, p < .05, the Errors measure o f the Trai l subtest, Z = 2 .1 , p < .05, and the 
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Primary and Achievement scores o f the 20 Questions subtest, Z = 2 .1 , p < .05 and 
Z= 1.9, p < .05 respectively. The performance o f the t w o experimental groups on 
tests o f ' execu t ive funct ions ' is summarised in the Table 4.3 below. 
Table 4-3. G r o u p s ' Performance on Tests of Executive Functions. 
Test Confabulating Patients Amnesic Patients 
Hayling Test 2,8(1.3)* 5.7(1.5) 
Hayling Errors Score 1,5(1)* 6.3 (.6) 
Cognitive Estimates 10,8(4,2) 4.7(1.2) 
D-KEFS 
Trail Making 1.3 (.5) 6(5) 
Switching 5(3.6)* 13.3(4.2) 
Errors in Switching 
Switching Vs Number & 6.8 (3.9) 11 (2,6) 
Letter Reading 
Verbal Fluency 
Letter 6,3 (3,4) 8 (3) 
Category 1,3 (.5)* 6(1,7) 
Set-Loss Errors 6,3(2.6) 10,6(2,5) 
Repetition Errors 4.5 (4.4) 7.3 (5.7) 
Design Fluency 
Switching 4,5(3,1) 7,3(1,2) 
Switching Vs Filled & 
Empty Dots 8,3(3,4) 12(1,7) 
Repetition Designs 9.5 (3) 9 
Color-Word Interference 
Naming & Reading 6.5 (4.4) 4,7 (3,2) 
Inhibition 7,5 (4,3) 9 (2) 
Inhibition/Switching 5,5(6,1) 7,7(5,7) 
Inhibition Vs Naming 10,5(3,3) 11(3,6) 
Inhibition Errors 3,3 (4,5) 6,7 (4,9) 
Switching Errors 1 6 (4,4) 
Sorting 
Correct Sorts 7,3(1,5) 13(5,7) 
Description Score 6,5(1,9) 5,7(2,5) 
Repeated Sorts 1* 7,3(4,1) 
20 Questions 
Questions Asl<ed 3,5(3)* 11(1) 
Achievement Score 4(3,6)* 10,3(2.1) 
Word Content 
Consecutively Correct 4 (2.5) n.a. 
Tower 
Achievement Score 5 (2) 9 (3.6) 
Rule Violations/Item 5.3(1,5) 6,3(1,5) 
Proverb 
Achievement Score 2,5(1,7)* 10.3(1.5) 
Significant differences between confabulating and amnesic patients, p < .05. 
In summary, the two experimental groups did not d i f f e r in terms o f their 
demographic characteristics and showed comparable d i f f icu l t ies in recent and 
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remote memory. However, confabulating patients appear more impaired than 
amnesic control patients on tests o f executive functions. These comparisons w i l l 
be further addressed in the Discussion section below. 
4.3.2 Experimental Analyses 
Recognition of Currently Relevant Events 
Both groups, confabulating and amnesic control patients, showed high 
levels o f correct recognition o f currently relevant and pleasant events, irrespective 
o f whether events were self-selected ( M = 5.5, SD = 1 and M = 6, SD = 0, 
respectively) or experimentally chosen ( M = 5.5, SD = 1 and M = 6, SD = 0, 
respectively). Patients also correctly recognised most o f the currently relevant 
unpleasant events but their scores were lower. These results are depicted in Figure 
4-1 below. 
1 Confabulating Amnesic 
4 
iE 
c 
o 
1 3 
O) 
o u 
DC 2 
1 
i 
I I 
Pleasant Unpleasant 
Self 
Pleasant Unpleasant 
Other 
Figure 4-1. Correct Recognition Scores of Current ly Relevant Events Across 
Groups . 
Note . S ign i f i can t d i f fe rence between pleasant and unpleasant events, w i t h both 
groups showing higher recogni t ion o f pleasant rather than unpleasant events (p < .05). N o 
s igni f icant d i f fe rence was f o u n d between groups. 
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A non-parametric IVIann-Whitney test revealed there was no main effect o f 
group (confabulating versus amnesic patients) on the number o f statements 
correctly recognised, Z = \, p = 3. Within-subject , non-parametric Wi lcoxon 
Signed Ranks Tests were used to analyse the main effects o f Valence (pleasant 
versus unpleasant statements) and Selection Agent (self versus other-generated 
statements). These revealed that Selection Agent had no significant effect on 
correct recognition, Z = I , p = .3, whi le there was a main effect o f Valence, Z = 
2.9, p < .005, w i th patients recognising overall more pleasant than unpleasant 
memory statements. The two-way interactions o f Group x Valence and Group x 
Selection Agent were analysed by calculating the differences between mean 
recognition scores o f pleasant and unpleasant statements and o f self-selected and 
other-selected memory statements, respectively. The Group factor had no effect 
on these differences, Z = 0.8, p = A and Z = 0 .1 , p = .9, respectively. The 
interaction Valence x election Agent was analysed by calculating the difference o f 
recognition scores f o r self-selected pleasant versus unpleasant items and other-
selected pleasant versus unpleasant items. This interaction was not significant, Z = 
1, p = .3. The three-way interaction. Group x Valence x Agent was analysed by 
calculating the difference between self-generated valence differences (pleasant 
minus unpleasant) and other-generated valence differences (pleasant minus 
unpleasant). The factor group had no effect on this difference, Z = 0, p = I . 
The above results indicate that whi le both confabulating and non-
confabulating amnesic patients were more l ikely to correctly recognise pleasant 
than unpleasant events as currently relevant, there were no other differences 
between or w i th in the groups in recognition o f very recent autobiographical 
events. The latter was relatively high for both groups. Thus, it appears that 
confabulating patients are able to correctly recognise true personal events o f their 
recent past, despite their more general d i f f icu l t ies in learning and recalling new 
information. 
False Recognition of Currently Irrelevant Events 
The critical results o f the experiment relate to the false positives, i.e. the 
number o f misrecognitions patients made in response to items that were not in fact 
relevant to their current reality. These f indings are summarised in Figure 4-2 
below. 
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Figure 4-2. False Positives in the Recognition of Current ly Non-Relevant Events 
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney test revealed an overall effect o f Group 
(confabulating versus amnesic patients), Z = 3.5, p < .001, wi th confabulating 
patients making more errors than amnesic control subjects. Wi lcoxon Signed 
Ranks tests were used to analyse the overall within-subject effects o f Valence 
(pleasant versus unpleasant). Time Reference (past versus future) and Selection 
Agent (self versus other). These revealed an overall effect o f Valence, Z = 4, / ) < 
.001, w i th more errors produced by patients in response to pleasant than 
unpleasant memory statements and an overall effect o f Selection Agent, Z = 2.8, p 
< .01 , wi th more mistakes produced by patients in response to self-selected than 
other-selected items. There was no overall effect o f time, Z = 1.5, /; = . 1. 
The interactions o f the between-subjects factor group w i t h the three 
within-subjects factors, i.e. Valence, Time Reference and Selection Agent, were 
analysed by calculating the difference between error scores o f pleasant and 
unpleasant items, past and future items, and self-selected and other-selected items, 
respectively. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used to analyse the effects 
o f Group on these differences. These revealed that Group had a significant effect 
on Valence, Z = 2.5, p < .05, and on Selection Agent, Z = 2.3, p < .05. The 
interaction Time Reference x Group was not significant, Z = J , p = .4. The 
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remaining 2-way interactions between the three within-subject factors, i.e. 
Valence, T ime Reference and Selection Agent, were analysed by calculating the 
difference between error scores in pleasant and unpleasant items. Thus, the 
interaction between the within-subject factors Valence and Time Reference was 
analysed by calculating the difference between error scores in pleasant and 
unpleasant items and comparing this difference across past and future items. A 
Wi icoxon Signed Ranks test revealed the interaction was not significant, Z = 1.2, 
p = .2. The interaction between the within-subject factors Valence and Selection 
Agent was analysed by calculating the difference between error scores in pleasant 
and unpleasant items and comparing this difference across self- and other-selected 
items. A Wi icoxon Signed Ranks test revealed this interaction was significant, Z = 
2.5, p < .05. Finally, the interaction between the within-subject factors Time 
Reference and Section Agent was analysed by calculating the difference between 
error scores in past and future items and comparing this difference across self- and 
other-selected items. A Wi icoxon Signed Ranks test revealed no significant 
interaction, Z = .8, /? = .4. 
The three way interactions, Group x Valence x Selection Agent, Group x 
Valence x Time Reference and Group x Time Reference x Selection Agent were 
analysed by calculating the difference between self-generated valence differences 
(pleasant minus unpleasant) and other-generated valence differences (pleasant 
minus unpleasant), the difference between past valence differences (pleasant 
minus unpleasant) and future valence differences (pleasant minus unpleasant) and 
the difference between self-generated time differences (past minus future) and 
other-generated past differences (past - future) , respectively. The factor Group 
had no effect on these differences, Z = 0 , p = \ , Z=0, p= I and Z = \ p = 0.3, 
respectively. The three way interaction Valence x Time Reference x Selection 
Agent was analysed by calculating the difference o f the difference o f the error 
scores o f past and future memoiy statements between self- and other-generated 
statements. The factor valence (pleasant versus unpleasant) had no effect on this 
difference, Z = .7, p = .5. Finally, the difference between groups o f the latter 
difference, i.e. the four-way interaction, was not significant, Z = .5, p = .6. 
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Don 7 know' Responses 
The number o f ' D o n ' t K n o w ' responses patients produced in response to 
the various categories o f false (i.e. currently irrelevant) memory statements was 
also separately analysed. These f indings are summarised in Figure 4-3 below. 
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Figure 4-3. C r o u p s ' 'Don't know' Responses across T ime and Agent Conditions 
A non-parametric Mann-Whitney test revealed an overall effect o f group 
(confabulating versus amnesic patients), Z = 3.8, p < .001, wi th confabulating 
patients making fewer 'don ' t know ' responses than amnesic control subjects. 
Wi lcoxon Signed Ranks tests were used to analyse the overall within-subject 
effects o f Valence (pleasant versus unpleasant). T ime Reference (past versus 
future) and Selection Agent (self versus other). These effects were not significant, 
Z = 1.8, p = .06, Z = 1.2, p = .8 and Z = .3, p = .8, respectively. However it should 
be noted that the overall effect o f Valence approached significant levels, w i th 
patients showing a tendency to produce more 'don ' t know ' responses in 
unpleasant than pleasant memory statements. 
The interactions o f the between-subject factor group w ith the three w i t h i n -
subject factors, i.e. valence. Time Reference and Selection Agent, were analysed 
by calculating the difference between errors scores o f pleasant and unpleasant 
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items, past and future items, and self-selected and other-selected items, 
respectively. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used to analyse the 
effects o f Group on these differences. These revealed that group d id not have a 
significant effect on Valence, Z = 0.2, p = .8, Selection Agent, Z = 0.4, p = .5, or 
Time Reference, Z = 1.3, /? = . 1 . The remaining 2-way interactions between the 
three within-subject factors, i.e. Valence, T ime Reference and Selection Agent, 
were analysed by calculating the difference between error scores on pleasant and 
unpleasant items. Thus, the interaction between the within-subject factors Valence 
and Time Reference was analysed by calculating the difference between error 
scores fo r pleasant and unpleasant items and comparing this difference across past 
and future iterns. A Wi lcoxon Signed Ranks test revealed a signif icant interaction, 
Z = 2.4, p < .05, wi th patients producing more 'don ' t know ' responses to 
unpleasant than to pleasant items in the future rather than in the past conditions. 
The interaction between the within-subject factors Valence and Selecfion Agent 
was analysed by calculating the difference between error scores for pleasant and 
unpleasant items and comparing this difference across self- and other-selected 
items. A Wi lcoxon Signed Ranks test revealed that this interaction was not 
significant, Z = \ J , p = .09, although patients showed a tendency to produce more 
'don ' t know ' responses to the unpleasant than to the pleasant iterns in the self-
rather than other-selected condition. Finally, the interaction between the w i t h i n -
subject factors Time Reference and Selection Agent was analysed by calculating 
the difference between error scores for past and future items and comparing this 
difference across self- and other-selected items. A Wi lcoxon Signed Ranks test 
revealed no significant interaction, Z = .9, p = .3. The three way interactions. 
Group X Valence x Selection Agent, Group x Valence x T ime Reference, Group x 
Time Reference x Selection Agent and Valence x Selection Agent x Time 
Reference were not significant, Z = A, p = .9: Z = .6, p = .6; Z = .9, p = A and Z = 
l . l , p = .3 respectively. Finally, the four-way interaction Group x Valence x Time 
Reference x Selection Agent was not significant, Z= .5,p= .6. 
Summary of Findings 
The above results indicate that the two experimental groups, confabulating 
and non-confabulating amnesics did not d i f f e r in terms o f their demographic 
characteristics or their performance on standardised tests o f new learning and 
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autobiographical memory. However, confabulating patients appeared more 
impaired than amnesic control patients on tests o f executive functions. In the 
experimental investigations both groups showed high levels o f correct recognition 
o f currently relevant events and both groups were more l ikely to correctly 
recognise pleasant rather than unpleasant events as currently relevant, irrespective 
o f whether these events were previously self-selected or experimentally chosen. 
Confabulat ing patients produced signif icantly more false positives than amnesic 
controls, i.e. they erroneously accepted past events or thoughts about potential 
future events as currently relevant events more often than controls did. Overal l , 
more errors were produced in response to pleasant than unpleasant statements in 
the self rather than the other condition. Al though both groups produced more 
errors in response to pleasant than unpleasant memoiy statements, this tendency 
was signif icant ly more frequent in confabulating patients. In addition, both groups 
produced more errors in the self-generated than in the other-generated conditions 
but this was more prominent in the confabulation group than in the amnesic 
control group. Amnesic control patients produced signif icant ly more 'don ' t k n o w ' 
responses than confabulating patients. In addition, there was a non-significant 
tendency in both groups to produce more 'don ' t know ' responses to unpleasant 
than pleasant memory statements and a significant tendency to produce more 
'don ' t know ' responses to unpleasant than pleasant memory statements in the 
future than in the pa.st conditions. These results are discussed below. 
4.4 Discussion 
This study explored three assumptions related to the hypothesis that the 
critical impairment in confabulation is the failure o f temporality, or temporal 
context (Dal la Barba, 2001 ; Schnider, 2003). 
4.4.1 Do confabulations always derive f r o m actual past experiences misplaced in 
time? 
The present investigations provide only partial support fo r the role o f 
temporal confusion in memory. More specifically, although confabulating and 
non-confabulating amnesic patients showed comparable degrees o f memory 
impairment.for recent,and,current l i fe t ime periods, confabulating patients showed 
- 155 
Chapter 4: The Role of Emotions in Temporal Confusion 
a signif icantly greater tendency than amnesic controls to misrecognise past events 
as currently relevant (Schnider et al., 1996), particularly i f they were self-selected. 
However, the f indings o f the present experiment contradict the assumption that 
confabulations always derive f r o m actual past experiences misplaced in t ime or 
erroneously assorted wi th events o f different temporal reference. More 
specifically, the investigations showed that confabulating patients were 
signif icant ly more l ikely than controls to misrecognise as currently relevant self-
referential events that had actually never taken place, i.e. their fears or wishes for 
the future. Al though such statements had been thought o f and expressed by the 
patients before (e.g. during the f i r s t phase o f the experiment), they were never 
experienced as real l i fe events, i.e. they were merely 'mental events', thoughts or 
fantasies. Thus, the material upon which confabulations are buil t may go beyond 
experienced memories and personal facts to thoughts, fantasies and potentially 
other mental constructs and representations, e.g. dreams. This v i ew is consistent 
w i t h previous descriptions o f confabulatory confusions o f dreams and reality in 
confabulation (e.g. M o l l , 1915; Berlyne, 1972). This v iew is also consisted wi th 
the theoretical f ramework put fo rward by Johnson and colleagues (1997; 2000), 
which conceptualises confabulation as the result o f deficits in the complex 
retrieval and attribution processes that determine whether a mental representation 
is internally generated (e.g. imagined) or der iving f r o m external reality (i.e. 
perceived). However, a defici t in reality moni tor ing alone, cannot account f o r the 
emotional bias observed in this study (see below). 
4.4.2 Does executive dysfunct ion difTerentiate confabulating f rom amnesic non-
confabulating controls? 
In this study the performance o f confabulating patients was significantly 
worse than that o f matched amnesic patients in a number o f executive functions. 
These included tests o f inhibi t ion, perseveration, set-shifting, abstract th ink ing 
and reasoning. However, it should be noted that the performance o f the 
confabulating patients showed some variabi l i ty across tests. For example, 
although these patients performed signif icantly worse than amnesic controls on 
the Hayl ing test, particularly during the second part o f the test (assessing 
inhibi t ion o f automated responses), they performed similar ly to control patients on 
the Colour -Word D-KEFS subtest which also taps inhibi t ion o f automated 
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responses. Similar ly , whi le they showed impairment on reasoning and abstract 
th ink ing on the proverbs and the 20 Questions D-KEFS subtests their performance 
was mixed and overall better on the Cognit ive Estirnation test, also assessing 
these abilities. These mixed results suggest that although executive dysfunct ion 
may be causative o f confabulation, ' f ronta l tests' are not suff ic ient to reliably 
ident i fy the specific cognitive deficits underpinning confabulation (see also 
Kopelman et al., 1997; Schnider et al., 1996; see also Chapter 2) . Moreover, these 
data cannot determine i f temporal confusion is a primary cause o f confabulation, 
or whether it is secondary to executive dysfunct ion, i.e. one o f the outcomes o f 
executive dysfunct ion. This issue w i l l be fur ther discussed in Chapter 8. 
4.4.3 Does temporal confusion, or a more general confusion between reality and 
fantasy lead to a random selection and retrieval o f confabulatory memories? 
In the present experiment confabulating patients mis-recognised as 
currently relevant more pleasant than unpleasant past events, and more self-
selected 'events' than other-selected events. Amnesic non-confabulating patients 
showed a similar tendency but at a signif icantly lower rate. These results suggest 
that although confabulating patients were prone to temporal and reality confusion 
errors, this tendency was more applicable to pleasant self-referential events and 
less influential over negative events. Characteristically, in response to several o f 
these positive memory statements patients responded wi th additional 
confabulatory descriptions, which they insisted they must narrate before the test 
could continue. For example, patient R M gave a positive response to a statement 
about winn ing the lottery in his current l i f e (a previous future self-selected 
statement). He then added that it was the second time in a year. Immediately, he 
went on to describe a long narrative w i th irnpressive amount o f detail regarding 
the amounts he won and how he spent the money, how grateful his friends and 
fami ly were fo r his presents, and what other acts o f charity he did. These findings 
con f i rm that confabulation is subject to emotional infiuences, over and above 
temporality and reality moni tor ing deficits. 
Interestingly, confabulating patients did not show this strong effect in 
experimentally selected events. More specifically, although they were prone in 
confusing personally-generated past events and wishes as current relevant events, 
they showed Jess confusion and no- pleasantness effect in' ' fu tu re ' other-serected" 
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events. A n interpretation o f this finding may be that these patients were not as 
l ikely to accept never experienced and externally generated information as part o f 
their autobiography, no rnatter how plausible and self-related the latter might have 
been. This interpretation goes against a 'suggestibi l i ty ' explanation o f 
confabulation, which postulates that such patients should be prone to external 
suggestion (Mercer et al., 1977; Schnider et al., 1996; see also Chapter 1). The 
issue o f self-relevance and motivat ion w i l l be addressed in the next chapter. The 
issue o f suggestibility w i l l be further addressed on chapters 6 and 7. 
It is also o f interest that amnesic patients showed more 'don ' t know ' 
responses than confabulating patients. This difference could relate to 
confabulating patients executive dysfunct ion (see above), leading to impuls ivi ty in 
responding. It could also be l inked to tendency to fill-in memory gaps ( in this case 
wi th a ' no ' or 'yes' answer) due to embarrassment. However, it should be 
highlighted that these patients were anosognosic o f their memory impairments and 
did not appear embarrassed or uncomfortable during the interview. By contrast, 
amnesic patients appeared more distressed wi th their occasional inabi l i ty to relate 
events to their current l i f e w i th certainty. Thus, although the ' g a p - f i l l i n g ' 
hypothesis could not be excluded w i t h certainty, it appears unl ikely . 
In conclusion, the results o f the above experimental investigations suggest 
that confabulations include both the confusion o f events in time as well as the 
confusion o f never experienced events fo r memories. The cognitive deficits 
associated wi th memory-related confabulation include both amnesia and executive 
dysfunct ion, although the exact aetiological role o f the latter and its relation to 
temporal confusion and reality moni tor ing remains to be specified. Crucial ly , this 
experiment conf i rmed the fifth hypothesis o f the study. Namely, confabulations 
are constructed according to motivated biases that influence confabulatory 
content, over and above the cognitive impairments o f reality moni tor ing and 
temporali ty. In other words, these deficits are not suff ic ient to account for the 
emotional biases observed in the misrecognition o f currently irrelevant memories. 
By implicat ion, they are not suff icient to explain confabulatory content (see also 
Chapter 3). 
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An Emotional Prose Recall Experiment 
"Alike with the individual and the group, the past is continually being re-made, 
reconstructed in the interests of the present" (Bartlett, 1932, p. 309) 
5.1 Introduction 
The wi sh fu l and purposeful character o f confabulation has been repeatedly 
portrayed in clinical descriptions (e.g. Berlyne, 1972; Feinberg, 2001; Kaplan-
Solms & Solms, 2000; Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). More recently it has being 
experimentally documented in single-case reports (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004). The previous group studies o f the thesis also 
documented such bias in the content o f spontaneous confabulation and showed 
that pleasant rather than unpleasant memories and representations were more 
l ikely to be confused as currently relevant memories and thus influence 
confabulatory content. This experiment aims at addressing the mechanisms which 
underlie such emotional bias and its relation to memory and frontal dysfunction. 
More specifically, the present study aimed at developing an experimental 
paradigm for addressing directly and under controlled conditions the potential 
self-serving biases in confabulation. To this extent, the study employed an 
emotional prose recall task to investigate the manner in which confabulating 
patients recall emotional narrative material. The cognitive abil i ty to comprehend, 
memorize and recall narrative stories has been the subject o f extensive research 
since the beginning o f the last centuiy (Bartlett, 1932; Propp, 1928). Research has 
shown that prose recall requires the pr iming, maintenance, and integration o f a 
number o f representations in long-term memory, as wel l as the capacity to retrieve 
them f r o m long-term memory (see Baddeley & Wilson, 2002; Mar, 2004). 
Furthermore, some recent models o f narrative comprehension and recall suggest 
that readers o f narratives often comprehend the depicted events by assuming the 
perspective o f a character, mentally representing his or her emotional states ( fo r 
review see Mar, 2004). Furthermore, experiments on memory encoding and 
retrieval have shown that relating information to oneself may enhance recall (self-
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referent effect, Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker , 1977). The self-reference effect has also 
been demonstrated in children as young as 10 years o f age (Halp in et al., 1984), as 
well as in elderly adults (see Symons & Johnson, 1997 f o r an extensive review). 
This effect implies that the use o f stories as recall material is ecologically va l id 
and h ighly appropriate fo r the investigation o f emotional memory biases and even 
more specifically fo r the investigation o f self-related emotional biases. 
In the present study, confabulating patients were asked to reproduce a 
series o f short stories. In order to investigate potential self-related emotional 
biases the f o l l o w i n g manipulations were carried out. First, the study manipulated 
the emotional valence o f the stories (positive, negative and neutral). Second, the 
study manipulated the self-reference o f the material (self- versus other-referent 
encoding). Such manipulations have proven successful in revealing negative 
emotional biases in studies on depression (e.g. Zupan et al., 1987; Bishop, 
Dalgleish & Yule, 2004). The performance o f confabulating patients was 
compared to that o f frontal and amnesic patients on the same task. As amnesia and 
frontal lobe dysfunction have been identif ied as the two core components o f the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms o f confabulation (e.g. Deluca, 2000; 
Moscovi tch, 1989; see Chapter 1) the study o f these groups could provide insight 
on the specific contribution o f these two factors into confabulatory behaviour (see 
also Kopelman et al., 1997 and Chapter 2) . In b r i e f this experiment addressed the 
sixth hypothesis o f the study. Namely, the content of confabulation is self solving, 
over and above the memory and executive deficits that might influence memory 
recall. 
5.2 Materials & Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants o f the study consisted o f 22 neurological patients and 10 
healthy individuals. 12 o f the 13 patients o f the Total Confabulation Group (see 
Chapter 2) were classified as the Confabulation group (patient PT was not tested 
due to t ime constraints). The three patients o f the Amnesic Group and the seven 
patients o f the Frontal Group were also tested as control subjects (see Chapter 2) . 
The ten healthy control participants tested were matched for age, gender and 
education to the confabulating patients. They were 4 females and 6 males, wi th 
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m e a n age 52 .1 yea rs ( S D 17.8 , r ange 2 6 - 7 9 y e a r s ) a n d m e a n yea rs o f e d u c a t i o n 11 
( S D 1.8). A l l s u b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g raters (see b e l o w ) , g a v e w r i t t e n i n f o r m e d 
consen t . 
5 .2 .2 M a t e r i a l s 
A p i l o t s t u d y , w i t h t w o phases, w a s c o n d u c t e d f o r se lec t i on o f t he 
a p p r o p r i a t e set o f s i x s to r ies f r o m an o r i g i n a l p o o l o f 18 d i f f e r e n t s t o r y p l o t s , 
d e v i s e d b y t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r . T h e la t te r i n c l u d e d s to ry p l o t s o f s i m i l a r l e n g t h ( 8 5 -
92 w o r d s ) b u t v a r y i n g e m o t i o n a l v a l e n c e , 6 s to r ies x 3 v a l e n c e o p t i o n s , p o s i t i v e , 
n e g a t i v e a n d n e u t r a l . A l l s to r ies w e r e a lso s i m i l a r w i t h respec t to t h e i r m a i n 
s e m a n t i c a n d n a r r a t i v e cha rac te r i s t i c s (see A p p e n d i x D l f o r f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n ) . I n 
a d d i t i o n , a l l s to r ies h a d equa l n u m b e r o f s e m a n t i c ' i d e a u n i t s ' f o r r e c a l l . T h e la t ter 
w e r e d e f i n e d f o l l o w i n g B r a n s f o r d a n d J o h n s o n ( 1 9 7 2 ) as c o r r e s p o n d i n g to " e i t h e r 
i n d i v i d u a l sen tences , bas ic s e m a n t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s o r p h r a s e s " tha t c o n v e y e d a 
s i n g l e t h e m e (see a lso M a q u i r e et a l . , 1 9 9 9 ) . A l l s to r ies i n c l u d e d ( 1 ) t he 
p resen ta t i on o f an a c t i n g agent w i t h an e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n f o r f u r t h e r 
a c t i o n , as w e l l the t e m p o r a l a n d spat ia l i n f o r m a t i o n o f the i n i t i a l s e t t i n g [ 8 
s e m a n t i c u n i t s ] ; ( 2 ) the p resen ta t i on o f an ex te rna l obs tac le to a g e n t ' s i n t e n d e d 
a c t i o n a n d the reac t i on by the m a i n agen t , i n c l u d i n g h is e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n [ 6 
s e m a n t i c u n i t s ] ; ( 3 ) t he t l n a l o u t c o m e , i n c l u d i n g i ts r a t i o n a l e , t e m p o r a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f the m a i n a g e n t ' s e m o t i o n a l state [ 7 
s e m a n t i c u n i t s ] . F i n a l l y , a l l s to r ies i n c l u d e d t w o a c t i n g agen ts . O n e w a s the 
p r o t a g o n i s t o f the s t o i y a n d one had a s e c o n d a r y ro le . 
T h e s to r ies w e r e p i l o t e d u s i n g 2 0 hea l t hy adu l t s ( 1 0 y o u n g e r a d u l t s , f i v e 
m a l e a n d f i v e f e m a l e , w i t h age range 2 0 - 3 0 yea rs a n d 10 o l d e r a d u l t s , f i v e m a l e 
a n d f i v e f e m a l e , w i t h age range 5 0 - 7 0 yea rs ) . T h e y w e r e asked to ra te ( i ) t h e i r 
a b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d each o f t he 18 s tor ies ( c o m p r e h e n s i o n r a t i n g ) ; ( i i ) the 
v a l e n c e o f each s to ry ( p o s i t i v e / n e g a t i v e ) ; ( i i i ) the e m o t i o n a l i n t e n s i t y o f i ts s t o r y 
(a rousa l r a t i n g ) ; ( i v ) t h e i r a b i l i t y t o ' v i s u a l i s e ' each s t o r y in t h e i r m i n d s ' eye 
( v i s u a l i s a t i o n r a t i n g ) ; ( v ) t h e i r ' f a m i l i a r i t y ' w i t h the agen ts ' a c t i o n s and reac t i ons , 
i.e. t h e i r a b i l i t y to ' r e l a t e ' a n d ' u n d e r s t a n d ' the ac t i ons a n d f e e l i n g s o f the m a i n 
cha rac te r o f each s to ry ( ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ' w i t h the agen t r a t i n g ) . A l l f i v e ra t i ngs 
w e r e g i v e n o n a 9 - p o i n t sca le . 
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I n the f i r s t s tage o f t h e p i l o t s t u d y , t he se lec t i on o f t he set o f s i x s to r ies 
w a s based o n the c o e x i s t e n c e o f t he f o l l o w i n g c r i t e r i a : h i g h c o m p r e h e n s i o n , 
v i s u a l i s a t i o n a n d agen t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a n d b a l a n c e d v a r i a b i l i t y i n v a l e n c e a n d 
a r o u s a l . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , t he s i x se lec ted s to r ies had m e a n ra t i ngs o f 
v i s u a l i s a t i o n > 6 a n d a l l o f t h e m r e c e i v e d , b y a l l 2 0 p a r t i c i p a n t s , r a t i n g s o f > 7 i n 
the c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d ' i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h agen t ' sca le (see A p p e n d i x D 2 f o r 
d e t a i l e d scores ) . I n a d d i t i o n , f o u r e m o t i o n a l s to r ies w e r e i n c l u d e d ( 2 n e g a t i v e a n d 
2 p o s i t i v e ) w h i c h w e r e ra ted b y a l l 2 0 p a r t i c i p a n t s o n the e x t r e m e l o w and h i g h 
bo rde rs o f t he v a l e n c e sca le ( i . e . <3 a n d > 7 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) a n d w e r e a lso ra ted b y 
a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s as r e l a t i v e l y h i g h in a r o u s a l , ra t i ngs > 6 . N o n e o f t he ' n e u t r a l ' 
s to r ies w e r e ra ted b y a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s as t o t a l l y neu t ra l i n v a l e n c e ( v a l e n c e r a t i n g o f 
5 ) , bu t t h e t w o s to r ies f i n a l l y se lec ted w e r e the ones w h i c h w e r e ra ted by a l l 
p a r t i c i p a n t s as l o w in a rousa l ( i . e . ra t i ngs < 2 ) a n d h a d v a l e n c e m e a n r a t i n g s m o s t 
a p p r o x i m a t i n g the neu t ra l p o i n t o f the v a l e n c e sca le ( M = 4 . 1 5 , S D = .93 a n d M = 
4 .9 , S D = .79 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . 
I n the s e c o n d phase o f t h e p i l o t s t u d y , d i f f e r e n c e s in v a l e n c e ra t i ngs w e r e 
ana l ysed u s i n g a repea ted measu res A N O V A w i t h t w o b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t f ac to r s , 
age ( y o u n g e r ve rsus o l d e r a d u l t s ) , a n d g e n d e r ( m a l e ve rsus f e m a l e ) a n d t w o 
w i t h i n - s u b j e c t f a c t o r s , v a l e n c e c a t e g o r y ( p o s i t i v e , n e g a t i v e , n e u t r a l ) a n d s to ry p l o t 
( p l o t a ve rsus p l o t b ) . T h e r e w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t m a i n e f f e c t o f v a l e n c e c a t e g o i y , 
F(2,32) = 2 9 1 , 7 , p < .001 a n d the re w e r e n o m a i n e f f ec t s o f age, g e n d e r o r s t o r y 
p l o t . P o s t - h o c tests u s i n g B o n f e r r o n i c o r r e c t i o n r evea led tha t the p o s i t i v e s to r ies 
w e r e ra ted as s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e p o s i t i v e t han the neu t ra l s to r ies , / ( 3 9 ) = 1 3 . 1 , p < 
. 0 0 1 , w h i c h in t u r n w e r e ra ted as s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e p o s i t i v e than the n e g a t i v e 
s to r ies , t ( 3 9 ) = 11.5 , p < . 0 0 1 . N o n e o f t he i n t e rac t i ons i n v o l v i n g age , g e n d e r o r 
s to ry p l o t w a s s i g n i f i c a n t , p s > A. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , p o t e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s in v i s u a l i s a t i o n ra t i ngs w e r e a n a l y s e d 
u s i n g a repea ted measures A N O V A w i t h t w o b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t f a c t o r s , age 
( y o u n g e r ve rsus o l d e r a d u l t s ) , a n d gende r ( m a l e ve rsus f e m a l e ) a n d t w o w i t h i n -
sub jec t f a c t o r s , v a l e n c e c a t e g o i y ( p o s i t i v e , n e g a t i v e , n e u t r a l ) a n d s to ry p l o t ( p l o t a 
versus p l o t b ) . T h e r e w a s no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f age, gende r , v a l e n c e ca tego ry o r 
s to ry p l o t o n v i s u a l i s a t i o n r a t i n g s , no r s i g n i f i c a n t i n te rac t i ons b e t w e e n thses 
f ac to r s , ps > 1. 
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T h e a b o v e resu l ts p r o v i d e i n d i c a t i o n o f success fu l m a n i p u l a t i o n o f v a l e n c e 
i n t he se lec ted s to r ies and sugges t t ha t t h e e f f e c t o f t h i s m a n i p u l a t i o n w a s 
cons i s t en t across d i f f e r e n t s to r ies a n d across p a r t i c i p a n t s o f d i f f e r e n t age a n d 
gende r . 
F i n a l l y , the se lec ted s i x s t o r y p lo t s w e r e a n a l y s e d f o r r e a d a b i l i t y u s i n g 
M i c r o s o f t W o r d 2 0 0 0 r e a d a b i l i t y s ta t i s t i cs . A l l s to r ies h a d s i m i l a r F lesch R e a d i n g 
Ease leve ls r a n g i n g f r o m 57.1 to 6 3 . 8 a n d s i m i l a r F l e s c h - K i n c a i d G r a d e leve l 
r a n g i n g f r o m 7.6 to 8 .3 . 
5.2.3 P r o c e d u r e 
Pat ien ts a n d c o n t r o l p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e assessed i n d i v i d u a l l y d u r i n g t w o 
sess ions, o n t w o c o n s e c u t i v e w e e k s ( t h ree s to r ies pe r sess ion , one p leasant , o n e 
unp leasan t a n d one n e u t r a l ) . T h e s to r ies w e r e read o u t t o each p a r t i c i p a n t in a 
neu t ra l m a n n e r a n d at a r e g u l a r pace. H i s / h e r a n s w e r s w e r e a u d i o - r e c o r d e d on 
d i g i t a l m i n i - d i s k a n d f u l l y t r a n s c r i b e d . P r i o r t o p resen ta t i on o f each s t o r y , 
p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e i n s t r u c t e d tha t a f i c t i o n a l s t o r y a b o u t a p e r s o n ' s l i f e w a s g o i n g 
t o be read ou t t o t h e m a n d that t h e y s h o u l d ivy t o s u b s e q u e n t l y r e m e m b e r as m u c h 
o f i t as poss ib l e . I n the second sess ion , t he i n s t r u c t i o n s o f the test w e r e i d e n t i c a l 
e x c e p t in tha t p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e a lso i n s t r u c t e d to i m a g i n e that t hey w e r e the 
p r o t a g o n i s t s o f each s to r y a n d tha t t h e even ts o f each s to ry w e r e a c t u a l l y 
h a p p e n i n g to t h e m ( s e l f - e n c o d i n g m a n i p u l a t i o n ) . I n t h i s second sess ion the 
n a r r a t i o n t y p e o f the s to r ies w a s a l t e red f r o m a t h i r d - p e r s o n n a r r a t i o n (e .g . " . l o h n 
W i l s o n is a t a l en ted a r c h i t e c t . . . " ) t o a t l r s t - p e r s o n n a r r a t i o n ( " I m a g i n e tha t y o u 
are a t a l en ted a r c h i t e c t . . . " ) . T h e la t te r w e r e m a t c h e d f o r g e n d e r to each p a r t i c i p a n t 
(e .g . " I m a g i n e y o u are a success fu l b u s i n e s s m a n / w o m a n . . . " ) . 
E m o t i o n a l v a l e n c e w a s m a n i p u l a t e d b y a l t e r n a t i n g the e m o t i o n a l c o n t e n t 
o f a l l s to r ies in the f i n a l n a r r a t i v e u n i t o f each s to r y p l o t ( u n i t o f f i n a l o u t c o m e ) . 
T w o o f t he s to r ies e n d e d in a f a v o u r a b l e w a y f o r t he m a i n agen t o f t he s to r y 
( p o s i t i v e v a l e n c e ) , t w o o f t h e m in a d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s w a y f o r the p r o t a g o n i s t 
( n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e ) and t w o in a neu t ra l w a y (neu t ra l v a l e n c e ) . I n each s t o i y th i s 
e n d i n g w a s a c c o m p a n i e d by the e x p l i c i t p resen ta t i on o f t w o o f the a g e n t s ' 
e m o t i o n s , e .g . " S h e fe l t h u m i l i a t e d a n d s c a r e d " . T h e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f v a l e n c e o f 
n a r r a t i v e s to r ies b y a l t e r n a t i o n o f a f e w k e y e l e m e n t s w i t h i n the last sec t i ons o f 
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each s to ry w a s used s u c c e s s f u l l y b e f o r e in e m o t i o n a l p rose reca l l s tud ies ( e . g . 
B i s h o p et a l . , 2 0 0 4 ) . 
T o m a x i m i s e l e a r n i n g o p p o r t u n i t y , each s t o r y w a s read o u t t w i c e a n d 
p a r t i c i p a n t s had t o r e m e m b e r as m u c h i n f o r m a t i o n as p o s s i b l e f o l l o w i n g each 
p resen ta t i on ( t w o i m m e d i a t e reca l l c o n d i t i o n s ) . P r i o r t o t he second p resen ta t i on 
p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e r e m i n d e d o f the o r i g i n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s a n d w e r e a lso t o l d tha t t hey 
s h o u l d t r y t o r e m e m b e r as m u c h as poss ib l e f r o m each s to r y i n c l u d i n g e l e m e n t s 
t hey h a d a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d . F o l l o w i n g a 10- ( f o r a l l a m n e s i c pa t i en t s ) o r 3 0 - ( f o r 
n o n - a m n e s i c p a r t i c i p a n t s ) m i n u t e d e l a y i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e e n g a g e d in 
d i s t r a c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s o f neu t ra l e m o t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , e .g . d i g i t s p a n , m a t r i x 
r e a s o n i n g tests e tc , t h e y w e r e asked to r e c o l l e c t each s t o r y a g a i n . W h e n 
p a r t i c i p a n t s c o u l d no t r e m e m b e r t he s to r ies , t he a g e n t ' s cha rac te r i s t i c s ( e . g . 
p r o f e s s i o n o f a g e n t ) o f each s to ry w e r e g i v e n as a s i n g l e cue . P r i o r to t he 
p resen ta t i on o f each n e w s to ry the re w a s a l O - m i n u t e i n t e r v a l , in w h i c h 
p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e a g a i n e n g a g e d in d i s t r a c t i n g c o g n i t i v e tasks o f neu t ra l e m o t i o n a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , e .g . b l o c k d e s i g n tests. 
i n o r d e r t o measu re w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s u n d e r s t o o d the s tor ies in s i m i l a r 
w a y s , p a r t i c i p a n t s had to a n s w e r a set o f ques t i ons f o l l o w i n g the s e c o n d 
i m m e d i a t e reca l l t r i a l o f each s to r y . These i n c l u d e d a r a t i n g o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y , 
a r a t i n g o f ' f a m i l i a r i t y ' w i t h the p r o t a g o n i s t ' s a c t i o n s and reac t i ons 
( u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p r o t a g o n i s t ' s ac t i ons a n d e m o t i o n s based o n p r e v i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e ) a n d a r a t i n g o f s t o r y v i s u a l i s a t i o n ( 7 - p o i n t sca les, 1= l o w t o 7 = h i g h ) . 
These fac to rs (e .g . l o w c o m p r e h e n s i o n , i n a b i l i t y to ' r e l a t e to the m a i n agen t e t c ) 
have been s h o w n to i n f l u e n c e reca l l in p r e v i o u s s tud ies ( M e y e r 1984 ; K i n t s c h a n d 
van D i j k 1978 ; G e r n s b a c h e r , Marg raves , a n d B e e m a n 1 9 8 9 ; K i n t s c h , Wel .sch, 
S c h m a l h o f e r , a n d Z i m n y 1990 ) . T h u s , these ra t i ngs w e r e used to c o n t r o l f o r the 
p o t e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e o f these c o n f o u n d i n g v a r i a b l e s o n p a r t i c i p a n t s ' reca l l scores. 
T h e s e l e c t i o n o f t he th ree s tor ies to be e n c o d e d in s e l f - r e f e r e n t ve rsus 
o t h e r - r e f e r e n t m a n n e r a n d the o r d e r o f p r e s e n t a t i o n by v a l e n c e w a s 
c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d across pa r t i c i pan t s w i t h i n each g r o u p . W h e r e it w a s no t poss i b l e 
t o f u l l y c o u n t e r b a l a n c e these f ac to r s , d u e to g r o u p s izes, i n d e p e n d e n t ana l ys i s 
w e r e p e r f o r m e d to assess t h e i r e f f ec t s (see b e l o w ) . 
164 
Chapter 5: Is Confabulation Self-Serving? 
5.2 .4 C o d i n g 
P a r t i c i p a n t s ' a t t e m p t s at r e c a l l i n g the s tor ies w e r e sco red f o r a n u m b e r o f 
p r i m a r y measu res . T h e s e i n c l u d e d a m o u n t o f reca l l ( n u m b e r o f c o n t e n t u n i t s ) , 
e m o t i o n a l v a l e n c e (p leasan tness sca le ) a n d c o n t e n t e r ro rs ( n u m b e r o f d i s t o r t i o n s , 
f a b r i c a t i o n s a n d p e r s e v e r a t i o n s ) . 
Amount of Recall 
P a r t i c i p a n t s ' reca l l p r o t o c o l s w e r e sco red f o r the p resence o f idea u n i t s , as 
d e f i n e d a b o v e ( f o l l o w i n g p r e v i o u s s tud ies e .g . B i s h o p et a l . , 2 0 0 4 ; C o w a n et a l . , 
2 0 0 4 ; V a n d e n B r o e k , L o r c h , & T h u r l o w , 1996 ) . F o r each u n i t a score o f one w a s 
g i v e n w h e n the p a r t i c i p a n t r e c a l l e d the e l e m e n t s o f the u n i t o r a l t e rna t i ve e l e m e n t s 
w i t h e q u i v a l e n t m e a n i n g , e .g . s y n o n y m o u s w o r d s o r phrases o f e q u i v a l e n t 
m e a n i n g , e .g . ' she s t o r m e d i n ' i ns tead o f she ' she burs t i n ' , ' t h e y u p g r a d e d y o u r 
s ta tus ' i ns tead o f ' t h e y o f f e r e d y o u a be t te r p o s i t i o n ' . E a c h s to ry had 21 d i f f e r e n t 
idea u n i t s . S e m a n t i c reca l l scores o f the t w o i m m e d i a t e reca l l c o n d i t i o n s w e r e 
added u p t o f o r m the T o t a l I m m e d i a t e S e m a n t i c Reca l l sco re ( m a x i m u m score = 
4 2 ) , w h i c h in t u r n w a s a d d e d t o the D e l a y e d S e m a n t i c Reca l l score to f o r m the 
T o t a l S e m a n t i c Reca l l Sco re ( m a x i m u m score = 6 3 ) . 
Amount of Confabulation Errors 
P a r t i c i p a n t s ' p r o t o c o l s w e r e s c o r e d f o r the n u m b e r o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n s . 
These i n c l u d e d ( i ) ' f a b r i c a t i o n s ' o f i n f o r m a t i o n c o m p l e t e l y un re l a t ed to the 
s e m a n t i c o r p h o n e m i c e l e m e n t s o f each s to r y ( F a b r i c a t i o n sco re ) , and ( i i ) 
' d i s t o r t i o n s ' o f the s e m a n t i c i n f o r m a t i o n o r n a r r a t i v e re la t i ons o f each s to r y 
( D i s t o r t i o n s c o r e ) . T h e to ta l C o n f a b u l a t i o n Score was c a l c u l a t e d b y a d d i n g the 
respec t i ve e r ro rs ( d i s t o r t i o n s a n d f a b r i c a t i o n s ) in bo th i m m e d i a t e a n d d e l a y e d 
reca l l c o n d i t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , p r o t o c o l s w e r e sco red f o r the n u m b e r o f 
pe rseve ra t i ons t hey i n c l u d e d . T h e s e re fe r red to the r e p e t i t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n bo th 
w i t h i n each s t o r y , as w e l l as across the s tor ies o f each sess ion . 
Valence Rating 
T h e reca l l p r o t o c o l s w e r e sco red f o r e m o t i o n a l v a l e n c e u s i n g a 7 - p o i n t 
scale (1 = E x t r e m e l y U n p l e a s a n t , 7 = E x t r e m e l y P leasant ) . S c o r i n g o f v a l e n c e 
e m e r g e d o u t o f each p r o t o c o l as a w h o l e , as o p p o s e d to p r i m a r i l y b e i n g a f u n c t i o n 
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o f the use o f e x p l i c i t l y e m o t i o n a l w o r d s o r phrases . I n t h i s w a y the a b i l i t y o f t he 
p a r t i c i p a n t s to c o m p r e h e n d a n d r e p r o d u c e the e m o t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f each s to ry i n 
t h e i r r eca l l p r o t o c o l s c o u l d be sco red i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r a b i l i t y t o r e m e m b e r 
accu ra te l y s p e c i f i c w o r d s o r phrases . F o r the same reasons , p o t e n t i a l reca l l e r ro rs 
(e .g . c o n f a b u l a t i o n s ) w e r e c o n s i d e r e d at f a c e - v a l u e in t h e v a l e n c e r a t i n g . T o t a l 
V a l e n c e Scores w e r e c a l c u l a t e d by a v e r a g i n g the v a l e n c e r a t i n g o f t h e t w o 
i m m e d i a t e a n d the d e l a y e d reca l l c o n d i t i o n s . 
T w o ' n a i v e ' raters p rac t i sed f o l l o w i n g t h i s c o d i n g s y s t e m . C o d i n g w a s 
p e r f o r m e d b l i n d t o t he p a r t i c i p a n t s ' g r o u p c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Raters w e r e p a i d f o r t h e i r 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n to t he s t u d y . I n t e r - r a t e r r e l i a b i l i t y w a s c a l c u l a t e d u s i n g Pea rson ' s 
c o r r e l a t i o n . T h e t w o rates s h o w e d s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l i a b i l i t y c o e f f i c i e n t s o f + .78 f o r 
s e m a n t i c reca l l r a t i n g , o f + .82 f o r e r ro rs r a t i n g a n d o f + .79 f o r v a l e n c e r a t i n g . 
D i f f e r e n c e s w e r e s o l v e d b y d i s c u s s i o n . F o r d i f f e r e n c e s in v a l e n c e r a t i n g s the 
f o l l o w i n g ru les w e r e f o l l o w e d : i f the t w o raters had j u d g e d a p a r t i c u l a r s t o r y 
p r o t o c o l as p leasant o r unp leasan t , bu t t he i r r a t i ngs d i f f e r e d i n deg ree (e .g . ra ter A 
= 5 and ra te r B = 6 , o r ra te r A = 1 a n d ra te r B = 2 ) t hen the m e a n w a s c a l c u l a t e d . 
T h e same a p p l i e d to t he cases w h e r e o n e o f t he ra ters had j u d g e d a g i v e n p r o t o c o l 
as neu t ra l a n d o the r had rated it as p leasant o r u n p l e a s a n t (e .g . rater A = 4 a n d 
ra ter B = 5 ) . W h e n , h o w e v e r , the t w o raters had ra ted a s t o i y p r o t o c o l o n o p p o s i t e 
s ides o f t h e sca le t hen they w e r e asked to d i scuss t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . 
5.2.5 D e s i g n 
T h e m a i n e x p e r i m e n t a l d e s i g n i n c l u d e d o n e betvveen-sub jec ts f ac to r . 
G r o u p ( c o n f a b u l a t i n g , a m n e s i c , f r o n t a l pa t ien ts a n d hea l t hy c o n t r o l s ) a n d t w o 
w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s f ac to r s , s to ry V a l e n c e ( p o s i t i v e , n e g a t i v e a n d n e u t r a l ) a n d s to ry 
R e f e r e n c e ( s e l f ve rsus o t h e r ) . T h i s des ign a l l o w e d f o r 4 x 3 x 2 c o m p a r i s o n s o n 
th ree m a i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s : a m o u n t o f r e c a l l , v a l e n c e r a t i n g a n d a m o u n t o f 
c o n f a b u l a t i o n e r ro rs . Severa l fac to rs , e .g . g r o u p s ' d e m o g r a p h i c a l cha rac te r i s t i c s , 
s t o r y cha rac te r i s t i c s , s t o r i e s ' r a t i ngs etc , w h i c h c o u l d have i n f l u e n c e d the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s p e r f o r m a n c e o n the p rose reca l l task w e r e a n a l y s e d separa te ly t o 
a v o i d o v e r l o a d i n g the m a i n a n a l y s i s . In a d d i t i o n , the p o t e n t i a l l a te ra l i t y e f f ec t s 
w i t h i n t he c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p , i.e. b i l a t e ra l ( N = 9 ) ve rsus u n i l a t e r a l ( N = 3 ) 
s u b g r o u p s , w e r e separa te ly a n a l y s e d . 
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5.3 Results 
G i v e n the s m a l l n u m b e r o f pa t ien ts assessed a n d the u n e q u a l l y s i zed 
g r o u p s , da ta w e r e ana l ysed u s i n g n o n - p a r a m e t r i c s ta t is t i cs . T h e K r u s k a l l - W a l l i s 
test w a s used f o r the b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t s ana lyses . S u b s e q u e n t p a i r - w i s e 
c o m p a r i s o n s w e r e p e r f o r m e d u s i n g the M a n n - W h i t n e y U - T e s t . T h e F r i e d m a n test 
w a s used f o r re la ted s a m p l e s c o m p a r i s o n s b e t w e e n the v a l e n c e c o n d i t i o n s , a n d 
subsequen t p a i r - w i s e c o m p a r i s o n s w e r e p e r f o r m e d u s i n g W i l c o x o n S i g n e d R a n k s 
tests. T h e la t ter w a s a lso used to ana l yse the w i t h i n - s u b j e c t s e f f ec t s o f r e fe rence 
( s e l f ve rsus o t h e r ) . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e t h r e s h o l d f o r a l l ana lyses w a s set aX p < . 05 . 
G i v e n the need f o r m u l t i p l e ana lyses o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t resu l ts are r e p o r t e d in f u l l . 
T h e p - v a l u e o f n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t f i n d i n g s is a lso r e p o r t e d . 
5.3.1 P r e l i m i n a r y A n a l y s i s : C o n t r o l l i n g f o r C o n f o u n d i n g V a r i a b l e s 
Participants' Characteristics 
T a b l e 5-1 s h o w s the age, e d u c a t i o n a n d g e n d e r cha rac te r i s t i c s o f the f o u r 
g r o u p s used in t h i s s t udy . 
Table 5-1. Means and SDs for Age, Education and Gender Ratio by G r o u p . 
Confabulation Frontal Group Amnesic Healthy 
Group (N = 7) Group Controls 
(N = 12) (N = 3) (N = 10) 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age 57.6(18 .1) 52 (22.1) 44 .3 (19 .1 ) 52.1 (17.8) 
Education 10.3(3 .2) 1 2 ( 2 ) 9 .7 (2 ) 11 (1.8) 
Male:Female Ratio 8:4 4:3 2:1 6:4 
N o n - p a r a m e t r i c K r u s k a l l - W a l l i s tests r evea led tha t the age and e d u c a t i o n a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the g r o u p s o f the s tudy w e r e no t s i g n i f i c a n t , ps > .2. 
T h e r e f o r e , these f ac to r s w e r e e x c l u d e d f r o m subsequen t ana lyses . T h e ra t i o o f 
m a l e s to f e m a l e s was no t i den t i ca l across g r o u p s and in o r d e r t o e x a m i n e w h e t h e r 
g e n d e r had an e f f e c t o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s r e c a l l , v a l e n c e and c o n f a b u l a t i o n scores , 
n o n - p a r a m e t r i c M a n n - W h i t n e y tests w h e r e p e r f o r m e d o n each o f the s i x to ta l 
r e c a l l , v a l e n c e a n d c o n f a b u l a t i o n scores . T h e r e w a s no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f g e n d e r 
o n the reca l l (ps > . 1 ) , c o n f a b u l a t i o n (ps > . 2 ) , o r v a l e n c e {ps> A) scores o f any o f 
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t h e s to r y c o n d i t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , the f a c t o r G e n d e r w a s e x c l u d e d f r o m subsequen t 
ana lyses . 
Story Characteristics 
T h e re fe rence ( s e l f ve rsus o t h e r ) in w h i c h each c o n t e n t s t o r y w a s 
p resen ted t o each pa t i en t a n d the o r d e r o f p resen ta t i on by v a l e n c e w e r e n o t f u l l y 
c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d w i t h i n each g r o u p , d u e to u n e q u a l s izes. I n o r d e r t o es tab l i sh 
w h e t h e r these f a c t o r s w e r e l i k e l y t o c o n f o u n d resu l t s , n o n - p a r a m e t r i c tests w e r e 
c o n d u c t e d o n each o f t he s i x to ta l scores o f r e c a l l , v a l e n c e a n d c o n f a b u l a t i o n w i t h 
e i t he r ( i ) t he s t o r y / r e f e r e n c e c o m b i n a t i o n o r ( i i ) the o r d e r o f p resen ta t i on as the 
b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t f ac to r . T h e r e w a s n o s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f s t o r y / r e f e r e n c e 
c o m b i n a t i o n o n reca l l {ps > . 3 ) , v a l e n c e {ps > . 2 ) o r o n c o n f a b u l a t i o n scores {ps > 
. 1 ) , a n d the re w a s no s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o f p r e s e n t a t i o n o r d e r o n reca l l {ps > . 6 ) , 
v a l e n c e {ps > . 2 ) , o r c o n f a b u l a t i o n scores {ps> . 1 ) . T h e s e f a c t o r s w e r e e x c l u d e d 
f r o m subsequen t ana lyses . 
Subjective Story Ratings 
K r u s k a l l - W a l l i s and M a n n - W h i t n e y tests r evea led that the f o u r 
e x p e r i m e n t a l g r o u p s d i d no t d i f f e r i n t h e i r ra t i ngs o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y , 
v i s u a l i s a t i o n , o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h agen t , ps > .1 (see A p p e n d i x D 3 f o r m e a n 
ra t i ngs b y g r o u p ) . 
Immediate Versus Delayed Recall 
T h e e f f ec t s o f i m m e d i a t e ve rsus d e l a y e d reca l l c o n d i t i o n s o n a m o u n t o f 
reca l l w e r e e x a m i n e d separa te ly to a v o i d o v e r l o a d i n g the m a i n ana l ys i s , w h i c h 
w a s c o n d u c t e d based o n to ta l scores . A s e x p e c t e d , t he s to r ies w e r e g e n e r a l l y 
be t te r r e c a l l e d o n i m m e d i a t e (ave rage o f f i r s t a n d s e c o n d i m m e d i a t e reca l l 
c o n d i t i o n s ) than on d e l a y e d r e c a l l , Z = 7 .6 , p < . 0 0 0 1 . H o w e v e r , t h i s d i f f e r e n c e 
w a s no t equa l across g r o u p s . T h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f the c o n f a b u l a t i n g and n o n -
c o n f a b u l a t i n g a m n e s i c pa t ien ts appeared to d r o p m o r e t han the o t h e r t w o g r o u p s , 
w h i l e the reca l l scores o f hea l t hy c o n t r o l s appea red less i n f l u e n c e d by d e l a y e d 
reca l l (see A p p e n d i x D 4 f o r de ta i l ed resu l t s ) . I n d e e d , there w a s a m a i n e f f e c t o f 
g r o u p o n the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n i m m e d i a t e a n d d e l a y e d r e c a l l , x^{3) = 4 2 . 8 , p < 
. 0 0 0 1 . Post hoc M a n n - W h i t n e y tests r evea led that the c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p 
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d i f f e r e d f r o m the a m n e s i c , Z = 2 .9 , p < . 0 0 3 , and h e a l t h y c o n t r o l g r o u p s , Z = 5 . 1 , 
p < . 0 0 0 1 , bu t no t t he f r o n t a l c o n t r o l g r o u p , Z = 0 .8 , p = .4 . T h e s e resu l ts are 
s h o w n in Figure 5-1 below. 
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Figure 5-1. Performance of Immediate and Delayed Recall across Groups 
T h e r e w a s n o e f f e c t o f v a l e n c e o r agent o n the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n 
i m m e d i a t e and d e l a y e d r e c a l l , x~{2) = ].3, p = .5 a n d Z = 1, p = .3 , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
N o n e o f t he o the r t w o - , t h ree - a n d f o u r - w a y i n t e r a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n g g r o u p , v a l e n c e 
and agent w e r e s i g n i f i c a n t , ps > . 1 , e x c e p t f r o m the i n t e r a c t i o n o f V a l e n c e 
( p o s i t i v e ve rsus n e g a t i v e ) x A g e n t ( s e l f ve r sus o t h e r ) x R e c a l l ( i m m e d i a t e ve rsus 
d e l a y e d ) w h i c h w a s s i g n i f i c a n t , Z = 2 .3 , < .05 . A s these d i f f e r e n c e s w e r e 
secondary to the hypo theses o f the s t u d y they w e r e no t i n c l u d e d in the m a i n 
ana l ys i s . H o w e v e r , t hey w e r e t a k e n in to c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t he 
resul ts (see b e l o w ) . 
5.3.2 M a i n A n a l y s i s 
Amount of Recall. 
M e a n to ta l s e m a n t i c reca l l scores, b r o k e d o w n b y e x p e r i m e n t a l f ac to rs and 
g r o u p , are d e p i c t e d in Figure 5 - 2 . 
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Figure 5 -2 . Mean Number of Idea Units Recalled by Groups across Conditions 
Fac to rs i n f l u e n c i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s ' reca l l p e r f o r m a n c e w e r e e x a m i n e d b y 
c o n d u c t i n g n o n - p a r a m e t r i c tests. O v e r a l l , c o n f a b u l a t i n g a n d a m n e s i c pa t ien ts 
reca l l ed less s e m a n t i c i n f o r m a t i o n than f r o n t a l pa t i en t s , w h o in t u r n r e c a l l e d less 
i n f o r m a t i o n than hea l t hy c o n t r o l s . A n i n d e p e n d e n t - s a m p l e , K r u s k a l l - W a l l i s , test 
c o n f i r m e d tha t there w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t m a i n e f f e c t o f g r o u p , x'(3) = 23.2, p < . 0 0 1 . 
Post hoc a n a l y s i s , w i t h B o n f e r r o n i c o r r e c t i o n , r evea led tha t the c o n f a b u l a t i n g 
g r o u p d i f f e r e d f r o m the f r o n t a l c o n t r o l g r o u p , Z = 2.9, p < . 0 0 5 , a n d the h e a l t h y 
c o n t r o l g r o u p , Z = 3.8, p < . 0 0 1 , bu t no t the a m n e s i c g r o u p , p = .8. B y con t ras t , a 
r e l a t e d - s a m p l e W i l c o x o n S i g n e d R a n k s T e s t revea led tha t the re w a s n o m a i n 
e f f e c t o f re fe rence ( s e l f versus o t h e r ) , p = .4, and a F r i e d m a n test r e v e a l e d t he re 
w a s no m a i n e f f ec t o f v a l e n c e , p = .2. F u r t h e r b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t n o n - p a r a m e t r i c 
tests r evea led that the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n s e l f - r e f e r e n t and o t h e r - r e f e r e n t reca l l 
d i d not v a r y b e t w e e n g r o u p s , p = .2. S i m i l a r l y , the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the reca l l o f 
s to r ies w i t h p o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e d i d no t s i g n i f i c a n t l y v a r y b e t w e e n 
g r o u p s , / ; = .9. A G r o u p x V a l e n c e ( p o s i t i v e ve rsus n e g a t i v e ) x R e f e r e n c e ( s e l f 
versus o t h e r ) i n t e rac t i on w a s a lso s t u d i e d by c a l c u l a t i n g t he d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n 
p o s i t i v e a n d nega t i ve s to ry reca l l i n s e l f - r e f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s a n d the d i f f e r e n c e 
between egsitive a n d n e g a t i v e s t o i ^ reca l l i n o t h e r - r e f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s a n d 
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f a b r i c a t i o n e r ro rs in i m m e d i a t e a n d d e l a y e d reca l l c o n d i t i o n s o f each .story 
p r o t o c o l ) . 
T h e mean scores o f T o t a l C o n f a b u l a t i o n across g r o u p s are s h o w n i n 
F i g u r e 5-3 b e l o w . 
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Figure 5-3. Mean Number of Confabulations across Groups and Conditions 
N o n - p a r a m e t r i c tests w e r e used to ana lyse the fac to rs that m i g h t h a v e 
i n f l u e n c e d p a r t i c i p a n t s ' c o n f a b u l a t o r y e r ro rs . A w i t h i n - s u b j e c t , F r i e d m a n test 
r evea led tha t there w a s a m a i n e f f e c t o f v a l e n c e , x"(2) = 8.9, p < .05, w i t h 
p a i l i c i p a n t s c o n f a b u l a t i n g m o r e in t he n e g a t i v e than the p o s i t i v e o r neut ra l 
c o n d i t i o n s . A W i l c o x o n S i g n e d R a n k s test a lso revea led a m a i n re fe rence e f f e c t , Z 
= 1.9, p < .05, w i t h p a r t i c i p a n t s p r o d u c i n g m o r e c o n f a b u l a t i o n s in the se l f - r e fe ren t 
than the o the r - r e f e ren t c o n d i t i o n s . I n a d d i t i o n , as e x p e c t e d , a b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t 
K r u s k a l l - W a l l i s test s h o w e d tha t there w a s an o v e r a l l e f f e c t o f g r o u p ]C{3) = 20.9, 
p < .001, w i t h the c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts c o n f a b u l a t i n g s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e t han a l l 
the c o n t r o l g r o u p s . T h e c o n t r o l g r o u p s s h o w e d no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e in a m o u n t 
o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n , i.e. w h e n the c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p w a s e x c l u d e d f r o m the 
ana lys i s the re was n o s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the a m o u n t o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n 
the c o n t r o l g r o u p s p r o d u c e d , x^(2) = 3.9, / ; = . 1 . T h e r e w a s a lso no e v i d e n c e that 
172 
Chapter 5: Is Confabulation Self Serving? 
the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n se l f - a n d o the r - r e fe rence c o n d i t i o n s , o r the d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e c o n d i t i o n s v a r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y across 
g r o u p , ps > 3 . S i m i l a r l y , there w a s no s i g n i f l c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n o f V a l e n c e x 
Re fe rence , o r G r o u p x V a l e n c e x R e f e r e n c e , / j s > .2 . 
T h e a b o v e resu l ts sugges t tha t a l t h o u g h c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t i en t s , a n d f r o n t a l 
pa t i en t s at a lesser deg ree , s h o w e d a t e n d e n c y to p r o d u c e h i g h e r a m o u n t o f 
c o n f a b u l a t i o n in n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t t han in o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s , th i s t e n d e n c y w a s 
no t s t a t i s t i ca l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Valence Ratings 
T h e m e a n scores o f v a l e n c e ra t i ngs across g r o u p s are s h o w n in Figure 5-4 
b e l o w . 
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Figure 5-4. Mean Valence Ratings across Groups , Valence and Perspective 
Conditions. 
N o t e . * * s i g n i f y s ta t i s t i ca l l y s i g n i f l c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the C o n f a b u l a t i o n G r o u p 
and the c o n t r o l g r o u p s in the s e l f - n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n . 
A n u m b e r o f d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n the g r o u p s w e r e o b s e r v e d in the reca l l ed 
v a l e n c e ( d e p e n d e d v a r i a b l e : p leasantness r a t i n g ) o f the o r i g i n a l l y p o s i t i v e a n d 
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n e g a t i v e s to r ies ( i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : s to ry V a l e n c e ) . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f these 
d i f f e r e n c e s w a s s ta t i s t i ca l l y a n a l y s e d u s i n g n o n - p a r a m e t r i c tests. A s e x p e c t e d , 
t he re w a s a m a i n e f f e c t o f s to ry v a l e n c e o n v a l e n c e r a t i n g , x^(2) = 5 2 . 6 , p < . 0 0 1 . 
T h e r e w a s n o m a i n e f f e c t o f r e fe rence ( s e l f ve rsus o t h e r ) a n d t he re w a s n o m a i n 
e f f e c t o f g r o u p , p = . 08 , a l t h o u g h the la t te r d i f f e r e n c e a p p r o x i m a t e d leve ls o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h e d i f f e r e n c e in v a l e n c e r a t i n g b e t w e e n p o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e 
s to r ies v a r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y b e t w e e n the g r o u p s , x" (3) = 17.4 , p < . 0 0 5 , w i t h t h e 
c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p s h o w i n g o v e r a l l h i g h e r r a t i ngs o f p leasantness t h a n t h e 
c o n t r o l g r o u p s . F u r t h e r m o r e t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n w a s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t he s e l f - r e f e r e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s , x'O) ~ ' 5 . 4 , p < . 0 0 5 , w i t h t he C o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p s h o w i n g h i g h e r 
p leasantness ra t i ngs t h a n c o n t r o l s in the s e l f - n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n . Pos t h o c a n a l y s i s 
r e v e a l e d t h a t t he d i f f e r e n c e in v a l e n c e r a t i n g b e t w e e n p o s i t i v e a n d n e g a t i v e se l f -
r e fe rence c o n d i t i o n s v a r i e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y a lso across the t h ree c o n t r o l g r o u p s , w i t h 
t he A m n e s i c g r o u p s h o w i n g l o w e r p leasantness ra t i ngs in t he s e l f - p o s i t i v e 
c o n d i t i o n , x^ (2) = 17.8 , p < . 05 . T h e la t te r f i n d i n g s h o u l d be i n t e r p r e ted w i t h 
c a u t i o n d u e to the s m a l l s ize o f the a m n e s i c c o n t r o l g r o u p . T h e d i f f e r e n c e in 
v a l e n c e r a t i n g d i d no t v a r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y across g r o u p s in t he o t h e r - r e f e r e n c e 
c o n d i t i o n s , p = . 06 , a l t h o u g h it a p p r o x i m a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l eve l s . N o o the r 
i n t e r a c t i o n reached o r a p p r o x i m a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l eve l s . 
I n c o n c l u s i o n , these f i n d i n g s revea led that t he c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p s h o w e d 
a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e f r o m o t h e r g r o u p s in r e c a l l i n g s e l f - r e f e r e n t e m o t i o n a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n in m o r e p leasan t t e r m s . T h i s t e n d e n c y w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i d e n t in the 
n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t s to r ies , w h i c h the c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts r e c a l l e d in m o r e 
p leasan t t e r m s o n ave rage . 
Laterality effects 
I n o r d e r to assess w h e t h e r the B i l a t e r a l a n d the U n i l a t e r a l ( r i g h t -
h e m i s p h e r e pa t i en t s ) C o n f a b u l a t i o n s u b g r o u p s d i f f e r e d in t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e o n 
the c o n d i t i o n s o f t he p rose reca l l test , n o n - p a r a m e t r i c M a n n - W h i t n e y U tests w e r e 
used w i t h l a t e r a l i t y ( b i l a t e ra l ve rsus u n i l a t e r a l ) as the b e t w e e n - s u b j e c t f ac to r . 
These r e v e a l e d that a l t h o u g h the un i l a te ra l pa t i en t s r e m e m b e r e d m o r e idea un i t s in 
a l l s t o r y - r e f e r e n c e c o m b i n a t i o n s , these d i f f e r e n c e s d i d no t reach s i g n i f i c a n t l eve l s , 
p?, > . 08 , e x c e p t in t h e se l f - r e fe ren t p o s i t i v e s to r ies , in w h i c h u n i l a t e r a l pa t ien ts 
r e m e m b e r e d m o r e idea un i t s than b i l a te ra l pa t i en t s , Z= 2, p < . 05 . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 
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v a l e n c e ra t i ngs o f t he p r o t o c o l s o f t h e t w o s u b - g r o u p s d i d no t d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
across a n y v a l e n c e - r e f e r e n c e c o m b i n a t i o n , ps > .2. T h u s , a l t h o u g h the u n i l a t e r a l 
pa t ien ts p r o d u c e d m o r e u n p l e a s a n t s to r ies t han the b i l a t e ra l g r o u p in t h e c r i t i c a l 
s e l f - n e g a t i v e c o m b i n a t i o n , t h i s w a s no t s i g n i f i c a n t , p = .2 . S i m i l a r l y , t he re w a s no 
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the g r o u p s in t he a m o u n t o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n t hey p r o d u c e d i n 
any o f t he v a l e n c e - r e f e r e n c e c o m b i n a t i o n s , ps > A, e x c e p t i n the o t h e r - r e f e r e n t 
and n e g a t i v e s to r ies . M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n the o t h e r - n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n the re w a s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the g r o u p s , Z = 2 . 1 , p < .05 , w i t h u n i l a t e r a l 
c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts p r o d u c i n g m o r e c o n f a b u l a t i o n s t han b i l a te ra l pa t ien ts . B y 
con t ras t , u n i l a t e r a l pa t ien ts p r o d u c e d less c o n f a b u l a t i o n s t han the b i l a t e ra l 
s u b g r o u p in t he s e l f - n e g a t i v e c o n d i t i o n b u t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e w a s no t s i g n i f i c a n t , p = 
A. T h e m e a n R e c a l l , C o n f a b u l a t i o n a n d V a l e n c e scores o f t he B i l a t e r a l a n d 
U n i l a t e r a l c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p s are p resen ted in A p p e n d i x D 5 . 
5.3.3 S u m m a r v o f M a i n F i n d i n g s 
A s e x p e c t e d , c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts s h o w e d excess o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n e r ro rs 
a n d i m p a i r e d reca l l o f sho r t a f f e c t i v e a n d neu t ra l s to r ies c o m p a r e d w i t h f r o n t a l 
a n d n o n - n e u r o l o g i c a l l y i m p a i r e d c o n t r o l s . T h e i r o v e r a l l p e r f o r m a n c e in t he reca l l 
o f these e m o t i o n a l s to r ies w a s e q u a l l y i m p a i r e d t o tha t o f a s m a l l g r o u p o f 
m a t c h e d a m n e s i c pa t ien ts , a l t h o u g h the la t te r s h o w e d a s teeper d e c l i n e f r o m 
i m m e d i a t e to d e l a y e d r e c a l l . H o w e v e r , c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts r e c a l l e d 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y less i n f o r m a t i o n w h e n p resen ted w i t h a n e g a t i v e t han a p o s i t i v e se l f -
re fe ren t s t o r y . T h i s finding w a s a c c o m p a n i e d by the fac t tha t c o n f a b u l a t i n g 
pa t ien ts r eca l l ed the v a l e n c e o f the n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t s to r ies w o r s e than a l l 
o t h e r g r o u p s , n a r r a t i n g the s t o r y p l o t in a m o r e p leasan t w a y than the o r i g i n a l . In 
a d d i t i o n , t hey s h o w e d the h i g h e s t a m o u n t o f c o n f a b u l a t i o n e r ro rs in t h i s c o n d i t i o n 
(a n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t t r e n d ) a n d f r o n t a l c o n t r o l pa t i en t s s h o w e d the same t e n d e n c y . 
B y con t ras t , c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t i en t s , s i m i l a r l y t o c o n t r o l g r o u p s , d i d no t s h o w such 
biases in t he reca l l o f t h i r d - p e r s o n s to r ies . F i n a l l y , these biases w e r e s h o w n by 
b o t h b i l a te ra l a n d u n i l a t e r a l c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t i en t s , a l t h o u g h the u n i l a t e r a l 
s u b g r o u p s h o w e d o v e r a l l be t te r r e c a l l , less c o n f a b u l a t i o n a n d the deg ree o f 
e m o t i o n a l a n d s e l f - s e r v i n g b ias w a s less e x t r e m e t han in the case o f the b i l a te ra l 
c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts . These findings are d i s cussed b e l o w . 
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5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 S e l f - S e r v i n g B i a s in C o n f a b u l a t i o n 
O v e r a l l , c o n f a b u l a t i n g a n d a m n e s i c pa t i en ts r e c a l l e d less p rose 
i n f o r m a t i o n t han f r o n t a l pa t i en t s , w h o i n t u r n r e c a l l e d less i n f o r m a t i o n t han 
h e a l t h y c o n t r o l s . T h e s e resu l t s w e r e a lso c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f the e x p e r i m e n t a l g r o u p s i n s t a n d a r d n e u r o p s y c h o l o g i c a l tests o f 
m e m o r y (see C h a p t e r 2 ) . H o w e v e r , the re w a s one c r u c i a l f ea tu re i n t he reca l l 
p e r f o r m a n c e o f c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t i en ts tha t w a s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t t h a n tha t o f 
the o t h e r t h ree g r o u p s . N a m e l y , t he c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p r e c a l l e d s e l f - r e f e r e n t 
e m o t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n in s i g n i f i c a n t l y m o r e p leasan t t e r m s than t h e o the r g r o u p s . 
T h i s b ias w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i d e n t i n the n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t s to r ies , w h i c h t he 
c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts r e c a l l e d o n ave rage in m o r e p leasan t t e r m s t han the o the r 
g r o u p s d i d . M o r e o v e r , the c o n f a b u l a t i o n g r o u p r e c a l l e d the n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t 
s to r ies in s i g n i f i c a n t l y less de ta i l t han the p o s i t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t s to r ies a n d t hey 
p r o d u c e d the h ighes t a m o u n t o f c o n f a b u l a t o r y e r ro r s , i.e. d i s t o r t i o n s and 
f a b r i c a t i o n s , in the reca l l o f these s tor ies (a n o n - s i g n i f i c a n t t r e n d ) . T a b l e 5-3 
b e l o w i l l us t ra tes the p e r f o r m a n c e o f c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts (pa t i en t s L H , O T , I R ) 
i n t h i s v a l e n c e / r e f e r e n c e c o m b i n a t i o n a n d con t ras ts i t w i t h tha t o f t he o the r 
g r o u p s . A s these e x a m p l e s i l l u s t r a t e , c o n f a b u l a t i n g pa t ien ts s h o w e d the t e n d e n c y 
to p r o d u c e s e l f - e n h a n c i n g f a b r i c a t i o n s a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l y to d i s t o r t the m e a n i n g 
a n d e m o t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f n e g a t i v e s e l f - r e f e r e n t s to r ies in w a y s m o r e p leasant 
f o r the ' s e l f . These tendenc ies w e r e no t o b s e r v e d in c o n t r o l p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
Table 5-3. Examples of Recall Protocols in Negative and Self-referent Conditions 
Story Version: Self-Referent & Negative Valence Combination 
Original Story Protocols 
Plot1 
[Imagine that] you are a tiard working/ employee/. It is Sunday/ morning/ and you are preparing to go out/. You have 
planned a wonderful day-trip/ to the seaside/ in order to rest/. However, your best friend calls you saying/ he is ill, lonely 
and needs your help/. Feeling exhausted/ and not bearing to miss your trip/, you lie to him/ saying that you promised to 
see your sister/. Four days later/, you find out that/, due to inappropriate treatment/, your friend's health has severely 
deteriorated/ since Sunday/. You feel guilty/ and ashamed of yourself. 
Plot 2 
[Imagine that] you are a well - qualified/ assistant/. It is Thursday/ morning/ and you have completed a long report/. You 
burst/ into your boss's office/, wanting to announce the outcome/. However, your boss has asked you/ not to disturb him 
that morning/. With great embarrassment/, you suddenly remember his request/. You apologise/ for interrupting a board 
meeting/. The next day/, your boss tells you that you might lose your promotion/ and even be fired/, as you are so 
absentminded/ lately/. You feel very humiliated/ and scared/. 
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Story Version: Self-Referent & Negative Valence Combination 
Normal Control: N7 
Male, Age: 57y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: I'm a dedicated employee, it's Sunday morning. I have a day-trip planned to the sea-side...I'm about 
to meet, to go w/ith my sister. A close friend calls, I make up an excuse not to see him or not to receive him. I get a call 
four days later to tell me that the friend's health has deteriorated...and thafs it. 
Immediate Recall 2: "I'm a dedicated employee, I'm sitting on a Sunday morning, looking forward to a day-trip to the 
seaside. My friend calls, to tell me they're feeling ill and lonely...I explain, no actually I don't explain how tired I am, I 
make up an excuse that I have to see my sister. And then four days later, my friend's health has deteriorated due to 
inappropriate treatment and I feel guilty and I can't remember what else it is". 
Delayed Recall: "It's Sunday morning, I have a trip to the coast planned. My friend phones to say they're feeling ill, feeling 
down. I make up an excuse that I have to see my sister. I find out four days later, due to inappropriate treatment he's got 
worse....1 feel guilty (?). And that's it". 
Frontal Control: F2 
Female. Age: 55y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: 'Your sitting around doing nothing much but you're a little tired, it's been a hard week, a hard days 
work and your friend phones you and says would you like to come out for dinner and you say I'm terribly sorry I have a 
friend, my sister is ill and unfortunately when the story came to it her sister really was ill and she felt very very guilty". 
Immediate Recall 2: 'Okay so... I'm a middle-aged lady, am I? Who's had a hard days work and I'm looking forward to a 
trip to the sea and I'm very very tired. Ohh I've never been so tired in my lite can you imagine and my friend phones me 
and he asks me to come out with him for tea. I say I'm terribly sorry my sister is ill, is it? And I won't be able to go there. 
My sister really became, no my friend,oh he, wait my friend was feeling ill and he asked me to come and see. He's sick 
and he's lonely and he needs my help and comfort. I said sorry but my sister's ill or is it my friend, my sister isn't it, oh no 
my friend is ill she didn't go. She felt really upset when she found out that he who had invited her out really was ill. 
Delayed Recall: "Her boyfriend called ill, said I am ill and lonely. But I said my friend is ill, I have to go and see her. Then 
she felt guilty because her friend was indeed ill". 
Amnesic Control: A2 
Male Age 63y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: He had arranged to go to the sea-side and he felt ashamed when his friend passed away. He felt 
ashamed that he lied. 
Immediate Recall 2: "He made an excuse that he was on holiday and his friend died. And he felt ashamed". 
Delayed Recall: "No, I can't remember" 
Confabulating Patient: LH 
Male. Age 60y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: 'You are going to see your sister at the coast, nice Sunday out, you've had a scadly time, looking 
fonward to it for a day's rehab so to speak (laughs), you get this call from your mate he is feeling a bit under the weather, 
not very happy with how the world is treating him he needs to talk to someone, to get these things out of his chest, sort 
them out. Would you go down to help him? Being a good friend you do. You go down do your best. Next WK he pops his 
cods. The only feeling you should have, not happiness satisfaction but something along these lines, because you did 
your best to help him in his final days, even if you didn't know that these were his final days". 
Immediate Recall 2: 'You are going to see your sister at the coast, you felt you needed a rehab visit to get yourself totted 
up again, a friend rings, he feels ill, getting worse, he needs a bit of help, would you go and talk to him, to cheer him up, 
pulling straight whatever. You go down you do that, that is on a Monday or something like that, by the Friday the medical 
people realise that they have been giving him wrong treatment and his condition has deteriorated considerably, but you 
feel happy that you've been down to help on time". 
Delayed Recall: 'Was this the guy feeling under the weather? He rang his mate because he was feeling down at the 
month, sorry at himself, have had the worse problems, sitting on his shoulders, well he wasn't but he would have done, 
and (laughs) so he wanted somebody to give him a bit of boost, to help him a bit, so he rang his mate. His mate was on 
his way to the coast to see his sister, but because this guy was such a close friend he knocked the trip to see his sister on 
the head and went to see his mate who felt wonderfully chaffed about it". 
Confabulating Patient: OT 
Male. Age 40y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "My friend rang up to see how I was. I started asking him how he was and how he was keeping". 
Immediate Recall 2: °A friend who rang and says he...well he asked... fancy on going on a trip with him. I told him yes". 
Delayed Recall: "Sorry, pet, nothing comes to my mind. Why though, I don't know". 
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Story Version: Self-Referent & Negative Valence Combination 
Confabulating Patient: IR 
Female. Age 45y. Plot 2 
Immediate Recall 1: "I... one morning, I went to work to pick up a check. They didn't give it. She can't leave the job. They 
want her to stay. She didn't leave it. Took the coffee and went back home". 
Immediate Recall 2: 'I wrote an exam. I went to my boss to show the school report. I had no more money. He said I must 
go. I took over the report and left. I can also lose the job. He didn't give me money any more. But I went. He said stay". 
Delayed Recall: 'Ladv is in the garden. They made garden pretty and they eat happy in the house, in the garden and they 
put clothes on. I liked it there. And he said I could stay'. 
5.4.2 Self-serving Confabulat ion: The Role o f Amnesia and Executive Dysfunct ion 
These f indings support previous indications o f emotional biases in 
confabulat ion (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al. , 2004; see also 
Chapters 3 and 4). In this experiment, such bias was not observed in either 
amnesic or dysexecutive patients, at least not to the same degree. The three 
amnesic patients tested in this study showed, when compared to confabulat ing 
patients, equally poor recall performance in stories w i th negative valence, 
although their performance deteriorated more sharply f rom immediate to delayed 
condit ions. However, unl ike the confabulation group, the amnesic patients were 
able to recall the negative valence o f the original stories appropriately. In addit ion, 
they made only few confabulatory errors in these condit ions, which did not d i f fer 
in number f rom their low error scores in all other condit ions. Thus, although 
memory impairment may have contributed to confabulat ing patients' wishfu l 
distortions o f the prose material it was not suff icient to cause such bias. 
Previous studies have shown that frontal patients are impaired in the recall 
o f narrative material, although at a different level and possibly for di f ferent 
reasons than amnesic patients wi thout executive dysfunction (Baddeley & Wi lson, 
2002; Moscovi tch & Winocur, 2002; Sir igu et al., 1995; Zal la et al. , 2002). In 
particular, identi f ied executive impairments specif ical ly contr ibut ing to poor prose 
recall, involve the inabi l i ty to establish inferential relations and sequential l inks 
among narrative events at early encoding stages (Zal la et al. , 2002). Moreover, the 
capacity to monitor, integrate and manipulate the contents o f work ing memoi-y is 
impaired in such patients (Baddeley & Wi lson, 2002; Moscovi tch & Winocour, 
2002). Final ly, the capabil i ty to provide the opt imal retrieval strategy for recall as, 
wel l as to select, ver i fy and adjust the products o f retrieval can be defective in 
frontal patients (Baddeley & Wi lson, 2002; Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Hough, 
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1990; Moscovi tch & Winocour, 2002; Wapner et al. , 1981). By contrast, the 
impairments thought o f as responsible for amnesic patients' poor performance in 
prose recall, include mainly transferring and maintaining semantic information in 
long-term memory (Baddeley & Wi lson, 2002; Zai la et al. , 2002). 
Al though the present study did not directly investigate these detailed 
differences, the general quantitative and quali tat ive differences in semantic recall 
between the story protocols o f the frontal and amnesic patients suggest that 
dif ferent cognit ive processes underlie their impaired performances, in particular, 
frontal patients tended to remember more idea units than amnesic patients but 
these were often misrepresented, or erroneously interpreted, distorted and even 
placed into dif ferent temporal order. Table 5-3 above illustrates the difference in 
recall quality between the two groups (see patients A2 and F2), as wel l as between 
the confabulation group and the group o f healthy participants (see also Appendix 
D6 for recall protocols o f posit ive story plots). However, it is important to note 
that despite the similarit ies in the recall patterns o f confabulat ing and frontal 
control patients, the latter did not distort the emotional valence o f the original 
stories as confabulat ing patients d id and their semantic recall scores d id not 
signif icantly vary across posit ive and negative stories. Thus, general executive 
impairment cannot explain the positive emotional bias shown by the confabulat ing 
patients. 
More generally, it appears that the combination o f executive dysfunction 
and memory impairment, as encountered in confabulat ing patients o f this study 
(See Chapter 2) and in the literature (e.g. Cunningham et al., 1997; Kopelman, 
1987; Moscovi tch & Melo , 1997) causes the unique pattern o f impaired recall 
presented by the confabulat ion group o f the present study. More specif ical ly, 
whi le the semantic recall scores o f these patients were as poor as those o f the 
amnesic group, their recall protocols also revealed an excess o f fabrications, 
distortions and narrative inconsistencies which resembled the recall performance 
o f the frontal group. Thus, both frontal lobe dysfunction and amnesia had an 
obstructing effect on the recall performance o f confabulat ing patients and could be 
considered as contr ibut ing factors to confabulat ion. However, this study shows 
that neither was suff ic ient to cause the selective emotional biases observed in 
confabulatory content. 
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Moreover, it is also important to highl ight that the emotional bias shown 
by the confabulat ing patients could not have been caused by general emotional 
processing or mood factors. The emotional bias observed in the confabulat ing 
patients was restricted to the self-referent condit ions. Confabulat ing patients had 
no d i f f icu l ty in representing the negative valence o f the other-referent story. Their 
protocols revealed that they expressed highly negative emotions about narrative 
characters they did not identi fy w i th . Moreover, the average recall scores o f the 
confabulation group in the other-referent stories w i th negative valence did not 
vary signif icantly f rom those o f the other-referent stories w i th posit ive valence 
and f ina l ly the number o f confabulations they made in the other-referent stories 
wi th negative valence did not vary signif icant ly f rom those o f the stories w i th 
posit ive valence. Thus, these results suggest that confabulat ing patients d id not 
show an inabi l i ty to encode, store and recall negative informat ion per se. Instead, 
their posit ive emotional bias was l inked to some other self-related mechanism and 
its influence on memory (see below). Table 5-4 below offers some examples o f 
other-referent recall protocols w i th negative valence. 
Table 5-4. Examples of Recall Protocols in Negative and Other-referent Stories 
Other-Referent & Negative Valence Combination 
Original Story Protocols 
Plot1 
Mary Taylor is a well - qualified/ assistant/. It is Thursday/ morning/ and she has completed a long report/. She 
bursts/ into her boss's office/, wanting to announce the outcome/. However, her boss has asked her/ not to 
disturb him that morning/. With great embarrassment/, she suddenly remembers his request/. She apologises/ 
for interrupting a board meeting/. The next day/, her boss tells her that she might lose her promotion/ and even 
be fired/, as she is so absentminded/ lately/. She feels very humiliated/ and scared/. 
Plot 2 
Patrick Welsh is a hard working employee. It is Sunday morning and he is preparing to go out. He has planned a 
wonderful day-trip to the seaside in order to rest. However, his best friend calls him saying she is ill, lonely and 
needs his help. Feeling exhausted and not bearing to miss his trip he lies to his friend, saying he promised to 
see his sister. Four days later he finds out that, due to inappropriate treatment, his friend's health has severely 
deteriorated since Sunday. He feels guilty and ashamed of himself. 
Confabulating Patient: LH 
Male. Age 60y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "This poor lass makes a big cock of her job because she is a woman so she will resign 
anyway (laughs!). Now, seriously, there'll be some very important business issue going on over a period of time, 
a good result is reached. Mary, whatever you call her, the assistant, so exited, she had overwhelming instinct, 
dives into his office to fire it out, he is in a meeting in which he definitely didn't want to be disturbed in, backs 
out. 
Next day she is pulled in and told that if she ever does anything like this again she'll be in hot water and could 
possibly lose her job. In the meantime it could seriously affect any positions she's been short-listed for a rise". 
Immediate Recall 2: "There'll be some long-term on-going business issue, came to a conclusion on Thursday. 
Mary, got very exited about this, so shot straight to her bosses office, the managing director to get him straight 
on this. As she shotted in she realised he was in an important board meeting and had given specific instructions 
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Other-Referent & Negative Valence Combination 
not to be disturbed. Friday boss calls Mary in says 'Look little flower" oh didn't say little flower but I'd thought it 
will be nice, He said right you know what you did yesterday was totally out of bounds you are not supposed to do 
things like that, it could have affected your situation as you are standing for a rise or it could mean that you are 
fired for breaking regulations". 
Delayed Recall: Was that the fish one? I thought she was doing pretty well and got a kick in the teeth? Why did 
she? I can't remember she was doing something. She was trying to do something with fish but she didn't 
manage to finish it. 
Confabulating Patient: OT 
Male. Age 40y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "Her boss was trying to get her to come to his office. Regarding a promotion that was in 
mind for her. And by the time the message came through for her...well by the time she got to his office she 
caused some kind of panic. Well, it sounds silly but how she caused it I don't know!" 
Immediate Recall 2: "Well, there was a lady that worked in an office block. There was room for some kind of 
trouble toward... in her job". 
Delayed Recall: "I don't remember this one, sorry". 
Confabulating Patient: WM 
Male. Age 56y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: Mary was working. She had news for her boss, but when she...when she got to her bosses' 
office the boss was in a meeting... and she didn't know what to do with the news. He was upset because he 
wanted the news and Mary was upset because he was upset and because she couldn't remember the news 
anymore. 
Immediate Recall: She had a phone call. Said she'd give the news to her boss immediately. And when she got to 
the bosses' office the boss was in a meeting... and the same night she went home, and the next day when she 
came back to work, she forgot to give a message to the boss and... it was, the boss, her boss had to attend a 
very important meeting. And next day, and her boss found out he had to be meeting, a very important meeting 
and he fired Mary Taylor. And when she got home she found that her dog was dead. 
Delayed Recall: ° Mary Taylor, was also involved with another man...and John's father killed Mary... And 
John...John's father found out. He went, he found, so his son knew about the other man involved with his 
mother He also wanted to kill John". 
Confabulating Patient: IR 
Female. Age 45y. Plot 2 
Immediate Recall 1: "Patrick has a friend. The friend is not well. But Patrick is tired, very tired. And he has no 
more money. Patrick tells his friend he is going to go, but doesn't go. The friend is not happy, Patrick is not 
happy." 
Immediate Recall 2 : ' Patrick has a friend. His sister says he has a friend and this friend is ill. Patrick must go 
and see his friend. But Patrick goes....Patrick is tired. He goes to his sister and says he is tired. His sister says 
you are lying again. When you were a child you use to lie to me too. But Patrick doesn't go to his friend and he is 
friend is not well and Patrick is not well". 
Delayed Recall: "They are brother and sister and they should not having doing these things. God, will know. God 
will punish them. He can see". 
Confabulating Patient: DO 
Female. Age 71 y. Plot 2 
Immediate 1 ...Mm, I wouldn't do that. [Can you just tell me what you remember from the story?] 
It's sad... Everybody would know that he didn't go to his sister. 
It's very sad really. [So can you tell me the story?)... He told his best friend he's going to his house to see his 
sister...I would have told him. That I had to go to the seaside. Because I neariy burned out. 
Immediate 2: Well, he did know he was ill. He didn't know he was that ill, so it is very sad. He has hurt his friend. 
He was bumed out. He wanted to rest. So, he lied to his friend. That was wrong. 
Delayed Oh that was awful... Somebody hurts their best friend. You shouldn't have lied to them. And...he goes 
to the beach. It is an occasion where you're being awful... 
In conclusion, the positive emotional bias showed by confabulat ing 
patients was not explicable solely by amnesia and classically associated lesions in 
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medial temporal lobes and diencephalic regions. In addit ion, the performance o f 
frontal control patients showed some simi lar i ty wi th that o f confabulat ing patients 
but executive dysfunct ion alone was not suff ic ient to cause the phenomenon and 
particularly to explain its emotional and self-related biases. This selective bias 
could not either be explained as an effect o f mood, as patients showed no 
d i f f icu l ty in recal l ing other-related negative emotions. Thus, both amnesia and 
executive dysfunct ion seemed to have contributed to the formation o f 
confabulations, but self-related processing seemed to have a salient role in the 
emotionally-biased performance o f confabulat ing patients. The latter self-related 
mechanisms w i l l be addressed below. 
5.4.3 Self-Referent Biases in True and False Memor ies 
Several studies w i th in cognit ive psychology have showed that memory 
for self-relevant informat ion is superior to memory for 'ob ject ive ' , i.e. not self-
related information (see Czienskowski , 1997; Gi l i ihan & Farah, 2005; Symons & 
Johnson, 1997 for reviews). This self-referent effect is explained w i th reference to 
the unique elaborative and organisational properties o f self-representation and 
self-related knowledge (e.g. Rogers et al., 1997; Mak i & Carlson, 1993). 
Alternative interpretations l ink the self-referent effect w i th increased elaboration 
or organisation demands included in process o f self-attr ibution o f memories, as 
wel l as its frequent use in information processing (Czienskowski , 1997; Ferguson 
et al., 1983; K le in & Kih is t rom, 1986; Symons & Johnson, 1997). Thus, whi le 
there is disagreement on whether the self is a unique structure that requires 
specialised processing or whether it is just one o f the eff ic ient ways o f structuring, 
representing and elaborating information (see Gi l i ihan & Farah, 2005 for 
discussion), there is almost universal agreement on the fact that the 'selt^ is a 
uniquely effect ive process o f encoding informat ion, maintaining it in memory and 
retr ieving it. It results in spontaneous, eff icient processing o f material that is often 
well organised and exceptionally wel l elaborated (Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
The above studies focused on the effects o f self-processing on memory 
faci l i tat ion, i.e. increase of memory accuracy and decrease of errors of omission. 
By contrast, other studies have considered the organisational properties o f the 
'self^ w i th respect to its capacity to cause memory inaccuracy and increase errors 
of both omission and commission (Greenwald, 1980; Johnson, Nolde, & 
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DeLeonardis, 1996; Schacter et al. , 1998). Thus, re ly ing on wel l -developed 
structuring f ramework, such as one's self-representation, may faci l i tate memory. 
However, it can also distort it in the process o f shaping it according to the 
characteristics o f one's self-representation. This is part icularly true in the case o f 
autobiographical memory which appears to have a reciprocal relation w i th one's 
social and self- identi ty, i.e. one's recollections influence one's sel f -v iew and 
one's self-representation filters one's memories (See Conway, 2001 ; McAdams, 
2001 for reviews). Given such interdependence, a number o f studies have been 
dedicated to the examination o f the ways self-representation can influence 
memory and lead to memory inaccuracies, distort ions, omissions and even 
fabrications ( for reviews see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McAdams, 2001 ; 
Pil lemer, 2001 ; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Stein, Wade & L iwag, 1999; Walker, 
Skowronski & Thompson, 2003; Woike, Gershkovich, Piorkowski & Polo, 1999). 
These studies also highl ight the connection and interdependence o f self-goals and 
autobiographical memory. More specif ical ly, autobiographical memory grants 
functions o f identity format ion, self-coherence, and emotion-regulat ion (Barclay, 
1996; Bluck & Habermas, 2001 ; Conway, 1996; Fivush, 1998; MacAdams, 2001 ; 
Neisser, 1988; Pasupathi, 2003; Pil lemer, 1992). However, there seems to be a 
trade-off between these organisational functions and memory accuracy, which 
leads to memory errors and distortions. Crucia l ly , distortions o f event content, 
t ime reference or signif icance are employed in the service o f posit ive self-
appraisal (Greenwald, 1980; Wi lson and Ross, 2003); and distortions o f emotional 
intensity and valence serve the purpose o f sustaining a pleasant representation o f 
one's autobiography (for a review see Walker, Skowronski & Thompson, 2003). 
The results o f the present study can be interpreted in a simi lar way. It thus 
appeared that although confabulating patients did not show a generalised 
emotional abnormali ty in their recall o f emotional and neutral stories, they did 
show a selective bias in recall ing the emotional valence o f self-referent negative 
informat ion. They instead distorted this information in a way that portrayed 
posit ive image o f themselves. It thus appeared that the confabulations employed 
to distort the emotional valence and the signif icance o f the crit ical stories served 
to preserve a positive self-representation and were guided by the emotional values 
o f the latter. As discussed above, these motivat ional processes can also be found 
in normal autobiographical distort ion. Characteristically, Greenwald (1980) has 
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termed the determining influence o f the sel f on autobiographical memory as 'the 
totalitarian ego' . However, despite the pervasive nature o f such self-related 
influences, in neurologically healthy individuals they are not suff icient to cause 
severe confabulat ion. Instead, confabulation seems to require the presence o f 
some degree o f both memory impairment and executive dysfunct ion. It seems that 
given such deficits the normal involvement o f mot ivat ion in shaping memory is 
further unconstrained and leads to the construction o f part icularly wishfu l 
confabulations. In brief, these results provide support for the f i f th hypothesis o f 
the study. Namely , they show that the emotional bias in the content of 
confabulation is self-serving, over and above the memory and executive functions 
deficits accompanying its presence. The potential neural basis o f such self-serving 
influences on memory w i l l be further addressed on Chapter 8. 
5.4.4 Self-Serving biases in Motor-related Confabulat ion 
It is also noteworthy that although the unilateral subgroup showed overall 
better semantic recall and less confabulatory errors, it showed a simi lar emotional 
and self-serving bias as the bilateral confabulat ing patients. Thus, although 
unilateral patients showed different emotional biases in spontaneous 
confabulations (see Chapter 3) , under control led experimental procedures they did 
show simi lar self-serving biases as the bilateral patients. It is also o f interest that 
these three patients showed an increased number o f confabulations in the negative 
other-referent condi t ion, although they d id not alter the emotional valence o f these 
stories. These findings could be related to the increased tendency these patients 
showed in their confabulations to blame others for their il lness, accuse them o f 
abuse, stealing, abandonment, conspiracy and other paranoid themes (see also 
Berlyne, 1972). These confabulations appear negative to the nai've rater (see 
Chapter 3) , yet they may serve similar motivat ional purposes o f posit ive self-
regard (Bental , 2003; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000). This issue w i l l be further 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 6 : A Case Report of Wishful 
Confabulation 
"Just as the pleasure ego can do nothing hut wish, work for a yield ofpleasure, and 
avoid unpleasure, so the reality ego need do nothing hut strive for what is useful and 
guard itself against damage " 
S. Freud, Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, 1911. 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the cognit ive prof i le and confabulatory behaviour o f a 
patient who suffered a subarachnoid haemorrhage and underwent craniotomy and 
c l ipping o f an anterior communicat ing artery ( A C o A ) aneurysm. His 
neuropathology resulted in dense anterograde and retrograde amnesia, executive 
dysfunction and marked confabulat ion, which persisted six months fo l low ing his 
operation. The present study w i l l focus on the content o f the patient's 
confabulations and anosognosic statements a iming at (1) investigating the 
cognit ive deficits underpinning the patients' confabulations; (2) prov id ing further 
support, specif ication and explanatory power to the f indings o f the previous group 
studies on motivated confabulat ion (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). More specif ical ly, this 
case report w i l l focus on the role o f awareness o f defici t , suggestibi l i ty, premorbid 
personality traits and self-representation in memory-related confabulation. 
6.2 Case Report 
6.2.1 Personal History 
L H was a 60 year-old, r ight-handed, man. He was a mechanical 
equipment salesman and local manager. L H was married and had two chi ldren. 
His relatives described his premorbid personality as strong-wi l led, apparently self-
confident and assertive. L H was highly sociable and involved in a variety o f 
leisure activit ies. However, his fami ly noted that L H was in reality very 
introverted regarding his own feelings and he found it particularly d i f f i cu l t to 
accept or reflect upon his own l imitat ions. He tended to 'work or j oke his 
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problems away' . They also noted that in the last years he was becoming 
increasingly less motivated in his work and had increased his weekly , social-
related, alcohol intake. 
6.2.2 Medical History 
L H had no signif icant previous medical or psychiatric history. He was 
travel l ing for business purposes when he was urgently admitted to hospital w i th a 
history o f severe headache w i t h nausea and vomi t ing . A C T angiographic 
investigation conf i rmed the presence o f a small saccular aneurysm at the junc t ion 
o f A l and A2 segments o f the left anterior cerebral artery and also revealed 
subarachnoid haemorrhage in the adjacent subarachnoid space and in the medial 
r ight frontal lobe. He underwent craniotomy and c l ipp ing o f the anterior 
communicat ing artery ( A C o A ) aneurysm the fo l l ow ing day. His postoperative 
recovery was uneventful apart f rom del i r ium tremens f ive days post-admission, 
which was treated by chlordiazopoxide. Prior to being transferred to a regional 
neurosurgery department in the Nor th East o f England a postsurgical intracerebral 
angiogram was performed, which conf i rmed satisfactory c l ipping o f the 
angiogram, although there was a very small residual bleb at the site o f the 
previous aneurysm and the right A l segment appeared hypoplastic. A f inal CT 
angiographic study 10 days post-surgery revealed evidence o f the recent fronto-
temporal craniotomy (see Figure 6-1 below). There was a sizeable extra cranial 
haematoma wi th evidence o f the recent haemorrhage and the placement o f an 
aneurysm c l ip in the left paraclinoid region. A small residual haematoma was 
present in the depth o f the anterior interhemisheric fissure/septum pel lucidum. 
Residual subarachnoid blood was noted w i th in the mid line frontal sulci and over 
the convexity mainly on the left. There was also a small amount o f blood in the 
occipital horns. Ventricles were mi ld ly prominent. 
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Figure 6 - 1 . LH's Post-operative C T scan. This cranial C T angiographic study, taken 
10 days post-surgery, demonstrates evidence o f lef\ frontal craniotomy. There is a 
large acute infraction w i th in the left frontal lobe, including both dorsolateral and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In addit ion, there is a smaller haematoma wi th in the 
posterior aspect o f the right frontal lobe. There is a sizeable extra cranial haematoma 
w i th evidence o f the recent haemorrhage and the placement o f an aneurysm c l ip in the 
left paraclinoid region. A small residual haematoma is present in the depth o f the 
anterior interhemisheric fissure/septum pel lucidum. Residual subarachnoid blood is 
noted w i th in the mid line frontal sulci and over the convexity mainly on the lef^. 
When L H ' s neurological condit ion was stabil ised, one month post-
admission he was transferred to another unit for ongoing rehabil i tation but made 
l i t t le signif icant progress wi th respect to orientat ion, memory and executive 
abilit ies. Fo l lowing his operation, caring staf f reported that L H presented w i th 
memoi7 problems and was ot\en confused and disoriented in t ime and place. 
Ini t ial ly he was very talkative and verbally disinhibited and constantly developed 
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false ideas, often o f a bizarre content, about the hospital s taf f and his whereabouts. 
He was also noted to be part icularly unmotivated to participate in the activit ies o f 
his rehabil i tat ion programme, a behaviour which was embedded in a 
confabulatory bel ief system. For instance, he demanded that staf f should leave 
h im alone, or other t imes immediately serve his needs insisting that they were 
hotel staf f in a hol iday resort in Austral ia. Psychiatric examination at the t ime 
reported cognit ive dysfunct ion, anosognosia and confabulat ion. L H had no 
physical impairments. He had a m i ld degree o f hypertension which was treated 
pharmacological ly. 
The most st r ik ing aspect o f L H ' s cognit ive state, as we l l as a major issue 
o f d i f f i cu l ty in his social interactions and management, was his persistent 
tendency to confabulate events and facts about h imsel f and his surrounding 
environment. A t the t ime o f the assessment, i.e. four months fo l l ow ing his 
admission to the rehabil i tation unit, s taf f reported that L H appeared unaware o f 
his hospitalisation, and confronted w i th the hospital surroundings he continuously 
fabricated reasons for being admitted or claimed he was simply v is i t ing the 
hospital premises. He often refused to participate in the activit ies o f the unit, was 
verbally disihibi ted and occasionally became verbal ly abusive to s ta f f threatening 
to attack them physical ly. 
In addit ion, he fai led to remember and accept that he was not al lowed to 
leave the hospital on his own free w i l l and he persistently claimed that he l ived at 
home wi th his wi fe . He also typical ly interpreted his everyday activities as part o f 
his premorbid everyday work schedule. For example, dur ing his occupational 
therapy session he behaved as though he was in hospital to sell medical 
equipment. L H ' s previous professional duties included such visits to the particular 
hospital and he did consult the unit 's occupational therapists about the use o f 
rehabil i tat ion supplies. However, L H did not actually remember these therapists, 
nor did he show fami l iar i ty wi th the surroundings. Instead, every t ime he 
misinterpreted the caring activit ies as work-related circumstances he claimed this 
was the f irst t ime he actually dealt w i th this specific unit and its staff. A l though 
L H ' s confabulations had some common themes, mostly relating to premorbid l i fe 
circumstances and activit ies, his confabulations did not show apparent content 
constancy or specif icity and could be triggered by questioning or produced 
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spontaneously. L H generally defended his confabulation but d id not hesitate to 
give alterative versions o f the same theme, even minutes apart. When his 
confabulations referred to the present and he intended to act upon them (e.g. leave 
the ward) prov id ing h im wi th conf l ic t ing evidence only enhanced his resistance 
and his adherence to his beliefs. A t these times, distraction was the only possible 
solut ion, although at times this failed too and the patient became very agitated. 
6.3 Neuropsychological Evaluation 
L H was assessed in his rehabil i tat ion unit four months post-surgery. His 
close relatives and friends helped substantially in ver i fy ing his answers and 
provid ing details about his premorbid l i fe and personality. In addit ion, a control 
group o f f ive neurological ly healthy adults were tested on the tests which lacked 
published norms. These controls were in-patients at Newcastle General Hospital 
suffer ing f rom non-neurological condit ions, such as orthopaedic injuries. These 
were f ive males wi th mean age 57.8 (2.2), ranging f rom 56 to 61 years, and mean 
education 13.6 (2.3) years. Where possible their performance scores were 
compared to that o f L H ' s using the methods developed by Crawford & Howel l 
(1998) and Crawford & Garthwaite (2002) for obtaining point estimates and 
confidence l imits o f the abnormali ty o f an individual patient's test score when the 
control sample is modest in size (e.g. N < 5). Wri t ten consent was obtained for all 
participants. 
6.3.1 Pre- and Post-Morbid Intell igence 
L H ' s performance on the W A I S - I I I is summarised in Table 6 -1 . Overal l , 
L H ' s intell igence score appeared as moderately deteriorated in comparison wi th 
his W T A R predicted W A I S - I I I score o f 92. His Verbal IQ Score o f 105 appeared 
less affected, w i th the main d i f f icu l ty shown on the Similar i t ies subtest (SS score 
7) which is know to require abstract th ink ing. Bedside and formal assessment 
(Pyramids and Palm Trees) further conf i rmed that L H ' s semantic abil i t ies were 
intact (See Table 6-1). By contrast, L H showed some deterioration in his abi l i ty to 
perform tasks that required perceptual organisation and even more marked 
di f f icul t ies in tasks that assessed processing speed (D ig i t Symbol Coding Subtest 
SS = 8 and Symbol Search SS = 6). 
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Table 6-1. Neuropsychological Evaluation of L H ' s Intellectual Abilities 
Test Score Age-Adjusted Level 
Intelliaence 
WAIS-III Index Scores 
Verbal IQ Score 93 Average 
Performance IQ Score 53 Extremely Low 
Verbal Comprehension 105 Average 
Perceptual Organization 54 Extremely Low Impaired 
Working Memory 75 Borderline 
Processing Speed 57 Extremely Low Impaired 
Full Scale IQ Score 73 Borderline 
WTAR Estimated IQ 92 
SCOLPTest 
Speed of Comprehension 5 10* percentile 
Spot-the-Word 11 75"' percentile 
Other Tests 
Mood 
HADS 
Anxiety Score 10 Borderline (8-10) 
Depression Score 10 Borderline (8-10) 
Semantic Abilities 
Pyramids & Palm Trees Test 88.4% Correct Rate 98.5% 
Bedside Tests 
Colour Pointing in Pictures 100% Correct Rale Normal 
Word Semantic Categorisation 99% Correct Rate Normal 
Word Semantic Naming 80% Correct Rate Normal 
Symbolic Gestures on Request 100% Correct Rate Normal 
Orientation 
WMS- 111 Orientation Sub-test 43 % Correct Rate S'*" percentile 
RBMT-E Orientation Subtest 10.5/14 Profile Score 1 
6.3.2 Executive Functions 
L H ' s performance appeared impaired on most executive funct ions' tests 
administered (Table 6-2). 
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Table 6-2. L H ' s performance on tests of Executive Functions 
Test Score Age-Adjusted Level 
Hayling Test SS 1 Impaired 
DEX Questionnaire 
LH Self-Report Ratings M 1.9 SD 1.4 Minimisation 
Staff Ratings M 2 . 7 SD1.1 
Relative Ratings M 2 . 7 SD0.9 
Cognitive Estimates Error Score: 5 Normal 
DK-EFS SS (Age-Adjusted) Normal 
Trail Making 
Condition 4: Switching 1 10(3) 
Total Errors in Condition 4 3 10(3) 
Contrasts 4 Vs: Motor Speed 1 10(3) 
Contrasts 4 Vs: Visual Scanning 3 10(3) 
Vs: Combined Measure of Reading 8 10(3) 
Verbal Fluencv 
Letter 9 10(3) 
Category 1 10(3) 
Switching 1 10(3) 
Switching Accuracy 1 10(3) 
Set-Loss Errors 4 10(3) 
Repetition Errors 9 10(3) 
Design Fluencv 
Composite Score 8 10(3) 
Switching 6 10(3) 
Switching Vs Combined 
Repetition Designs 7 10(3) 
Percent Design Accuracy 6 10(3) 
Color- Word Interference 
Naming & Reading 12 10(3) 
Inhibition 10 10(3) 
Inhibition/Switching 14 10(3) 
Inhibition Errors 1 10(3) 
Inhibition/Switching Errors 1 10(3) 
Sorting 
Free Sorting Correct Sorts 6 10(3) 
Free Sorting Description Score 5 10(3) 
Repeated Sorts 1 10(3) 
20 Questions 
Initial Abstraction 7 10(3) 
Total Questions Asked 7 10(3) 
Weighted Achievement Score 8 10(3) 
Word Content 
Total Consecutively Correct 2 10(3) 
Tower 
Total Achievement Score 6 10(3) 
Mean First-Move Time 12 10(3) 
Total Rule Violations 9 (Percentile Rank) 
Rule-Violations-Per-ltem Ratio 7 10(3) 
Proverb Free Inauirv 4 10(3) 
n.a. = Not administered 
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Furthermore, L H clearly underestimated his executive di f f icul t ies in 
comparison wi th the perspective o f his relatives and staf f in the D E X 
Questionnaire (Dysexecutive Syndrome Questionnaire, B A D S 1996). Somewhat 
surprisingly, his performance was normal on the Cogni t ive Estimates Test. 
However, his performance was defective on the more demanding DK-EFS 
battery. More specif ical ly, L H showed marked impairment in sequencing and set 
shi f t ing as measured by the Trai l Mak ing Test. Interestingly, he showed problems 
even in simple letter and number sequencing ( low scores on condit ions 1 & 2 o f 
the test), over and above any visual or motor d i f f icu l t ies. His performance was not 
defective in a letter fluency task, but deteriorated steeply when he had to perform 
a category fluency task, as his few answers were mainly repeated words or non-
words. Interestingly, L H did not show problems in tests o f semantic knowledge 
(see Table 6-1) suggesting that his deficit was one o f flexibility, rather than 
semantic categorisation. In the design fluency task, L H did not show problems in 
designing abstract figures. However when he had to shift between alternating 
designs he showed perserveration and his performance was defective. 
In the color-word test, an equivalent o f the Stroop procedure, he was able 
to complete the simple reading tasks wi thout errors in relatively normal speed. 
However, in the crit ical inhibi t ion condit ion he exhibited impuls iv i ty in that he 
fai led to fo l l ow the rules and inhibi t the automatic response. Thus, although his 
processing speed scores appear normal, he made an abnormally high number o f 
errors, for which he showed no moni tor ing. L H ' s performance was contaminated 
by impuls iv i ty and luck o f sel f -moni tor ing also dur ing the Word Context test, 
where his answers d id not meet the specif ied semantic criteria, were often 
inappropriate and generally did not portray the abi l i ty for deductive, abstract 
th ink ing. Inductive th ink ing was also impaired as shown by L H ' s poor 
performance on the Proverbs test where he produced inaccurate and concrete 
interpretations to both common and uncommon proverbs. L H performed sl ight ly 
better and he showed clear evidence o f mot ivat ion dur ing the 20 questions test, 
wh ich has a game-format. He showed clear interest in the examiner's feedback 
and was able to use it to his benefit. He did not exhibi t perserveration tendencies 
dur ing this task, but his abstraction and semantic categorisation abilit ies were 
poor. 
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6.3.3 Anterograde Memory 
L H ' s anterograde memory abil i t ies as assessed by the Wechsler Memory 
Scale-I l l Edi t ion ( W M S - I l l ) are summarised in Table 6-3. His General Memory 
Index Score was extremely low, showing marked memory deterioration 
attributable to his poor performance on both visual and verbal memory tests. His 
scores were somewhat higher for visual than for auditory immediate and delayed 
recall subtests, whi le his performance on work ing memory subtests was average. 
L H made a few intrusions ( inc luding fabrications) dur ing these tests, mainly in the 
delayed recall o f the auditory tests (Logical Memory I I & Verbal Paired 
Associates I I ) . On the Rey Complex Figure Test (Table 6-3) he showed intact 
planning and construction abil i t ies (normal Copy scores) but he was unable to 
retain suff ic ient informat ion in memory even immediately after presentation o f the 
f igure. L H was not orientated to space and t ime and he performed poorly on two 
different orientation tasks assessed in dif ferent sessions (see Table 6-1 above). 
Table 6-3. LH's performance on neuropsychological tests of memory 
Memory Test Score Age-Adjusted Level 
WMS III Index Scores 
Auditory Immediate Memory 59 Extremely Low 
Visual Immediate Memory 88 Low Average 
Immediate Memory 67 Extremely Low 
Auditory Delayed 58 Extremely Low 
Visual Delayed 75 Borderline 
Auditory Recognition Delayed 55 Extremely Low 
General Memory 57 Extremely Low 
Working Memory 105 Average 
Rey Complex Figure Raw Scores 
Copy 33/36 Normal 
Immediate Recall 9 Impaired 
Delayed Recall 7 Impaired 
AMI Raw Scores 
Personal Semantic Memory 
Childhood 14/21 Borderline 
Early Adult Life 12/21 Definitely Abnormal 
Recent Life 9/21 Definitely Abnormal 
Total 35/63 Definitely Abnomial 
Autobiographical Incidents 
Childhood 5/9 Borderline 
Early Adult Life 4/9 Probably Abnormal 
Recent Life 1/9 Definitely Abnomnal 
Total 10/27 Definitely Abnormal 
n.a. = Not administered 
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6.3.4 Autobiographical Memory 
The Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al, 1990) was 
used to assess LH's knowledge and memory of his personal past. His wife was 
interviewed following his assessment and was asked to verify his answers. LH's 
recollection of his own past appeared generally defective. He showed particular 
difficulty in recollecting personal semantic and autobiographical information of 
recent years, a difficulty indicative of retrograde amnesia. Although his scores for 
earlier periods were higher they did not reach cut-off levels (i.e. he showed a mild 
temporal gradient). Crucially, his performance in autobiographical memory recall 
was contaminated by confabulation and perseveration. Thus, LH answered some 
of the autobiographical events questions by narrating an event of similar thematic 
content as the one he had narrated in the previous life-time period. Or, he 
answered by fabricating events that had never taken place, and that could never 
have taken place in the context of LH's life circumstances (according to his wife). 
His recollections were also poor in specificity and often hard to follow. LH did 
not appear aware of these inconsistencies, nor of the lack of coherence in his 
memories. 
6.3.5 Language 
LH's spontaneous speech was normal, showing normal flow, articulation 
and prosody. He did not appear to have difficulties in comprehending spoken or 
written speech and could follow complicated conversations. However, LH found 
it difficult to remain within the limits of given conversational topics and although 
he initially addressed such topics, often he quickly went on to speak of something 
totally unrelated. More generally, LH's speech appeared as abnormally abstract. 
For example, his answers to direct questions tended to address the given topic in a 
quasi-metaphorical way. More specifically, he tended to provide a relevant answer 
but this was set in an irrelevant context. E.g. when asked what he had done the 
previous day, LH replied that he had been to work but it was a terrible mess. The 
files had been all lost and the catalogue did not make sense anymore. The worse 
thing, he said, was that others could not really have helped him. The information 
was gone, he could not retrieve it. On another occasion, when asked i f he 
remembered who the examiner was he replied as follows: "Yes, 1 had to do a 
promotion in Durham University but the material was complicated and they- -
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brought in this Greek lass. I was showing her the catalogue, everybody else was 
laughing but to their surprise she understood. She is the one who introduced us, 
isn't she?" 
6.3.6 Mood & Cooperation 
LH was generally cooperative during testing but he occasionally found it 
difficult to concentrate for long periods and often required prompting in order to 
complete certain tasks. His motivation in the ward was low. He was very 
talkative, hyperactive and often verbally disinhibited and inappropriately jocular. 
LH's mood fluctuated between apathy and occasional and sudden episodes of 
agitation. Despite his apparently apathetic answers in informal conversation, his 
scores on a self-report questionnaire were of borderline levels for both depression 
and anxiety (see HADS results). 
6.3.7 Confabulation 
In order to formally assess LH's confabulations the "Dalla Barba 
Confabulation Battery" (1993a) was administered to both him and the control 
participants (see Chapter 2 for test's details and procedure). LH's and controls' 
performance across the sections of the batteiy is summarised in Figure 6-2. LH 
confabulated across all the sections of the battery; more often he confabulated 
when answering episodic questions, orientation questions and "1 don't know" 
semantic questions. LH's confabulation scores on the General Semantic questions 
section were relatively low, in contrast to the relatively high rate of confabulations 
produced by controls in this same section. Dalla Barba and colleagues (1993a,b; 
Dalla Barba, et al., 1990) have observed similar patterns in their confabulating 
patients. These results are also similar to the findings collected from the bilateral 
confabulation group of the present study (see Chapter 2). 
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Figure 6-2. Percentage of Confabulations in the Confabulation Battery. 
6.4 Experimental Investigations: Confabulation and the Self 
The above investigations examined potential cognitive deficits associated 
with the production of confabulation, as shown in the hterature. The following 
section focuses on the positive aspects (Jackson, 1932) of LH's symptomatology. 
These included the subjective experience of his deficits (awareness of deficits), 
the potential role of suggestibility and personality traits in confabulation, as well 
as the potentially motivated self-representations elicited by confabulation. 
6.4.1 Study 1: Awareness of Deficit 
The ability to be aware of one's deficits entails a number of cognitive, and 
potentially emotional, components and there is currently no generally acceptable 
theoiy of unawareness (e.g. see Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Bisiach & Geminiani, 
1991; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Heilman et al., 1998; Vuilleumier, 
2004). Moreover, its relation to confabulation has not being thoroughly 
investigated (e.g. see Feinberg et al., 1994; Lu et al., 1997; Schacter, 1991; 
Venneri & Shanks, 2004). Although a number of reliable measures have been 
proposed to quantify awareness of deficit (e.g. Anderson & Tranel, 1989;^i,^.a 
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Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1996; Fordyce & Roueche, 1986; Giacino & 
Cicerone, 1998) few o f them have been developed to assess confabulating patients 
and even more importantly some authors have argued that developing standard 
assessment tools for such highly complex and poorly understood abilities requires 
consideration of individual differences. For instance, writing about unawareness 
related to hemiplegia and hemianopia, Bisiach and Geminiani (1991) argued that 
"from what has been said about the clinical presentation of anosognosia, it follows 
that no satisfactory standard assessment of this condition can be suggested. 
Anosognosia deserves assessment tailored to each individual case, comprising 
faithful records of all spontaneous behaviour, as well as o f that instigated by the 
examiner's queries, the limits to which are set only by the examiner's 
inventiveness and the patient's mood and intelligence" (see also Clare, Wilson, 
Carter, Roth, & Hodges, 2002). 
With this perspective in mind, and given the focus of the present study on 
confabulation only a clinical assessment of LH's awareness abilities was 
undertaken. This relied on an exploratory semi-structured interview, the Levels of 
Awareness Test (see Appendix E l ) . The aim of this was not to provide 
quantifiable awareness scores but instead to clinically explore the nature of LH's 
understanding of his own postmorbid condition. The interview included open 
ended questions, aimed at a variety of cognitive domains and also explored the 
patient's reaction to a variety of question types. These included general direct 
questioning, questioning following specific tasks and demonstration of deficits, 
questioning about past examples of behaviour and questioning about anticipation 
of future difficulties (see Appendix El for description of questions). The patient's 
answers were corroborated by equivalent interviews with relatives and 
professionals. 
General Postmorbid Condition Awareness 
LH appeared unaware of his general condition and medical histoiy and 
answered the relevant questions mostly by confabulating. For example, he gave 
multiple and inaccurate accounts of why he was admitted to the hospital. For 
instance, he claimed he was in hospital due to a misunderstanding. He narrated 
that one day he was standing at a bus stop and two buses arrived. There was a 
nurse there who said one of the buses was for the healthy and one for the i l l . She 
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asked him to get in the bus on the right and only after he had got in he discovered 
this was the wrong bus, the one for the i l l . Afterwards, he said, they wouldn't let 
him go (see Study 4 for similar examples). 
Awareness of Individual Deficits 
LH's answers to questions about specific impairments showed that he was 
unaware of most of the individual deficits staff, relatives and the examiner had 
observed. His answers to such questions took two forms. He either appeared 
totally unaware of any change in his abilities and portrayed a self-confident image 
of himself e.g. "Oh, yes. 1 have a very good memory. I've always relied on i f , or 
he acknowledged some problem, but minimised its importance or its self-
relevance by confabulating, e.g. "Yes, I do find that over the last three four weeks 
I am exhausted all the time. But everybody has it. ft's a bug". In domains like 
memory and executive functions LH showed particular difficulties in 
acknowledging his impairments. Crucially, LH showed marked unawareness of 
the everyday consequences of his impairments such as his inability to live 
independently or manage his finances. In order to answer the corresponding 
questions he appeared to use information and self-values from his premorbid life. 
For example, he frequently referred to his duties and responsibilities as a local 
area manager in order to demonstrate what he thought were his current intact 
abilities. When his current performance on relevant tasks suggested otherwise he 
failed to acknowledge it and he further confabulated work-related excuses, e.g. 
"they keep changing the catalogue these days, how am I supposed to work like 
this?". 
LH's answers to questions about his mood and emotional state were 
noteworthy. He generally appeared more aware of changes in his emotional than 
his cognitive state. Yet, he often gave confabulatory answers to these questions 
and he did not always describe the expected personality change. For example, he 
stated he felt more 'mellow', 'lazy', 'calm' and 'able to control his temper' lately, 
in vast contrast to his relatives' observations and staffs complains about his 
hyperactivity and irritability. Interestingly when asked to respond to specific 
examples of his behaviour, or give examples of his current goals and plans LH 
provided further insight into his condition. He described that he felt his 
personality was largely 'switched-otT. He sensed he had "created a dream-like 
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state for himself . One he felt safe in, but one that worried him too. He felt stuck 
and needed to unstuck himself. He felt like he is hiding. "Hiding from others and 
myself Hiding my emotions most of a l l . . . in any way 1 can. In the only way that I 
know. With any words I can find. It doesn't really matter how". 
When further prompted LH was momentarily able to gain insight into his 
confabulation. He described how he often said things to people just to "distract 
them until he could find the right answer". Other times he went away from "a 
professional meeting" and asked himself "Oh, my God what bollocks have I been 
saying? Why? I couldn't help it. These thoughts just come out and people must 
think I am out of i f . When asked how he felt during these episodes he replied 
"Well you see, at the time I always feel I am right and they are all wrong and daft. 
1 am better than them, I am ful l of myself, and there is no doubt in my mind". 
Despite these remarkable descriptions LH appeared unable to retain a stable 
awareness of his emotional and motivational state. His answers to identical 
subsequent questions fluctuated greatly and it appeared every effort he made to 
gain insight was soon followed by a confabulatory minimisation, or self-alienation 
of the conclusions he had just reached. Thus, for example, when he was asked 
again regarding the state of his current motivation he referred to the political 
situation in Britain and insisted that it was the government and its economical 
policies that had to be blamed for his luck of motivation. 
Observation of his own impairments 
From the above it appears that LH had impaired general knowledge of his 
deficits. Most of the time, demonstration of his deficits by specific tasks had no 
beneficial effect on his awareness. However, there were times that following 
demonstration he was able to explicitly recognise his inability to perform certain 
tasks. For example, after having replied that he does not confuse his memories 
with dreams "more than any other person would", he was reminded of a dream he 
had reported in a previous session, which he had experienced as "so real" he 
couldn't decide i f it was a dream or not. He then commented that he felt his 
"dream pattern was massive". He had "the same dreams again and again repeating 
themselves in [his] mind that they came to bear on reality". Reality, he continued, 
"is twisted into dreams, which are not dreams". When however, minutes later he 
was asked about the same symptom he appeared unable to reflect on it again and 
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replied by saying he could easily tell the difference between the two. The only 
problem he faced, he now thought, was excessive dreaming which he attributed to 
specific current work circumstances. He expected the problem to be temporary. 
Future Perspective 
LH's perspective on the future was also characterised by unrealistic plans 
of returning to activities of his premorbid life and largely expressed in terms of his 
professional life. His goals for the future seemed to focus on improving external 
circumstances, e.g. working under a different boss, asking for a raise, and he 
couldn't identify any self-improvement needs or goals. 
Awareness and Confabulation 
LH's confabulated frequently throughout the interview and particularly in 
sections that he showed the highest unawareness of deficits. His confabulations 
included false excuses of failure to perform a task ("I've been out of work for a 
few weeks you see. I am a bit out of practice"), impossible future plans ("I just 
need to tell this people how to do their jobs properly and it wi l l be fine") and 
spontaneous false memories (e.g. "Wasn't there something on TV the other day 
about Prince Charles having mixed up his memories? Yes, yes, we saw it together, 
don't you remember?"). 
Overall, the interview revealed that LH had impaired awareness of his 
deficits at multiple cognitive levels (See also Crosson et al., 1989; Langer & 
Padrone, 1992; Schacter, 1991). While he sometimes presented with intact ability 
to recognise his difficulties upon demonstration he had poor general knowledge of 
his deficits, and even greater difficulty in updating his self-representation, 
foreseeing his disabilities and planning his future in a realistic way. He was more 
aware of a few isolated deficits, such as minor language problems. He also 
showed considerable insight, albeit temporary and contaminated by frequent 
confabulations, into the changes of his emotional and motivational state. 
Importantly, there was an association between the deficits of which LH was most 
unaware of and the high amount of confabulation he produced in these domains, 
i.e. it appeared his confabulations supported the denial of his deficits. 
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6.4.2 Study 2: Confabulation and Suggestibility 
Materials and Procedures 
The hypothesis that suggestibility is wholly or partly responsible for 
confabulation has a long tradition in the literature (see Chapter I ) but few studies 
have addressed this hypothesis experimentally (Mercer et al., 1977; Moscovitch & 
Melo, 1997; Schnider et al., 1996). In the present study, the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (GSS1) (1997) was used to directly assess LH's potential 
tendency to yield his answers according to external suggestion. The scale 
comprises a narrative paragraph containing a story of an event (read out to the 
subject) and 20 questions (15 suggestive and 5 non-suggestive) that are asked 
about the story, following immediate and delayed recall trials. The 20 questions 
are then asked a second time, following clear negative feedback, and provide the 
scoring for 'Yield 1' (giving in to suggestive questions prior to negative 
feedback), 'Yield 2' (giving in to suggestive questions following negative 
feedback), 'Shift ' (number of times subjects change their answers following 
negative feedback) and 'Total Suggestibility' (Combined scores of Yield I and 
Shift). A secondary measure of 'Total Confabulation' is also estimated as the 
amount of distortions and fabrications produced on free recall. The suggestibility 
questions were asked following immediate recall, i.e. delayed recall of the story 
was not assessed. Gudjonsson's (1997) scoring criteria were followed as closely 
as possible. LH's responses to the GSSl were audio-taped and transcribed ful ly . 
Results 
LH's immediate recall scores were abnormal in comparison with the 
means of the general population (Gudjonsson, 1997). These results were hardly 
unexpected given LH's memory impairment (see above). His distortion and 
fabrication scores were within normal range (2 in total). LH's scores on the 
Suggestibility measures indicate that his responses to memory questions did 
'yield' to external suggestion but not as excessively as expected given his memory 
and intellectual deficit. His initial Yield scores were abnormally high (partly 
explicable by his poor memory), but his Shift score (5) indicates that negative 
feedback and repeated exposure to distracting information had a limited influence 
on his answers, comparable to other individuals with intellectual deficits. His 
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Total Suggestibility score (14) was not within normal range, but was certainly 
within the range of individuals with intellectual disabilities (IQ 57-75). 
Table 6-4. LH's performance on the Suggestibility Scale 
Suggestibility Scale 
Percentile 
GSS1 
LH General 
Population 
Norms 
Intellectual 
Disabilities 
Sample (IQ 57-75) 
Immediate Recall 8 (5-^ ) 21,3(7.1) 7,3 (4.5) 
Delayed Recall - 19.5(7.5) 5.9 (4.5) 
Yield 1 9 (90'*') 4.6 (3) 7.1 (4) 
Yield 2 12 (90"') 5.6 (3.8) 8.5 (4.4) 
Shift 5 (75«^ ) 2.9 (2.5) 5.0 (3.6) 
Total Suggestibility 14 (90'h) 7.5 (4.6) 12,1 (6,2) 
Distortions (immediate) 1 1.15(1,2) (GSS2) 
Distortions (Delayed) - 1.26 (1,8) (GSS2) 
Fabrication (immediate) 1 0,4 (0.7) (GSS2) 
Fabrication (Delayed) - 0.5 (0.7) (GSS2) 
6.4.3 Study 3: Pre- and Post-Morbid Personality 
Several authors have stressed the potential role of premorbid personality 
characteristics in the production of confabulation (see Chapter 1) but very little 
experimental research has actually addressed this issue (Gainotti, 1975; Conway 
& Tacchi, 1996) and the hypothesis remains controversial (e.g. Burgess & 
Shallice, 1996; DeLuca, 2000; Johnson, 2000). The present thesis employed the 
Big Five personality inventory to account for premorbid personality factors in 
confabulation (see Appendix E2 for detailed description of the five personality 
factors by .lohnson, 1998). 
More specifically, LH's premorbid personality traits were assessed using a 
120-item questionnaire ('IPIP-Neo') developed and validated by J.A. Johnson 
(1998), based on recent developments in the Big Five personality classification 
system. The 'IPIP-Neo' was read out to LH and he was asked to rate his 
premorbid personality. Since LH's compromised retrograde memory could 
interfere with his ability to judge his premorbid personality, his relatives were also 
asked to complete the questionnaire. They rated both LH's premorbid and 
postmorbid personality on the same items. In this way, measures of both 
premorbid personality and personality change could be obtained. The three total 
scores for each factor (self premorbid rating, independent-rater premorbid rating, 
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independent-rater postmorbid rating) were compared with the standardised 
personality factor scores provided by J. A. Johnson (1998). 
Results. LFl's self-ratings and the ratings of his relatives are depicted in 
Figure 6-3. 
ILH Premorbid B Relatives Premorbid • Relatives Postmorbid 
75 90 
1 60 - _jk 
Figure 6-3. Big Five Pre- and Post-morbid Personality Traits: Self- and Carer's 
Ratings 
LH's relatives judged his personality as premorbidly more extravert, than 
he did (see Appendix E2 for detailed scores). LH rated himself as low in 
'agreeableness", indicating that he did not prioritise being liked or accepted. His 
relatives rated him as average on most facets of agreeableness except cooperation, 
confirming that he preferred confrontation rather than compromise to others 
needs. He was also self- and other-rated as not self-disciplined or capable of 
suppressing his impulses ('conscientiousness'). Interestingly, this characteristic 
was premorbidly low and remained low in his postmorbid personality. 
Additionally, both he and his relative's scored his personality as very high in 
'Neuroticism', reflecting his tendency to often experience negative feelings, 
showing "problems in emotional regulation" (.lohnson, 1998). which also would 
"diminish [his] ability to think clearly, make decisions and cope effectively with 
stress"" (.lohnson. 1998). Lastly, his relative's judged his premorbid personality as 
average in openaeas. to eJiperjence', witli lower scores those of omoliunality, 
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suggesting that he not well aware of his feelings and he tended not to express his 
emotions openly. 
The rating's of LH's postmorbid personality show that according to his 
relatives he was less extravert, and even less agreeable and conscientious than 
prior to his stroke. Crucially, he remained overwhelmed by negative feelings. 
Interestingly within the openness factor, the facet of 'imagination' was given a 
higher rating than its premorbid average level (from 38 to 75), while the intellect 
facet was rated as significantly lower (from 44 to 8). Emotionality scores, i.e. 
having access to and awareness of one's feelings, remained at their low premorbid 
level. 
These personality changes were consistent with LH's postmorbid 
cognitive profile and coping strategies. His previously low abilities and/or 
wiliness to compromise with his social environment and physical condition had 
now become virtually absent. Instead, according to his relatives, he continued to 
experience intense negative emotions at times despite his anosognosia and his 
apparent jocular and apathetic behaviour (see also HADS results-Table 6-1). 
Interestingly, his relatives reported how LH had always been reserved about his 
emotions, particularly the negative ones. He instead tried to portray a self-
confident, assertive and extravert image of himself even when his relatives 
suspected otherwise. Their occasional attempts to express this to LH were met 
with anger or withdrawal on his side. Finally, they felt his postmorbid behaviour 
and particularly his confabulatory and anosognosic manifestations reflected an 
exaggeration of his premorbid copying skills. 
6.4.4 Study 4: Self - Representations in True and False Memories 
Recent studies in autobiographical memory have shown that through 
autobiographical narratives a particular representation of self-identity in time, 
with synchronic and diachronic values, is constituted, maintained and used as a 
basis for further memory organisation, as well as future goal and action planning 
(for reviews see Barclay & DeCooke, 1988; Conway, Singer & Tagini, 2004; De 
Vries, Blando, & Walker, 1995; McAdams, 2001; Pillemer, 2001; Singer & 
Salovey, 1993; Stein, Wade & Liwag, 1997; Woike, Gershkovich, Piorkowski, & 
Polo, 1999). However, the role of self-representation in confabulatory narratives 
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has received less attention in neuropsychology (e.g. see Feinberg, 2001; Tallberg, 
2001), despite indications of its central role (e.g. Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Johnson & Raye, 2000; see also Chapter 3). In this case-
report, two aspects of self-representation, namely its 'valence' and 'agency' (see 
below), were investigated using a method adjusted from studies on 
autobiographical memory and identity formation (for review see Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
Materials and Procedures 
Self and interpersonal representations in the accurate and false memories 
of LH were investigated using a modified version of the McAdam's (1985) life 
story technique (see in McAdams et al., 2001). The interview began by informing 
participants, LH and five controls (matched for sex, education and age) that they 
were going to be asked to recall and reflect upon personally significant and self-
defming events from their whole life. Next they were asked to describe twelve 
specific experiences in their lives including a particularly pleasant experience 
(high point), a sad experience (low point), a turning point, their earliest memory, 
an important childhood event, an important adulthood event, a recent important 
event, an important event of any lifetime period, a memory that displays 
something stable about the self, a decision-making memory, a morality memory 
and a goal memory (see Appendix E3 for questionnaire). Each of the 12 memory 
descriptions were fully transcribed and coded by two independent coders. They 
were blind to the hypotheses and the groups of the study, previously trained in the 
following coding system and paid for their participation. Participants' relatives 
and visitors provided corroboration information about each of the events narrated. 
Coding 
Three main categories were separately coded. These included: (1) Self-
representation valence and agency, (2) 'Other'-representation valence and unity 
(3) Overall valence of memory. Self-representation rating included any statements 
explicitly providing information about the 'self and its position in interpersonal 
relations (e.g. '1 never had any high sights', '1 became better, tougher', ' I always 
gave my family everything' etc). In this scoring category the self-representation 
could be scored with regard to its emotional valence, i.e. negative (e.g. being 
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lonely), positive (e.g. being happy), or neutral (neutral, ambivalent or hard to 
evaluate) and its agency, i.e. 'self as active/responsible (e.g. one who cares for 
others) or 'other' as active/responsible and 'self as passive (e.g. one who is 
supported by others). The meaning of positive and negative self-representations 
were defined based on a long tradition of measuring self-representations in 
autobiographical memory (e.g. McAdams & Bowman, 2001; Nelson, 2003; 
Wilson & Ross, 2003; See also Chapter 3). 
More specifically, positive self-representations were defined as phrases or 
sentences that described a positive outcome for the self or a decidedly positive-
affect state. Examples included: pleasure, growth, strength, efficacy, confidence, 
understanding, recovery, gain, praise, recognition, learning, improvement, 
gratification, and strengthening of desired interpersonal relations (e.g. sympathy, 
love, inclusion, intimacy) or ultimate concerns (e.g. religious beliefs). By contrast, 
negative self-representations were defined as phrases or sentences that described a 
negative outcome for the self or a decidedly negative-affect state. Examples 
included: displeasure, reduction, decrease, incompetence, fear, anger, sadness, 
fall, loss, deterioration, insult, illness, injury, offence, abuse, annoyance, and 
weakening of desired interpersonal relations (hatred, antipathy, exclusion, 
alienation, separation) or ultimate concerns (see also Chapter 3). 
Given the delusional reduplications which accompany confabulation in 
some patients (e.g. see case study below), two aspects of others' representation 
were coded separately. The relevant coding category focused on the relation 
between unity and valence of others' identity. This included statements which 
revealed the ability to perceive others' identities as emotionally complex, often 
ambivalent towards or for the self but still integrated entities (e.g. accurate 
memory: "the vicar realised the position I was in and he tried to help me out, but 
he only made it worse"). The notion 'others' in this context, included other people 
(e.g. his wife), other objects or places (e.g. his car) or parts of his body potentially 
treated as separate agents. In contrast, statements were correspondingly coded, 
which included reduplications of the same 'other', i.e. splitting of it into two or 
more distinctive entities in time and place, with the same [positive (+), or negative 
(-)], or opposite emotional significance (+/-) for the self The overall emotional 
valence of each accurate or confabulatory account was measured on a five-point 
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scale: I = negative; 2 = emotional shift from positive to negative; 3 = neutral; 4 = 
emotional shift from negative to positive; 5 = positive. Although this scale did not 
allow for relative ratings among different valence categories (e.g. positive versus 
very positive), it did include the rating of emotional shifts. This consideration is 
important in rating self-related memory narratives, as the investigation of such 
shifts in autobiographical memory has shown that they are both frequent in 
personal narratives and central to the formation and expression of one's self-
representation and identity (for review see McAdams, 2001). 
Statements to be coded were single or multiple phrases or sentences that 
described information about one's self-representation with a single thematic 
content e.g. the following sentences by LH " . . . I became a departmental head at a 
very very early age for insurance...and the next thing 1 know I was running a 
department....I had me own staff, me own department..." were considered as 
belonging to a single theme expressing a positive self-representation of gaining 
authority. All statements included in the confabulation protocols were candidates 
for coding, as it was considered arbitrary to separate accurate statements from the 
'confabulated' context in which they were recalled e.g. in a protocol LH referred 
to how on his first job he was 'authoritative' in tiying to modernise the company's 
old-fashioned dressing code (confabulation) and argued that this effort gained him 
a managerial position in the company (accurate development but on different 
grounds). Both descriptions were considered for coding. 
Results 
Controls produced 12 accurate memories in the interview, although some 
of their memories were less coherent and less specific than others. LH produced 
seven accurate memories and five confabulations. In order to compare the 
accurate accounts produced by LH during the interview with an equal amount of 
confabulatoi7 narratives, the first two spontaneous self-referential confabulations 
produced by LH in the same week were identified and corroborated by 
information given by relatives and nursing staff They were given to the raters for 
coding along with the other memories. The two independent raters agreed on 92% 
of the selected items to be coded and 98% of the specific classifications made. 
Their remaining differences were resolved by discussion. 
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Accurate Memories. Overall, LH included more self and interpersonal 
representations in his accurate memories (42 representations in seven memories) 
than controls (41 representations on average in 12 memories each). This result 
appeared to relate to LH's impaired ability to retrieve events specific in time and 
their details. Instead, he often produced general, poorly contextualised and 
narrated events that were focused around multiple descriptions of positive self-
representations, rather than the description of specific events. The following 
narrative is characteristic: 
High Point: "Oh. There's Zelkions of them man. [Can you think of a specific one?] 
...First position of authority. Which absolutely praised me in the whole dam school. I 
was made house captain. How old was that? 1 can't remember even i f I was in the tech 
high. I'd be 10. Well, they didn't really make anything official. The announcement 
coming out: [LH] house captain. I was thinking well, they picked the wrong boy out 
(laughs). But, I mean.... lots of things. I took i l l , 1 got... what the hell did 1 got.., I 
went to a new school for the first time. 1 got a kidney disease, 1 was in agony for the 
last fortnight...In fact in the end we did a three or four day camping session, 1 had to 
carry a small sack, everybody else had to carry in the tents, I just couldn't bare... but 
in the end they said, you know: "[LH], he is alright. He is cool (laughs). [LH]. . . house 
Captain". But you see the thing is ...oh no I was going to ramble again...but ya, 
things I had them happening all my life". 
Interestingly, LH portrayed himself and his relation with others in more 
negative terms than controls in his accurate memories. Yet the overall valence of 
his accurate memories (mean 2.7; SD 1.3) did not differ from that of controls 
(mean 3.4; SD 0.1). This result is explained by the observation that although LFI 
described several unpleasant events in his life in which he was either i l l , weak or 
lonely, he typically ended his narration by describing how he overcame the 
difficulties and what a beneficial effect that events had on him. The above 
example is again characteristic. He gave similar answers to questions about a sad 
event (how his mother's early death made him stronger), an early adulthood event 
(how a first negative experience with a girl taught him a lesson), a moral dilemma 
(how he took the right decision in dealing with a difficult moral situation in his 
family), and an event that shows self-continuity (how he has become lazy because 
his intellectual abilities were always greater than those of others). Similarly to 
controls, LH focused more on active and responsible self-representations (e.g. 
achieving goals, loving or misbehaving towards others) than passive ones (e.g. 
loved or being hurt by others). No other noteworthy difference was observed 
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between LH's and control's accurate memories. Percentages of coded statements 
of self- and interpersonal representations in LH's and controls' accurate memories 
and LH's confabulations are shown in Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5. Percentages of Self-representations in True Memories and 
Confabulations 
Agency Valence LH's Confabulations 
LH's 
True Memories 
Controls' True 
Memories 
%' %^ 
Self Positive 
Negative 
Neutral 
42.8 
28.6 
5.3 
21.4 
40.5 
14.3 
38.8 
24.4 
12.9 
Other Positive 
Negative 
Neutral 
8.9 
12.5 
1.8 
7.1 
11.9 
4.7 
9.8 
11.7 
2.3 
' Percentage of the total number oF self-representation statements in L H ' s confabulations. 
^ Percentage of the total number of self-representation statements in L H ' s true memories. 
' Percentage of the total number of self-representation statements in controls' true memories. 
Confabulations. The self-representation depicted in LH's confabulations 
had a number of differences from that described in his accurate memories and 
those of controls. First of all, in his seven confabulations he included 56 different 
references to his self-representation, showing greater preoccupation with his effort 
to describe himself in positive terms. In addition, he showed even greater 
disorganisation of recall. More specifically, he was unable to place events in time, 
although he repeatedly tried to do so (see also Fotopoulou et al., 2004) and he 
confused different events between them. He gave very little sensory details of the 
narrated events, failed to refer to specific people, locations, and other details. 
Instead, his vague, disorganised mernories seemed to focus around specific ideas 
he wanted to convey about hiinself Events and facts appeared as almost a random 
background to these self-enhancing ideas. These included his determination and 
achievements in life, his recognised authority and his superior intellectual 
abilities. The latter was also described as responsible for his ability to achieve 
goals without significant effort or even experience. Although these values were in 
fact part of his self-representation premorbidly, as confirmed by his accurate 
memories but also by his relatives' accounts of his premorbid personality, they 
were erroneous in the present context and in the perplexed way by which he 
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retrieved past events. Moreover, as his relatives noted, they were grossly 
exaggerated and had overshadowed any other, perhaps less positive, components 
of his premorbid self-representation. The following narrative is characteristic (for 
more examples see Appendix E4): 
Decision-IVIaking Event: There's all sorts of things. Important decisions... 1 elected which 
way I wanted to go in life, and I've done it. And it's proved out to be a bit of a hassle. 
Because these are people who aren't particularly bright. 1 mean I don't think it is my 
arrogance, they might be, but I don't think they're as bright as me... get above me. And, 
they come up with the most ridiculous things. And since me last birthday I thought, ah, I've 
really had enough of this. So I started to be a lot more honest with people and tell them 
what I think of what they're doing. But actually, they all say how grateful they are I've 
done that. [Hm.] Because they're so inexperienced. The danger comes when they think they 
are experienced and they want to do the same bloody thing. [So do you remember any more 
details about the day you took such a decision? What happened?] Oh... to be totally 
honest? Fairly recently, actually. Probably about ten years ago. But, in the first place, to be 
devious and do the job. It'd be... probably right at the end of me teens. About, sort of 19 to 
21, that sort of area. Urn, now... it's a lot easier, but people absolutely hate me for it. 
Because I regularly- well, they think I'm kicking against the pricks. Telling them what 1 
think of their decisions. Because i f they blew me out now, I could just write a cheque and 
pay me mortgage off. The house is mine. Um... and in the worst scenario you know, 1 
could live. But, the problem is, particularly when- what the hell is the company called? 
What were we before we became what we are now? And I can't remember what we're 
called now, either. I've never bothered to look at it. Um... see, that was a mess. The 
company was a mess. It came so close to closing down, it was just unbelievable. 1 think 1 
told you it took the third telephone call in one morning to stop the company being closed 
down. Uh...(looks perplexed). [You were talking about the decision you took 
to...interrupted by the patient:] It's easier to talk about the company, you see. Laughs. [I 
see]. 
[Corroboration Notes: LH's hospitalisation coincides with his 'last birthday'. It is true thai 
LH is more 'outspoken' since that time hut this could hardly be described as honesty and it 
was definitely not the result of his decision. Some of his other associations have kernels of 
truth in them, e.g. indeed his company was recently bought by another company and thus 
changed name, but are hard to understand. His family is not aware of any other period he 
claimed he took the decision of becoming more honest, or more critical of others. 
According to them he was always stating his opinion clearly and often went against 
authority in his profession] 
LH's confabulations, similarly to his accurate memories, included more 
active than passive self-representations. However in his confabulations he 
included markedly less negative self-representations than in his accurate 
memories. Moreover, these unpleasant descriptions did not refer to himself but 
rather to the aggressive statements and behaviours that he showed towards others. 
More specifically, he appeared frustrated at others' 'lower intellectual' or other 
abilities and he repeatedly described how he communicated these beliefs to the 
responsible parties, how he 'set the record straight' and how he returned the 
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'insults' and established his authority. He described how he achieved what he 
wanted once he had taken control over the situation. Once again he used, or rather 
misused, misinterpreted and wrongly combined, events from his past to 
contextualise such thoughts and feelings. Interestingly, LH rarely expressed, in his 
true or false memories positive feelings toward others, such as sympathy, concern, 
or longing. In addition, unlike controls who narrated social occasions such as 
relative's weddings and the birth of children etc, he never placed the focus of a 
memory on anybody but himself Also, in his memories he included several 
references to issues of health and disability. Lastly, in his two spontaneous 
confabulations, he seemed to fabricate different and rather bizarre reasons for his 
admission. The following spontaneous confabulation is characteristic (see also 
Appendix E4 for more examples): 
" I ' d just like to be at home, away from it. Because so many buffoons make so many 
mistakes, it's just getting ridiculous. And I didn't realize who these people were that 
kept popping around. So I started giving them bigger insults than they'd been 
giving me. [Did you say insults?] Yeah, because what they're doing- what 
happened was, I saw these two bloody pens, and I was passing through Carlisle. I 
said yeah, no problem, I ' l l go for them. There's nobody there, and nobody would 
hand them out. I said well, I ' l l bend me journey on Friday on the way to the feriy, 
just- did I say Carlisle? I should've said Morpeth. So 1 bend me journey over that 
way, to pick those pens up for you, when the lady said 'oh they're all at their 
morning's art session'. They should be heading back. I said I ' l l see i f I can catch 
them on the road. Caught them ringing the buses up. Knowing I got the pens they 
put me on this bus to go back to the centre [referring to his hospital ward], and I've 
been in their bloody hands ever since! [Hm. Do you remember when this 
happened?] What do you mean when? I know it happened, I know the girl who 
made a misdemeanor which was terrible and 1 ended up cutting the bloody can for 
it. And I've seen her since she just sort of blushed a little tinge. I ' l l not tell you what 
I called her cause she blushed even deeper". 
[Corroboration Notes. Any connection of these events to reality was impossible to 
establish, except from the fact that the patient did indeed often passed through Carlisle as 
part of his professional activities. In different .sessions, he has mentioned similar versions 
of these confabulated reasons of admission] 
Overall Valence. The overall valence of controls memories showed a 
mild positive bias, M= 3.4; SD = 0.1, while LH's accurate memories were slightly 
more negative (M= 2.7; SD = 1.3), although within one SD below the controls' 
mean. In contrast, five out of his seven confabulations were rated as pleasant, or 
as ending in pleasant terms for LH, and thus their valence was more positive on 
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average, M = 3.9; SD = 1.7. This score approximates that of controls. However, it 
should be noted that his two negative confabulations referred mostly to fabricated 
reasons for his admission (see above). Although the latter are negative i f scored at 
face value as here, they are actually 'pleasant alternatives', i f one considers the 
'reality' they correspond to, i.e. LH's accurate reasons for admission (see also 
Chapter 3). 
Representation of Other's Emotional Identity. There was no differences 
in amount of times LH (two) and controls (M = 1.2; SD = 0.8) appeared to 
perceive others in emotionally ambivalent terms in accurate memories, or in 
confabulations (two descriptions by LH). Moreover, none of the controls or LH 
represented 'others', people or places, as split into two or more different identities 
(see case study below for reduplication examples). 
In summary, LH's confabulations portrayed a self-representation which 
was predominately active and positive and relied on the exaggeration of 
premorbid values, positive character traits and praised achievements. The latter 
were also present in his accurate memories but to a lesser degree and balanced by 
a greater number of negative self-representations. In addition, in his confabulatory 
narratives LH alluded to his postmorbid condition, mostly his hospitalisation, but 
provided fantastic and different reasons for hospital admission, which shared only 
one common characteristic: they did not portray an impaired image of himself 
Instead, they portrayed his current state as the result of others' errors or 
incapability. LH actively expressed frustration and aggression towards others in 
his accurate, but most frequently in his confabulated memories. 
6.4.5 Summary of Findings 
LH's neuropsychological profile was indicative of severe cognitive 
disruption consistent with ruptured ACoA aneurysm diagnosis. While his general 
intellectual (verbal), semantic and language abilities were only mildly affected, 
LH showed substantial problems in specific cognitive domains such as perceptual 
organisation, orientation, new learning, autobiographical memory and executive 
functions. His memory abilities were also contaminated by confabulation and 
perseveration, particularly in free recall conditions and affecting mostly events of 
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his life, and orientation. In addition, LH showed lacl< of motivation and borderline 
depression and anxiety scores despite apparent apathy. 
LH's awareness of deficits was poor and he appeared generally unable to 
retain a realistic and stable representation of his deficits and confabulated about 
his alleged abilities. His memory showed a mild suggestibility tendency and his 
'defensive' premorbid personality traits appeared exaggerated in his 
confabulations. Finally, his accurate memories portrayed a positive, strong and 
able self-representation, which was maintained and even exaggerated in his 
confabulations despite the contrary facts of his postmorbid condition. 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Neurocognitive Deficits 
LH's neuroradiological and cognitive profile was characteristic of the 
profile shown by the rest of the patients in the CI confabulation subgroup of the 
study (bilateral patients; see Chapter 2). He showed damage to the medial 
prefrontal cortex and other proximal areas resulting in severe memory and 
executive functions impairment. The latter included disinhibition, perseveration, 
and lack of flexibility, abstraction and self-monitoring. This profile is consistent 
with most of the 'retrieval deficit' hypotheses put forward in the literature (see 
Chapter 1). A somewhat surprising finding was LH's relatively good performance 
on two tests of reasoning (Cognitive Estimates and 20 Questions Test) and one 
test of problem solving (Tower Test). In some retrieval models, such functions 
have been linked with more 'bizarre' and 'fantastic' forms of confabulation (e.g. 
Burgess and Shallice, 1996). LH showed such confabulations (e.g. his obscure 
narrations of his reasons of admission), yet he did not present with such deficits. 
Moreover, LH showed mood and motivation abnormalities and somewhat 
problematic social conduct. These observations have also been raised before in the 
confabulation literature and have more generally been linked with lesions of the 
OMPFC (Bechara et al., 2000; Berlin et al., 2004; Joseph, 1999; Malloy et al., 
1993; Rolls, 2000; Stuss, 1991). His confabulation was more frequent in the 
episodic memoiy domain and in orientation questions, but was not restricted to 
these domains (see also Daila Barba et al., 1997; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; 
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Kopelman et al., 1997; see also Chapter 4). Crucially, his performance on these 
standardised neuropsychological tests, as well as on the Dalla Barba Battery was 
similar to that of the rest of the bilateral confabulating patients of the study (see 
Chapter 2). 
6.5.2 Positive Features 
The experimental investigations of LH's confabulations revealed that they 
showed positive features which could not be explained based solely on the above 
memory and executive functions impairments (see also Chapters 3, 4, and 5). 
Indeed, the behaviour of LH in the previous chapters, as well as the current 
investigations revealed that LH portrayed a positive image of himself in his 
confabulations (Study 4). In Chapter 5 it was shown that the wishful character of 
confabulation was not the result of an emotional bias but rather the result of a 
specific self-serving emotional bias. Three aspects of the self were investigated in 
the present chapter in order to further specify the nature of these self-related 
motivational biases in confabulation. These investigations targeted the role of 
suggestibility, the role of premorbid personality traits and the role of self-
awareness and representation in confabulation. These are briefly discussed below 
and they will be further addressed in Chapter 8. 
6.5.3 Suggestibility 
During the suggestibility scale, LH was given negative feedback and 
repeated exposure to misleading information. His answers were influenced more 
than those of the general population, yet not more than expected, given his 
memory and intellectual impairments. These results are consistent with LH's 
spontaneous production of confabulations. The latter were often influenced by 
random environmental prompts and when challenged, LH would alter his 
responses and provide alternative confabulatory versions of a given narrated 
event. However, as Moscovitch (1989) has previously suggested, this appeared to 
be a secondary phenomenon in LH's presentation. More specifically, his 
confabulations were both easy to elicit and direct, yet they existed independently 
of such leading efforts and they were at times accompanied by corresponding 
actions or intentions for action (see also Schnider et al., 1996). Moreover, both 
LH and his relatives described his premorbid personality as highly assertive and 
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rather resistant to suggestion and more generally to authority (see also below). 
Thus, it is unlikely that suggestion had a primary causative role in LH's 
confabulation tendency, although it might have contributed to the production of 
several secondary confabulations aimed to provide support or, explanation for 
original confabulations. 
6.5.4 Premorbid Personality 
LH's premorbid personality profile contained a number o f characteristics 
previously associated with confabulation (Berlyne, 1972; Gainotti, 1975; 
Weinstein, 1996; Williams & Rupp, 1932; see also Chapter 1). In particular, his 
relatives described LH as a very sociable and outgoing person, an extravert. 
However, they noted that this did not concern his emotions and inner thoughts. 
According to them LH put on a facade of assertiveness and self-confidence, while 
in reality he was overwhelmed by anxiety and other emotions. LH's ratings of his 
own premorbid personality confirmed these observations. His relatives also noted 
how LH used work, social interaction, alcohol, hobbies and other activities as a 
distraction from his worries and potential problems. According to his wife "He 
was definitely one of those that prefer to hide from their problems rather than face 
them and he always said so himself. Moreover, although LH was rated as 
postmorbidiy 'impulsive', a finding consistent with his prefrontal lobe lesions (see 
also Berlin et al., 2004), his premorbid personality was also rated as very 
impulsive. Thus, given these premorbid traits, his postmorbid personality, his 
anosognosia and the self-enhancing content of his confabulations could be 
interpreted as exaggerations of his premorbid character. 
More specifically, given the difficult circumstances of his deficits and 
their social implications LH's apathy and anosognosia could be seen as an 
exaggerated form of conscious or unconscious denial (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955), 
of impulsivity and extraversion (Williams & Rupp, 1932). Furthermore, one could 
postulate that had another patient with less sensitive self-esteem and different 
coping strategies suffered LH's brain damage he might have not developed 
confabulation and anognosia (e.g. Gainotti, 1975), or his symptoms might not 
have lasted for so long (Talland, 1961; 1965). Although these factors may have 
had a role in the formation of the content his confabulations (see below), it is not 
likely that premorbid personality alone was causative of confabulation. 
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Specifically, it is highly unlikely that a specific neurological syndrome was 
entirely caused by personality factors, essentially unrelated to brain and cognitive 
dysfunction. Indeed, LH's lesions and his cognitive profile were typical of 
patients with memory-related confabulation (see Chapter I ) . However, a large 
group study with appropriate controls is required in order to empirically verily 
whether personality factors can distinguish confabulating from other amnesic or 
dysexecutive patients. 
6.5.5 Past Self-Representations and Current Goals 
Although LH's personality characteristics and his exaggerated premorbid 
coping strategies may not have caused his confabulations they might have 
coloured their content. As briefly discussed in Chapter 5, one's autobiographical 
memory is deeply connected with one's self-representation and one's self-identity 
in a given social context. Social psychology has emphasised that memory is not 
simply a cognitive function keeping a record of the past. Personal memory allows 
individuals to construct stories about themselves, their family and their nation, i.e. 
their origins, and these narratives contribute to the filtering of reality, the 
formation of future intentions and predictions and more generally the construction 
of an organised and continuous sense of self in time (e.g. McAdams, 2001; 
Neisser, 1988; Nelson, 2003). Thus, when brain dysfunction and cognitive deficits 
hampers one's ability to form autobiographical memories one's self-identity and 
sense of self-continuity is also at risk. Yet confabulating patients, unlike amnesic 
patients, do not behave as though they have lost access to information vital to 
their self-representation and personal identity. They do not admit ignorance, as 
amnesic patients do. Instead, they continue to recollect past events and facts, 
albeit erroneously. In this way they continue to draw images of themselves and 
their role in their social environment. In L H ' case, these self-images seemed to 
rely on premorbid self-values and personality characteristics. Thus, the 
construction of current autobiographical memories and their corresponding self-
representations were highly influenced by his premorbid self-regard and his 
previous strategies of coping with stressful and perplexed situations. 
In addition, LH's confabulations appeared influenced by his current needs 
and goals. Thus, LH often distorted reality in a way consistent with his wishes and 
inner drives. For example, when wishing to leave the ward he often told staff his 
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car was parked just outside and he had to move it immediately or he would get 
fined. In sessions preceding his lunch he often mentioned his hunger and then 
immediately went on to describe relevant false events such as the opening of a 
new canteen in the area. Other times he suddenly began treating the examiner as a 
waitress and asking what was on the day's menu. Following the examiner's 
questions it turn out he was either hungry, or thirsty. Once given some drink and 
when possible offered a snack these confabulations disappeared instantly. In the 
face of these pressing needs, LH potentially employed past self-representations 
and values to try to satisfy them. For example, in wanting to leave the ward, he 
often claimed he had some important business meeting to attend. The potential 
relation between current emotions, past self-representation and confabulation is 
further addressed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
6.5.6 Awareness of Illness 
One distinctive class of previous self-representations used by LH as 
material for his current self-regard included his premorbid representation of his 
cognitive and health condition. More specifically, LH mostly relied on his 
premorbid life circumstances when answering questions about his current 
cognitive and medical state and thus he confabulated. More generally, his 
awareness of his memory and other deficits was severely affected. He could only 
momentarily gain access to his postmorbid condition and often this took the form 
of 'metaphorical' confabulations, i.e. relevant information acknowledged and 
described but expressed at an irrelevant context. His attitude towards such 
questions fluctuated from apathy to jocular remarks. He also occasionally 
exhibited frustration but this was directed at others' actions or intentions rather his 
own condition. Occasionally, he did acknowledge some difficulty but this was 
attributed to others rather than his illness. 
These brief moments of insight suggested that he was deeply concerned 
about his postmorbid mental state and his self-esteem was threatened by his 
amnesic and confabulatory state. These observations suggest that although LH 
was anosognosic, he did have some forms of implicit awareness of deficit and 
these coloured his confabulations. Similar fluctuations in awareness and other 
forms of implicit awareness of deficits have been frequently described in 
confabulating patients (Burgess & McNeil, 1999; Feinberg, 2001; Moscovitch, 
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1989; Ramachandran, 1995; Solms, 2000; Stuss, 1991; Talland, 1961; Weinstein, 
1996). More generally, unawareness of deficits has been repeatedly described in 
the literature on confabulation and its occurrence is most often associated with 
cognitive functions of self-monitoring and reality monitoring (Johnson et al., 
1991; Blumer & Benson, 1975; Schacter, 1991; Stuss, 1991). These in turn are 
most often associated with frontal lobe dysfunction and particularly OMPFC 
lesions (see Stuss, 1991; Deluca, 2000 for reviews). However, it should be noted 
that other investigators have put forward less centralised and more domain-
specific theories of awareness (e.g. Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991) and no generally 
accepted theory of unawareness exists in the literature (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; 
Stuss, 1991). This issue wil l be further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. 
In conclusion, LH's confabulatory self-representations were not based on 
true self-defining autobiographical events, realistic appreciation of his current 
condition, or goal-directed satisfaction of his inner needs. Given the pressing 
influence of the latter inner desires, as well as his cognitive deficits and his 
premorbid personality traits, LH's portrayed a highly positive self-representation 
in his confabulations. More specifically, LH appeared to select self-enhancing 
elements of his autobiography or of his thoughts and fantasies (see also Chapter 4) 
and create a highly self-congratulatory mnemonic collage, albeit incoherent, 
disorganised, poor in detail and falsely rooted in reality (see also Chapter 5). 
Thus, it appears that LH was not only unable to monitor his current self and 
current reality but his false memories showed an over-reliance on past self-
enhancing instances and were guided by current inner needs and preoccupations. 
In other words, what was characteristic of his confabulations was not only what 
was missing, i.e. the appreciation of current reality and the appropriate recall of 
the past, but also what remained, i.e. the dominance of premorbid self-values and 
current inner drives and goals. 
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Chapter 7 : A Case-Report of Paranoid 
Confabulation 
The Fragmented Self and Negative Emotions 
The greatest hazard of ail, losing one's self, can occur very quietly in the world, as if it was 
nothing at all No other loss can occur so quietly; any other -an arm, a teg, five dollars, a wife 
etc. -is sure to he noticed. 
-S. Kierkegaard 
7.1 Introduction 
Confabulation has been studied within different paradigms in neurology, 
psychiatry and neuropsychology. Classically, confabulation was investigated in 
studies of the amnesic-confabulatory syndrome (see Chapter 1). However, the 
term confabulation has also been used in a variety of other neurological 
syndromes in the absence of amnesia (Deluca, 2000; Feinberg & Ciacino, 1997). 
One of these syndromes is anosognosia for hemiplegia, as typically caused by 
frontoparietal right-hemisphere (RH) damage (Babinski, 1914). However, no clear 
distinction exists between the two types of confabulatory behaviour and the direct 
relation between anosognosia for hemiplegia and confabulation remains 
controversial (Feinberg et al., 1994; Lu et al., 1997; Venneri & Shanks, 2004; see 
also Chapter 1). In this study, the latter type of confabulation was termed 'motor-
related' and was contrasted with the classic 'memory-related' confabulation type 
(see Chapter 1). Moreover, neuroanatomical, cognitive and emotional differences 
were observed between memory and motor-related confabulation in the previous 
chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 5). Further specification of these differences is the 
aim of the present chapter. 
More specifically, the present study reports the cognitive profile of a 
patient who suffered a RH infarct resulting in left hemiparesis, hemianopia, and 
neglect, as well as marked neuropsychiatric symptoms, such as false 
autobiographical memories and delusional reduplications. Although transient 
anosognosia for hemiplegia is quite common following acute RH lesions, the 
chronic type described here is less frequent (Berti et al., 1996; 1998; Cocchini et 
al., 2002; Gold et al., 1994; Rode et al., 1998; Venneri & Shanks, 2004). The 
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study focuses on the content of the patient's confabulations and anosognosic 
statements, aiming at (1) investigating the cognitive deficits underpinning the 
patients' confabulations; (2) providing further support, specification and 
explanatory power to the findings of the previous group studies on motivated 
confabulation (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and (3) identifying similarities and differences 
between this type of motor-related confabulation and the memory-related 
confabulation described in the previous chapters. More specifically, this chapter 
will focus on the role of awareness of deficit, suggestibility, premorbid 
personality traits, self-representation and memory awareness in motor-related 
confabulation. Finally, it wil l briefly discuss its results in comparison to the 
similar investigations undertaken in the previous case-report on memory-related 
confabulation (Chapter 6). This issue wil l be further addressed in the following 
chapter. 
7.2 Case Report 
7.2.1 Personal History 
Patient AO, right handed, was an 87-year old woman, who had worked as 
a secretary for the fire brigade prior to her retirement. AO was a widow and had 
no children. She had always been in close contact with her niece and nephew, who 
described her as premorbidly sociable and active, although she always tended to 
be "a lady who spoke her mind and didn't suffer fools gladly". Relatives, friends 
and AO herself all agreed that she was a vei^ independent, competent, somewhat 
eccentric and strong-willed woman. 
7.2.2 Medical History 
AO had a previous history of hypothyroidism, recurrent urine infections 
and compromised visual acuity in the left eye, which had been treated 
successfully by a left cataract extraction and lens implant. She had no other 
previous medical or psychiatric history. She presented with headache and sudden 
onset of severe left hemiparesis. She was transferred to hospital where it was 
confirmed that she suffered a total right anterior circulation infarct resulting in 
dense left hemiparesis with dypraxia, left homonymous hemianopia, left-sided 
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neglect and urinary incontinence. Subsequent CT scans were consistent with an 
infarct diagnosis, showing a small low attenuation lesion in the right internal 
capsule region, as well as some low attenuation in the periventricular white 
matter, consistent with ischaemia or age related changes (see Figure 7-1 below). 
Position 49.0 
Figure 7-1. AO's C T scan. Post-admission cranial CT scan of patient AO shows 
generalised prominence of the ventricular system and of the extracerebral CSF spaces 
consistent with global atrophy. These appearances are most prominent in the frontal 
and temporal regions. There is also some periventricular white matter hypodensity 
indicative of ischaemic or age related change. A lacunar infract is noted within the 
posterior limps of the right internal capsule. 
AO was discharged to a nursing home following a brief rehabilitation 
period during which she made little significant progress with respect to mobility, 
praxis and vision. Care staff reported that AO presented with memory problems 
and was often confused and disoriented in time and place. She developed 
persistent false ideas about the staff often of a paranoid nature, and could not 
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distinguish between her dreams and reality. There was some improvement over 
time and her cognitive state stabilised, but AO continued to fabricate stories about 
her whereabouts and about her physical abilities. Psychiatric examinafion at the 
time and at one-year follow-up reported anosognosia, confabulafion, persistent 
delusions, severely fluctuating mood but no depression. 
At the time of the assessment, two-years post injury, AO's neurological 
report included severe lower limb hemiparesis, total paralysis of upper limb below 
the shoulder and impaired tactile sensafion of left upper and lower limbs, mild 
facial palsy, homonymous hemianopia and visuospatial neglect without 
extinction. There were no clinical indications of proprioception loss, personal 
neglect, asomatognosia or somatoparaphrenia. She required 24-hour nursing care 
as she was immobile and dependent for all basic living functions except feeding. 
She was forgetful and irritable but she did not appear as generally confused (lost 
points in the MMSE included orientation, calculation and construcfion) and was 
cooperative. She was orientated to person but her orientation in time and place 
fluctuated across sessions (see also Table 7-1). She still produced spontaneous 
confabulations and appeared unaware of her motor difficulties. 
AO also showed some neuropsychiatric symptoms. During the assessment 
period, she had two isolated incidents of Cotard's delusion, i.e. the delusional 
belief that one is dead (Cotard, 1882). Indeed, she was convinced she was dead 
and that staff were 'preparing her for her burial". Additionally, she showed 
indications of other misidentification delusions, mostly reduplicative paramnesia, 
i.e. erroneous identification and reduplication of places (see Feinberg & Keenan, 
2005; Joseph, 1986b for reviews). For example, she claimed she was not in 'her 
room', but in another of the several identical ones she 'owned' in the same 
nursing home. Across testing sessions she produced various paranoid versions of 
this theme (see also below). AO even reached the point of telephoning the police 
or legal offices on several occasions to report that she was being kept against her 
wi l l , she was in physical or financial threat and danger. For example, following 
the events of 9/11 in the USA she called the police and reported that terrorists had 
captured her relatives and she was in the same danger. 
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7.3 Neuropsychological Examination 
In order to identify the crucial cognitive and emotional deficits underlying 
AO's behaviour we administered extensive neuropsychological assessment. Her 
close relatives and friends helped substantially in verifying her answers and 
providing details about her premorbid life and personality. A control group of five 
neurologically healthy adults were tested on the tests that lacked published norms. 
These controls were residents at AO's nursing home. There were three females 
and two males (age range: 81-91 years; mean age: 86; mean education = 11). 
Where appropriate their performance scores were compared to that of AO's using 
the methods developed by Crawford & Howell (1998) and Crawford & 
Garthwaite (2002) for obtaining point estimates and confidence limits of the 
abnormality of an individual patient's test score when the control sample is 
modest in size (e.g. N < 5). 
7.3.1 Pre- and Post-Morbid Intelligence 
AO's performance on the WAIS-III is summarised in Table 7-1. Overall, 
AO's Full Scale IQ showed moderate deterioration in comparison with her 
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR) predicted WAIS-lII score of 94. Her 
Verbal IQ was preserved but AO appeared quite dyspraxic and could not start 
most of the WAIS-III Performance subtests. This was partly due to her visual 
impairments and also because of the high demands most of these tests make on 
executive functions, visuospatial and construction abilities (see also her 
performance on the copy condition of the Rey Complex Figure Test). 
7.3.2 Language 
AO's spontaneous speech was normal, showing normal flow, articulation 
and prosody. Her comprehension also appeared intact and AO performed well on 
semantic abilities bedside tasks (see Table 7-1). However, AO tended to speak 
endlessly, failing to take turns in conversation and although she would readily 
express humour herself, she would occasionally take the humorous remarks of 
others literally and become offended. In general, she did not appreciate the more 
subtle aspects of communication (impaired pragmatics of communication, 
Friedland & Miller, 1998). This behavioural pattern is consistent with her RH 
pathology (Brownell & Stringfellow, 1999; Gardner et al., 1983). 
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Table 7-1. Neuropsychological Evaluation of AO's Intellectual Abilities 
Test Score Age-Adjusted 
Level 
/nfe/Z/qence 
WAIS-III 
Verbal IQ 
Performance IQ 
Verbal Comprehension 
Perceptual Organization 
Working Memory 
Processing Speed 
Full Scale IQ 
WTAR 
Estimated IQ 
Index Scores 
107 
58 
103 
50 
113 
84 
94 
Average 
Impaired 
Average 
Impaired 
High Average 
Low Average 
Other Tests 
HADS 
Anxiety Score 
Depression Score 
Grated Naming Test 
Semantic Abilities 
Bedside Tests 
Colour Pointing in Pictures 
Word Semantic Categorisation 
Word Semantic Naming 
Symbolic Gestures on Request 
WMS- III 
Orientation Sub-test (18.04.02) 
WMS- III 
Orientation Sub-test (10.05.02) 
Mini-Mental State 
10 
10 
7/30 
60 % Ccnect Rate 
85 % Correct Rate 
80 % Correct Rate 
100% Correct Rate 
86 % Correct Rate 
33 % Correct Rate 
22/30 
Borderline 
Borderline 
Impaired 
Normal 
Nornial 
Normal 
Normal 
Normal 
Impaired 
Impaired 
7.3.3 Attention and Executive Functions 
AO's eyesight was highly defective, showing left homonymous 
hemianopia and marked visuospatial neglect of her left side in spontaneous 
behaviour, posture, reading and standard neuropsychological tests such as Letter 
Cancellation, Line Bisection and the Balloons Test (Table 7-2). AO's auditoiy 
attention, as measured by the 'Test of Everyday Attention' (TEA) (Robertson et 
al, 1994), was clearly abnormal showing problems with sustained attention, 
consistent with AO's right-frontal lobe pathology. 
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Table 7-2. Neuropsychological Evaluation of AO's Executive Functions & 
Attention Abilities 
Test Score Age-Ad justed Level 
Executive Functions Tests 
Hayling Test SS9 Impaired 
Brixton Test Discontinued Impaired 
BADS Test SS 54 Impaired 
Rule Shift cards PS 1 Impaired 
Action Programme PS 0 Impaired 
Key Search PS 1 Impaired 
Temporal Judgement PS 3 Average 
Zoo Map Discontinued Impaired 
Six Elements Discontinued Impaired 
Cognitive Estimates Error Score: 6 Normal 
Luria Rhythmic Tapping 9/10 Normal 
DK-EFS Verbal Fluency F/11 A/6 S/l 1 SS9 
DK-EFS Semantic Fluency 1/5 11/7 SS3 
Attention Tests 
Letter Cancellation 27 (L-sided neglect) Impaired 
Line Bisection 5 (L-sided neglect) Impaired 
Balloons Test A- LO R3; B- LO R2 Impaired 
Test of Everyday Attention 
Elevator Counting 5/7 Impaired 
Elevator Counting with Distraction SS=5 5%ile 
Elevator Counting with Reversal SS=9 25%ile 
AO also performed poorly on most tests of executive functions (see Table 
7-2) with the excepfion of the D-KEFS Letter Fluency test (Delis-Kaplan 
Execufive Funcfion System, 2001). It should however be noted that AO's 
performance could have been contaminated by her visuospatial and construction 
deficits. Her performance was average on the Temporal Judgment subtest of the 
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) and on the 
similar but more demanding Cognitive Estimates Test, consistent with her intact 
general cognitive judgement (see also WAIS-III verbal IQ scores). 
7.3.4 Anterograde Memorv 
AO's anterograde memory abilities as assessed by the Wechsler Memory 
Scale- Third Edition (WMS-I l l ) are summarised in Table 7-3. Her General 
Memory Index Score showed only moderate memory deterioration, attributable 
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mainly to her poor performance on visual memory tests, which in turn was, at 
least partly, attributable to her impoverished vision and visuospatial attention. By 
contrast, AO's performance on verbal memory subtests was average, she made 
only a few minor intrusions in these tests and her performance was normal in 
recognition subtests. 
7.3.5 Autobiographical Memorv 
The Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman, et al., 1990) was 
used to assess AO's knowledge and memory of her personal past (Table 7-3). Her 
relatives were interviewed before and after her assessment and asked to verify her 
answers. AO appeared to remember well the events of her life but presented 
problems in remembering personal semantic information, particularly of her 
recent life. Instead she remembered the facts of her childhood better than any 
other period of her life. She also showed some difficulty in remembering 
autobiographic incidents from her early adult life and she confabulated about 
certain postmorbid life events. These results were consistent with the impression 
AO gave in spontaneous conversation, during which she often referred to her 
childhood, providing impressive details of the remembered experiences. These 
recollections were consistent across sessions. By contrast, although she generally 
showed intact knowledge of recent events and personal facts (pre- and post-
stroke), at times she was confused about them, could not retrieve them accurately 
nor in the right order, and she produced elaborated confabulations in their place. 
Table 7-3. Neuropsychological Evaluation of AO's Memory 
Memory Test Score Age-Adjusted 
Level 
WMS III Index Scores 
Auditory Immediate Memory 99 Average 
Visual Immediate Memory 81 Low Average 
Immediate Memory 71 Borderline 
Auditory Delayed 99 Average 
Visual Delayed 84 Low Average 
Auditory Recognition Delayed 100 Average 
General Memory 92 Average 
Working Memory 96 Average 
Rey Complex Figure Raw Scores 
Copy 0/36 Impaired 
Immediate Recall - Discontinued 
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Delayed Recall - Discontinued 
Memory Test Score Age-Adjusted 
AMI Raw Scores 
Persona/ Semantic Memory 
Childhood 17/21 Normal^ 
Early Adult Life 16/21 Borderline 
Recent Life 12/21 Impaired 
Total 45/63 Impaired 
Autobiographical lr)cidents 
Childhood 8/9 Normal 
Early Adult Life 4/9 Borderline 
Recent Life 8/9 Normal 
Total 20/27 Nomnal 
Confabulation Battery AO Controls 
Personal Semantic 15% 0 
Episodic 33% 1.3% 
Orientation 10% 0 
General Semantic 13.3% 2.66 % 
D'K Semantic 30% 6% 
D'K Episodic 10% 2% 
7.3.6 Mood 
AO's mood most frequently appeared as negative and she scored 
accordingly in a self-report measure (see 11 ADS scores; Table 7-1). She showed 
frequent episodes of intense distress, tearfulness, and accompanying 
confabulations (see below). However, during other, less frequent, sessions AO's 
mood improved. At these times, she appeared to regain access to information 
previously unavailable or distorted and she seemed more realistic about her 
abilities. Fluctuation of mood, memory and awareness performance has been 
observed before in both confabulating and anosognosic patients (e.g. Baddeley & 
Wilson, 1986; Ramachandran, 1995; Taliand, 1965). 
7.3.7 Confabulation 
AO did not only confabulate in direct relation to her anosognosia, e.g. 
insisting that she has been walking since her stroke. She also confabulated about 
other activities, e.g. she maintained that she often went to the village in Scotland 
where she had spent her memorable childhood years; and about the behaviour of 
others towards her, e.g. she believed that her relatives were taking advantage of 
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her finances and staff were forcing her to shift rooms during the night. Her 
relatives in their initial efforts to understand AO's symptoms had termed these 
confabulations 'her wishful fantasies' and had tried to be sympathetic, but AO's 
forceful conviction in the accuracy of her memories and her persistent accusations 
had eventually caused severe distress in her family. 
In order to quantify AO's confabulations and formally verify their 
presence, the "Dalla Barba Confabulation Battery" (1993) was administered to 
AO and the control group (see Chapter 2 for test details). AO's and controls' 
confabulation scores are summarised in Table 7-3. AO confabulated across all the 
sections of the battery; most frequently, she confabulated when answering 
episodic questions and " I don't know" semantic questions. AO's confabulation 
scores on both Personal and General Semantic questions were relatively low, in 
contrast to her hits, which were high (80% and 60% respectively). Moreover, her 
confabulation score on the General Semantic questions was low in contrast to the 
relatively high rate of confabulations produced by normal subjects on this section. 
7.3.8 Summary 
Although AO's CT scans did not identify the exact location of her cortical 
lesions, her neuropsychological profile was indicative of severe and chronic 
cognitive disruption consistent with anterior RH damage diagnosis. While her 
general intellectual (verbal), semantic and language abilities were unaffected, AO 
showed substantial problems in specific cognitive domains such as visuospatial 
perception (neglect), attention, construction, executive functions, and pragmatic 
communication skills. She also showed mild anterograde memory impairment and 
her autobiographical memory appeared contaminated by confabulation and 
delusions, particularly for events of her recent postmorbid life. Lastly, she showed 
fluctuations in orientation and mood, prevalence of negative emotions and 
paranoid beliefs. 
7.4 Experimental Investigations: Confabulation and the Self 
The above investigations examined potential cognitive deficits associated 
with anosognosia and the production of confabulations. The following section 
focuses on the positive aspects (Jackson, 1932) of AO's symptomatology. These 
included the subjective experience of her deficits (awareness of deficits), the 
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potential role of suggestibility and personality traits in confabulation, as well as 
the potentially motivated self-representations elicited by confabulation. 
7.4.1 Study I : Awareness of Deficit 
The major issue of difficulty in AO's management and social interactions 
was her chronic anosognosia for hemiplegia and its related confabulations. Two 
years post-stroke she appeared unaware of the fact that her motor functions had 
been affected by stroke, she could not walk and that she would not be able to live 
independently. The awareness of her deficits across different behavioural and 
cognitive domains was assessed by a lengthy semi-structured interview, which 
was developed to clinically explore the nature of AO's understanding of her own 
postmorbid condition (see Chapter 6 and Appendix El for test details). 
General Postmorhid Condition Awareness. AO showed intact general 
knowledge of her medical history but she appeared unaware of most of the 
resulting deficits and their implications. Her awareness appeared particularly 
compromised in relation to her hemiplegia, neglect, memory and communication 
problems, as well as their everyday life implications. She was more aware of her 
executive difficulties, her dyspraxia and the changes in her emotional condition. 
Observation of her own impairments. AO's reduced awareness was 
influenced by direct demonstration of her difficulties in a complex way. In some 
instances, she did not admit her deficits even upon demonstration. Other times, 
she admitted the observed inability (e.g. inability to move left leg), but continued 
to explicitly deny the impairment (paralysis) by either minimising its importance 
(e.g. ' I could walk but I might have a bit of problem while turning') or 
misattributing, through aggressive and paranoid confabulations, its cause to other 
non-self related sources (see also Study 4). For example, when asked i f she could 
move both legs she initially replied yes. She then spontaneously tried lifting her 
legs. She slightly lifted her left leg with her hands and commented: "Oh, yes, this 
one is a bit weaker". When asked again i f she could move both her legs she then 
replied: "Well I cannot move this one so easily because of the fall . They let me 
fall one day and I've hurt this side [staff had indeed reported a similar but minor 
incident several months ago]. I reported it but they won't put it down cause they 
are afraid I ' l l ask for compensation". These clinical observations imply that 
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although AO explicitly denied her motor deficits, she implicitly expressed them 
though misinterpretations, minimisations or confabulations (see also Study 4). 
Future Perspective. AO's perspective on her future condition was also 
defective. She oscillated between extreme pessimism ("1 wish 1 would die") to 
completely unrealistic plans ("1 am going to get a taxi, move my things... I ' l l find 
my old friends in Newcastle and I ' l l get a flat on my own there"). Interestingly, 
AO would not anticipate difficulties in certain tasks even when she had just failed 
them and had showed intact recognition of such performance. For example, 
following a neglect task, AO elaborated on her "blind-side" and narrated how she 
sometimes lost things placed on her left. However, when after few minutes of 
distractive activity AO was asked whether she could re-perform the task 
successfully she showed no sign of recognition of her previous failure, tried to 
perform the task and failed to acknowledge her difficulty. 
Awareness and Confabulation. AO's unawareness was often accompanied 
by the presence of confabulations (see also below). These included false excuses 
of failure to perform a task, unrealistic future plans and spontaneous false 
memories (e.g. "1 have been walking to the centre many times since I've been in 
here, but they don't know, you see."). Crucially, most of the abilities that AO 
showed low awareness of (e.g. everyday living independence, walking, social 
communication), featured in the most common of her confabulations (e.g. her 
alleged walks, the 'suspicious' selling of her flat by her relatives, her captivity in 
the nursing home, the conspiracy against her by staff members etc). 
7.4.2 Study 2: Confabulation and Suggestibility 
The potential relation between AO's confabulations and suggestibility was 
also assessed (see Chapter 1). AO's responses to memory questions did not 'yield' 
to external suggestion, as measured by the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
(1997) (see Table 7-4). The scale (GSS2) comprises a narrative paragraph 
containing a story of an event and 20 questions that are asked about the story, 
following free recall. The 20 questions are then asked a second time, following 
negative feedback, and provide suggestibility scores (see Chapter 6 for tests 
details). AO's initial Yield 1 scores (giving in to suggestive questions prior to 
negative feedback) were abnormally high, partly explicable by her poor memory. 
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However, her low Shift score (number of times subjects change their answers 
following negative feedback) indicates that negative feedback and exposure to 
distracting information did not appear to influence AO's answers and indeed her 
Total Suggestibility score was within the normal range. 
Table 7-4. AO ' s performance on the Suggestibility Scale 
Suggestibility Scale AO Norms 
Immediate Recall 13 197 (6.1) 
Delayed Recall 9 18.4 (6) 
Yield 1 9 4.5 (3.6) 
Yield 2 11 5.5 (4) 
Shift 2 3.0 (3) 
Total Suggestibility 11 7.5 (5.3) 
Distortions (Immediate) 2 1.15(1.2) 
Distortions (Delayed) 2 1.26(1.8) 
Fabrication (Immediate) 0 0,4 (0.7) 
Fabrication (Delayed) 0 0.5 (0.7) 
7.4.3 Study 3: Pre- and Post-Morbid Personality 
AO's premorbid personality traits were assessed using the same 120-item 
questionnaire as the one used in the assessment of LH (see Chapter 6). The 
questions were read out to AO and she was asked to rate her premorbid 
personality. AO's only mildly compromised retrograde memoiy was considered 
sufficient to allow her to perform such task. However, AO's relatives were also 
asked to complete the questionnaire; once for AO's premorbid personality traits 
and once for her postmorbid ones. In this way, measures of both premorbid 
personality and personality change could be obtained. The total scores for each 
factor of all three ratings (self premorbid rating, independent-rater premorbid 
rating, independent-rater postmorbid rating) were compared with the standardised 
personality factor scores provided by .I.A. Johnson (1998). 
Results. AO's relatives judged her as premorhidly more extravert and less 
self-disciplined or capable of suppressing her impulses ('conscientiousness') than 
she did (see Figure 7-2). Both AO and her relatives scored her as low in 
'agreeableness', indicating that she did indeed "speak her mind" and did not 
prioritise being liked or accepted. Additionally, they both scored her personality 
as very high in 'Neuroticism', reflecting her tendency to often experience negative 
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feelings, showing "problems in emotional regulation" (Johnson, 1998), which also 
would "diminish [her] ability to think clearly, make decisions and cope effectively 
with stress" (Johnson, 1998). 
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Figure 7-2. Big Five Pre- and Post-morbid Personality Traits: Self- and 
Carer's Ratings 
The rating's of AO's postmorhid personality show that according to her 
relatives she was less extravert, and conscientious, i.e. she was moi'e impulsive, 
and even more overwhelmed by negative feelings than before her stroke. 
Interestingly, the facet of'imagination' remained very high and 'adventurousness' 
(tendency to experience new things) remained close to its premorbid average 
level, while the intellect facet was lower. Emotionality scores, i.e. having access 
to and awareness of one's feelings, had severely dropped (see Appendix Fl for 
detailed scores). 
These personality changes were consistent with AO"s postmorbid 
cognitive profile and coping strategies. Her intellectual abilities wei'e mildly 
deteriorated without that affecting her rich imagination or wish to be exposed to 
novel situations. However, her abilities and/or willingness to attend to or 
compromise with her social and physical condition had become virtually absent. 
Instead, she experienced intense depressive emotions and felt quite anxious at 
times (see HADS results-Table 7-1). Interestingly, her relatives reported how 
following her stroke AO also had abnormally negative emotional reactions to the 
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slightest frustration, including past unpleasant events, which at the time of 
occurrence had not really affected her, e.g. her abortion or the selling of her flat. 
When AO was questioned about such events she indeed acknowledged that in the 
past she tended to 'forget' her problems by working, but she now felt these losses 
were "terrible and unbearable". Nevertheless, she did not associate her 
overwhelming negative emotional reactions with her stroke; instead she attributed 
them to an array of fabricated causes and events by producing paranoid and 
hostile false beliefs (see below). 
7.4.4 Study 4: Self - Representations in True and False Memories 
Materials and Methods 
Two aspects of self-representation in AO's confabulatory narratives, 
namely its 'valence' and 'agency' (see below), were investigated using a method 
adjusted from studies on autobiographical memory and identity formation (for 
review see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). This test, based on a modified 
version of the McAdam's (1985) life story technique (in McAdams, 2001), is 
described in detailed in Chapter 6 (see also Appendix E3 for detailed 
questionnaire). AO and three controls (matched for sex, education and age) were 
asked to recall and reflect upon 12 personally significant and self-defining events 
as in the previous chapter. In order to compare the accurate accounts elicited by 
AO and control participants during the interview with confabulatory narratives, 
the first 12 spontaneous self-referential confabulations produced by AO in the 
same week were identified and corroborated by information given by relatives and 
nursing staff. Materials, procedures and the three main categories coded were 
identical to the ones used in LH's case report (se previous chapter). 
Coding 
A brief description of the coding system is given again below, but this 
time with examples from AO's memory protocols. The coded categories included: 
(1) Self-representation valence and agency, (2) 'Other'-representation valence and 
unity (3) Overall valence of inemory. Self-representation rating included any 
statements explicitly providing information about the 'self and its position in 
interpersonal relations (e.g. ' I am a cripple', 'they all hate me', ' I was always 
praised'by"hiiii' etc)riff this'sctirirfg^^ seilPrepresehtation could be ' 
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scored with regard to its emotional valence, i.e. negative (e.g. being inferior), 
positive (e.g. being superior), or neutral (neutral, ambivalent or hard to evaluate) 
and its agency, i.e. 'self as active/responsible (e.g. one who hurts others) or 
'other' as active/responsible and 'self as passive (e.g. one who is hurt by others). 
Given AO's delusional reduplications of people and places, two aspects of 
others' representation were coded separately. The relevant coding category 
focused on the relation between unity and valence of others' identity. This 
included statements which revealed the ability to perceive others' identities, 
including other people (e.g. her niece, nursing staff), other objects or places (e.g. 
her room, her town) or parts of her body potentially treated as separate agents 
(e.g. 'this hand won't move'), as emotionally complex, often ambivalent towards 
or for the self, but still integrated entities (e.g. accurate memory: " I t was terrible. 
My aunt was very strict; she took pleasure in punishing us all the time. But she 
saved me, you know, when 1 took i l l , 1 had this poisoning and 1 was very poorly"). 
In contrast, statements were correspondingly coded, which included 
reduplications of the same 'other', i.e. splitting of it into two or more distinctive 
entities in time and space, with the same [positive (+), or negative (-)], or opposite 
emotional significance (+/-) for the self (e.g. she believed she had been to this 
"this horrid place" before (the town), except it was in Scotland where she grew 
up, and "it was wonderful. It looked the same, and yet it wasn't"). The overall 
emotional valence of each accurate or confabulatory account was measured on a 
five-point scale: 1 = negative; 2 = emotional shift from positive to negative; 3 = 
neutral; 4 = emotional shift from negative to positive; 5 = positive. 
Statements to be coded were sequences of phrases or sentences that 
described a single thematic content e.g. the following sentences "...1 cannot stand 
it any longer, being in her command...she lives down the road, and they come 
whenever they want to. They come without asking my permission" was 
considered a theme expressing explicitly a negative dependent self-representation. 
Al l statements included in the twelve confabulation protocols were candidates for 
coding, as it was considered arbitrary to separate accurate statements from the 
'confabulated' context in which they were recalled e.g. in a protocol AO referred 
to how powerless she felt against her nephew who had bought several rooms in 
the nursing home, despite her objections (confabulation). In the same protocol she 
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also explained how dependent it made her feel leaving all her financial affairs to 
him (accurate). Both statements were considered. 
Resuhs 
The two independent raters agreed on 88% of the selected items to be 
coded and 96% of the specific classifications made. Their remaining differences 
were resolved by discussion. Controls and AO produced 12 accurate memories in 
the intei-view although the latter's accounts were not always coherent and 
included multiple events. AO did not confabulate during the interview. This was 
explicable by the fact that her answers were predominately drawn from her remote 
past for which AO had preserved recollection and rarely confabulated (see also 
the A M I results). 
Overall valence. The mean valence of controls' memories showed a mild 
positive bias, M= 4.1 SD = 1.4, while AO's accurate memories were equally 
distributed along the valence scale and their mean did not show any bias, M = 3.3 
M = 1.3. Although the mean valence of AO's confabulations, M = 2.2, SD = 1.2, 
did appear to fall approximately one standard deviation below that of the controls' 
mean it should also be noted that nine out of her 12 confabulations were rated as 
unpleasant, while only four, live and seven of the three controls' memories were 
rated as unpleasant. 
Self and Interpersonal Representations. Percentages of coded 
statements of self- and interpersonal representations in AO's and controls' 
accurate memories and AO's confabulations are shown in Table 7-5. Overall, AO 
included more self and interpersonal representations in her accurate memories (38 
representations) than controls (25 representation on average) but AO's abnormally 
talkative presentation could be at least partly responsible for this finding. AO 
portrayed herself as more negative and passive than controls in her accurate 
memories, e.g. "they tricked me badly, I ' l l never forget the disappointment, I was 
hopeless", or, "She made a lot of trouble and put me down a lot when he came 
back. She insulted me in everyway she could". Controls portrayed themselves 
overall in more active terms than AO, e.g. "It was difficult, but there again I 
managed it all myself you see and my whole family acknowledged it". Overall, 
although AO represented herself and her relation with others in mildly more 
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passive and negative terms than control participants, her self-representation in 
accurate memories did not show striking differences in comparison to the self-
representation of controls. 
Table 7-5. Percentages of Self-representations in True memories and 
Confabulations 
Agency Valence 
AO's True AO's Controls' 
Memories Confabulations True Memories 
%' %^ 
Self Positive 13.1 20.8 20 
Negative 15.8 9.4 13.3 
Neutral 10.5 11.3 22.8 
Other Positive 18.4 9.4 14.8 
Negative 34.2 43.4 16 
Neutral 7.9 5.7 13.3 
Percentage ofthe total number of self-representation statements in AO's true memories. 
^ Percentage of the total number of self-representation statements in AO's confabulations. 
^ Percentage ofthe total number of self-representation statements in controls' true memories. 
The self-image depicted in AO's spontaneous confabulations was 
markedly different froin her self-representation in accurate inemories. AO 
included 53 different indications of self and interpersonal representations in her 
confabulations. AO depicted herself in passive and negative terms even more 
frequently than in her accurate inemories. She often referred to herself as being 
treated with hostility by others, e.g. "this is how cruel they can be to ine. There 
was a rise of voice and I was so upset", as being alienated by others, "she doesn't 
care about ine anymore, she just left ine here" and as being deprived of her 
independence, e.g. "They are afraid I ' l l slip and fall down. It is upsetting, they are 
putting iTie o f f everything. They want to control everything". However, AO also 
expressed active seeking of autonomy and power in her confabulations, e.g. 
"Well, I told them, I won't have it, I can walk to the chair, I can manage it without 
them, it is iny chair, I have paid for it and 1 can walk to it whenever I want to". 
Interestingly, AO rarely expressed, in her confabulations, positive feelings, such 
as sympathy, concern, longing etc towards others. Most importantly, AO 
confabulations included several references to issues of health and disability. She 
described herself as ill or disabled mainly in passive terins, i.e. attributing 
responsibility to others, e.g. " I am getting infuriated about these girls that say they 
haven't got to help me. 1 have to tell the nurse to find out who told her I hadn't 
236 
Chapter 7: Motor-Related Confahulation 
walked. It wasn't the doctor's advice. I f they had given me some exercise I could 
walk", in contrast, in active terms, she referred to herself as able and healthy, e.g. 
" I don't report it but one night there was nobody, the staff had gone and I had to 
go on my own [to the toilet]. 1 managed. But I don't tell them". 
Representation of Other's Emotional Identity. Although in accurate 
memories AO appeared to perceive others as ambivalent emotionally (7 
descriptions) more often than controls (3 descriptions on average), this tendency 
diminished in her confabulations (3 descriptions). Instead, in her confabulations 
certain 'others' (people and places) were represented as split into two or more 
different identities (5 reduplications), usually with opposite emotional 
significance (4/5 instances). For example, AO referred to a hospital 
physiotherapist who had treated her following her stroke as two distinct therapists, 
one whom she associated with pleasant and encouraging experiences and a 
separate one whom she described in very negative terms ("she was awful, she 
finished me") and as responsible for the termination of her physiotherapy. She 
could not understand how "two therapists so much alike could have such different 
opinions" and she believed that perhaps the 'disliked' one might not be properly 
qualified, "there must be something set I am telling you". On a different occasion, 
AO insisted she was not in her room, she was made to believe she was in it by 
way of "making them look the same, furnishing them the same" and placing her 
personal belongings there but she "just knew" it was not her room. She believed 
she was in another room she owned because her nephew had bought two or three 
of these rooms in the nursing home where she was living. She didn't like these 
"other rooms" and she hated "being moved at night". In reality, none of these 
events had taken place. It is important to note that the above delusions, apart from 
the reduplicative par-amnesia about her room, were false 'beliefs' or false 
'memor-ies' (delusional reduplications without misidentification, Weinstein et al., 
1956). AO never eri-ed about (mis-recognised) the identity of someone in his or 
her presence. 
In summar-y, AO's confabulations portrayed a self-image vastly differ-ent 
than that of her accurate memories. While in accurate autobiographical memories 
AO described hei^self in slight unpleasant and passive terms (more so than 
controls), this was greatly exaggerated in confabulations. In the latter, AO 
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described herself as mainly disliked, intruded, plotted against, made i l l , excluded, 
and deprived of information. She rarely expressed activity or responsibility about 
her postmorbid disabilities. Instead, in active terms she depicted herself as 
healthy, autonomous and competent and she expressed little interest for others in 
her confabulations. The latter also included reduplications of people and places, 
showing an inability to represent others beyond the potential emotional 
ambivalence she felt towards them. Finally, the overall valence of AO's 
confabulations was strongly negative, unlike her true memories and those of 
control participants. 
7.4.5 Study 5: Recollective Experience 
The retrieval of autobiographical memories is characterised by a self-
reflective mental state of time travel or reliving of the past (Tulving, 1985). The 
qualitative characteristics of this recollective experience have been the focus of 
much recent research on autobiographical memory recollection and memory 
distortion (see Gardiner & Richardson-Clave, 2000; Johnson et al., 1993; Rajaram 
& Roediger, 1997 for reviews). By contrast, the study of recollective experience 
in confabulation has received less attention (e.g. see Dalla Barba, I993a,b; et al., 
1997b). 
Materials and Methods 
Recollective experience was investigated by a self-report questionnaire 
consisting of 26 memory statements (see Appendix F2). These consisted of the 
first 13 true incidents that had taken place during the previous month and that AO 
had spontaneously mentioned during previous sessions, as well as the first 13 
events confabulated by AO during these sessions. The statements were read out to 
her in random order and she was asked to judge whether the corresponding events 
were true or not. Each statement that AO recognised as a true memory was 
accompanied by a fixed set of recollective experience questions. These concerned 
confidence in accuracy, event typicality, frequency of rehearsal, importance of 
consequences, emotional intensity, emotional valence, presence of images, image 
clarity, presence of movement in images and image recall effort. The questions 
and their corresponding response options (reported on 5-point scales) were based 
on Heaps and Nash's (2001) study, which elicited false childhood memories in 
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normal adults (undergraduate students) using a variation of the interview method 
originally reported by Loftus and Pickrell (1995). Controls' scores from Heaps 
and Nash (2001) study were used as a comparison basis for AO's recollective 
experience ratings. 
Results 
AO's scores are summarised in the Table 7-6. AO recognised correctly all 
true events and misrecognised as true 11 of her own confabulations. AO claimed 
she remembered less information about her confabulations than she did about her 
true memories and she rated her confabulations as less typical than her true 
memories. However, on average she experienced her confabulations with greater 
emotional intensity than her accurate memories. Given the multiple dependent 
variables, multivariate statistical tests were used in order to evaluate the 
significance of these differences. The sample of the analysis consisted of the 
individual true and false memories that AO accepted as true and thus rated their 
recollective experience. Similarly to Heaps & Nash (2001) the present study 
found that in AO's memories amount remembered and confidence in accuracy 
ratings were highly correlated for both true and false memories (/• = .6,p< 0.005). 
In addition this study found that amount was significantly correlated with ratings 
of clarity of visual images (r =.6, p < .01). To avoid multicollinearity, amount 
remembered ratings were not included in subsequent analysis. Responses to 
imagery related questions, which included dichotomous measures, were analysed 
separately (see below). 
Table 7-6. AO's Ratings of Recollective Experience. 
Recollective Experience Categories' AO 
Tme Events Confabulations 
M SD M SD 
Amount Remembered 3.00 1.09 1.72 0,90 
Confidence 3,54 0.93 3.18 1.16 
Rehearsal Frequency 1.18 0.75 1.27 0.90 
Typicality 1.18 1.66 0,36 0.67 
Importance of Consequences 2.18 1.77 2.18 1.47 
Emotional Intensity 2.27 1.19 3,00 1,34 
Emotional Valence 2.63 1.62 1.63 1,62 
Image Clarity 3.33 1.00 3,00 1,41 
Recall Effort 0.11 0.33 1,37 1,5 
Rated 0-4, with tiigher numliers indicating greater amoiint,s (see Heaps & Nash, 2001) 
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A multivariate analysis of variance ( M A N O V A ) was performed with 
confidence in accuracy, event typicality, iinportance of consequences, einotional 
intensity, valence, image clarity and recall effort as dependent variables and true 
or confabulatory memory status as an independent variable. Results of evaluation 
of multivariate normality and homogeneity of covariance inatrices assuinptions 
were satisfactory. The MANOVA revealed no significant difference in the 
dependent variables between AO's true and false memories, F(7,9) = \ .2,p = .36. 
A inultivariate analysis of covariance MANCOVA was also performed 
with the same variables but using rehearsal frequency as covariate. Results of 
assumptions were again satisfactory. The MANCOVA found no significant 
differences between true memories and confabulations on the different aspects of 
recollective experience, F(7,8) = \,\, p = .43. Thus, it appeared that even when 
the effects of rehearsal frequency were accounted for, AO's true meinories and 
confabulations did not reliably differ on inajor aspects of recollective experience. 
Heaps & Nash's (2001) have also observed no difference between the recollective 
experience ratings of true and false memories in neurological ly healthy adults, but 
only when the effects of rehearsal frequency were statistically controlled. 
AO reported imagery in 72% of her confabulations and 82% of her true 
memories. AO's imagery included moveinent in 37%) of her confabulations and in 
67%) of her true memories. Finally, AO rated all of her true memories as 
associated with a field perspective (i.e. had a view approximating to the actual 
experience), while she associated 40% of her confabulations with an observer's 
perspective (i.e. saw herself in the memory). Independent Mann-Whitney tests 
were perforined between true memories and confabulations for imagery presence 
(yes or no), imagery inovement (static or dynamic) and iinage perspective 
(field/observer). The critical alpha level was .016 (Bonferroni correction). There 
was no difference in image presence, Z-.S,p = .6; image inovement, Z = \ .2, p 
= .2; or image perspective, Z = 1.9, /? = .05, between true inemories and 
confabulations. Although the last difference was not found to be significant in the 
small sample of memories assessed here, healthy adults (Heaps & Nash, 2001) 
showed a similar tendency of associating false meinories with an observer's 
perspective. 
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In conclusion, it appears that although AO showed some tendencies to 
experience her confabulations differently from her true memories, these 
differences were not statistically significant, as assessed in the present study. The 
possibility that AO experienced her confabulations as true memories is addressed 
in the discussion section below. 
7.4.6 Summary of Findings 
In summary, AO's neuropsychological profile was indicative of severe and 
chronic cognitive disruption consistent with RH damage diagnosis, although only 
a small internal capsule lesion was detectable by neuroimaging investigations. 
More specifically, while her general intellectual (verbal), semantic and language 
abilities were unaffected AO showed substantial problems in specific cognitive 
domains such as visuospatial perception (neglect), attention, construction, 
executive functions, and pragmatics of speech. She also showed mild anterograde 
memory impairment and her A M appeai'ed contaminated by confabulation and 
delusions, particularly for events of her recent pre- and post-morbid life. In 
addition, she showed r^ educed awareness of her deficits, fluctuations in 
orientation, mood and insight, prevalence of negative emotions, paranoid thoughts 
and exaggerated premorbid personality traits. Finally, her confabulations were not 
susceptible to external suggestion. Instead, they were typically of a delusional 
quality, persistently and with great conviction portraying a victimised self-
representation. AO experienced these false memories similarly to her accurate 
recollections. 
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Confabulation and AO's Neuropathology 
AO's detectable br-ain damage included only a small right internal capsule 
lesion and some degree of generalised atrophy. Her neuropsychological profile 
was indicative of fronto-parietal right-hemisphere damage, although given AO's 
age, the contribution of age-related changes could not be excluded. Crucially, a 
similar lesion has been observed by Schnider and colleagues (1996) in another 
sever^ely confabulating patient. Unfortunately, these author's did not describe the 
precise content and emotional quality of their patient's confabulations. However, 
according to their view, spontaneous confabulation (in this context 'spontaneous' 
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meaning 'acted-iipon' confabulation) can occur even following such a discrete 
lesion given its participation to a more general functional system, linking limbic 
and medial temporal lobe regions (i.e. regions traditionally implicated in memory, 
such as the amygdala) with the orbitofrontai cortex. 
7.5.2 The Cognitive Deficits Underpinning AO's Confabulations 
AO's cognitive profile was similar to the profile shown by the rest of the 
patients in the C3 confabulation subgroup of the study (unilateral patients DO and 
JO; see Chapter 2). AO was not clinically amnesic. However, she did show visual 
memory impairment and some difficulty in recalling recent autobiographical 
memory events. Moreover, AO showed indications of executive functions 
impairments, including mainly inhibition, set-shifting, planning and problem-
solving deficits. A somewhat surprising finding was AO's relatively good 
performance on the Cognitive Estimates Test, a demanding test of reasoning, 
despite her impaired performance on similar test of temporal estimation (BADS). 
This finding suggested that AO may have a specific temporal appreciation deficit 
(e.g. see Dalla Barba, 1997b). AO also performed on an average level on a letter 
fluency test, while she was impaired in the semantic version of this test. This 
dissociation was observed in many confabulating patients of the study (see 
Chapter 2), including LH (see previous Chapter) and suggests that these patients 
show a particular difficulty in retrieving information from a given semantic 
category. Moreover, given that both AO and LH did not show a general 
impairment in semantic knowledge, their impaired performance on this test was 
more likely linked with a deficit of flexibility and goal-direct retrieval of 
semantically related information, rather than semantic categorisation. Crucially, 
this selective deficit has being linked with lesions to the OMPFC (e.g. Stuss et al., 
2002) and thus suggests that although AO's cortical lesions were not visible on 
CT investigations, she did show the cognitive deficits associated with right 
OMPFC lesions, or functional disconnection of these areas from their subcortical 
limbic connections (Schnider et al., 1996). 
7.5.3 Emotional Changes & Postmorbid Personality 
AO showed mood abnormalities and somewhat problematic social 
conduct. These difficulties have been described before in the confabulation 
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literature and have more generally been linked with lesions of the OMPFC (Berlin 
et al., 2004; Damasio et al., 1985; Joseph, 1999; Rolls, 1999; Stuss, 1991). In the 
present study, it was also observed in the bilateral confabulation patients. 
However, AO's mood and the quality of her behaviour towards others were 
different than that of the CI and C2 groups (see Chapter 2 and 6). More 
specifically, she did not show apathy, or euphoria, instead, she was mostly 
anxious and sad, she demanded immediate satisfaction of her needs and the 
slightest delay or mistake from the part of the staff triggered in AO great 
irritability, anger, despair, paranoid thoughts and confabulations. More generally, 
she appeared as particularly vulnerable to negative experiences or news and she 
was likely to experience panic, confusion, and helplessness when under such 
pressure. 
7.5.4 Confabulation Domains & Quality 
Another difference from the bilateral patients was that AO's 
confabulations were most often related with her physical disabilities (hence the 
term motor-related confabulation). However, her confabulations frequently also 
extended to the episodic memory domain and less often to other domains such as 
orientation, personal semantic and 'don't know' questions. Moreover, AO 
confabulated less often than bilateral patients and, her confabulations were more 
organised and their themes were more restricted and more persistent (e.g. compare 
with previous case-report). In other terms her confabulations were more 
delusional in character (see Chapter 1). This observation was consistent with the 
qualitative classification of confabulation in bilateral and unilateral confabulating 
patients (see Chapter 2). However, as discussed before (see Chapter 1) the 
distinction between confabulation and delusion is a wider conceptual and 
interdisciplinary issue, which escapes the scope of the present study. 
7.5.5 Confabulation. Premorbid Personality & Suggestibility 
AO's premorbid personality traits included a number of characteristics 
previously associated with confabulation (Berlyne, 1972; Gainotti, 1975; 
Weinstein, 1996; Williams & Rupp, 1932; see also Chapter 1). In particular, her 
relatives described AO as a very sociable and outgoing person, an extravert. This 
characteristic has been linked with confabulation in the past (see Williams & 
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Rupp, 1932; see also Chapter 1). AO was also overwhelmed by anxiety and other 
negative emotions in difficult situations. Her relatives and also AO herself also 
noted how she tended to used work and social interaction as a distraction from her 
worries. In AO's own words, "you don't deal with sorrow, you just get on with it 
and you keep busy". Given these premorbid traits and coping strategies, AO's 
anosognosia and its related confabulation could be interpreted as an exaggerated 
form of conscious or unconscious denial of deficit, a psychological coping 
mechanism (Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). Furthermore, one could postulate that a 
patient with a less sensitive self-esteem and different coping strategies might have 
not developed confabulation and anognosia (e.g. Gainotti, 1975; Weinstein & 
Kahn, 1955). Crucially, LH showed similar premorbid personality characteristics 
including high ratings of extraversion and neurotism. However, although these 
factors may have a role in the formation of the content of confabulations (see 
Chapter 6 and below), it is not likely that premorbid personaMty is causative of 
confabulation. More specifically, it is highly unlikely that a specific neurological 
syndrome is entirely caused by personality factors, essentially unrelated to brain 
and cognitive dysfunction (see also Chapters I and 6). However, aside from the 
above theoretical postulations, a large group study with appropriate controls is 
required in order to empirically verify whether personality factors can distinguish 
confabulating from other non-confabulating patients with similar deficits. 
In addition, AO's memory was not susceptible to suggestion. Even when 
presented with misleading information and given negative feedback AO did not 
yield her original answers. This finding suggests that AO's personality was not 
compliant, as also shown by her Big Five ratings. LH's suggestibility scores were 
higher. This finding may also have a role in the difference of confabulation 
quality between the two patients. AO's confabulations were specific, well-
organised, persistent and resistant to correction. LH's confabulations showed 
some predominat themes but their content was mostly ephemeral, disorganised, 
not specific and easily directed by questioning. Thus, although suggestibility was 
not sufficient to explain the production of confabulations in either patient, in LH it 
might have contributed to the formation of secondary confabulations and thus it 
might have contributed to the disorganised quality and wide thematic range of 
LH's confabulations (see also Chapter 6). Finally, it should be noted that the 
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above qualitative characteristics of confabulation were similar in most of the 
patients of the corresponding CI and C3 confabulation subgroups (see Chapter 2). 
7.5.6 Memory Awareness in Confabulation 
Since the pioneering work of Tulving (1985), the relation between 
episodic memory and its subjective experience has generated significant interest 
among memory researchers. Tulving proposed that episodic memory is 
distinguished from semantic memory on the basis of a distinct type of awareness, 
namely 'autonoetic consciousness'. This is a self-reflective mental state of time 
travel or reliving of the past, which is contrasted with 'noetic consciousness', the 
awareness accompanying semantic knowledge (see also Conway, 2001) and 
'anoetic consciousness', which is linked to implicit memory (Wheeler et al., 
1997). In neuropsychology, although few studies have directly investigated 
recollective experience in confabulation (e.g. Dalla Barba et al., 1993a; 1997b), 
the issue is central to the theoretical conceptualisation of the symptom, as a 
prototype form of autobiographical false remembering. Johnson and colleagues 
(1997) found that in their confabulating patient the qualitative characteristics of a 
fabricated and an accurate memory were similar. Unfortunately, they did not ask 
him to rate his memories. By contrast, Dalla Barba and colleagues (1993a; 1997) 
directly studied recollective experience in confabulating patients by using the 
'remember/know' paradigm. 'Remember' judgements are made i f patients revive 
the experience (autonoetic consioussness), whereas 'know' responses indicate that 
they simply recognise the event as true or familiar without subjective experience 
of remembering. Both correct and confabulatory autobiographical events were 
accompanied by 'remember'judgements. 
In the present chapter the qualitative characteristics of recollective 
experience were investigated and were consistent with the above results. AO's 
recollective experience of her false memories did not differ significantly in quality 
from the corresponding recollective experience accompanying her true memories 
(Study 4). In William James's (1890) terms AO experienced her false memories 
with the warmth, intimacy and immediacy o f accurate personal memories. 
Although this finding calls for further investigation, it raises the possibility that 
the false beliefs and memories surrounding AO's anosognosia were not mere 
rationalisations of false perceptions or the filling-in of memory gaps (for review 
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see Whitlock, 1981). This conclusion is also consistent with the previous 
investigation that showed that AO did not accept as true any suggested 
information, even when she was given negative feedback about the accuracy of 
her memory (suggestibility study). 
Of course, the breakdown of the ability to appreciate that non-real events, 
e.g. imagined events, dreams, thoughts, are not true memories is axiomatic to 
confabulation (see previous discussion; also Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Hirstein, 
2004). However, the present findings suggest that confabulations are confused 
with real memories at the level of autobiographical or episodic memory 
awareness. Patients actually experience their false memories as real. This 
observation has important implications for the nature of the relation between 
human memory and awareness, as well as for the relation of confabulation to 
delusion and other classes of false beliefs about one's self However, these issues 
escape the direct scope of this chapter, particularly since few fundamental aspects 
of such concepts are generally accepted and more confabulating patients need to 
be assessed (for discussions see Dalla Barba, 2000; .lohnson et al., 1997; 
Kopelman, 1999; Moscovitch, 1999). For the purposes of this thesis, the 
implications of this finding will be addressed in direct relation to the results of the 
other investigations (see Chapter 8). 
7.5.7 Self-Representations and Awareness in Confabulation 
The present findings demonstrated that the content of AO's 
confabulations included two extreme types, both mostly relating to her physical 
and social postmorbid state. Namely, 'wishful ' and 'paranoid' confabulations. 
Wishful Confabulations 
In wishful confabulations AO portrayed a positive image of herself based 
on premorbid self-values (see also Chapter 6; Fotopoulou et al., 2004). These 
were selective instances of poor autobiographical memory retrieval and reality 
monitoring, e.g. not remembering, or not appreciating the consequences of one's 
illness, despite repeated explanations by one's physician. AO's assessment 
revealed a number of such 'awareness clefts' which mostly concerned issues of 
bodily integrity and independence in everyday living and thus were mainly related 
to her anosognosia for hemiplegia. Thus, it appeared that her self-representation in 
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such confabulations and anosognosic statements, was not updated according to 
current reality criteria. Instead, it appeared largely constrained by premorbid 
goals, expectations and current needs and drives (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000; see also Fotopoulou et al, 2004). This explanafion of motivated 
confabulation has been previously put forward in relation to amnesic patients with 
bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; 
Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Solms, 2000; see also Chapter 6) and it wil l be further 
addressed in the following chapter (Chapter 8). 
Negative Emotions and Paranoid Confabulations 
AO's wishful false memories and beliefs, as described above, were less 
prominent than the observed paranoid confabulations and reduplications. In the 
latter, she portrayed an image of herself which was deceived, defeated and 
deprived of its knowledge, abilities and independence. She further accompanied 
these representations with the expression of the corresponding negative emotions. 
In this sense, what AO confabulated, though it was not in accordance with the 
facts, // was emotionally on target (see also Kinbourne, 2000). Indeed, AO 
experienced intense negative emotions (sadness, anxiety and anger), which she 
both explicitly acknowledged (e.g. HADS; Big Five Questionnaires results) and 
implicitly revealed through the constructions of markedly unpleasant 
confabulations and delusions. Crucially, although AO was able to process the 
negative emotions corresponding to her postmorbid condition, she could not 
cognitively evaluate and explicitly express her postmorbid condition itself, nor 
integrate the relevant memories into her current self-representation. As described 
above, the latter remained instead largely attached to premorbid values, 
expectations and goals. These observations reveal a decoupling of reality-based 
emotions from their corresponding cognitive representations. In AO's case, and 
perhaps in other similar cases, this uncoupling led to the formulation of extreme 
paranoid confabulations. 
More specifically, although AO showed some implicit awareness of her 
deficits and expressed the corresponding negative emotions (e.g. she justified her 
intense disappointment with care staff by claiming that i f they had provided her 
the necessary exercise she could walk, thus implying that she could not walk as 
the situation was), she appeared to misinterpret their significance and misattribute 
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them to external sources. Thus, she externalised such negative thoughts and 
emotions from her own self-image (see also Marcel et al., 2004). For example, her 
own deficits were attributed to the actions and mistakes of other people, her 
unwanted nursing home room was 'not her room, but some other identical room 
that others force her to move into', and the town in which she moved following 
her stroke was not in fact town x, but the town in which she happily grew up, 
which in her disappointment the local government had renamed as x. Although 
further research is required to establish in which type of patients such implicit 
awareness o f deficits occur, these differences between explicit unawareness and 
implicit emotional processing may throw additional light on the theoretical 
debates about the complicated role of the right-hemisphere in emotional 
processing and anosognosia (for discussions see Gainotti, 2000; Heilman et al., 
2000; Tucker et al., 2000; Turnbull et al., 2004b). Crucially, for the further study 
such fragmented awareness of one's postmorbid self may contribute to the 
formation of confabulations. This mechanism of confabulation construction will 
be further addressed in the following chapter. 
Neuropsychialric Symptoms and the Right-hemisphere 
AO's symptoms included a number of delusional reduplications. This 
observation is also consistent with increasing evidence that indicates that 
delusional misidentiflcation disorders, when they occur in relation to neurological 
conditions are more commonly associated with predominance of RH damage, 
even in the context of bilateral and particularly bifrontal lesions (e.g. Benson et 
al., 1976; Feinberg & Shapiro, 1989; Feinberg & Roane, 1997b; ForstI et al., 
1991a; 1-iakim et al., 1988); or even in generalised brain disorders like 
Alzheimer's disease (e.g. ForstI et al., 1991b; Mentis et al., 1995). For example. 
Staff and colleagues (1999) showed that in Alzheimer's disease the presence of 
content specific delusions, including misidentifications, was associated with areas 
of hypoperfusion in the right anterior hemisphere (see also Levine & Grek, 1984). 
Furthermore, such delusions can-occur with confabulation (Baddeley & Wilson, 
1986; Box et al., 1999; Dab et al., 1999; Mattioli et al., 1999; Stuss et al., 1978) 
and anosognosia for hemiplegia (e.g. Levine & Grek, 1984). 
Despite this increasing consensus about the role of RH dysfunction in 
redublicative delusions, its exact neuropsychological basis remains unexplained. 
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A number of different cognitive theories have been proposed (e.g. Alexander et 
al., 1979; Ellis & de Pauw, 1997; Feinberg & Shapiro, 1989; Frith et al., 2000; 
Joseph, 1986a; Levine & Grek, 1984; Young, 2000). For example, delusional 
misidentifications are interpreted as the consequence of a rational judgment 
superimposed on a false emotional perception, i.e. lack of familiarity (for reviews 
Ellis & de Pauw, 1997; Young, 2000). However, these approaches are not 
sufficient to explain the positive (in Jackson's sense, 1932) aspects of the 
delusions (see also Feinberg & Roane, 1997b; Fleminger, 1997), such as the 
observed selectivity of misattributions or misidentifications (e.g. why AO 
misidentified her room but not her furniture, or why AO had familiarity with the 
room she claimed "was not hers"; she knew she had been before in that room, 
although she insisted ''this was not her room"). Crucially, such theories cannot 
explain why AO constructed and accepted bizarre beliefs (note, for example, that 
AO's cognitive estimation and reasoning abilities were not impaired). Through 
the latter she did not simply negate the ownership of the misidentified objects or 
people (misidentification); instead, she narrated memories involving the presence 
of doubles (reduplication). Finally, in a way reminiscent of how misoplegic 
patients are endlessly preoccupied with their hated paralysed arm (see also 
Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000), she appeared emotionally engaged and 
preoccupied with the presence, description and confabulatory identity of these 
'disturbing' duplicates (e.g. " I hate this room, 1 do not want it, they made me 
come here"; see also Fleminger, 1997). This predominance of negative emotions 
and their misattribution to external, this time non-existent sources, suggests a link 
between AO's paranoid confabulations and these reduplications. 
The present investigations revealed that AO's delusional reduplications 
typically involved two split identities that had the opposite emotional valence and 
significance for her. Although further research in these symptoms is required, this 
finding warrants some speculation. Redublicative delusions may reflect a more 
severe instance of emotional and cognitive fragmentation of one's self-
representation and self-other differentiation than paranoid confabulations, in these 
delusions negative self-related emotions are externalised from the impaired self-
representation as in paranoid confabulations, but in this case it is not just the 
'agency' of internally generated (i.e. though memoi^) emotions that is 
misattributed to others (e.g. these 'experienced' yet disturbing emotions are 
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caused by them, they hate me). It is also the 'ownership' of externally-triggered 
(i.e. through perception) negative emotions that is misattributed to other sources 
(e.g. this perceived yet disturbing entity is not my room), in the same speculative 
sense, AO's isolated incidents of Cotard's delusion may represent instances of 
exaggerated cognitive incomprehensibility and depersonalisation of experienced 
negative emotions (this experienced yet disturbing 'self is not me). 
In summary, AO's confabulations and delusions exemplify how a specific 
organic dysfunction (anterior RH damage) can lead to impairments in specific 
cognitive abilities (reality congruent self-representation), which in turn is 
aetiologically related to a series of dynamic changes in the relation between 
cognition and emotion (e.g. external isation of self-related negative emotions from 
self-representation). In this sense, the false memories and beliefs described above 
are not caused by psychogenic compensatory (defence) mechanisms. Instead, they 
are neurological equivalents of such mechanisms, tied to specific neural and 
cognitive dysfunction. Furthermore, it is precisely because they are caused by 
specific neurological damage that their investigation can be informative with 
respect to their neural correlates. Of course, the above explanations are 
incomplete. For example, the exact neural, cognitive (e.g. spatial, motor, 
mnemonic) and emotional components of the mental ability for high-order self-
representation and self-other differentiation are not fully understood. Yet, the 
cross-disciplinary perspective that this study introduced may serve to point 
research attention towards the counterintuitive fragmentation of the emotional and 
cognitive components of self-representation, which can then be targeted by 
specific neuroimaging or other investigations. The implications of these findings 
wil l be further discussed in the following chapter (Chapter 8). 
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Chapter 8 : Discussion 
"Originally the mere existence of a presentation was a guarantee of the reality of what was 
presented" 
S. Freud, Negation, 1925 
"Were it not for the inten'ention of the ego, or of those external forces which the ego 
represents, every instinct would know only one fate- that of gratification " 
Anna Freud, 1946 
The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence 
8.1 Confabulation: Deficit or Motivation? 
The main objective of the thesis was to address the following question: "Is 
neurological confabulation motivated"? (see Chapter I ) . In the first experimental 
chapter of the thesis (Chapter 3), it was demonstrated that spontaneous 
confabulations rewrite the past, present or future of the patient in a pleasant and 
self-enhancing way. In other words, the content of confabulation is not randomly 
generated. Instead, confabulating patients show a positive emotional bias in their 
false recollections. This bias has been experimentally demonstrated before in a 
case-report (Fotopoulou et al., 2004) and in a retrospective study of selective 
cases in the literature (Turnbull et al., 2004a). The current thesis represents the 
first experimental group study on confabulation that focuses on this bias. The 
findings presented, provide evidence for the hypothesis that the content of 
confabulation is motivated. 
In classical studies, this hypothesis was described in purely psychological 
terms (e.g. Weinstein & Kahn, 1955; for a review see Chapter 1). In subsequent 
neurocognitive models, the potential role of motivation in confabulation was de-
emphasised (see Deluca, 2000 for a review). By contrast, these theories explained 
confabulation in relation to several cognitive deficits, including amnesia, 
dysexecutive syndrome, impaired temporality and impaired strategic retrieval (see 
Chapter I ) . However, more recent models of confabulation re-introduced the 
motivational hypothesis in neuropsychological terms. More specifically, they 
addressed the potential motivational influences in parallel with the cognitive 
deficits accompanying confabulation (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 
2004; Solms, 2000; Turnbull et al., 2004a). In other terms, they provided a 
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theoretical framework that explained how brain dysfunction can cause alterations 
in the dynamic relation between the emotional and cognitive processes that 
normally serve memory. The following example from the current thesis is used to 
clarify this point. 
Patient W M often confabulated about his parents' whereabouts and could 
not accept they were no longer alive. W M frequently visited his mother's former 
house in a vain 'search of time lost'. There, he was repeatedly told by the new 
house owners that his parents had died several years before and the house had new 
occupants (see also Chapter 1). This behaviour could be explained with reference 
to several cognitive deficits: (i) an inability to recall the corresponding accurate 
experiences, e.g. his sister's repeated reminders of their mother's death, (ii) an 
inability to remember that a change has occurred in his habitual circumstances 
(e.g. he no longer lived with his parents; see also Burgess & McNeil, 1999). ( i i i ) 
an impaired ability to guide memory through the appropriate environmental cues 
(e.g. the physical changes in his parents' house) (Kopelman et al., 1997); (iv) an 
inability to access and retrieve the corresponding memories (e.g. his mother's 
funeral) and (v) an inability to control and reason about his memory output, e.g. 
his age, which he occasionally recalled accurately, which suggested his parents 
would have been of greater age than he claimed (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; 
Moscovitch, 1989; Schacter et al., 1998). (vi) a potential inability to subjectively 
distinguish between life-time periods (Dalla Barba, 2000). Thus, he could have 
mistakenly attributed to his current experiences (e.g. "1 went shopping with my 
mother yesterday"), events that in fact took place in different periods (e.g. they 
did go shopping together while she was alive) (see also Schnider, 2003). 
Indeed, the present thesis confirmed the contributing role of memory 
deficits (Chapters 2, 5 and 6), executive functions deficits (chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and 
7) and impaired temporality (Chapter 3) in confabulation. Hence, the results of the 
neuropsychological and experimental investigations were consistent with the 
impairments identified in most 'deficit theories' (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, 
none of these impairments, or their combination, was sufficient to account for the 
positive bias observed in confabulatory content. For example, these deficits 
theories cannot explain why most of WM's false recollections were pleasant. At 
the same time as his parents' death, W M went on trip with a close friend. He met 
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his former girlfriend. His sister moved to a bigger house. Yet, W M was not 
confused about these pleasant events, and he did not confabulate unpleasant 
versions o f them. He was at times unable to recall them, but he never failed to 
recognise them. By contrast, he could not recognise, nor accept the death of his 
parents and all the associated events that followed their death. Instead, he insisted 
that "they must be alive". This positive emotional bias requires a theoretical 
framework capable of incorporating the relation between emotions and memory. 
Moreover, the rest of the present experimental investigations studied the relation 
of this bias to some of the cognitive dysfunctions observed in confabulation 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Therefore, these studies can provide additional 
specification to the proposed theoretical framework of motivated confabulation. 
8.2 Confabulation: D e f i c i t M o t i v a t i o n 
The starting point of the thesis's theoretical framework is that 
autobiographical memory has the fundamental function of generating and 
maintaining a meaningful and motivated representation of one's self in the world. 
This includes information about one's self-goals and the ways to achieve them in 
interaction with the environment (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; see also 
Chapter 1). The representations, stored in memory, allow the individual to operate 
in evolutionarily adaptive ways on reality. These functions are clearly affected in 
confabulating patients (for discussions, see Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Conway & 
Tacchi, 1996; Solms, 2000). Nevertheless, the latter persistently strive, through 
the generation of false autobiographical memories, to construct their self-
representation and use it to interact with their environment (Conway & Fthenaki, 
2000; Fotopoulou et al., 2004). Thus, according to this view, the production of 
confabulations is the direct result of brain damage and cognitive dysfunction. In 
this respect, confabulafion is not intentional (for discussion, see Chapter 1). 
Nevertheless, confabulatoiy content is both motivated and meaningful from the 
subjective perspective of each patient. This framework, described in detail below, 
wil l be used to discuss the findings of the thesis. However, before proceeding to 
the theoretical discussion of the cognitive and emotional nature of confabulation, 
it is necessary to address its neuroanatomical basis. 
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8.3 The Neuroanatotnical Basis of Confabulation 
in previous studies, severe confabulation has most often been associated 
with frontal lobe lesions and particularly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Less 
clear is the contribution of other surrounding areas, such as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, the basal forebrain, the anterior cingulate, and other 'anterior 
limbic' areas (Deluca, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Kroll et al., 1997; Moscovitch 
& Melo, 1997; Schnider, 2003; see also Chapter 1). in the present thesis, 
confabulating patients showed neuropathologies frequently associated with 
confabulation (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7). They had bilateral lesions at the orbital 
and medial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC, see Chapter 2), or other 'paralimbic areas' 
(Mesulam, 2000) and possibly limbic areas, such as the basal forebrain. However, 
unilateral discrete subcortical lesions and more generalised brain damage were 
also observed. Thus, lesion localisation was not precise enough to provide definite 
conclusions about the neuroanatomical basis of confabulation. However, the 
neuropsychological profile of these patients provided additional insight into their 
neuropathology. 
The cognitive deficits of the bilateral patients were indicative of damage to 
OMPFC, without excluding the possibility of lesions to adjacent basal forebrain 
areas. More specifically, their clinical presentation included a number of 
symptoms typically resulting following OMPFC lesions. These mainly included a 
selective semantic fluency deficit, disinhibition, social inappropriateness, and lack 
of insight (see Chapter 2). Moreover, confabulating patients showed a variable 
impairment in standardised 'frontal' tests, which are developed to mainly assess 
the functional role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (for recent discussions see, 
Knight & Stuss, 2002; Mesulam, 2000; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002; Stuss et al., 
2002). In addition, the bilateral confabulating patients showed severe memoiy 
impairment and disorientation. These deficits were comparable in degree, but not 
in quality, to those of a small group of amnesic control patients with diencephalic 
and temporal lobe lesions (see Chapter 2). The memory deficits could relate to 
lesions in the OMPFC, as well as to basal forebrain lesions, albeit non-detectable 
in the present study. The latter are known to have effects on episodic memory, in 
light of their dense cholinergic projections to the cerebral cortex (Amstein & 
Robbins, 2002; Mesulam, 2000). 
-254 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
Based on the above, confabulation in bilateral confabulating patients is 
potentially associated with lesions to OMPFC, as well as to basal forebrain areas. 
However, the neuropathological and neuropsychological evidence of the present 
thesis was not sufficient to identify the potentially dissociable role of these areas 
in confabulation. The possibility remains that given the dense interconnections 
between these 'anterior limbic system' structures (e.g. see Mesulam, 2000), 
lesions to any of these formations could cause confabulation. This view is 
consistent with Schnider's proposal about the role of a functional disconnection 
between core limbic structures, e.g., amygdala, and the orbitofrontai cortex 
(Schnider, 2003). Moreover, this view is supported by the current finding that 
discrete unilateral and subcortical lesions lead to severe confabulation (see 
Chapter 2). Given these findings, further study into the distinct role of these areas 
in the nature of confabulation could be undertaken in the future. For the purposes 
of the present thesis, recent data about the functional role of the OMPFC, as well 
as the basal forebrain, are considered below and will be subsequently discussed in 
relation to confabulation. 
8.3.1 The Functional Role of the Orbital and Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
Following the classic neurological case of Phineas Case, damage to the 
OMPFC in humans has been repeatedly linked with deficits in affective 
regulation, including emotional impulsivity, lack of initiative, lack of concern for 
one's condition, aberrant risk-taking and socially inappropriate behaviour (e.g. 
Berlin et al., 2004; Damasio, 1999; Joseph, 1999; Knight & Stuss, 2002; Malloy, 
Bihrle, Duffy & Cimino, 1993; Mesulam, 2002). Interesfingly, these patients 
typically show this social and emotional disturbance in the context of relatively 
intact intellectual and executive abilities (Bechara et al., 2000; Mesulam, 2002). 
The role of the OMPFC in affective regulation is also supported by converging 
data from various other sources. These include animal studies (e.g. conditioning 
and extinction studies in lesioned monkeys, Baxter et al., 2000; Watanabe , 2002; 
Schultz, Tremblay, & Hallerman, 2000; Rolls, 2000); recent neuroimaging 
investigations in humans (e.g. reward and extinction of reward learning, Elliott, 
Dolan & Frith, 2000; Elliot et al., 2003; Gottfied & Dolan, 2004; O'Doherty, et 
al., 2001); and psychopathological data (increased activation of orbitofrontai 
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cortex in obsessive compulsive disorder, Abbruzzese, Bellodi, Ferri, & Scarrons, 
1995). 
From a theoretical point of view, the inability of patients with OMPFC 
lesions to integrate the emotional response into an appropriate social and 
cognitive context has been considered by Damasio and colleagues (for review see 
Bechara et al., 2000) as resulting from a defect in the activation of 'somatic 
markers'. These include somatosensory states (based on autonomic and 
proprioceptive afferences) that provide the individual with 'gut feelings' 
associated to the outcomes of their actions. These somatic markers allow 
individuals to anticipate the future consequences of their present actions and thus 
guide decision-making through 'signalling' the outcomes of responses to be 
selected or inhibited. In its most sophisticated form, such a mechanism identifies 
the emotional reaction of others in the environment and also dictates the 
behaviours most appropriate for social approval and positive interpersonal 
reaction to the individual's goals. Thus, dysfunction of this system has also being 
linked with empathy, theory of mind abilities and social judgement (Bechara et 
al., 2000; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; see also Hirstein, 2004 for a review). 
Various other similar theoretical proposals have been put forward to 
explain the primary role of the OMPFC in regulating emotion and arousal (e.g. 
Elliot et al., 2000; Rolls, 2000; Ressler, 2004; Shimamura, 2000). For example. 
Rolls (2000) associated the decoding and readjusting of the reinforcement value 
of stimuli as functions of the OMPFC. He showed that these regions are 
associated with (i) the assessment and representation of primary (unlearned) 
reinforcements, such as taste and touch; (ii) the learning and reversing of 
reinforcement contingencies (learning which stimuli are rewarding and which are 
non-rewarding in every situation); and (i i i ) the control and correction of reward-
and punishment-related behaviours. Elliot et al., (2000) suggested that the 
OMPFC becomes active when there is insufficient information available to 
determine the appropriate course of action. In such circumstances, the selection of 
appropriate responses, actions or stimuli is based on their likely reward, so that a 
feeling of familiarity or of "rightness"', rather than the identity or the location of 
the stimuli, guides their selection. 
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Taken together, these studies suggest that the functions of the OMPFC 
guide behaviour through the monitoring of the affective consequences of one's 
actions. This is achieved through the maintenance of task- and reward-relevant 
activations and inhibition of irrelevant or inappropriate neural activity. Similar 
inhibitory control functions are performed by lateral regions of the prefrontal 
cortex (Mesulam, 2002; Shallice, 2002; Stuss et al., 2002). The exact functional 
fractionation of the prefrontal cortex is still highly debated (for discussions see 
Bechara et al., 2000; Berlin et al., 2004; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002; Shallice, 
2002; Shimamura, 2000; Stuss et al, 2002). Nevertheless, the above notions of 
social and reward-orientated inhibition and impulsivity, are distinguishable from 
funcfions of working memory, reasoning, motor inhibition, and response 
suppression in purely cognitive tasks (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Petrides & Milner, 
1982; Petrides, 1998). This is consistent with the frequent finding that patients 
with OMPFC lesions, including confabulating patients, may perform well on 
standardised 'frontal tests' (e.g. Dalla Barba, 1993a; Mesulam, 2002), or at least 
their performance on these tasks may not show a reliable pattern of impairment 
(Schnider et al., 2003; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002). 
8.3.2 The OMPFC and Memoi-y 
Crucially, most of the above studies have used memory paradigms (e.g. 
reward conditioning and extinction methodologies) to study the emotional 
functions associated with the OMPFC. Thus, they have highlighted that one of the 
fundamental functions of memory is maintaining and constantly updating a record 
of stimuli, environmental conditions and corresponding actions, which are capable 
of satisfying the individual's inner needs and goals in the most efficient way. 
More recently, neuroimaging studies have linked the OMPFC with conscious 
reflection (Wheeler et al., 1997), self-referential mental activity (Keenan et al., 
2000; 2001; 2003; Kelley et al., 2002; Kircher & David, 2003; Kircher et al., 
2000; 2001; 2002; see also Gilliham & Farah, 2005 for a review) and most 
importantly the retrieval of emotional and self-related episodic memories (e.g. see 
Addis et al., 2004; Conway et al., 2001; 2003; Fink et al., 1996; Greenberg et al., 
2005; Lepege et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2004; Maguire et al., 2001; Markowitch 
et al., 2003; Piefke et al., 2003). 
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In addition, the neuroanatomical connections of the OMPFC seem suitable 
for the regulation of the relation between memory and emotions. More specifically, 
orbitofrontal and adjacent subcallosal cortices receive input from posterior cortical 
integration areas and other prefrontal cortex regions. They also receive input from 
many limbic regions. Thus, they represent the site of convergence for ex- and in-
teroceptive, i.e. proprioceptive and visceral, information (Bechara et I . , 2000; 
Rolls, 2002). Lateral and medial portions of this basal frontal cortex have different 
networks of connectivity. The medial sector is particularly related to hippocampal 
and parahippocampal regions, and the posterior cingulate and retrosplenial areas, 
while the lateral section has strong connections with the amygdala, sensory and 
premotor regions (Mesulam, 2000; Tucker, Derryberry, & Luu, 2000). Thus, a 
lesion of the OMPFC could disrupt the relation between internal emotional 
reactions and the corresponding external stimuli. 
The above functions of emotional learning are not performed by the 
OMPFC alone. Instead, they are also mediated by wider 'anterior limbic' systems 
that include both cortical and subcortical structures, such as the amygdala and the 
ventral striatum (Bechara et al., 2003; Ledoux, 1996; 2000; Rolls, 2000). The 
amygdala receives pre-processed polysensory information and its left and right 
nuclear complexes respond differently to different aspects of emotional stimuli 
(Markowitsch et al., 2000; 2003). The ventral striatum has also been linked to the 
processing of emotional information (Bechara et al., 2003; Cardinal et al., 2002; 
Davidson et al., 2000) and it may be seen as a subcortical extension of this 
anterior frontal-limbic circuit. 
The exact relation between the OMPFC and these limbic structures is at 
present unclear and the specific mechanisms and neural correlates of affective 
regulation are not as yet fully understood. Some studies suggest that the OMPFC 
is involved predominately in the processing of positive emotions or reward-related 
stimuli, while the amygdala serve the processing of negative emotions, such as 
fear, anger and anxiety-related emotions (Adolphs, 1999; Cardinal et al., 2002; 
Maratos et al., 2001; O'Doherty et al., 2001; Piefke et al., 2003). However, other 
studies contradict such findings (see Piefke et al., 2003 for review). Another view 
suggests that the contribution of the OMPFC appears crucial in the control and 
coordination of the emotional processes mediated by other limbic structures, in 
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the same way that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex monitors and controls a number 
of more basic cognitive processes (for discussions see Bechara et al., 2000; Rolls, 
2000; Mesulam, 2002; Shimamura, 2000). For example, patients with both 
amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex lesions perform poorly on a test of emotion-
based learning and emotion-based decision making (Bechara et al., 2003). 
However, amygdala-lesioned patients appeared to have more fundamental deficits 
than patients with OMPFC lesions (see also Bechara et al., 2000; Cardinal et al., 
2002 for discussion). 
The above observations about the unique role of the OMPFC in emotional 
memory are confirmed by the findings of the present thesis. Namely, 
confabulating patients with lesions of the OMPFC, showed emotional biases in 
tests of emotional memory (Chapters 4 and 5), while patients with lesions to other 
prefrontal areas (e.g. dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), did not show such a bias, nor 
did amnesic patients with lesions to other parts of the limbic system, e.g. the 
hippocampus. These findings may represent a dissociation between emotion-
based learning (which is thought to be in most part implicit) and explicit episodic 
memory, as traditionally associated with hippocampal structures and related 
circuits (e.g. Squire, 1992; Tulving, 1985). The long history of this claim dates 
back to the classic report of Claparede (Claparede, 1911) and involves multiple 
reports of intact emotion-based learning in people with amnesia (for reviews see 
Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001; Turnbull et al., 2005b). However, before proceeding 
to the relation of these emotional learning mechanisms to confabulation, it is 
necessary to examine the role of the basal forebrain in amnesia and confabulation. 
8.3.3 The Functional Role of the Basal Forebrain 
Amnesia has been traditionally associated with damage to temporal or 
diencephalic structures (Squire, 1992; Tulving, 1985). Other brain regions 
intimately involved in the long-term processing of episodic information are 
situated in the basal forebrain (septal nuclei, diagonal band of Broca and the 
nucleus basalis of the substantia innominata) (Alexander & Freedman, 1984; 
Damasio et al., 1985; Vi lkki , 1985; Phillips et al., 1987; Irele et al., 1992; Morris 
et al., 1992; von Cramon et al., 1993; Beeckmans et al., 1998; Hashimoto et al., 
2000; Schnider et al., 2000; Fujii et al., 2002). A memoiy-related role for these 
areas is plausible in light of the cholinergic cell density in the septal region, but 
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activation or blockage of intraseptal GABA receptors has also being proven 
sufficient to disrupt working or episodic memory processes (see von Cramon et 
a!., 1993; Thiel et al., 2002, for discussions; see also Chapter 1). Generally, the 
neurochemical effects of acetylcholine upon neurons of the cerebral cortex are 
associated with motivational valence, attentional tone, and memory (for a review, 
see Mesulam, 2000). These effects become obvious following damage to the basal 
forebrain regions, as often found in Korsakoff s patients and in Alzheimer's 
disease. However, these neurological diseases show involvement of other cortical 
and subcortical areas, and thus do not often allow insight into the specific role of 
these areas in memory and in confabulation (see Chapters 1 and 2). More discrete 
lesions are found in ACoA patients and tumor patients, but several 
methodological difficulties related to these pathologies also prevent accurate 
lesion localisation (see Chapters 1 and 2). More generally, the specification of the 
role of cholinergic pathways of the basal forebrain in long-term memory, and their 
contribution to the functional role of the OMPFC, awaits further investigation. 
In the monkey, single unit recordings show that neurons of these regions 
are sensitive to the motivational significance of sensory stimuli, i.e., when the 
animal is hungry, these neurons alter their activity only when a remembered 
'favourite' food is detected (Rolls, 2002). More generally, the neurochemical 
effects of the ascending cholinergic pathway from the basal forebrain are in 
position to enhance the immediate neural impact and long-term memorability of 
motivationally relevant events (Mesulam 2000). Although further research of 
these functions in humans is required, these findings suggest a functional link 
between the OMPFC and the basal forebrain. Specifically, both functions seem to 
have a role in emotion-based learning and in the association of sensory events 
with their rewarding value. 
Of particular interest for the present thesis, are the investigations of 
emotional learning in Korsakoff patients and in patients with isolated lesions to 
the basal forebrain. For example, Markowitch and colleagues (1984) showed that 
alcoholic Korsakoff patients showed increased memory recognition for material 
of personal and positive emotional significance. Interestingly, in studying the 
performance of alcoholic Korsakoff patients in cognitive estimation and affective 
judgment. Brand and colleagues (2003) found that Korsakoff patients showed a 
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marked tendency to mis-judge the emotional significance of single neutral or 
negative words as positive. Similar emotional biases have being observed in a few 
patients with isolated basal forebrain lesions (Babinski et al., 1997; von Cramon et 
al., 1993; Zeman & King, 1958). These patients tended to "avoid negatively 
affecting stimuli" (von Cramon et al., 1993, p. 1175) and to remember better 
experiences of great emotional and personal significance. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that these patients show a positive 
bias in their memories, which could relate to the bias observed in the 
confabulating patients of the present thesis. However, although confabulation is 
highly prominent in Korsakoff patients and amnesic patients with basal forebrain 
damage, the presence of the above emotional biases in conjunction with the 
presence of confabulation in these patients has never been addressed by these or 
subsequent studies on this type of patients. By contrast, the relation between 
emotion and spontaneous false memories, as produced by confabulating patients, 
was studied in the present thesis. The cognitive and emotional mechanisms by 
which such biases are created are discussed below. 
8.4 The Deficits of Confabulation and their Loyal Attendants: 
Emotions 
8.4.1 The Deficit of Temporality: The Role of Past Emotions & Rewards 
A recurrent hypothesis in the literature is that confabulation is caused by 
an impaired sense of temporality and chronology (see Chapter 1). The findings of 
Chapter 4 showed that confabulating patients were more likely than amnesic non-
confabulating patients to misrecognise past events as currently relevant. Thus, 
these findings could be directly interpreted according to the neurocognitive 
models that postulate that disrupted temporality is the primary source of 
confabulations (Schnider et al., 1996; Dalla Barba, 2001). The 'deficit' model put 
forward by Schnider and colleagues (1996; see Schnider, 2003 for review) was 
used as a working hypothesis. This group has argued that confabulating patients 
have a deficit in adjusting their current thinking to on-going reality, due to their 
inability to identify the correct temporal context of memories. In more recent 
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versions of this theory, confabulation was conceptualised as impairment in the 
deactivation or suppression of irrelevant thoughts and memories (Schnider, 2001). 
However, the present experimental findings suggested an extension of this 
model. More specifically, the present findings showed that confabulating patients 
were more likely to misrecognise as currently relevant, positive rather than 
negative memories (Chapter 4). This positive bias was consistent with the positive 
bias observed in the context of spontaneous confabulations (Chapter 3). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that confabulating patients have greater difficulty 
in de-activating memories with a positive emotional value, rather than memories 
with a negative emotional value. In other words, confabulating patients face 
difficulties in de-activating memories that are no longer associated with positive 
emotions. Therefore this finding suggests that in confabulating patients the 
memory traces that were previously associated with positive values are the ones 
less likely to be inhibited. In Myslobodsky and Hicks' (1994) terms, 
confabulations are "memories that want to get themselves recalled" (p. 225). 
Interestingly, the brain networks that Schnider and colleagues (et al., 2002; 
Schnider, 2003) have associated with the production of confabulation, i.e. the 
anterior limbic system, are traditionally linked with the control and regulation of 
emotion (see above). Schnider and colleagues have indeed acknowledged the 
association of the anterior limbic system lesions observed in confabulation 
patients with the 'reward system'. For example, Schnider et al, (2002) cited 
animal studies which showed that monkeys failed to suppress their previous 
responses to cues that were no longer rewarded, and postulated that " i f one 
accepts the idea that human behaviour, too, is motivated by predicted goals, this 
model may be applied to the human ability to adapt behaviour and thinking to the 
changing reality" (p. 60). However, Schnider and colleagues (1996; Schnider, 
2003; Schnider, 2004) have repeatedly argued against motivational hypotheses in 
confabulation. Nevertheless, their arguments and experiments have only targeted 
the 'gap-filling hypothesis' and the 'suggestibility hypothesis' (see Chapter 1). 
They have not addressed the potential emotional biases observed in the content of 
confabulation (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2004; Turnbull et al., 
2004a). 
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By contrast, the present findings suggest that indeed the two functions, i.e. 
de-activating irrelevant memories and monitoring affective outcomes, may 
represent two sides of the same phenomenon. More specifically, whilst Schnider's 
model can account for the failure of confabulating patients to de-activate 
irrelevant memories, their theory cannot explain which irrelevant memories 
become candidates for activation in the first place. The results of the present 
experimental investigations reveal that the past memories that are most likely to 
be falsely activated as currently relevant memories, are the ones that have being 
previously associated with positive emotions. Thus, as Fotopoulou and colleagues 
(2004) have argued, Schnider's model of confabulation could be extended to 
include instances of motivated confabulation, which are not elicited by the 
model's 'neutral' experimental procedure. In everyday-life circumstances, there is 
an endless number of memory traces available for recollection. Confabulating 
patients are no longer able to select between these memory traces based on current 
reality criteria, i.e. select the memories that could effectively guide their 
interaction with their current environment. Instead, they seem to permanently rely 
on the memories that generated positive outcomes in the past, irrespective of 
whether these still generate the same outcomes or not. This provides support for 
the hypothesis that confabulation is associated with both cognitive dysfunction 
and motivational factors. Moreover, this view is consistent with the literature on 
the functional role of the OMPFC, which suggests that this area of the prefrontal 
cortex is involved in the inhibition of previously rewarded responses (see above). 
Indeed, this deficit could be seen as the equivalent of cognitive and 
behavioural impulsivity in the memory domain. In a recent paper, Moscovitch and 
Winocur's (2002) considered both Schnider's proposal (see above) and the recent 
evidence on the role of the OMPFC in marking stimuli and representations with 
their expected positive emotional consequences, i.e. 'feelings of rightness' (Elliot 
et al., 2000). They claimed that from the point of view of memory retrieval, felt-
rightness is an intuitive, rapid endorsement or rejection of memories according to 
the goals of the memory task. In their terms, cognitive impulsivity in the memory 
domain is "manifested as the absence of a mechanism for feit-rightness, which 
leads to the hasty acceptance of any strong, recovered memory as appropriate to 
the goals of the memory task, even i f it is not" (p. 202). Although at first sight 
these authors seem to take into account the role of emotional processes in memoiy 
263 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
retrieval, their position ultimately 'de-emotionalises' the described processes. 
More specifically, their position implies that feelings of rightness relate to the 
goals of the task, i.e. the 'reward' of appropriate recollection itself, irrespective of 
any reward generated from the recollection of one memory over another. In this 
aspect, their view approximates Schnider's proposal. According to both views, 
emotions have only a minor 'reality monitoring' role in retrieval. 
However, both the above studies on the functional role of the OMPFC, as 
well as the results of the present thesis on confabulation, suggest that reward 
values have a more salient role in memory retrieval. Specifically, they show that 
the mental associations that are 'strong' (in Moscovitch and Winocur's terms, see 
above) candidates for recollection, are the ones previously associated with reward 
or other positive values. Familiarity and 'feelings of rightness' are mere 
subcomponents of these more pervasive motivational mechanisms (see also Elliot 
et al., 2000). in summary, Moscovitch and Winocur's above position could be 
paraphrased as follows: '"Cognitive impulsivity' in the memory domain, is 
manifested as the absence of a mechanism for felt-rightness. This leads to the 
hasty acceptance of any memory or thought that is associated with positive 
emotional (rewarding) value, as appropriate to the goals of the memory task, even 
i f it is not". 
8.4.2 The Deficit o f inhibition: The Role of Current Emotions and Fantasies 
The confabulating patients studied in this thesis produced a number of 
fabrications during the assessment period. Moreover, as the experimental findings 
of Chapter 4 highlighted, confabulating patients were significantly more likely 
than amnesic controls, to misrecognise events that had actually never taken place 
(i.e. their fears or wishes for the future), as events currently relevant in their lives. 
Although such statements had been thought of and expressed by the patients 
before (e.g. during the first phase of the experiment), they were never experienced 
as real life events, i.e. they were merely 'mental events', thoughts or fantasies. 
Thus, the material upon which confabulations are built may go beyond 
experienced memories and personal facts to thoughts, fantasies and potentially 
other mental constructs and representations, e.g. dreams. 
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This view is consistent with previous descriptions of confusion between 
dreams, fantasies, thoughts and memories in confabulation (see Chapter I ) . On the 
contrary, these findings are not in accordance with temporality hypotheses (see 
above), which suggest that confabulation can always be traced to actual past 
events experienced by the patient (see Chapter I ) . However, these findings are in 
accordance with other 'deficit' models of confabulation, which have postulated 
that a defective sense of temporality or chronology is not the primary cause of 
confabulation. In the latter models, it is itself seen as a symptom of a more 
fundamental retrieval deficit (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Kopelman, 1999; 
Moscovitch, 1989; see also Chapter 1). However, given the focus of these models 
on cognitive factors, they are not sufficient to address another aspect of the 
present findings. Namely, the present data also showed that patients' pleasant 
fantasies about the future, rather than their unpleasant future fantasies (Chapter 4), 
were more often misrecognised as memories. Thus, these results provide further 
support for the hypothesis that the content of confabulation is motivated. 
Specifically, these findings suggest that it is not only past positive 
memories that are not easily inhibited by confabulating patients. Instead, 
representations associated with current goals, fantasies, needs and potentially 
somatic drives may also be falsely activated and accepted as true memories (see 
also Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Solms, 2000). For example, RM's frequent false 
beliefs that his mother had just called the ward to speak to him (see Appendix 
A3), were caused by his inner wish to speak to his mother. The latter did call the 
ward on some specific evenings, but never during the day. However, RM formed 
the belief that he was on the phone, as soon as he heard the telephone ring and 
sometimes even in the absence of a ringing sound. Given the pressuring 
motivational character of the need, the corresponding 'rewarding' representation 
was selected over other candidate thoughts and memories, irrespective of its low 
pertinence to reality. Interestingly, RM repeatedly expressed this belief 
throughout the duration of the study, despite the numerous disappointments that 
followed his discoveries that his mother was not on the phone (see Chapter 6 for 
similar examples from patient LH). In Solms's terms, the patient "displayed a 
pei-vasive tendency to misperceive external reality on the basis of his internal (and 
usually wishful) schemata" (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000, p. 208). 
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This view is in accordance with more recent studies that have highlighted 
the role of the OMPFC in the unlearning (extinction) of arbitrary and temporarily 
associations between neutral stimuli and rewarding outcomes (e.g. Rolls, 2000; 
see also above). In the case of confabulating patients, this lack of inhibition of 
reward-associated representations is revealed in the domain of memory, and 
particularly in memory retrieval. It is thus worth highlighting that the impairment 
of memory inhibition and selectivity described above, and the associated wishful 
confabulatory processes, may be particularly vulnerable to the specific arousal 
state required by a 'retrieval mode' (Tulving, 1985; see also Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). This mental state necessitates a redirection of attention from the 
environment to one's self, i.e. a direction of attention from behaviour, perception 
and acfion to thought, memory and bodily sensation, (autonomic and 
proprioceptive afferences). 
Interestingly, recent studies have put forward evidence regarding the role 
of the OMPFC, and potentially the basal forebrain, in mediating a background 
arousal state, which could relate to the neurocognitive state of retrieval mode. 
More specifically, they have proposed that the OMPFC has a unique role in 
maintaining a default, restful, yet alert, baseline homeostatic state of brain activity 
that functions as a dynamic between exteroceptive and interoceprive deployment 
of attention (e.g. Raichle et al., 2001; Nagai et al., 2004). It is thus possible that 
the inability of confabulating patients to inhibit irrelevant representations of 
reward, may relate to the level of arousal required to successfully direct one's 
attention from external stimuli to internal somatic markers. This is also supported 
by other neuroimaging investigations that have associated the activation of the 
OMPFC and the basal forebrain with retrieval mode states (Duzel et al., 1999; 
Lepege et al., 2000). However, further confirmatory studies are necessary before 
valid claims about the relation between confabulation, arousal and retrieval mode 
can be put forward. 
In summary, the above discussion suggests that in confabulation 
motivational mechanisms interact with cognitive deficits in the production of the 
symptom. Specifically, confabulating patients have an impairment in selectively 
activating the memories, or other mental representations that pertain to the goals 
of the present task (Schnider et al., 2002; see also Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002). 
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instead, they activate memories and other mental representations that achieved 
goal attenuation in the past or that are associated with current emotions and 
drives. Thus, components of irrelevant experiences, thoughts or fantasies can 
influence confabulatory content. This leads to both temporal misplacements of 
events, as well as content distortions and fabrications of never experienced events. 
This deficit is seen as the equivalent of cognitive and behavioural impulsivity in 
the memory domain. Other non-amnesic patients with lesions at the OMPFC show 
behavioural impulsiveness and inability to delay and filter gratification-seeking 
options and choices, even in the light of disadvantageous environmental 
conditions. Similarly, confabulating patients with lesions to the OMPFC and 
potentially the basal forebrain, show retrieval impulsiveness and the inability to 
delay and filter gratification-seeking memories and representation choices, despite 
counter reality indications. This view, describes how a particular cognitive deficit 
can alter the dynamic relation between cognition and emotion, in turn, this 
alteration can highlight certain motivational influences, which pre-existed in 
implicit form, but were moderated through selective inhibition. 
8.4.3 The Deficit of 'Controlled' Retrieval: The Role of Past Selves 
The motivational mechanisms, described above as operating in 
confabulation, interact with cognitive deficits at a pre-retrieval level. This was 
proposed by Schnider and colleagues, who showed that suppression of presently 
irrelevant memory traces seems to be realised prior to the conscious stage of 
retrieval, through transient inhibition of synchronized neocortical activity 
(Schnider, Valenza, Morand, & Michel, 2002), instigated by the orbitofrontal 
cortex through frontal-subcortical loops (Treyer, Buck & Schnider, 2003; see 
Schnider, 2003 for a review). This is also consistent with recent studies on the 
OMPFC, which show that these regions modulate implicit, rather than explicit, 
forms of emotional memoiy (Bechara et al., 2000; Turnbull et al., 2005b; see also 
above). 
However, the cognitive deficits associated with confabulation are not 
limited to this early pre-retrieval stage. Instead, impairment in a number of more 
thorough selection, check and monitoring processes (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; 
Moscovitch & Melo, 1997; Schacter et al., 1998), as well as relevant attribution 
processes (Johnson et al., 2000) are implicated in the production of confabulation. 
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These more thorough, cognitive checks of memory plausibility and accuracy most 
likely follow the early, rapid (intuitive and implicit) decision to accept or, reject 
an item as true, particularly under conditions of uncertainty or when the initial 
response is incompatible with other knowledge or memories (Moscovitch & 
Winocur, 2002). The present thesis (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7) revealed that in 
confabulation, emotions and self-values have a strong influence on the faulty 
outcome of these later retrieval stages, as they did on the earlier stages. The 
findings of these studies are presented below. 
The experimental investigations of Chapter 5 revealed that although 
confabulating patients were able to recall emotionally salient (positive and 
negative) narrative information similarly to emotionally neutral information, they 
did show selective biases when recalling emotional narratives in self-referent 
conditions. Specifically, they showed a difficulty in recalling the negative valence 
of self-referent narratives. They instead distorted the information in a way that 
portrayed positive information about themselves. It thus appeared that these 
patients are particularly prone to memory errors in conditions that involve the 
recall of information relevant to their own self-representation. Moreover, these 
errors, i.e. distortions of content and emotional valence, seem to serve one specific 
function; namely, sustaining a positive self-representation. 
The above findings are further supported by the description of a 
confabulating patient with bilateral damage to the OMPFC (Chapter 6). LH's 
confabulations portrayed a self-representation which predominately relied on 
premorbid values of self-esteem and self-regard, e.g. professional competence. 
Thus, the content of his confabulations were dominated by positive character traits 
and praised achievements of his previous life. The latter were also present in his 
accurate memories, but to a lesser degree, and balanced by a greater number of 
negative self-representations. In addition, in his confabulatory narratives, LH 
alluded to his postmorbid condition, mostly his hospitalisation, but provided 
fantastic and different reasons for his hospital admission, which shared only one 
common characteristic: they portrayed a non-impaired image of himself 
Moreover, the description of his current self-representation was highly influenced 
by his premorbid self-regard, even in the light of obviously conflicting current 
circumstances. For example, in describing his failures on current memoiy tasks, 
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LH often referred to his laziness. He justified his performance by explaining he 
has always felt superior to others intellectually and therefore was bored during 
such exercises. Moreover, he was sure he would triumph in the end, despite the 
results, as he had always done in his academic and professional life in the past. 
These descriptions exemplify how patients continue to rely on premorbid 
achievements and self-values in interpreting their current interaction with the 
environment, despite counter-indications. 
8.5 Confabulation and the Self in Memory 
8.5.1 Confabulation and the Self-Memory System 
The above findings suggest that self-values and self-goals have a 
determining influence on the construction of memories during retrieval. This 
interdependence of self-goals and memory retrieval processes has been 
particularly emphasised by Conway's model of autobiographical memory 
(Conway, 2001; Conway et al., 2004, see also Chapter 1). More specifically, the 
Self-Memory System (SMS) suggests an intimate and reciprocal relation between 
one's current self-goals (the 'working se l f ) and the retrieval of one's past. In 
several other similar models of retrieval (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch, 
1989), as well as in alternative theories of episodic retrieval (e.g. Tulving, 1985; 
Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997), the intentional and organised access to one's 
memories is mediated by executive functions. In the SMS these functions indeed 
operate in the service of one's past, i.e. they assist the access to memories, they 
pursue their specificity and monitor their accuracy. However, in this model 
executive functions also operate in the service of one's present, i.e. one's current 
self-representation and its associated self-goals and values. More specifically, the 
working self guides and filters the availability of memories to consciousness in 
ways that are consistent and congruent with the current goals of the individual 
(see Chapter 1). 
Based on this model, Conway and colleagues (Conway and Tacchi, 1996; 
Conway & Fthenaki, 2000) have conceptualised confabulation as a disconnection 
between the goals of the working self and the autobiographical knowledge base. 
When this relation is disrupted, as in the case of damage to the prefrontal cortex. 
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the working self is no longer fully constrained, or guided by the autobiographical 
memory base, which is inaccessible. Thus, as the 'self becomes partly 
disconnected from the knowledge base, the formation of autobiographical 
memories is heavily shaped by unconstrained self-goals ('wishes'). As a 
consequence, the degree of involvement in memory construction of the wished-
for-self (ungrounded goals and plans) is disproportionately larger than that of the 
"actual" self (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). For example, the frontal patient 
OP, reported by Conway & Tacchi (1996), persistently narrated a set of plausible, 
self-related but confabulated memories. These rewrote her previous 
disappointments in familial interactions into a history of successful and supportive 
intimacy with family members. 
Fotopoulou and colleagues (2004) also employed the SMS to account for 
the positive emotional bias observed in their confabulating patient ES. They 
stressed how the patient's memories were formed, based on the emotional 
consequences of particular thoughts or memory components, so that the patient 
was more likely to affirm thoughts or memories that had positive affective 
consequences. Crucially, this study also stressed the dynamic relation between the 
cognitive impairments observed in ES, and the positive aspects of his 
confabulation, i.e. their pleasant content. Following the surgical intervention for 
the removal of a recurrent meningioma in the pituitary and suprasellar region, ES 
suffered damage to areas usually associated with confabulation, such as the basal 
forebrain and surrounding regions. As a consequence, his autobiographical 
memory recall was contaminated by clouding and temporal confusion (see also 
Baddeley & Wilson, 1986), and he was unable to voluntarily select, monitor and 
verify the thoughts and memories that reached his consciousness (see also 
Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Moscovitch, 1989). However, ES's knowledge of his 
habits, personal values and his self-regard appeared unaffected by the brain 
damage. Thus, given his inability to reach optimal retrieval accuracy and control 
by using generative retrieval processes, these goals and premorbid self-
representations, i.e. the unconstrained working self, appeared to dominate his 
retrieval efforts. Ultimately, these self-values coloured ES's attempts to recollect 
his past and thus led to wishful confabulations. 
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The positive bias observed in the confabulations of the patients assessed in 
the present thesis could be interpreted in a similar way. Confabulating patients 
with bilateral prefrontal lesions depicted themselves in their confabulations in 
more positive ways than the corresponding reality suggested. Moreover, they 
presented severe memory impairment and executive dysfunction. Thus, it is 
assumed that their working self was compromised by frontal damage, as well as 
by its lack of grounding in the autobiographical memory base, which was now 
compromised and partly inaccessible. Therefore, their false recollections were 
guided by an unconstrained and dysfunctional working self As a consequence, 
representations pertaining to current or past goals were activated. Conversely, 
currently relevant memories were distorted i f they failed to confirm the goals and 
expectations of the working self. Hence, although confabulations were in conflict 
with reality, they were in accordance with patients' goals and emotions, in brief, 
confabulations were motivated. 
Thus, the present thesis shows that the autobiographical memory of 
confabulating patients functions under the 'totalitarian' influence (Greenwald, 
1980) and conservative control of a premorbid self-representation, and past or 
current self-goals and wishes. These influences are so exaggerated, that 
incongruent information deriving from reality, e.g. the negative self-related stories 
of the present experiment (Chapter 5), are 'confabulated away', i.e. distorted in 
content and valence to the point that they become congruent with the patients 
premorbid or wished-for self-representation. 
8.5.2 Goals, Emotions and Autobiographical Memory Distortion 
These conceptualisations are supported by a plethora of studies on 
autobiographical memory, which have demonstrated the interdependence of 
memory and current self-goals (for reviews see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce; 
McAdams, 2001; Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 2003; Wilson & Ross, 
2003). Given the centrality of this aspect to the present thesis, these studies will be 
briefly discussed below. 
in recent decades, a wide-range of naturalistic and lab-based investigations 
has focused on how specific goals and emotions may influence autobiographical 
memoiy (for reviews see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; McAdams, 2001; 
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Pillemer, 2001; Singer & Salovey, 1993; Stein, Wade & Liwag, 1999; Walker, 
Skowronski & Thompson, 2003; Woike, Gershkovich, Piorkowski & Polo, 1999). 
A common notion underlying these studies is that the current self-representation, 
with its associated traits, goals and emotional predispositions, influences the 
recollection of the past (Bartlett, 1932; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Greenwald, 
1980; Hastorf & Cantril, 1952; Ross, 1989). For example, Barclay (1996) 
described the primary function of autobiographical memory as being to assist 
individuals to maintain self-coherence and continuity in time. This function 
maybe so important that memories maybe altered, distorted or inhibited in order 
for central components of the self-representation to remain unaltered. 
Furthermore, Wilson and Ross (2003), emphasise that people selectively 
remember the past, or even distort it, in order to serve motives of both self-
consistency (Conway & Ross, 1984; Ross, 1989) and self-enhancement. For 
instance, people tend to re-appraise memories of their remote past in a negative 
way, in order to form the belief that they have improved over time. This 
reconstruction serves the motive of current self-improvement and self-esteem 
enhancement (see also Greenvvald, 1980; Walker et al., 2003). Emotions and goals 
are also especially salient in the construction of what Singer and Sallovey (1993) 
named 'self-defining memories', Pillemer (1998) termed 'personal event 
memories' and McAdams called ' l i fe stories'. These memories serve fundamental 
processes of personal and social identity formation and thus their recollection is 
influenced by goals of self-regard and self-consistency (see also Bluck & 
Habermas, 2001; Fivush, 1998; Neisser, 1988; Pasupathi, 2003). Taken together, 
the above studies highlight the interdependence of self-goals and autobiographical 
memory. 
8.5.3 Goals. Emotions and False Episodic Memories 
Similar observations have been made in cognitive psychology with respect 
to the production of false episodic memories in neurologically healthy individuals. 
Specifically, several studies have showed that memory for self-relevant 
information is superior to memoi^ for 'objective', i.e. not self-related information 
(see Czienskowski, 1997; Gillihan & Farah, 2005; Symons & Johnson, 1997 for 
reviews). Whilst there is disagreement on whether the self is a unique structure 
that requires specialised processing or whether it is just one of the efficient ways 
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of structuring, representing and elaborating information (see Gillihan & Farah, 
2005 for discussion; see also Chapter 5), there is consensus regarding the uniquely 
effective function of the 'self in encoding information, maintaining it in memory 
and retrieving it. Specifically, it results in spontaneous, efficient processing of 
material that is often well organised and exceptionally well elaborated (Symons & 
Johnson, 1997). Most crucially for the present thesis, this strong self-referent 
effect has a trade-off in cases of memory distortion. In other words, while self-
reference increases memory accuracy, it also increases the possibility of memory 
distortion. For example, Johnson and colleagues (1996) found that affective self-
focus improved the recognition performance of neurologically healthy 
individuals. However, they observed that self-focus also increased source memory 
errors, as it reduced attention to the sensory and semantic properties of the stimuli. 
These authors concluded that false memories and distortions are more likely in 
conditions of self-focused attention. 
Thus, relying on well-developed structuring framework, such as the self-
representation, may facilitate one's memory. Nevertheless, it can also distort it in 
the process of shaping it according to the expectations and characteristics of one's 
self-representation. This is particularly true in confabulating patients, whose 
executive and memory deficits constitute the adaptation of their self-
representation to a highly problematic and changing reality. Johnson and 
colleagues (1991; Johnson et al., 1997; 2000) have not directly addressed the issue 
of motivation in confabulation (although see Johnson, 2000 for a discussion). 
Nevertheless, emotions and self-related goals have a central role in their reality 
monitoring framework (Johnson, 2001; Johnson & Multhaup, 1992). Recently, 
they have found that available schemas, motives, goals and emotions influence the 
development of false memories (Johnson, 1999; Johnson & Sherman, 1990; 
Mather, Johnson & De Leonardis, 1999). In discussing these findings, Johnson 
(2000) has suggested that there is no reason to assume that such influences would 
become inoperative following brain damage. Instead, she postulated that there is a 
possibility that these factors are exaggerated in cases of frontal damage and 
particularly in confabulating patients. It is precisely this point that was revealed in 
recent single-case studies on motivational confabulation (Conway & Tacchi, 
1996; Fotopoulou et al., 2004) and further specified in the thesis's findings. 
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8.5.4 Premorbid Personality and Confabulation: The Role of the 'Long-term Self 
The findings of the thesis suggest that self-related emotions, drives, and 
schemas have a determining influence on confabulatory content. Furthermore, 
given that emotions and goals (the working self) guide the retrieval of information 
from the knowledge base across various hierarchical levels of emotional and 
memory organisation (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), the dysfunction of the 
working self may influence confabulatory content at different levels. More 
specifically, the formation of memories by the working self-knowledge base 
interaction can range from single representations elicited by simple somatic 
drives, to personal memory narratives unfolding under the influences of goals 
relating to different life-time periods and self-defining events. Some of the 
simplest emotional influences on memory retrieval were examined at previous 
sections. At this point, the most organised and abstract levels of one's self-
representation are considered. These could be described as the 'long-term self, a 
term introduced recently by Conway and colleagues (Conway, Singer & Tagini, 
2004), to describe those aspects of the self-representation, which exert a more 
permanent influence on one's self-regard. 
This notion was based on previous models of personality and other models 
of autobiographical memoiy (e.g. Kihistrom & Hastie, 1997; Neisser, 1988). 
More specifically, self-representation is organised around a number of self-
defining memories, as well as non-temporally specific self-related knowledge, i.e. 
personal semantic and trait information. These are progressive schematisations of 
acquired self-related knowledge and experience that determine the understanding 
of the on-going interaction of individuals with their environment. Thus, during 
these interactions, the above long-term aspects of self-representation provide a 
framework of fast, effective and meaningful appreciation of the present in the 
light of the past. On certain occasions, this function may even lead to the 
distortion of recent or current experience in the process of fitting to past values 
and schemas ('principle of memoiy conservatism'). Conversely, each new 
experience has the potential of influencing these abstract and more permanent 
records of self-representation, so that newly observed aspects of the world and the 
self can be accommodated in a more stable self-representation ('principle of 
memoiy adaptation'). The balance between these two principles is mediated by 
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the working self, based on the objective of achieving optimal goal attainment in 
the necessary interaction with the physical and social environment. 
The results of the present thesis suggest that the content of confabulations 
maybe further influenced by patients' most enduring psychological 
characteristics, namely their personality traits. This was suggested by the two 
single case-studies reported, in that patients' premorbid personality traits were 
exaggerated and the appreciation of their current reality was filtered, in 
accordance with these characteristics. For example, in LH's case, the construction 
of autobiographical confabulations was potentially influenced by his previous 
strategies of coping with stressful and perplexing situations. For instance, in order 
to deal with stressful circumstances premorbidly, LH would typically employ 
avoidance strategies and engage in distractive activities, such as excessive 
preoccupation with work and leisure activities. Interestingly, although due to his 
hospitalisation, LH was unable to employ these strategies he appeared to 
experience himself as actively involved in professional activities. Further, during 
brief minutes of awareness, he acknowledged that he found it easier to talk about 
work than face his problems. More generally, the findings of the present 
experiments suggest that in confabulation, given the working self s dysfunction, 
goal attainment in memory is attempted without an appropriate consideration of 
reality-constraints. In this equation, the principle of conservatism, i.e. the 
maintenance of schematised self-representation irrespective of reality changes, 
can reach pathological levels. In other words, reality may be distorted or even 
totally ignored in the face of long-term past self-characteristics and values. 
Indeed, the patients' premorbid personality has been proposed as one of 
the aetiological factors of confabulation (see Chapter 1). The present thesis 
revealed that suggestibility, i.e. a tendency to adjust one's memory responses 
according to external feedback and suggestion, did not have a primary causative 
role in confabulation. However, it might have contributed to the production of 
several secondary ad hoc confabulations aimed to provide support or, an 
explanation of original confabulations (see Chapters 6 and 7). By contrast, other 
critical premorbid personality traits such superficial extraversion, denial or 
avoidance coping strategies (see above example), neurotism, and sensitive self-
esteem were identified in both patients under investigation. Such characteristics 
275 
Chapter 8: Discussion 
have been associated with confabulation in previous studies (Berlyne, 1972; 
Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Gainotti, 1975; Johnson, 2000; Weinstein, 1996; 
Williams & Rupp, 1932). However, it is highly unlikely that personality factors 
alone can distinguish confabulating from other amnesic or dysexecutive patients. 
Instead, the production of confabulation appears to be based upon specific 
neurocognitive deficits. As exemplified in the present thesis, personality factors 
may merely colour confabulatory content (see Chapters 1, 6 and 7 for discussion). 
However, it is not possible to draw meaningful generalisations about this factor 
based on two confabulating patients. A large group study with appropriate 
controls is required in order to address this issue further. 
In summary, confabulation following lesions to the OMPFC and 
associated areas is conceptualised as the product of a disordered self-
representation system. The construction of the autobiographical 'self is severely 
disrupted. Patients' memory construction is influenced by implicit premorbid 
feelings of 'rightness', as well as more complex, abstract and explicit self-
representations and self-related goals. Patients seem unable to inhibit such 
representations and emotions, particularly when the latter had premorbidly been 
linked with reward or positive values, and when they coloured patients' premorbid 
identity and self-representation. Moreover, current potential needs for the 
attenuation of similar goals render these past-associations stronger candidates for 
recall. Confabulations appear to convey the 'satisfaction' of these emotions, 
fantasies and longings in the realm of memory, irrespective of physical reality and 
social constraints. Finally, in an impaired memory retrieval system, it is the 
rewarding value and self-reference of these memories and representations that 
induces them to be strong candidates for recollection, and provides them with felt 
'credibility' during later retrieval stages of memory monitoring and attribution 
(see also below). 
8.6 Confabulation and the Bodily Self 
Confabulation, as discussed above, is a memory disorder. However, 
confabulation is also linked to other non-memory-related symptoms, such as 
anosognosia for hemiplegia (see Chapter I). The relation between the two forms 
of confabulation (referred to as 'memory-related' and 'motor-related', 
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respectively) has not been sufficiently considered in the literature (see DeLuca, 
2000; Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; see also Chapter I ) , in the present thesis, three 
patients with isolated right-hemisphere lesions and anosognosia for contralesional 
hemiplegia were assessed. Although this small sample warrants limited 
generalisation, the differences and similarities observed between the behavioural 
patterns of the two forms of confabulation were highly revealing, particularly with 
respect to the organisation of the 'self and emotional biases in confabulation. 
8.6.1 Confabulation and Anosognosia for Hemiplegia 
In the present thesis, right hemisphere confabulating patients appeared less 
confused and disoriented than the bilateral patients. They were also able to 
coherently represent themselves in time, presenting concrete, organised and 
specific autobiographical memories, discounting, of course, their marked 
confabulation about postmorbid life events. Despite this relatively preserved self-
organisation and representation, these patients were found to be selectively 
impaired in self-awareness (anosognosic). Such an 'awareness cleft' normally 
regarded issues of body and mental integrity (e.g. left-sided hemiplegia) and their 
direct everyday-living implications (see also Feinberg, 2001; Gainotti, 1975; 
Ramachandran, 1994; Weinstein & Lyerly, 1968). They behaved as though they 
were not attending to their deficits and they explicitly denied their disabilities. 
Instead, they narrated confabulations about their recent past, which included the 
respective abilities, e.g. walking. However, these patients constantly demanded 
immediate satisfaction of their needs and the slightest frustration or delay 
provoked anger and sometimes despair. 
Moreover, the wishful, anosognosic, confabulations were not the only, and 
in fact, not even the main type of confabulatoi7 behaviour observed in these 
patients. The majority of their confabulations were negative in valence, often 
'paranoid' in content, and delusional in form, i.e. persistent, mono-thematic and 
resistant to correction. These confabulations did not often extend to the remote 
past. Instead, they focused on recent events (postmorbid period) and were mostly, 
but not exclusively, related to the patient's deficits. During these confabulations, 
which were often intermingled with reduplications of person or space, the self-
image portrayed was very different to the wishful confabulations of the same 
patients or of the patients with bilateral lesions discussed above. Indeed, in 
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'paranoid' confabulations the self was mainly represented as passive, dependent, 
ill or disabled, and at the mercy of others' hostility or indifference. These negative 
self-representations and their corresponding emotions were interpreted as implicit 
forms of awareness of deficit, in that they conveyed the emotions and self-
representations associated with the deficits of these patients. Moreover, they 
appeared against the background of a relatively intact autobiographical memory 
and thus they represented strikingly isolated failures of memory and reality 
appreciation. 
Even more remarkably, as these unpleasant and 'paranoid' confabulations 
reoccurred they included the same set of erroneous beliefs, with minimal 
variations. In this respect, these false memories had more common features with 
delusional memories, than with typical confabulations (see Chapter 1). Although 
the question of differentiating confabulation and delusional memories requires 
further investigation, the present findings suggest that delusional memories may 
differ from confabulations in that they occur on the background of relatively 
preserved memory and are linked with right-hemisphere lesions. Similar 
conclusions have been put forward by Feinberg and colleagues in a recent review 
of the literature on delusional misidentiflcations and reduplications (Feinberg & 
Keenan, 2005). 
Moreover, although these spontaneous confabulations appeared as 
negative in valence (see Chapter 3), the present experimental findings suggest that 
they might share some similarities with the wishful confabulations produced by 
bilateral patients. More specifically, right-hemisphere patients showed the same 
bias as bilateral patients in remembering negative self-referent prose narratives in 
more positive terms (Chapter 5). These findings suggests the motivational 
mechanisms associated with memory-related confabulation (see above), apply to 
motor-related confabulation. In other words, motor-related confabulation could 
also be conceptualised as a disruption in the ability for self-representation in time 
and an abnormal reliance on past self-values. More specifically, although these 
patients showed some implicit awareness of their deficits and expressed the 
corresponding negative emotions, they appeared unable to form the corresponding 
self-representations. Instead, the significance of these negative emotions was 
misinterpreted and they were misattributed to external sources. Thus, similarly to 
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the bilateral patients studied, the self-representation of right-hemisphere patients 
remained attached to premorbid values and abilities. The experienced negative 
and perhaps intuitive feelings (see above) were externalised from patients' self-
image and identity (for examples see Chapter 7). Thus, although at first sight 
these patients produced negative self-representations in their confabulations (e.g. 
my brother is in hospital because he had a stroke), these representations in fact 
replaced worse self-related scenarios (e.g. I am in hospital because I had a stroke). 
Finally, during these confabulations, these patients appeared largely 
confused and their self-representation was significantly disorganised. Indeed, the 
presence of such confabulations in right hemisphere patients was empirically 
observed in association with a severe disintegration and splitting of 'self-' and 
'other-' representations in the construction of personal narratives (see Chapter 7). 
In this sense, the self-representation of these patients appeared fragmented. On the 
one hand, they conveyed anosognosic and wishful self-representations, e.g., "I can 
walk, I am able", which were built upon premorbid self-values. On the other hand, 
they described extremely negative representations of self-degradation, perceived 
as caused by others, e.g. "A l l this is their fault, they hate me". 
Similar reports of cognitive misattributions of emotional experiences have 
been reported before in both transient and chronic anosognosic patients and have 
been interpreted as partial, implicit and misinterpreted knowledge of deficits 
(Feinberg & Roane, 1997a; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2000; Marcel et al., 2004; 
Ramachandran, 1995; Turnbull et al., 2002; Turnbull et al., 2004b; Venneri & 
Shanks, 2004). Most relevantly for the present thesis, Solms (1999) proposed a 
specific link between anosognosia and feelings of loss following perisylvian 
lesions of the RH. He attributed the abnormal processing of loss in these patients 
to deficits in spatial cognition, and specifically the spatial representation of self-
other separateness. More specifically, based on a series of RH patients (Kaplan-
Solms and Solms, 2000), and from a psychodynamic tradition, Solms proposed 
that the profound anosognosia results from a consequent inability to cognitively 
and emotionally engage in a normal 'mourning' process, i.e. the ability to 
normally accept their deficits and their associated personal losses as their own. He 
also described how these patients exhibit complex patterns of 'splitting' 
(uncoupling), 'projection' (externalisation) and 'introjection' (internalisation) of 
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negative feelings and representations, in the absence of the ability to attribute 
them to their own self-representation (see also Bentall, 2003; Marcel et al., 2004; 
Ramachandran, 1995). 
Solms stresses the implicit awareness of deficits observed in such patients, 
in that they show general irritability despite their selective anosognosia or 
anosodiaphoria, and occasional emotional outbursts. This psychological inability 
to process and self-attribute negative emotions is seen as a direct consequence of 
brain damage (spatial cognition deficit) and not as a purely psychological and 
compensatory mechanism, as previous psychodynamic models suggested (e.g. 
Weinstein & Kahn, 1955). Interestingly, in a recent paper Venneri and colleagues 
(2000) presented two cases of Alzheimer's disease, who denied the deaths of their 
spouses and instead developed a chronic severely delusional reaction to their 
bereavement. Neuroimaging investigation revealed a significant reduction of 
cerebral blood flow in the right frontal area. 
In this sense, the false memories and beliefs described above are not 
caused by psychogenic compensatory (defense) mechanisms. Instead, they are 
neurological equivalents of such mechanisms, tied to specific neural and cognitive 
dysfunctions. Furthermore, it is precisely because they are caused by specific 
neurological damage that their investigation can be informative with respect to 
their neural correlates. In Schacter and Prigatano's (1991) terms: "Because 
defensive denial has been approached traditionally within a purely psychiatric 
framework, study of the subset of brain-damage patients who exhibit defensive 
denial represents an opportunity to develop a neuropsychological approach to this 
important phenomenon" (p. 259). 
However, the exact neural, cognitive (e.g. spatial, motor, mnemonic) and 
emotional components of the mental ability for high-order self-representation and 
self-other differentiation are not fully understood. Thus, the above explanations 
are incomplete. Yet, the cross-disciplinary perspective that the present thesis 
introduced may serve to point attention towards the counter-intuitive 
fragmentation of the emotional and cognitive components of self-representation, 
which can then be targeted by specific neuroimaging or other forms of 
investigation. For example, with respect to domain-specific awareness and 
particularly bodily awareness and representation, investigations thus far have 
280-
Chapter 8: Discussion 
ascribed the RH with a specialised role in imbruing bodily representations with 
emotional flavour and sense of personhood and thus separating self from non-self 
representations (Craik et al., 1999; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Keenan et al., 
2001; 2003; Kircher et al., 2001; 2002; Nakamura et al., 2001; Platec et al., 2004; 
Sugiura, 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001). More specifically, the right prefrontal 
cortex, given its strong limbic connectivity (Tucker et al., 1996), has been 
described, in a number of lesion and neuroimaging studies as a specific 
convergence site for most of the neural processes essential to affectively 
personalise higher order experience of the corporeal self (motor and 
somatosensory representations) in space and in time (Damasio, 1994; 1999; 
Devinsky, 2000; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Keenan et al., 2003; Levine et al., 
1998; Levine, 2004; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Stuss & Alexander, 1999; for a 
critical review see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). The relation between awareness and 
confabulation is further discussed below. 
In summary, motor-related confabulations differ from memory-related 
confabulations' on several dimensions, (i) They occur only periodically in the 
background of a relatively intact autobiographical memory, (ii) They are more 
specific in content and delusional in form, (i i i) Crucially, they are predominately 
guided by negative emotions and paranoid thoughts. Although these emotions are 
associated with patients' impaired self-representations, the latter are explicitly 
denied by patients. Instead, negative feelings and unpleasant self-representations 
are attributed to others' actions or attitudes. In other words, although in such 
patients unpleasant feelings are expressed, they are kept at a distance from the self 
(i.e. externalised). Finally, in at least some of these patients, self-organisation is 
severely disrupted and split between positive premorbid self-representations and 
current unpleasant self-images. 
8.6.2Unpleasant Confabulation in Patients with OMPFC Lesions: 8.6.3 
Motivational Similarities between Different Confabulatoi-y Forms 
Although memory-related confabulation was found to be mostly wishful 
there was a minimal occurrence of negative emotions and apparently unpleasant 
confabulations in these patients (see also Fotopoulou et al., 2004). Such instances 
may represent a link between the mechanisms of the two types of confabulation 
outlined above. More specifically, bilateral patients constructed momentary and 
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contradictory self-representations according to fleeting inner pleasure-seeking 
states and past self-representations. However, patients may occasionally 
experience moments of increased insight and gain explicit or implicit awareness 
of the difference between their 'remembered' and current 'sel f . Indeed, 
fluctuations in awareness and confabulation are frequently reported in the same 
patient (e.g. Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Feinberg & Giacino, 1997; Stuss et al., 
1978; Talland, 1961). Similarly to the right hemisphere patients this realisation 
could bring about negative feelings. Patients may also experience negative 
feelings due to environmental and social obstacles to their intended actions. For 
instance, they might experience frustration when they are not allowed to leave the 
ward. However, since these patients are not able to cognitively integrate these 
feelings in their self-representation, they may attribute them to others and as a 
consequence construct aggressive and paranoid confabulations. 
For example, patients LH, FM, and PT occasionally justified their 
hospitalisation by claiming that they came to visit some ill relative. Although 
these confabulations had at first sight negative valence, they may have served the 
purpose of externalising the awareness of their medical condition away from the 
self-image. Weinstein, Kahn and Malitz (1956) have also described similar 
tendencies in cases of memory-related confabulation. In their view, this 
'externalisation' of negative emotions and thoughts represents an important 
adaptive step towards realising one's own impairments. Interestingly, they claim 
that unpleasant confabulations of this kind occur during the final stages of 
recovery from confabulation. Finally, as discussed above, this mechanism was 
observed in motor-related confabulation and is thus common to both 
confabulatory types. This suggests that although a number of different cognitive 
deficits characterise the two confabulation types, they may share common 
motivational mechanisms. However, the similarities and differences observed 
between bilateral and unilateral confabulating patients in the present small 
sample, can only be put forward tentatively and call for investigation of these 
issues in future studies. 
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8.7 Confabulation and Awareness 
More generally, the present investigation of memory and motor-related 
confabulation can be informative with respect to autobiographical memory 
awareness, bodily awareness and by implication, self-awareness. Although the 
complex subject o f self-awareness escapes the scope of this thesis, some tentative 
remarks could be made based on the present investigations. Episodic memory 
entails autonoetic awareness (self-knowing), i.e. awareness of oneself in the past 
(Tulving, 1985). Thus, episodic memory allows one to mentally travel back in 
time to an earlier experienced event and 're-live' the experience from a subjective 
point of view. In autobiographical memoiy, i.e. the subcomponent of episodic 
memory that concerns events and experiences of one's life, autonoetic awareness 
facilitates the sense of self-continuity in time. In other terms, "the self doing the 
experiencing now is the same self that did so at an earlier time" (Wheeler et al., 
1997, p. 349). Thus, the ability to re-experience the emotions and sensations of 
the original event plays a central role in establishing normal recollective 
experience of the past. 
Based on recent studies on the role of the OMPFC in affective regulation, 
it was proposed that the content of confabulation is coloured by the lack of 
deactivation of internally generated feelings and their corresponding 
representations. From this theoretical starting point, it is possible to further 
postulate that these feelings give confabulations and delusions their 'credibility' 
stamp against obvious reality challenges. In other words, it is because the 
association of previous memories and self-representations with feelings of 
'rightness' and reward cannot be inhibited and progressively unlearned that these 
memories are activated and forcefully accepted as true. More specifically, in the 
present thesis it was shown that confabulating patients failed to inhibit the 
emotions associated with previous experiences, despite the potential irrelevance of 
the latter to the present context. Thus, memories or thoughts associated with 
positive emotions, or congruent with one's premorbid self-representation acquired 
privileged access to retrieval. It is thus possible that these same, not updated 
emotions are responsible for generating feelings of normal recollective 
experience. In other words, the false memories activated have the emotional 
quality of experienced memories and gain credibility as such. Thus, in 
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confabulating patients the ability to recollectively travel back in time appears 
impaired, in that patients cannot 'free themselves' adequately from the emotions 
of the present and the successes of the past. 
This proposal was supported by the present findings. More specifically, in 
motor-related confabulation (patient AO, Chapter 7) the recollective experience 
accompanying confabulations was comparable, in quality, to that accompanying 
accurate autobiographical memories. Moreover, the confabulatory protocols of 
bilateral patient LH revealed that his confabulations included more information 
about his self-representation and emotions than perceptual or temporal details. 
This was observed to a much lesser degree in his accurate memories (Chapter 6). 
Moreover, there are a few previous studies on confabulation that have addressed 
this issue (Dalla Barba et al., 1997b; Johnson et al., 1997; see also Chapter 7). 
These studies support the present findings. Most strikingly, as early as 1915, Moll 
in his systematic clinical study on confabulation observed that his patients 
recalled their confabulations better than real memories and he thought this related 
to the strong emotional quality guiding the fabrication of memories. However, the 
investigation of this issue in the present thesis was experimentally targeted in only 
one patient (see Chapter 7) and thus these conclusions are tentative. The issue of 
recollective experience in confabulation awaits further experimental investigation. 
The above discussion of memoi7 awareness is also relevant to the more 
general concept of self-awareness (Stuss, 1991) and thus to the symptom of 
anosognosia of deficit (see Chapter 1). Following the above conclusions on 
memory-awareness, one can further postulate that in confabulating patients, 
anosognosia or anosodiaphoria for current deficits represents a phenomenon 
complementai-y to motivated confabulation. More specifically, confabulating 
patients were unaware of their current impaired 'selves' because their self-
awareness was attached to the emotional values and qualities of their past and 
intact self-representation. These observations are consistent with the clinical 
descriptions of the two presented case-studies (Chapters 6 and 7). Both patients 
relied on their premorbid cognitive and health conditions when answering 
questions about their current cognitive and medical state. Moreover, this proposal 
may explain why such patients seem so indifferent towards their deficits, even in 
moments when they 'intellectually' acknowledge their impotence. Conversely, 
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even when they are overwhelmed by the corresponding negative emotions of 
disability and dependence, they attribute such emotions to different non self-
related sources. In brief, their self-representation has become permanently 
associated with positive emotions. Thus negative emotions are externalised to 
other sources and intellectual knowledge of deficits is treated with emotional 
indifference. 
Interestingly, this thesis showed that confabulation and its associated 
anosognosia were confined to issues relating to the 'somatic self in right-
hemisphere patients, while they more generally affected the 'autobiographical 
self in patients with bilateral lesions. These observations reveal how different 
deficits, i.e. the neurocognitive basis of body-representation and the 
neurocognitive basis of self-representation in time respectively, can both cause 
alterations in the dynamic relation between cognition and motivation. However, it 
should be emphasised that the neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and 
psychological basis of memory, bodily-, and more generally, self-awareness are 
complex issues that escape the scope of this thesis. The above postulations 
represent mere working hypotheses for further studies with confabulating patients 
and beyond. 
In more general terms, the present thesis on confabulation exemplifies 
how the functional dominance of the prefrontal cortex, through inhibitory control, 
can modulate, rather than replace, more fundamental cognitive and emotional 
processes undertaken by phylogenetically and ontogenetically older structures 
(e.g. mesencephalic regions) (Jackson, 1879). In doing so, the prefrontal cortex 
creates the necessary conditions of cognitive and emotional flexibility, so that the 
more automatic sensory, motor and motivational patterns of functioning can be 
more effectively directed towards the attainment of long-term goals (see Shallice, 
1988; Tucker et al., 2000 for discussions). The specific contribution of this thesis 
to this general topic is to address the inhibitory functions of the OMPFC on 
memory. The functions of the OMPFC are less understood than the ones of the 
lateral prefrontal cortex. More specifically, the lack of motor and cognitive 
inhibition following lesions to the lateral prefrontal cortex is known to disrupt the 
appropriate psychological distance from the environment and lead to stimulus-
bound cognition, utilisation behaviour, perserveration and over-reliance on 
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environmental cues (e.g. Mesulam, 2000; Stuss et al., 2002). Similarly, lesions to 
the OMPFC may cause lack of emotional and cognifive inhibition and disrupt the 
appropriate psychological distance from intrapsychic processes. This would lead 
to an excessive reliance on intrapsychic infoimation and signals, even in cases 
where these are in conflict with external reality. As a consequence, the individual 
would be at the mercy of pressing emotions and intuitions. In the present thesis, it 
was argued that this is the fate of confabulating patients. Namely, their 
autobiographical memory, and as a consequence, their self-awareness, are 
profoundly disrupted, by yielding to internal sensations, emotions and goals, and 
largely 'ignoring' the need to update these emotional signals according to ever-
changing reality constraints. 
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Chapter 9 : Conclusions and Implications 
9.1 Conclusions 
The main aim of the present thesis was to address the role of motivation in 
neurological confabulation. This aim was portioned out to a number of empirical 
questions as presented in the Introduction (Chapter 1). Based on the findings of 
the thesis the following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Direct damage or functional disconnection, involving the ventromedial and 
orhitofrontal cortices, is impUcated in confabulation. This hypothesis was 
tentatively confirmed by the present thesis, but it requires further specification. 
2. Severe memory impairment commonly, hut not necessarily, accompanies 
confabulation. However, it is not sufficient for its occurrence. More 
specifically, memoiy-related confabulation was found to be accompanied by a 
varied pattern of memory impairment, most likely involving the damage of 
anterior limbic areas, such as the septal nuclei and other basal forebrain nuclei. 
In motor-related confabulation memory impairment was selective and most 
likely secondary to other body-representation impairments. 
3. Executive dysfunction is a common, but variable component of confabulatory 
syndromes. Indeed, the present thesis showed that standardised 'frontal' tests of 
cognitive executive functions, although partly informative, were not sufficient 
to characterise the impairment associated with confabulation. The latter 
involved mainly the inhibition and control of emotions and emotion-related 
representations. This finding highlights the need to develop adequate emotion-
based tools for the assessment of confabulation. 
4. The content of spontaneous confabulation is wishful, i.e. it shows a positive 
emotional bias. This hypothesis was confirmed by the present thesis in the case 
of memoiy-related confabulation in bilateral patients. The content of severe 
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motor-related confabulation in unilateral patients showed a predominance of 
negative emotions. This finding requires further study. 
5. The content of confabulation shows a positive bias, over and above temporal 
source confusions. This hypothesis was assessed only in the case of memory-
related confabulation and was confirmed by the present thesis. It was also 
demonstrated that the content of memory-related confabulation showed a 
positive bias, over and above reality monitoring errors. 
6. The content of confabulation is self-serving, over and above the memory and 
executive deficits that might influence memory recall. This hypothesis was 
confirmed and it was further argued that this self-serving bias relies on the 
disruption of the emotional mechanisms responsible for the updating of internal 
representations and memories according to their consequences in the 
environment. 
7. Suggestibility had only a secondary influence on confabulation. This finding 
requires further study. 
8. Premorbid personality traits were not causative of confabulation but could 
have contributed to the colouring of confabulatory content. This finding 
requires further study. 
9.1.1 The Characteristics of Confabulation 
Confabulation is also associated with a number of clinical characteristics 
(see Chapter 1). In the present thesis, a critical literature review and the study of 
13 severely confabulating patients suggested a reformulation of some of these 
characteristics. These conclusions are summarised below based on the framework 
introduced in Chapter 1, i.e. reformulation of Talland's (1965), Moscovitch's 
(1989) and Burgess & Shallice's (1996) proposals. 
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(a) . Confabulation is characterised by variable content coherence and internal consistency, ranging 
from plausible and coherent narratives to dream-like recollections. 
(b) . The falsification range of confabulation includes both content distortions and context 
displacements. 
(c) The content of confabulation is most commonly based on autobiographical memory sources but 
can also contain semantic elements; The content includes both distorted and misplaced previous 
experiences and information, as w/ell as the weaving of thoughts, fantasies, dreams and other 
internally-generated mental representations. 
(d.) The exact nature of confabulation is determined by the combination of damaged and preserved 
normal constructive memory processes. 
(e) Patients are typically unable to monitor the inappropriateness, implausibility, or incoherence of 
their false statements (over and above their falsehood) and when confronted appear perplexed, 
indifferent or simply confabulate further to support their claims. 
(f) Confabulation is not restricted to intentional gap-filling but the content of confabulation is both 
motivated and meaningful from the subjective perspective of the patient. 
(g) The role of premorbid personality traits in confabulation is secondary, it may colour the content of 
confabulations and it may lead to secondary ad hoc confabulations . 
(h) Memory-related confabulation may be accompanied by associated actions and other forms of 
confabulation, such as visual or constructive confabulation. 
(i) All confabulating patients seem to suffer from anosognosia, an unawareness of their memory 
deficit, or, at best, a profound lack of concern and lack of appreciation of its severity and extent. The 
more general relation between confabulation and anosognosia awaits further investigation. 
(j) The duration of confabulation varies among patients. Typically the symptom disappears or is 
reduced in frequency and variety of content following an acute period but chronic states are also 
described. 
(k) The frequency and thematic range of confabulation varies across and within patients. Typically 
confabulation is considered ephemeral and multi-thematic. This is particularly true for bilateral 
patients and patients with generalised brain dysfunction. 
(I). The nature of confabulation is typically as described by (k) and also easily sidetracked by 
questioning or environmental cues. However, across and within patients, confabulations delusional in 
character also occur. These may occur more often following right-hemisphere lesions. 
(m). Confabulation is distinct from the similar phenomena observed in acute confusional states. 
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9.2 Wider Implications and Future Directions 
In recent years, confabulation and anosognosia have been typical ly 
investigated wi th the a im o f iden t i fy ing their underlying cognitive deficits. By 
contrast, this thesis focused on a relatively neglected aspect o f such symptoms, 
namely the emotional features o f their content. The present thesis examined the 
content and emotional quality o f confabulation experimentally and revealed that 
confabulating patients w i th bilateral lesions to the orbital and ventral prefrontal 
cortex show a positive and self-enhancing emotional bias in their confabulations. 
This is conceived as an inabil i ty to inhibi t irrelevant reward-associated memories, 
thoughts and self-representations. The present thesis introduced a further 
empirical dimension to previous f indings, namely that confabulatory content 
f o l l o w i n g right-hemisphere lesions may take the f o r m o f paranoid confabulations 
and delusional reduplications. Indeed, although these patients did construct 
wi sh fu l confabulations these were a minori ty in comparison wi th the aggressive 
and paranoid themes that dominated their false memories. The latter were based 
on a non-updated bodi ly representation, which confl icted wi th the impl ic i t ly 
experienced negative feelings o f dependence and inabil i ty. 
Thus, these f indings suggest that the nature, and the emotional basis o f 
confabulation appears more complex than original ly suggested (Fotopoulou et al., 
2004), as both pleasant and unpleasant emotions have determining influences on 
the content o f confabulation. Further investigations w i l l be required in order to 
assess whether bilateral versus unilateral prefrontal cortex damage is necessary 
and suff icient to explain the differences between these two types o f confabulatory 
behaviour, or whether other factors w i l l also have a determining role on this 
divergence. These could include differences between chronic and transient states, 
differences in memory or executive abilities and even premorbid personality 
factors. However, independently f r o m these differences, the present thesis 
revealed that the content o f confabulation is depended upon common motivational 
factors. 
This conclusion has important consequences f o r the clinical management 
and rehabilitation o f these patients. This is particularly applicable to chronic cases 
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l ike some o f the patients assessed in this thesis, who pose great challenges to 
carers and other health professionals. However, although it is assumed that there 
are aetiological differences between chronic and transient cases o f anosognosia 
and confabulation (Berti et al., 1996; Cocchini et al., 2002; Go ld et al., 1994; 
Rode et al., 1998; Venneri & Shanks, 2004 fo r discussion), there is some evidence 
that suggests that they pose similar obstacles to rehabilitation, and that early 
intervention and management in these symptoms has great prognostic value 
(Gialanella & Mat t io l i , 1992; Jehkonen et al., 2001). In this respect, the study o f 
the positive aspects o f these syndromes in both transient and chronic states has 
great theoretical and clinical implications. 
In addition, symptoms, such as confabulation and anosognosia, have wider 
theoretical importance. Understanding their basis could contribute to 
understanding one o f the fundamental aspects o f human nature: self-
consciousness. The present investigations addressed the emotional underpinnings 
o f memory consciousness, as they are revealed by their disruption in 
confabulation. In the past, very li t t le, i f any, research has focussed on such 
emotional factors in confabulation. A reason may be that the importance o f the 
subjective experience o f illness, so much favoured in other fields such as 
psychoanalysis, appeared fo r decades to fa l l outside the traditional scope o f val id 
neuroscientific research. Nevertheless, given the recent interest increase in topics 
such as 'a f fect ive neuroscience' (Panksepp, 1998; Lane & Nagel, 2000), the 
traditional theorising about neurobehavioral problems could be broadend to 
include emotional influences and the subjective experience o f mental disabilities 
(see Damasio, 1999; LeDoux, 1996; 2000; T u l v i n g , 1985; Lane & Nagei , 2000; 
Kircher & David , 2003; Panksepp, 2003). Specif ical ly, given the recent 
emergence o f f r u i t f u l interdisciplinary fields such as neuropsychiatry and 
neuropsychoanalysis, this thesis has argued in favour o f a theoretical and 
empirical integration between neuroscientitic and motivational accounts in the 
service o f a more comprehensive understanding o f the vicissitudes o f self-
awareness and consciousness. 
Furthermore, the thesis has methodological implications. Tradi t ional ly , 
experimental paradigms are applied in research as a means o f s i m p l i f y i n g and 
control l ing the mult iple factors that could influence behaviour in ' rea l ' everyday 
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l i f e situations. However, in functions as complex as autobiographical memory, or 
executive ftinctions, there is frequently a very weak correspondence between the 
experimental paradigms used to assess behaviour and the everyday l i f e situations 
that elicit such behaviours ( fo r discussions see Burgess & Robertson, 2002; 
Neisser, 1997). Thus, recently a number o f studies began to employ experimental 
paradigms which approximate real-world situations (e.g. Wilson et al., 1996). 
More specifically, in the study o f episodic memory, these efforts have used 
original autobiographical memories as experimental material (e.g. see Piefke et 
al . , 2003). These studies revealed behavioural dimensions previously ignored by 
traditional experimental paradigms. The present thesis further applied such 
methodological considerations to the study o f confabulation. These revealed that 
emotion and motivation have a determining influence on confabulatory content. 
These aspects were neglected in previous experimental studies that manipulated 
'neutral ' material. Therefore, the thesis demonstrated that increasing the 
'ecological va l id i ty ' o f neuropsychological studies could lead to further insight 
into the complex cognitive and emotional processes that underlie the behavioural 
sequelae o f neurological damage. 
In conclusion, the present thesis represents an init ial attempt to empir ical ly 
address the multifaceted emotional underpinnings o f confabulation. In this 
respect, it aimed to contribute to a s ignif icant three-fold scientific aim. First, to 
cast l ight upon the neglected affect ive aspects o f neuropsychological symptoms 
such as confabulation. Second, to employ and further develop established 
experimental procedures to account fo r such phenomena, which have been 
hitherto described only by clinicians. Final ly, to a l low a f r u i t f u l interdisciplinary 
dialogue between clinicians and laboratory researchers, as well as between 
psychodynamic and cognitive schools o f thought. Despite the obvious benefits o f 
such an approach, one must be aware and be wary o f the dense f ie ld o f complexi ty 
uncovered. The present empirical f indings could represent an interdisciplinary 
starting-point, but the cross-disciplinary terms and theories employed to 
accommodate these f indings face, as a consequence, substantial reconstruction. As 
confabulating patients exempl i fy , any reconstruction o f the past inevitably leads 
to some degree o f distortion and speculative gap- f i l l ing . Nevertheless, f o r as long 
as the necessary information is not f u l l y available, such a strategy appears to be 
well-motivated and highly adaptive. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
A l . Confabulatings Patients: Age Adjusted WAIS-TIIIQ, Index Scores 
and WTAR predictions 
Patient Group VIQ (VIQ) PIQ (PIQ) FSIQ (FSIQ) VC PO WM PS 
Predicted Predicted Predicted 
LH C1 103 104 91 105 98 105 103 99 106 84 
RM C1 84 84 65* 87 74 84 70 64* 99 68* 
OT C1 71 90 65* 93 66* 91 68* 69* 73 60* 
IR C1 n.a. 73 62* 78 n.a. 73 n.a. 65* n.a. 66* 
BA C1 79 107 74 108 75 107 78 82 82 68* 
SA C1 91 104 75 104 83 106 98 62* 63* 63* 
PT C1 82 90 n.a. 108 n.a. 106 94 n.a. 84 73 
WM C2 76 92 70 93 71 92 84 82 65* 81 
FM C2 78 80 n.a. 84 n.a. 80 80 65* 73 n.a. 
CM C2 83 91 83 93 81 93 76 91 78 69* 
AO C3 107 94 58* 96 84 94 103 50* 113 n.a. 
DO C3 123 104 62* 104 94 106 134 67* 108 63* 
JO C3 93 91 53* 94 73 92 105 54* 75 57* 
Note. Group, KC = Korsakoff Confabulation Group, OBC = Other Bilateral Confabulation Group, RC = 
Right Hemisphere Confabulation Group; VIQ = WAIS-III Verbal IQ Score, (VIQ) Prediction = WTAR 
and Education level Predicted WAIS-III Verbal IQ Score, PIQ = WAIS_1II Performance IQ Score, 
(PIQ) Prediction = WTAR and Education level Predicted WAIS-III Performance IQ Score: FSIQ = 
WAIS III Full Scale IQ; WTAR and Education level Predicted WAIS-III Full Scale IQ Score. VC = 
WAIS-III Verbal Comprehension Index Score; PO = WAIS-UI Perceptual Organisation Index Score, 
WM = WAIS-III Working Memor>' Index Score; PS = WAIS-III Processing Speed Index Score. * = 
Scores more than 2 SD below the normative mean; n.a. = not as.sessed or discontinued. 
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A2. Confabulation Ratings 
Table 1. Confabulation Ratings: Confabulation Group 
Patient Group Frequency Plausibility Novelty Conviction Production Mode Mean SD 
LH C1 5 4 5 5 5 4.8 0.5 
RM C1 4 4 5 4 5 4.4 0.5 
OT C1 4 4 5 5 5 4.6 0.5 
BA C1 5 5 5 4 5 4.8 0.4 
MS C1 5 4 5 4 4 4.4 0.5 
IR C1 5 5 5 4 5 4.8 0.4 
PT C1 4 4 4 5 5 4.4 0.5 
WM C2 4 5 4 5 3 4.2 0.8 
FM C2 4 3 4 4 3 3.6 0.5 
CM C2 4 5 4 5 4 4.4 0.5 
AO C3 3 4 5 5 5 4.4 0.9 
DO C3 3 5 5 5 5 4.6 0.9 
JO C3 3 5 4 4 4 4 0.7 
Mean 4.1 4.9 4.6 4.5 4.5 
SD 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.8 
Note. Higher scores indicate more severe confabulatory behaviour 
Table 2. Confabulation Ratings: Control Groups 
Patient 
Group Frequency Plausibility Novelty Conviction Production Mode Mean SD 
F1 Frontal 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 0.4 
F2 Frontal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
F3 Frontal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
F4 Frontal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
F 5 Frontal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
F6 Frontal 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 0.45 
F7 Frontal 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 0.45 
Mean 1 1 1.3 1.1 1 
S D 0 0 0.5 0.4 0 
A1 Amnesic 1 1 2 2 1 1.4 0.5 
A 2 Amnesic 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 0.4 
A 3 Amnesic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Mean 1 1 1.7 1.3 1 
S D 0 0 0.6 0.6 0 
Note. Higher scores indicate more severe confabulatoiy behaviour 
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A3. Brief Case Reports 
One typical patient o f each confabulation subgroup is br ief ly presented below to 
illustrate the neuropathological, neuropsychological and behavioural characteristics o f 
each group. 
Case Study 1. R M : Confabulation Subgroup: Ct 
RM was a left-handed 19-year-old man with 11 years o f education who worked as a window 
fitter. He had no previous psychiatric or neurological history. RM had recently moved with his 
mother from South England to the North-East, fol lowing his parents divorce. One week 
following RM's move to the North, RM was admitted to the hospital fol lowing a severe road 
traffic accident (October 2002). His GCS (Glasgow Coma Scale) on admission was 4/12. He 
was found to have a traumatic subarachnoid haemorrhage, left frontal and bilateral temporal 
contusions and his ventricles were compressed and small. He required a bifrontal 
decompressure craniotomy and insertion o f EVD five days post-admission following increased 
intracranial pressure. Subsequent CT scans revealed bi-frontal damage with small contusions 
in the left frontal lobe and a larger single contusion in the right medial aspect o f the frontal 
lobe. There was extensive low density in left anterior frontal region. Low density was also 
noted in the right and left temporal regions. Bilateral riding bone flaps were also noted. There 
was less generalised swelling and the ventricles were now larger. 
RM initially presented with residual right-sided weakness and variable confusional state. He 
made slow but steady progress in respect to his physical state but his confusion and 
disorientation persisted. He was transferred to a rehabilitation unit in March 2003, where his 
formal neuropsychological assessment took place in the period May to July 2003. He was 
found to be physically ful ly recovered and his confusion had cleared. He was orientated in 
place and person. His speech, comprehension, writing and reading were normal on bedside 
tests. However, his profound amnesia and spontaneous confabulation were immediately 
observable. He also showed clear indication of frontal lobe pathology, in that he had problems 
in initiating behaviour, planning ahead his activities and monitoring himself According to his 
relatives his personality was also affected in that he was irritable, aggressive and 
argumentative. The involved clinical psychologists confirmed that RM showed emotional 
lability, irritability, distractibility and impulsivity. He presented with exaggerated mood swings 
and would often cry without apparent reason, only to become cheerful again after a few 
seconds. The patient also appeared anosognosic about his condition, in that he believed and 
supported that he had recovered fully from his accident and that he was "back to my own-self . 
He claimed that he could work, drive and live independently without any help or care. He 
insisted his memory was good and kept repeating personal semantic information (e.g. he cited 
his address and the names of his relatives correctly) to "prove his point". 
Neuropsychological Assessment. Formal neuropsychological testing confirmed the above 
clinical observations. RM's general intellectual function (FSIQ 74) as measured by the WAIS-
111 was mildly deteriorated from the predicted premorbid level (WTAR FSIQ 74). This was 
mainly attributable to his low scores on Performance subtests (PIQ 65). By contrast, his verbal 
intellectual abilities remained intact (VIQ 84). His anterograde memory was severely 
compromised for both visual and verbal information (WMS-I I I Auditory and Visual Delayed 
Index Scores 55 and 68 respectively), while his working memory remained in high levels 
(Working Memory Index Score 96). His autobiographical memory, as measured by the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (adjusted due to the patient's young age) was severely 
compromised (Total Personal Semantic information Score = 38 and Total Autobiographical 
Incidents Score = 5), and RM produced several confabulations during the interview, including 
fabrications o f novel events. For example, when asked to narrate the wedding o f his sister, he 
narrated a lengthily event allegedly following the wedding during which RM protected his 
sister from her husband who physically abused her. Both his mother and sister confirmed this 
event was completely unrelated to RM's life and even added that RM had a good relation with 
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his brother in-law. His performance on tests of executive functions, as assessed by the D-
KEFS (see below for detailed description of this test battery), was severely impaired on most 
tests administered but he did show average performance in some selective tests and conditions. 
He showed low scores on the switching conditions o f the Trial Making (SS = 2), Color-Word 
Interference (SS = I ) , and Sorting (SS = 1) subtests, and on the perserveration measures of the 
Verbal Fluency (SS = 1), and Sorting (SS = I ) subtest. His overall performance was also 
defective on the critical conditions o f the Trial Making, Verbal Fluency (both Letter & 
Category), Sorting, 20 Questions, Word Context, Tower and Proverb subtests. However, his 
scores were average in the error measure o f the Trail Making subtest (SS = 9), the set-loss 
errors measures o f the Verbal Fluency test (SS = 10), the primary contrast (SS = 13) and error 
measure (SS = 8) o f the Design Fluency test, and the inhibition (SS = 10) and inhibition errors 
(SS = 10) measures o f the Color-Word Interference subtest. His performance on the Haying 
Test (SS = 3) and on the Cognitive Estimates Test (Total Score = 12) were also poor. In 
summary, RM appeared to have difficulties in switching between mental sets, inductive and 
deductive thinking, spontaneous and reactive flexibility and he showed perserveration during 
testing. His abilities to inhibit automatic responses were compromised but to a lesser degree. 
Behavioural Observations. RM was cooperative during sessions and but his motivation 
towards testing varied. He showed labile emotion, being often euphoric but very sensitive to 
poor performance and negative feedback. He was particularly concerned of performing poorly 
on memory tests and occasionally refused to complete them. He was also hyperactive and very 
distractible. For example, each time the clinics phone rang he would interrupt his efforts to 
complete a task and would say: 'This could be my mother' even though he knew his mother 
only called him once a day and only the days she would not visit him. RM was also 
'hyperactive' in conversation in that he switched from one subject to another in great speed, 
did not take turns, did not ceased speaking or even singing during formal testing and insisted 
on narrating lengthily and irrelevant to current conversation events o f his life. Most o f these 
were confabulations. 
RM presented as a very pleasant man but caring staff found his management very challenging 
mainly due to the content o f his confabulations, which typically concerned violent events, and 
his luck o f self-monitoring. RM engagement in rehabilitation activities was also diff icult as he 
was constantly insisting his brain function was normal and he had no memory or other 
cognitive problem. Typically he confabulated about his alleged abilities and staff found it 
ineffective to confront him. Relatives described substantial changes in RM's personality in that 
he had lost initiative, goal-setting abilities and he was very irritable and often verbally abusive. 
Confabulation and Insight. RM's confabulations involved different events and people from his 
premorbid life but were also constructed using novel information. Some o f the latter appeared 
to relate to media or arts information that RM had described as part of his personal interests. 
For example, while on one session he narrated a specific joke that he had heard in a favourite 
Hollywood movie in the next session he narrated a personal event in which he had made up 
this particular joke and his parents praised him for his wit. His parents reported such an event 
never took place. RM's confabulations involved various themes and concerned different life-
time periods. He produced them spontaneously and almost constantly during informal 
conversation but also during formal testing. Despite this variety in RM's confabulations, a 
great amount o f them were remarkably similar in narrative unravelling and shared a common 
ending of self-enhancement. More specifically, in the alleged events RM and one or more 
beloved fi-iend or relative were threatened, abused or mistreated by some stranger. However, 
RM managed to protect himself and the important others by using violence, exhibiting power, 
speed or 'his father's name'. Less often he simply used his wits to convince others to leave or 
to apologise. Frequently, the police arrived at the scene but just after RM had taken the 
situation in his hands and they praised him for his accomplishment. At times the police even 
apologised because they had initially misunderstood his intentions. Finally, his relatives 
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explicitly thank him for his protection. Other confabulatory types concerned alleged prizes, 
honours or competitions RM had won, money his father or a friend gave him, various fights he 
won but which left him his head scars (in reality caused by his road traffic accident), 
accomplishments o f power or speed he or his father had achieved, the fact that he had a 
girlfriend that visit him often (untrue), his intact abilities, his parents agreeing not to divorce 
etc. RM appeared totally convinced o f the truthfulness of his recollections and described these 
false events in confidence and in impressive detail. 
He further could not understand why his recollections would upset people atid he insisted in 
trying to convince others that the violence he claimed he had to exercise during these events 
was completely justifiable. Interestingly, when the rehabilitation team decided to ask RM to 
cease describing violent scenes this request became integrated in his confabulations. In 
particular, RM would describe a dangerous situation in which he described the challenged to 
use violence, the course o f action he could have taken, but he didn't! He instead narrated how 
he managed to overcome the danger by threatening others, by 'grabbing' and 'pushing' them 
away and by arguing that violence is harmful and he didn't want to be forced to harm anybody. 
Thus, it appeared that he managed to narrate the violence events he intended to describe but he 
also complied with hospital rules in that he denied the self-attribution o f such events. 
Confabulation Examples. The examples below illustrate the content and the characteristics o f 
RM's confabulations. RM's parents confirmed that the following descriptions referred to 
fabricated events: 
a) One day 1 was at home, and I had a mobile, and it was ringing and it was late and I thought 
ah yes, it's my dad, 'cause he was coming to see me and he was late and I picked it up and 
went "hello dad I love you" and he went, "hello son, I love you too, do you know the mobile 
shop on the corner?". "Yeah, you stuck there?" "No, I 'm not stuck there, me and a police 
officer was chasing Fred", the lad who did the murder, that was his name, and I can't 
remember the second name, but I knew what he looked like. I said to dad, I said "dad, I ' l l be 
there in 5 minutes, I ' l l sprint there". " W i l l you?" I said "yeah" " w i l l you be knackered?" 1 
said, "don't worry dad", so I just drained the rest of me tab and stuck it out and just ran all he 
way up, which was one and a half mile away, and then, I said to him, the policeman, "look 
mate, us 3 split up and see i f we can find him", and then I ran into sort of like a school site, 
'cause that's where he hangs around, that's where he hung around, and when I saw him he 
tried to hit me and get away but I sort of rugby tackled him, and the policeman had 3 hand 
cuffs sets and we had one each. So I got him to hit the floor and funnily enough, he span 
round, so I knelt on his back, not knelt sorry, I just got hold of his arms, put them close 
together, put the hand cuffs on them , picked up and put him on my shoulder, opened the 
police back door, put him in, there you go, and then, I just waited there in case he tried to 
escape, and then the police... and then the police come, and they said "bloody hell, he was just 
round corner, he was hiding, bloody hell, did you have to, fight him?, I said, "no, I just rugby 
tackled him" I said look mate, 1 was helping the police and i f you try to arrest us mate, I ' l l f l ip , 
1 wi l l I ' l l f l i p" . My dad said said "He isn't going to arrest you, you just rugby tackled him". 
And the policeman said: "Well , you did good because he's got some strength to fight you off , 
and you put the handcuffs on as well David, well done David. Thank you". 
b). Once at school while I was on stage, 'cause er, everyone was, I don't know why, but upset, 
and 1 wasn't, 1 was all good, and I was up on stage, and 1 said to the head teacher, "can 1 just, 
sing a tune?" And she said, "do you know all the words?" I said "yeah" and I sang "Cruella 
DeVil , Cruella DeVil , i f she doesn't scare you then Mrs. Wilson w i l l . Everyone, they were all 
crying and they were all sat in stitches, they were laughing and laughing and laughing and I 
went down to Mrs Wilson after I 'd finished doing the tune and said, look. Miss, that isn't what 
I was thinking, I was just making them all laugh. She said, "you did, well done David". And, I 
got a week o f f school for no reason which 1 thought. Yes! 
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c). I ' l l tell you, I won a competition, 'cause, it was a competition, and I was walking past 
where it was. [Where was that? ] . In X [Town that he lived before his parents separated]. 
'Cause I was walking to get some tabs, I was walking back with one lit, and then someone said 
to us, "have you got any strength on you?" I said, " 1 think I have mate, why?" "Well , can you 
fi t windows?" " What, for a window fit t ing company?" "Well , can you do it by yourself?" 1 
said "yeah, why?" "Mine are smashed" Do you know what it was? A weight l i f f ing 
competition... So, I fitted this window, and he said, "do you want to enter my weight lift ing 
competition?" I said, " I ' l l start with 15 stone, and I did it, I was just l i f t ing it like that, easy, 
and then, someone lifted up 18, and 1 did it, and it was, I wasn't struggling, but it was heavy, 
and then someone else couldn't l i f t up 20, and I was like this, "Grrrrrrrrr", got it up there, I 
thought, thank God for that, I won. 
d). Cause I was in school when 1 heard that the teacher was writing on the board, so me and 
me mate was talking while he was writing on the board, and he heard me talking and he 
suspended us [Relatives confirmed similar events had happened in reality but the following 
never occurred]. I said, er hold up. I said, hold up, you were just writing on the board and me 
and him were just talking, while you were writing on the board. Why the hell have you tried to 
suspend us? 
[What did he say?] 
He said, right then, we' l l go see the head teacher. 1 said right, go on then, and so I sort of, and 
he was taking the Mickey and was walking one step every 30 seconds, and so I picked him up, 
put him on me shoulder, and then, carried him to the head teacher's office, and she said, "why 
have you got him on your shoulder?" I said, 'cause, he reckons he's going to suspend me. She 
said "what for?" I said because, sort o f like, while he was writing on the board, I was talking. 
She said, "that doesn't matter" I said, yeah 1 know, and I said to him, well can I come and see 
you Miss Wilson and sort it out, and then, he tried to assault me. 
[Who tried to assault you?] The teacher [Your head teacher?] Yeah. [Why?] Not the head 
teacher, the deputy head, Mr. Ferguson. And you know what? Mrs Wilson saw i t , and do you 
know what she did? Sacked him, and she put a complaint in to the teachers community, and 
he'll never get a job again. 
[So why did the teacher, the other teacher try to assault you?] 
Because I told them the truth. He's never getting a job as a teacher again. 
e). I was in me main house because mum and dad divorced and I 'd just got a job so I stayed 
down south and er, and heard a kickin, someone kicked the front door twelve o clock at night, 
so I just looked at my bedroom window because it faced the front door I thought something is 
wrong and urn I said "Who the hell is that?". And it was 10 blokes trying to break into my 
house. Surprised, they didn't hit me you know, but I wasn't scared. And I said "You'd better 
go away". "And what you think you're strong?" You know? I don't think stuff like that. But I 
said " i f you threw a brick in the house I am going to smash your face". I mean I wouldn't, it 
wouldn't have mattered, but that's what I said just to scare them o f f and then he said "Er, what 
i f I kicked the front door down and take everything?". I said "You think so"? He said "yeah". I 
said "Just wait and see" and I sprinted down the stairs, really fast, slammed the front door and 
then just pushed them all back, through them down, I didn't hit them but I've through them all 
to the ground and I run back to my mum and dad. They said "are you scared? I said "No I 'm 
not scared, but they tried to break into my house. You know". And my dad said "wait I ' l l help 
you. And I said "Really dad? Thank you" and we didn't hit them. We just picked them up. I 
had 4 on me shoulders, so did me dad. And then we just walked them back to the bus .station 
which is a twenty minute walk with them all on my shoulders, head held hands to the back o f 
their head, and then just chucked them ofF our shoulders and went back to our house you 
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know, so I've got a scar there. See it there? [RM points to his head scars that he has following 
his accident]. 
[You got a scar from that? How did they do that?] 
Because elbow... sharp... you know and they just scraped it o f f the back o f my head. Little 
buggers eh? Didn't feel no pain. 
[Really?] 
1 was just concentrating you know... So, do you know when me mum's coming in then? 
Case Study 2. F M : Confabulation Subgroup C2 (Korsakoff Patients) 
Case History: FM was a 71-year-old South African man with 9 years o f education who used to 
work as a builder. His first language was English. He was right-handed and had no previous 
psychiatric or neurological history prior to his hospitalisation on November 1985. He was 
admitted to a local hospital in Cape Town two weeks following a referral for disorientation and 
restlessness by district surgeons and an apparent history of heavy alcohol consumption. CT 
scans at the time, as well as repeated CT examinations on November 2003 revealed 
generalised cerebral and cerebellar atrophy with periventricular white matter disease. No focal 
lesion was noted. On admission FM presented with marked memory, orientation and executive 
problems, including irritability, aggressive behaviour and frequent confabulations. In addition, 
he was totally unaware o f his condition and failed to understand the reasons o f his 
hospitalisation. He was unable to give a coherent account o f his personal history and showed 
mild ataxia. He was considered unable to live independently, or manage his finances and 
shortly after the death of his mother in the following year FM was transferred to a nursing 
home where he received 24-hour care. He was moved between a psychiatric hospital and 
several nursing homes in the following 22 years due to financial constraints and changes in 
health authority policies. His mental state remained stable showing minimum improvement. 
FM was assessed in a psychiatric ward in the period February to April 2002. He was very 
pleasant and cooperative during assessment. Staff characterised him as one o f the most joy fu l 
and helpfiil patients in the ward. He presented with mild ataxia and his vision was severely 
compromised by impairments o f non-neurological origin. FM denied such difficulties, was 
generally euphoric and paid little attention to his appearance or his disabilities. Thus, when 
asked whether he would like glasses to correct his vision FM denied the need for them. Upon 
demonstration o f his difficulties he acknowledged them momentarily and laughed, only to 
deny them again after five minutes. 
Neuropsychological Assessment. FM's verbal intellectual abilities (VIQ = 78) were largely 
preserved as assessed by the WAIS-I I I and compared with his WTAR predicted V-IQ of 80. 
Certain performance tests of the W A I S - I l l , such as the Digit Symbol Coding subtest, had to be 
discontinued given FM's impaired vision. However, as indicated by his low index score of 
Perceptual Organisation (SS = 65) his visual difficulties were also accompanied by 
deterioration in perceptual organisation. His memory abilities also appeared deteriorated as 
assessed by the WMS-I I I . His index scores ranged from 51 on Immediate Memory to 64 on 
Auditory Delayed with the exception o f his Working Memory abilities which appeared intact 
(Index Score 79). FM's autobiographical memory was also defective as tested by the A M I (see 
below). He remembered only a few information about his past (Personal Semantic Information 
Total Score = 18) and these were mainly childhood facts (Personal Semantic Childhood Score 
= 11). His memory of autobiographical events was equally poor showing lack of specificity 
(Autobiographical Events Score = 6). The events he rerrrembered were mostly of his young 
adult life (Score = 4). His performance was also markedly influenced by his tendency to 
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fabricated events about his personal past. FM was impaired on most tests o f executive function 
administered, although some tasks had to be discontinued due to his visual difficulties. FM 
produced average repeated errors during the Verbal Fluency subtest (SS = 9) o f the D-KEFS 
but he was very slow in responding and his scores were impaired in letter and category fluency 
(SS = 2 and SS = I respectively). On the Card Sorting Test he scored poorly on description 
and recognition measures (both SSs = 3), as well as on the repeated errors measure (SS = 4). 
However, his free sorting attempts were within the low average range (SS = 7). He was 
impaired in the Word Content Test (SS = 3) and the Proverbs Test (SS = 6). He was also 
impaired in the Hayling (SS = 1) and Brixton Tests (SS = I ) and on the Cognitive Estimates 
Test (Total Score = 10) during which he produced bizarre estimations. Interestingly his 
performance on the BADS Temporal Judgement subtest was within normal range (Profile 
Score 3). In summary, FM's executive functions o f inhibition, flexibility and abstract thinking 
appeared compromised. 
Behavioural Observations. FM's behaviour was very appropriate and compliant with hospital 
routine and regulations. He was in excellent terms with a number o f fellow patients and staff 
members. His mood was constantly positive (HADS results: Anxiety = 0; Depression = I ; 
consistent with psychiatric evaluation) and he never complained o f the difficult conditions o f 
the psychiatric ward although he described himself as not belonging there. At times he 
appeared as grandiose, as for example when he described how he had invented a method of 
treating insomnia with water, a method which the doctors he believed still ignored. However, 
he did not engage in such descriptions unless asked specific questions about himself and he 
often admitted not knowing or not remembering information that did not concern him 
personally. His false memories were usually poor in detail and appeared more as factual 
information about himself rather than detailed events he had experienced (see examples 
below). 
Confabulation and Insight. More generally, FM's confabulations seemed crystallised in certain 
information about himself and these were repeated from session to session with minimal 
variations. It was as though he had with time created a false self-identity by which he regarded 
himself and which was embedded in a set o f specific false memories. He often emphasised that 
he was "very happy here" and he was satisfied with his abilities, his health and his current life. 
He was convinced that he would soon go back to his home-town, where he would move back 
in to his house and resume his premorbid life as a "a famous photographer". He claimed he 
was well-known there and had many friends. In fact, FM's behaviour in hospital portrayed an 
image o f a man who was calmly and in confidence waiting to return back to his home from a 
temporary absence. It appeared as though in FM's mind it was only a matter of spatial 
dislocation. It did not matter why he was away, or how much time had elapsed since he had 
been to his home-town (FM actually believed it was only 11 years). He experienced himself as 
"a famous man", only dislocated. Elsewhere he believed, in his home-town or in his mind one 
may argue, he was famous, he was popular, he still had a house. In reality, FM never worked 
as a professional photographer and his house, which he indeed inherited from his mother, was 
sold 18 years ago in a public auction due to financial restrictions. FM never acknowledged 
such facts and in.stead claimed that his former einployers were taking care o f his financial 
affairs (no record or account exists o f such employment) and his neighbours (FM has not had 
contact with them since hospitalisation and his previous relationship with them was not close) 
were looking after the house on his behalf He even 'recalled' a 'recent' phone call he made to 
them during which they reassured him his house was in good condition and was being looked 
after by them. He was also convinced that he had a girlfriend in his home-town who was 
waiting for him to marry her as soon as his was back. He claimed she was 20 years younger 
than him and he was 56 years old (he was admitted to the hospital for the first time when he 
was 53 years old). When showed the documents o f his real age he laughed and denied the 
possibility. In subsequent sessions when he was asked for his age FM insisted he was 56 years 
old but added that he knew "the doctor doesn't believe it, but the doctor is wrong". 
Interestingly, he was aware o f the death o f his mother (one-year post-admission) and gave a 
relatively accurate description o f the events surrounding her death. 
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Confabulation Examples. 
(1) . [Can you see this]: Yes. fls your vision from both eyes OK?] Yes. [Can you please read 
this sentence?] No, Dr. I can't read, 1 can't see. [Oh, you can't see.] 
No 1 can see. There is nothing wrong with my eyes. [So, why can't you read this sentence 
then?] I don't know Dr. 
(2) . Health is a very good thing. I enjoy my health perfectly Dr. 1 am fine and I am happy. 
They take good care for me. And the railways [his alleged employee] pay for everything. They 
pay for everything. 
(3) I am a very famous man in X [hometown]. So many pretty woman came to me to be 
photographed... [laughs]. 
(4) 1 feel glad when good things happen, but I also feel glad when bad things happen. 
No doctors know it but I discovered it here. It is very important. You can sleep well with 
water. They do not know. 1 discovered it. 
(5) I'm a famous man. I'm a photographer but I work for the railways. 
[Are you really famous?] I'm famous throughout South Africa. I travel to photograph white 
weddings. I got a lot o f money for it. [Really?]. Yeah. I made the pictures myself 
[You made the pictures?] I made them myself. 
[Is that why you're famous? Is that what people know you for?] They know me as a 
photographer. Many of them don't know me as a man who worked on the railway. 
[And you did both?] 1 did both 
[So how old were you when you worked on the railways?] ...1 wasn't old, 40s or so 
[And were you famous already then?] I'm very well known because of the photos. 1 have lots 
o f photos too 
[Where did you develop the photos?] The police gave me a roof The police, they came almost 
every day. Know me very well. Because of the photos. 
[Why? Did you make photos for the police?] For the police, magisttate, everyone... But this is 
merely a hobby. 1 work for the railways 
[Do you work now?] No it's gone now 
[What was it last time you worked?] Before I came here 
[Which was? How long ago?] . . .About.. . about 10 years. I'm 11 years here. 
[So tell me again, I want to understand about your profession. What did you do? What made 
you famous?] The photos? I bought two cameras from a shop in [name o f street]... lens, reflex, 
flash, stand. I had a lot o f photos with that camera. I take it myself Nobody else can do it. I f 
you take a photo to any photographer, not everyone wi l l enlarge the photo. But I can do it. Any 
photo. That's why the police are very, they like me very much 
[And did you manage both your jobs?] Yes. 1 always have a lot o f money on me 
[And how did you spend it?] Wisely. Very wisely. I buy a motor car. I had many motor cars in 
my life. I like motor cars. 1 f ix them. Everything I find, I buy 
[You buy everything you can find?] Yes. But I . . . what I need. I buy it 
[And tell me what you did with the motor cars?] I used them to go to work, travel, so on 
[How many motor cars did you buy?] Several, many. I can't remember 
[And how often did you buy your motor car?] When it's too old I buy another one. I sell that 
one 1 buy another one (laughs). 
Case Study 3. DO: Confabulation Subgroup C3 (Right-Hemisphere Patients) 
Case History: DO was a 71-year-old woman of British and Austrian origin. She had 13 years 
of education and worked as a secondary school teacher before her retirement 14 years prior to 
her hospitalisation. She was right-handed and had no previous psychiatric or neurological 
history, but she had a history of hypertension and severe arthritis that caused her pain and 
irritation. She had particularly difficult upbringing, lived in many counfries but settled in the 
UK 30 years ago. DO had three children from her marriage, but became a window at age 57 
and lived independently ever since. Five months prior to her recruittnent (winter 2002) she 
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presented with severe headache and left-sided weakness and was admitted to the hospital 
where it was confirmed that she suffered a stroke. CT examination on admission revealed right 
middle cerebral artery territory infraction and acute right middle cerebral artery thrombosis. 
There was no haemorrhage observed. After spending three weeks in hospital she was 
transferred to a nursing home in the North East o f England, for approximately 2 months and 
then to a second one ftirther North to be closer to her family. She was tested while resident at 
this home. 
Following her stroke she presented with left hemiplegia and left visuo-spatial neglect. 
Deterioration in her general cognitive state was noted, mostly showing confusion, 
disorientation, persistent nightmares and persecutory ideas. The latter included fears o f 
monkeys, rats or other creatures being in her room at night and threatening her life. These were 
initially interpreted as 'hallucinations' but later on it became apparent that DO never described 
seeing any o f these creatures but instead claimed she 'remembered' these events. Thereafter 
they were described as confabulations. DO's nightmares disappeared with time (although the 
possibility remains that her confabulations were based on vivid dreams, Mol l , 1915) but her 
left-sided neglect and hemiplegia persisted, as did her flat mood and confabulation. 
Neuropsychological Assessment. DO's general intellectual function (FSIQ 94) as measured by 
the WAIS- I I I was mildly deteriorated from the predicted premorbid level (WTAR FSIQ 106). 
This was mainly attributable to her very poor scores on performance subtests (PIQ 62), during 
which she showed marked visuospatial (she showed neglect in letter and star cancellation tests) 
and constructional difficulties (she scored poorly, 7.5, on the Copy condition o f the Rey Figure 
Test). Similarly, while her verbal memory remained intact (WMS-I I I Auditory Delayed Index 
Score 117), her visual memory was affected (Visual Delayed Index 59). Her autobiographical 
memory also appeared largely preserved as she scored 51 on Personal Semantic Information 
and 15 on Autobiographical Incidents. DO produced two distortions during the interview but 
she did not fabricate any new or bizarre events. Only a selection of subtests of the D-KEFS 
(see below for detailed description o f the test battery) were administered to DO. The BADS 
test was also used as an alternative. Her overall performance on these tests was mixed. Her 
BADS profile scores were largely impaired (ranging from 0 to 2) and showed a total 
standardised score (mean 100, SD 15) o f 54, which was clearly within the impaired range. On 
the contrary, she performed average on the Hayling Test (SS = 13), and on the D-KEFS Word 
Context (SS = 14) and Proverb (SS = I I ) subtests showing intact abilities of inhibition, 
abstract inductive and deductive thinking. This was confirmed by her intact performance on 
the Cognitive Estimates Test (Total Score = I ) . The last score was somewhat surprising given 
DO's impaired performance on the Temporal Judgement subtest o f the BADS and may reflect 
a specific inability to judge temporal facts. Her performance was average on the D-KEFS letter 
fluency subtest (SS = 10) and she overall made only a few set-loss (SS = 10) and repetition 
errors (SS = 12). However, she was impaired on the category condition o f the same test (SS = 
4). Her performance was also average on the Abstraction measure o f the 20 Questions subtest 
of the D-KEFS (SS = 10). However, she was more generally impaired on this test 
(Achievement SS = 2), showing high amount o f repeated and 'spatial questions' indicating her 
tendency to perserverate and to respond in a stimulus-bound manner instead of engaging in 
high-level categorical clustering. 
Behavioural Observations: DO was positively orientated towards the assessment but her 
attitude towards testing and her cooperation, as well as her cognitive alertness, were 
fluctuating from session to session. Her mood was flat even in sessions that she was more alert 
and concentrated. She was generally restless and irritable. Staff found her management 
extremely challenging, particularly as DO was often verbally abusive. DO herself admitted 
that she constantly required "immediate response and satisfaction" to her needs and requests 
and she insisted others must do exactly what she told them to. Often however her requests did 
not represent practical needs, e.g. DO would call carers into her room and ask them to simply 
touch her feet. She would then tell them to go, only to call them back after 5 minutes to repeat 
the task. This could go on for hours or until carers refused to assist her. These requests 
appeared to reflect DO's anxiety and fears that were ' in need' o f the reassuring presence of 
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others, as well as her desire to "control" the situation and "tell people what to do, instead o f 
them ordering her, as though she was a pupil and they were the teacher". Particularly during 
the night DO admitted she felt "scared and helpless", she often confused her dreams with 
reality and she was in need o f others. DO denied feeling low or depressed, but admitted being 
terrified at times and "misbehaving" (e.g. screaming impatiently) and expressed the wish to 
improve her irritability and low tolerance. She scored very high in both anxiety (17) and 
depression (14) on the HADS (borderline scores 8-10) but she appeared able to enjoy previous 
hobbies and family visits, she showed normal appetite and sleeping circle. Indeed, psychiatric 
examination one month preceding DO's recruitment to the study concluded that DO was not 
depressed. 
DO's relatives described her premorbid personality as pleasant, strong-willed but also very 
anxious, particularly of her "performance" in certain situations. She was an independent and 
rather intellectual woman. She was also demanding o f others but sociable and open to new 
experiences. They felt the basic character o f DO had not changed but some of her traits, such 
as anxiety, were exaggerated. 
Confabulation and Insight: DO's confabulations mirrored the above observations about her 
behaviour and mood. They did not dominate her communications, which were generally 
normal (see confabulation criteria above) but appeared as isolated confabulation instances. 
They were predominately paranoid in content and negative in valence (see Chapter 3 for an 
experirriental account of this observation). Occasionally she produced wishful false memories 
that were mostly related to anosognosic statements (e.g. 1 can walk, I went for a walk to the 
garden yesterday) and she also showed isolated episodes o f reduplicative paramnesia, claiming 
she is in "her other room", which is similar to the current one but it is another "further down 
the corridor". On some of these occasions she asked the examiner to bring her desired items 
from this not existing second room, items that she indeed possessed but had currently run out 
of (e.g. her soothing cream). Despite these occasional pleasant confabulations and delusions 
the content o f the majority o f DO's confabulations was predominately paranoid, included 
negative feelings, and presented DO as a victim of violent or sadistic acts (see examples 
below). 
DO very rarely confabulated about the remote past; on one isolated instance she claimed a 
well-known musician appearing on TV was in fact her colleague 20 years ago, teaching 
English, and she described details o f their collaboration. This confabulation was reminiscent o f 
Fregoli delusion (see Feinberg & Roane, 1997b) but was limited to one episode and never 
reappeared for the duration of the study. Instead, she often made up very elaborated and 
detailed memories o f her recent (postmorbid) everyday life and circumstances. DO produced 
these false memories spontaneously and upon provocation but she did not fabricate any other 
information during formal testing. These accounts were quite specific in content (usually 
involving her mistreatment by staff) and persistent in time (there were variations in each 
narration but the same narrative themes and characters persisted). For example, DO claimed 
that a member of the night staff was a Nazi, who threaten to stuff a pillow down her throat and 
kil l her. Staff repeatedly told her that her stroke is responsible for this belief and DO 
interpreted this as a further conspiracy against her. However, after 2-3 weeks she claimed that 
he couldn't have been a Nazi, as he is too young, but she insisted he was the one who told her 
he had fought for the Nazis, because he is their supporter. She felt she was in danger. 
DO was not aware of these memory problems and her awareness about her overall condition 
was fluctuating. At times she appeared quite unrealistic about the future or did not 
acknowledge her current deficits. She even occasionally confabulated to support these views 
(e.g. claimed a doctor told her she was able to walk and see without problems) but more 
generally appeared aware o f her difficulties and her management needs and was actively 
preoccupied o f whether others wi l l provide her with the help she needed. Towards the end o f 
the testing period (7 months from onset)_DO appeared to 'intellectually' acknowledge she 
produced false memories but could not manage to apply this insight to the monitoring o f her 
confabulations when these occurred. For example, during that period DO accused a carer o f 
303 
Chapter 10: Appendixes 
punishing her neediness by hitting her and by creating bruises to her arms and legs (some of 
which were indeed visible but were minor bruises DO had from using the hoist). Staff tried to 
help her see this was a product o f her faulty memory but DO insisted the event had taken 
place, she denied the possibility o f the memory being faulty and she refused to ful ly 
collaborate with staff unless the carer apologised. 
Confabulation Examples. DO constructed an array o f similar confabulations in which others, 
usually members of staff, directed violent or verbally abusive behaviour towards her. The 
following example from an informal interview is typical o f the confused, bizarre yet detailed 
and vivid nature o f her confabulations. 
[What do you mean when you say you had a 'horrible night'? What happened?] Being locked 
in the room with one carer, who gave me no water, who did not help me and 1 felt 1 am going 
to die. 
[Did this happen or did you dream about it?] No it happened. It was a she. I shouted and 
screamed and shouted. 
[When did that happen?] The night before last. 
[Why do you think that carer didn't give you water?] Because she wanted to teach me how to 
behave. 
[What was wrong with your behaviour?] I shouted [DO indeed often shouts at nights]. 
[Do you remember any more details o f the event?] Yes, she used to be my favourite, in the 
other home, in X [name o f town her previous nursing home indeed was, but DO hasn't had 
contact with members o f staff at X since she moved out]. I loved her, she did think old-fashion 
but . . . Then she turned up here and they called her Rachel and she said my name in Mina, 
short for William mina. Anyway I said so what do I call you here she said: Gremlin. I said 
alright Gremlin. No, then I called her Gremlin. And then she explained to me that she had took 
me at her neighbours gathering but 1 was not amusing her, anyway she came that night, day 
that there was the nurse, a man. I had pains and they moved my bed about a meter away from 
the wall where my buzzers where, and my phone and my drink, so later on I shouted 1 have no 
buzzer, no water. Gremlin and nurse, help me. And she came in and sat with me and I loved 
her for it. She said she couldn't move the bed back, because she must punish me and then 1 felt 
asleep and 1 wake up in this cold room ice cold, lying on the bed with a lot of these tiny tubes 
and I had intense pain and then., she told me I had to shut up. Anyway.. . 
[Why do you think she asked you to call her Gremlin?] Because she knew she was going to 
make me very angry, she thought that would annoy me. 
[Do you know anybody else called that?] No. 
[Why would it annoy you?] Not that annoy me, she thought I wouldn't use it. Anyway, all the 
people wi l l think 1 did it on purpose, shouted... any way it got colder and colder, I was in the 
draft, all my blankets were gone and the pain was terrible, so I sent her to the nurse that gives 
out the tablets, she gives out the gel as well and then I started shouting 'nurse', 'nurse' and 
then my two, the permanent nurse and her husband, whom you've met [true] heard me, they 
were next door [they never work night shifts] and then they came and rescued me. The nurse 
had disappeared and I told Gremlin to disappear too. So my two favourite came with me and 
help me sit up and then we went back into the world. 
[So i f this did not happened in the world, where did it happened?] It was underground. 
[What do you mean underground? Where is this place?] I don't know, just underground. 
[Have you ever been there before?] No, first time. 
[So, you believe all this happened in reality or . . . ] DO interrupted: I believe it happened for 
real because now I've got pain in my bottom and I can't stand the woman anymore. 
[Flave you seen her ever since?] No. 
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[I have you seen the couple that save you since then?] Yes. They are everyday people. [These 
carers were indeed on day shifts that week]. 
[Do they remind you o f anybody you knew before?] Yes, my parents. They protected me. 
[Do they look like your parents, at all?] No, they were everyday people. They didn't look like 
anybody. 
[How confident are you in the accuracy of your memory?] 100%. 
[How would you describe your emotions? Positive, negative or neutral?] Negative, very 
negative. 
[And how intense are these emotions?] Very intense. 
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Appendix B 
B l . Confabulation Questionnaire Sample Questions with 
Corresponding Ratings 
Patients' confabulations are presented here by group, in tlie actual questionnaire these 
were mixed in random order. The raters were, o f course, not informed o f the group 
each person was classified under (e.g. confabulation, control etc). 
Confabulation Subgroup C I : Confabulating Patients with Bilateral 
Lesions 
Patient R M 
Confabulation 2. The patient is talking about the region he comes from. 
"Yes, it is very dangerous. But my family is safe. I protect them. I make sure everybody is safe 
in the house and I just, I just sit in the house from 9:00 in the morning until 6:00 at night, 
and then I know nothing going to happen. Once, buglers came but as soon as they saw me 
they turned and left. They said: Sorry mate. If we knew it was you looking after this 
house we wouldn't have came. Sorry mate, don't hurt us. I said it is Ok but leave now or 
I'll have to rugby-tackle you. They left. They were swearing like but they left". 
[The area that the patient lived in the past has had some criminality problems. But he, his 
family or their property were never in any danger or exposure to criminals]. 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3—4—5—6-—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) = 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 6 
Confabulation 4. The discussion continues. 
"Do you know how much he gets paid a month"? 
{No.} 
"£6000! And he gives me £1000 each month cause he says I am his son, and a good son. 
What do you think of this"? 
[His father exact salary is not known but the patient does not receive £1000 from either o f his 
parents.] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—J—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
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(b) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 7 
Patient B A 
Confabulation 12. The discussion continues. 
{So, you said you were married? You have a wife?} 
"Yeah, I've got a wife called Mary". 
[The patient was a widower but re-niarried recently. Mis wife's name is Pauline. His former wife was 
called Carol] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(b) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (b) Impossible to judge 
Confabulation 13. The discussion continues. 
{You mentioned your children... are you married?} 
"Rumour has it I 'm married". 
[Rumour has it?] 
"Well, there were some medical complications but we are married". 
{So you remember anything more about this?} 
"No, my wife thinks she's ill all the time". 
[There are no medical complications in his marriage. His wife denied having medical 
problems. She recently gave birth to their daughter and they are both in good health]. 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—-2-—3—-4-—5-—6—-7 Extremely Positive 
(b) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
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Rating: (a) Mean Rating 
Confabulation 14. The discussion about the patient's wife continues. Suddenly the patient 
says: 
"My wife has stupid thoughts. I don't have to have stupid thoughts, other people have them. I can listen 
to them, I just don't have anywhere to write it down, so I put it in their head". 
{What do you mean? You tell them their thoughts hack?) 
"No, I put them in their head. I mean what I say. I open their head and say, here you need some 
thoughts. Your head is empty. It needs thoughts. I have plenty. Take mine". 
fit is unclear what the patient is actually referring lo in the above statement. However, it is clear that the 
events he is describing have not taken place in reality]. 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative 1—2—3-—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[ ( I ) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 5 
Confabulation Subgroup C2: Korsakoff Patients 
Patient W M 
Confabulation 1. The patient is accompanied to the consulting room. As he enters the room he 
says: 
"I 've been here before". 
{Really, do you remember being here before?} 
"Yes, it was years ago. I had come to see my father. He was ill". 
{And have been here since?} 
"No". 
[In reality, the patient was an in-patient at this hospital for one week, two months before 
this session. He had also been an in-patient 4 years prior to that. His father was never in 
this hospital as an in- or an out-patient]. 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3—-4-—5——6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[ ( I ) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
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Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 4.5 
Confabulation 2. The discussion has shifted to another hospital the patient had visited some 
years ago. 
"That was years ago. I was in iny 30s". 
{In your 30's?} 
"Yes, that must be around 10-15 years ago. Yes, now I am 46". 
(in reality, the patient is 56 years old.] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3—4-—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 5 
Confabulation 5. The discussion continues. 
{So, Tania, whom 1 just met, is your sister's daughter?"} 
"Yes, 1 have no children". 
[In reality, the patient has a 15 year-old son] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative 1—2—3-—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(b) Impo.Hsible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 2.5 
Confabulation Subgroup C3: Confabulating patients with unilateral 
lesions 
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Patient A O 
Confabulation I . This patient is resident in a nursing home. She is referring to outings her 
niece and her husband organise. 
"Oh I haven't been well at all. I hate this place. And my relatives are being so terrible. 1 don't 
know what is the matter with her. She used to be so nice to us. They don't take us out 
anymore. I've always paid for my meals but...oh I don't know. It is more than a month now 
they have not taken me anywhere. We used to go every week for lovely meals. Mean while 
they have their precious holidays". 
[In reality, the patient had been out with her niece for a meal at a local restaurant the Sunday 
before and once more in the last month.] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that of the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) = 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 3 
Confabulation 2. The di.scussion continues. 
"I had the stroke in March and they were up the nail then they were in Russia and they 
when in a skiing holiday to the Austrian alps then to Venice I felt rotten, I am left, they 
can't take me anywhere". 
[In reality, the patient had her stroke in February two years ago. The holiday destinations 
mentioned are correct but her relatives visited them in a different order and within the last two 
years. Indeed, the patient hasn't been with them in any of these or other holidays] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3-—4—5-—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 3.5 
Confabulation 3. The discussion continues. 
" I t is all America's fault, so many people making compensation for next to nothing, two to the 
lavatory, you know! I can manage on my own you know but 1 usually call because 1 cannot 
be bothered with the pads infections, running all the time". 
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[In reality, the patient is not able to stand and walk to the toilet due to her left leg and arm 
paralysis following her stroke. Hence she needs the assistance. She indeed suffers fi-om urinary 
infections] 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—i—4—5—6—7 Extremely Positive 
(h) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[(1) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 6 
Confabulation 4. The patient continues to refer to her relatives. 
"Ah , and he [her nephew in law] is terrible. I don't know what she [her niece] sees in him. I 
wonder i f he knows." 
[He knows?] 
"You know about the affair. Her and tlie nurse. The 'greek' nurse. She was here the 
other night. But she was not here to see me. She was here to see her friend, the nurse. 
And I was here all alone. They closed the door and stayed there for hours. Maybe the 
whole night, I don't know I felt asleep, in tears". 
[In reality, the patient's relatives had no close relationships with any of the staff members and 
they never visited the home after visiting hours]. 
Is the patient's self-representation in the confabulated situation more positive or more negative 
in comparison with that o f the actual reality? 
(a) Extremely Negative I—2—3-—4—5—6-—7 Extremely Positive 
(b) Impossible to judge 
Comments 
[ ( I ) = Extremely negative; (2) = negative; (3) = somewhat negative; (4) = neither, nor; (5) 
somewhat positive; (6) = positive; (7) = Extremely positive] 
Rating: (a) Mean Rating = 1.5 
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B2. Confabulation Examples Read Out to Control Subjects 
(1) This person's wife is a shop assistant. He is referring to her and says: 
"She is a nurse. I don't know exactly what type of nurse, but she is a nurse". 
(2) This person went to the gym some days ago but the event he narrates never took place. 
"Fell over at the gym the other day, wasn't looking when someone put their foot out 
unnecessarily, sort of stupid thing that happens". 
(3) . This person is in hospital and he is describing the lunch he had that day accompanied by 
some members o f staff. However, only a male carer and a brunette nurse were with him. 
"Well, there was the blond too. And one of the nursing assistants who's quite good-
looking too, that's that I think". 
(4) The people mentioned by this person below are real. But the event she narrates never took 
place. 
" When little 'Chappy' was here. He grabbed a piece of bread. He didn't know what he 
was doing because he was retarded. He grabbed a piece of bread out of the plates that 
were on the trolley and he shouldn't of done. And the other chap hit him. That was 
unnecessary. I get upset when people hit each other without reason". 
(5) This person's parents have died more than 10 years ago. 
"Yes, both my parents are |alive|. Yeah. My mother and my father". 
(6) This person was once a worker but he had been unemployed for years and he never worked 
as a photographer. 
"I am a vei-y important person. And as I told you, I was always happy. Particularly as a 
photographer". 
(7) This person is been seeing by doctors but the events described below never took place. 
" I am all blue, blue and black. I have bruises everywhere. It was the doctor". 
[The doctor?] 
"Yes. Because- because I was- I was misbehaving all night. And I called him and he came 
and I said I have a- I had a bandage on my knee. And he said you haven't. And to prove 
that I hadn't, he ran his hand over my legs and then he used his knuckles to- push and 
hurt me and to show that I had nothing over my knee". 
(8) This person is married but is currently an in-patient at a stroke NHS unit following a 
stroke. 
" My wife is waiting for me at home. I'll go there afterwards". [You are?] Yes, its my 
house. [Oh, you mean you live there}. Yes and I am staying there tonight". 
(9) . This person is resident at a private full-care nursing home. She pays around £250 a week. 
" I cannot stand this place with its endless rules and regulations. I pay £132 a week in here. 
Imagine". 
(10) This person's father is a salesman in a high street shop. 
[So, your father is still leaving in that area?] 
"Yes, you know the police Weapons Force?" 
[Weapons Force? No] 
"Well it's to track down heavy weapons, atomic and stuff He works there. In fact he is 
the big big big big boss there". 
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B3. Examples of True and False Memories Produced by Healthy 
Controls 
Subject (I). False Statement: "1 hated these dogs. 1 constantly tortured them". 
[Memory Statement: I grew up with two dogs in the house. I used go everywhere 
with them]. 
Subject (2). False Statement: "My husband woke up this morning half an hour 
earlier so he could prepare me a nice breakfast and bring it to bed. I woke up with 
the smell of hot coffee". 
[Memory Statement: I woke up with a terrible headache this morning. My husband 
was already gone.] 
Subject (3). False Statement: "I am undecided about my future. It is hard to choose 
a career these days. I've made mistakes before. I am not sure what to do". 
[Memory Statement: I recently got a new job and at the moment 1 feel very 
satisfied with things professionally]. 
Subject (4). False Statement: "We live in a huge house and I have three kids". 
[Memory Statement: We recently bought a two-bedroom flat. We are very pleased 
but we would like more space. I would like to buy a house when we'll have kids.] 
Subject (5). False Statement: "I was out in Newcastle yesterday for some serious 
drinking". 
[Memory Statement: I watched a DVD at home last night, it was a good film.] 
Subject (6). False Statement: "My mother is in hospital. It was an accident. My 
father was driving. But it wasn't his fault. The other care was speeding too much. I 
think mum is going to be OK". 
[Memory Statement: My parents are planning a road-trip in central Europe and 
they told me to go along]. 
Subject (7). False Statement: "My youngest daughter changed school last year. 
She was just too clever in comparison with the other kids". 
[Memory Statement: My youngest daughter received excellent feedback on her 
school report, again this year. She is in a good school too]. 
Subject (10). False Statement: "We had an amazing holiday last year. We went to 
Greece again for two weeks this time and the weather was just perfect". 
[Memory Statement: Last year our holiday in Spain was OK but not as nice as the 
year before in Greece] 
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B4. Examples of True and False IVIemories Produced by Amnesic 
Controls 
Subject (1). False Statement: " I was very happy when my son was born" 
[Memory Statement: I have one daughter. 1 also wanted a son, you know to continue 
the family line. Like everyone, I guess.] 
Subject (2). False Statement: "1 can't cook". 
[Memory Statement: 1 am a qualified chef i enjoy working.] 
Subject (3). False Statement: "I have my own building business. 1 am independent and 
1 make lots of money". 
[Memory Statement: 1 worked free-lance once. I really enjoyed that time. But then I 
didn't like the risk. 1 worked for others. And then I went to Germany to work]. 
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B5. Percentages of positive and non-positive confabulatory self-
representations 
Group % % 
Positive Non-Positive 
Confabulation Group 
01-Bilateral 
LH 82.4 17.6 
RM 85.0 15.0 
OT 61.1 38.0 
BA 64.7 35.3 
C2-Korsakoff 
FM 90.0 10.0 
CM 44.0 55.0 
WM 68.4 31.6 
C3- Unilateral 
AO 43.8 56.3 
DO 35.3 64.7 
JO 52.9 47.1 
Healthy Controls 
1. 47.4 52.6 
2. 45.0 55.0 
3. 42.1 57.9 
4. 45.0 55.0 
5. 55.0 45.0 
6. 55.6 44.0 
7. 50.0 50.0 
8. 35.0 65.0 
9. 52.6 47.4 
10. 65.0 35.0 
Amnesic Controls 
A1 45.00 55.00 
A2 52.60 47.40 
A3 36.80 63.20 
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B6. Mean valence ratings of confabulatory self-representations across 
patients. 
Group Valence Rating 
N Mean SD 
Confabulation Group 
CI-Bilateral 
IJ I 16 5.58 1.54 
RM 20 5.73 1.31 
OT 18 5.05 1.80 
BA 16 5.03 1.64 
C2-Korsakoff 
FM 19 5.88 0.98 
CM 17 4.50 1.45 
WM 19 5.05 1.44 
C3- Unilateral 
AO 16 3.8 2.32 
DO 17 3.38 2.17 
.10 17 4.32 2.00 
Healthy Controls 
1. 19 4.65 1.20 
2. 20 4,35 1.74 
3. 19 4.26 1.49 
4. 20 4.45 1.66 
5. 20 4.87 1.77 
6. 18 4.83 1.80 
7. 20 4.62 1.65 
8. 20 4.20 1.68 
9. 19 4.39 2.12 
10. 20 5.02 1.51 
Amnesic Controls 
A l 20 4.40 1.69 
A2 19 4.60 1.35 
A3 19 4.34 1.84 
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B7. HADS results of each confabulating patients 
Subgroup Patient Depression Anxiety 
C1-Bilateral LH 10 10 
RM 11 9 
OT 0 6 
BA 4 7 
C2-Korsakotf WM 10 14 
FM 1 0 
CM 0 13 
C3- Unilateral AO 10 10 
DO 14 17 
JO 6 12 
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The event or fact could relate to: 
Your house a meeting/appointment 
your children/parents a discussion 
your car/motorbike a mora! dilemma 
a night out a decision you had to make 
a party meeting someone for the first time 
an accident meeting an old friend 
your work/study an emergency 
a turning point in your life shopping experiences 
your or somebody else's pet winning/losing a prise 
a picnic/barbeque being late 
holidays you've had being at the pub 
a trip you took an argument 
an experience at the seaside a moving 
to an achievement/failure a surprise 
to a habit you have a medical condition you or someone else 
you know had 
C2. Groups' Mean Ratings of Valence, Arousal and Rehearsal 
Frequency 
Time Period Group Valence Arousal Rehearsal Frequency 
M SD M SD M SD 
Past Confabulating (N = 4) 4.5 .9 4 0.4 3.7 .18 
Amnesic (N= 3) 4.8 .5 4.1 0.1 3.9 .22 
Present Confabulating(N = 4) 4.3 .1 3.9 0.2 4 .29 
Amnesic (N = 3) 4.1 .3 3.8 0.4 3.9 .53 
Future Confabulating (N = 4) 4.1 .4 4.2 0.4 3.5 .18 
Amnesic (N = 3) 4.7 .5 4.2 0.1 3.7 .35 
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C3. Preliminary Analysis: Characteristics of Self-Selected IVIemory 
Statements 
Preliminary Analysis: (1) Rehearsal, (2) Valence and (3) Arousal Ratings 
Two factor mixed ANOVAs with Group (confabulating versus amnesic patients) as 
the between-group factor and Time (past, present, future) as the within-group factor 
were performed on the (1) rehearsal, (2) valence and (3) arousal ratings. IMo 
significant differences were revealed in (1) rehearsal frequency ratings between the 
two groups of patients, F(l,5) = .2, p = .7, or among the three levels of the factor 
Time, F(2,10) = 1.8, p = .2, or in the interaction between the factor Time and the 
between factor Group, F(2,10) = .58, p = .6. Nor were there any significant 
differences in (2) valence ratings between the two groups of patients F(l,5) = 1.1, p 
= .3, or among the three levels of the factor Time, F(2,10) = .9, p = .4, or in the 
interaction between the factor Time and the between factor Group, F(2,10) = .05, p 
= .9. Similarly, there were no significant differences in (3) arousal ratings between 
the two groups, F(l,5) = .02, p = .9, or among the three levels of the factor Time, 
F(2,10) = 1.5,/7 = .3, or in the interaction between the factor Time and the between 
factor Group, F(2,10) = .03, p= .8. 
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Appendix D 
D l . Story Plots and their Semantic and Narrative Characteristics 
Narrative Constituents and Idea Units 
1. Setting presentation including temporal informat ion [2] and spatial 
information [1 ] . [Total : 3 idea units] 
2. Presentation o f main agent [2 ] , action [2] , and intention (rationale) for action 
[1 ] . [Total : 5 idea units] 
3. Presentation o f complication. [Total : 2 idea units] 
4. Presentation o f main agent's reaction to complicat ion including emotional 
reaction [1 ] , action [2 ] , action intention (rationale) [ 1 ] . [Total : 4 idea units] 
5. Presentation o f outcome, including agent's or external (non-agent) action [2] 
and its rationale [1] and temporal informat ion [2 ] . [Total : 5 idea units] 
6. Presentation o f the main agent's emotional reaction to outcome [2 ] . [Total : 
2 idea units]. 
Positive Story Plot 1 
Self- Reference 
Word Count: 88 
Semantic Units: 21 
[Imagine that] you are an upcoming/ businessman [woman]/. Last/ month/ you've applied for a 
new job/ in Holland/ and you succeeded. You always wanted to live there/. However, you feel 
obliged to your current boss/, for at least three more months/. With great disappointment/, you 
write a polite letter/ and send it to the company/, explaining why you have to decline the offer/. 
Two weeks later/, they respond/. Deeply appreciative o f your loyalty/, they offer you an even 
better position/ starting in four months time/. You feel highly praised/ and vindicated. 
Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [John Wilson], is an upcoming /businessman/. Last/ 
month/, he applied... 
Positive Story Plot 2 
Self- Reference 
Word Count: 87 
Semantic Units: 21 
[Imagine that] you are a talented/ architect. It is Friday/ evening/ and you arrive/ home/ eager 
to tell your family/ that you have won an award/. However, you find nobody waiting for you/ 
and the house in darkness/. In obvious disappointment/, you go in/ to call your wife [husband]/ 
and tell her [him] the news on the phone/. One minute later/, the lights are suddenly switched 
on/ and your whole family congratulates you/. They know you had won the National 
Architectural Award/ the previous day/. You feel truly loved/ and admired. 
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Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [John Wilson] is a talented /architect/. It is Friday 
evening and he arrives /home.... 
Negative Story Plot 1 
Self - Reference 
Word Count: 92 
Semantic Units: 21 
[Imagine that] you are a hard working/ employee/. It is Sunday/ morning/ and you are 
preparing to go out/. You have planned a wonderful day-trip/ to the seaside/ in order to rest/. 
However, your best friend calls you saying/ he is i l l , lonely and needs your help/. Feeling 
exhausted/ and not bearing to miss your trip/, you lie to him/ saying that you promised to see 
your sister/. Four days later/, you find out that/, due to inappropriate treatment/, your friend's 
health has severely deteriorated/ since Sunday/. You feel guilty/ and ashamed of yourself 
Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [Patrick Welsh] is a hard working/ employee./It is Sunday 
morning, he needs rest... 
Self - Reference 
Word Count: 85 
Semantic Units: 21 
Negative Story Plot 2 
[Imagine that] you are a well - qualified/ assistant/. It is Thursday/ morning/ and you have 
completed a long report/. You burst/ into your boss's office/, wanting to announce the 
outcome/. However, your boss has asked you/ not to disturb him that morning/. With great 
embarrassment/, you suddenly remember his request/. You apologise/ for interrupting a board 
meeting/. The next day/, your boss tells you that you might lose your promotion/ and even be 
fired/, as you are so absentminded/ lately/. You feel very humiliated/ and scared/. 
Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [Mary Taylor] is a well-qualified/ assistant/. It is 
Thursday/ morning/ and she bursts/ into her boss's off ice . . . 
Neutral Story Plot 1 
Self - Reference 
Word Count: 91 
Semantic Units: 21 
[Imagine that] you are from central/ London/. It is Sunday/ morning/ and you go/ into the 
kitchen/ to open your newspaper/. You want to read the outcome o f a trial/. However, the jury 
is undecided/ and has not reached a verdict yet/. You don't know whether this has good or bad 
implications/. You decide it is better/ to wait for further news/ and think o f other matters/. The 
next morning/, the situation remains unaltered/, as both TV and radio say/ they wi l l announce 
the outcome/ in the afternoon/. You remain interested/ and curious. 
Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [Patrick Welsh] is from central/ London. It is Sunday/ 
morning/ and he goes/ into the kitchen .... 
Neutral Story Plot 2 
Self- Reference 
Word Count: 89 
Semantic Units: 21 
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[ Imag ine that ] y o u are a mar r ied / middle-aged w o m a n [man ] / , i t is Saturday/ a f ternoon/ and 
you are s i t t ing alone/ by the w i n d o w / , star ing at the garden/ , and en joy ing your peace/. 
Suddenly, you r daughter knocks you r room 's door/ and unexpectedly br ings you tea/. Y o u te l l 
her/ to leave it on the bedside table/ , as you w o u l d prefer to sei've it yourse l f / and besides, y o u 
are not sure y o u are th i rs ty / . Y o u r daughter agrees/ and immed ia te l y / adds that it m igh t be very 
hot/ , as it was prepared/ on ly minutes ago. Y o u wa i t pat ient ly / and ca lm l y . 
Other - Reference Conversion: E.g. [ M a r y T a y l o r ] is a mar r ied / m idd le aged-woman/ . It is 
Saturday af ternoon and she is s i t t i ng / by the w i n d o w / . . . 
D2. Ratings of Story Plots Characteristics (Pilot Study). 
Valence Arousal Visualisation identification Compreh. 
Story 
Plots N Mean SD mean SD Mean SD mean SD Mean SD 
1 
1 20 7.2 .1 7.1 1.0 6.8 1.3 8.2 0.7 8.1 0.6 
1 
2 20 7.2 .0 6.7 0.7 7.0 1.4 8.3 0.9 7.8 0.6 
0 
3 20 4.2 .9 1.9 1.0 6.8 1.3 8.5 0.6 8.2 0.7 
0 
4 20 4.7 .8 1.3 1.2 7.3 1.2 8.7 0.6 7.9 0.7 
1 
5 20 2.1 .0 7.5 1.1 7.1 1.5 8.7 0.7 8.3 0,8 
0 
6 20 2.2 ,9 7.0 1.0 7.2 1.2 8.8 0.4 8.4 0.7 
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D3. Secondary Measures: Descriptive statistics across group 
Table 1. GROUP = Confabulation 
Descriptive Statist ics 
Comprehension N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Self Positive 12 5.00 7.00 6.08 .79 
Self Negative 12 4.00 7.00 6.08 .99 
Self Neutral 12 4.00 7.00 5.42 1.31 
Other Positive 12 4.00 7.00 5.75 .96 
Other Negative 12 4.00 7.00 6.16 1.11 
Other Neutral 12 2.00 7.00 5.58 1.44 
Identification 
Self Positive 12 4.00 7.00 5.58 1.16 
Self Negative 12 4.00 7.00 6.16 .83 
Self Neutral 12 2.00 7.00 5.67 1.55 
Other Positive 12 4.00 7.00 6.08 1.16 
Other Negative 12 4.00 7.00 5.58 1.08 
Other Neutral 12 4.00 7.00 5.91 .90 
Visualisation 
Self Positive 12 3.00 7.00 5.33 1.55 
Self Negative 12 4.00 7.00 6.16 1.02 
Self Neutral 12 4.00 7.00 5.66 .98 
Other Positive 12 4.00 7.00 6.25 .96 
Other Negative 12 2.00 7.00 5.75 1.65 
Other Neutral 12 4.00 7.00 6.00 1.12 
Table 2. GROUP = Frontal 
Descriptive Statist ics 
Comprehension N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Self Positive 7 5.00 7.00 6.42 .78 
Self Negative 7 4.00 7.00 5.8 1.06 
Self Neutral 7 4.00 7.00 6.14 1.21 
Other Positive 7 5.00 7.00 6.28 .75 
Other Negative 7 6.00 7.00 6.71 .48 
Other Neutral 7 6.00 7.00 6.57 .53 
Identification 
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Self Positive 7 3.00 7.00 6.00 1.52 
Self Negative 7 6.00 7.00 6.71 .48 
Self Neutral 7 4.00 7.00 6.00 1.15 
Other Positive 7 6.00 7.00 6.71 .48 
Other Negative 7 5.00 7.00 6.57 .786 
Other Neutral 7 4.00 7.00 5.42 1.13 
Visualisation 
Self Positive 7 4.00 7.00 6.57 1.13389 
Self Negative 7 4.00 7.00 6.42 1.13389 
Self Neutral 7 5.00 7.00 6.42 .78680 
Other Positive 7 3.00 7.00 5.71 1.60357 
Other Negative 7 5.00 7.00 6.57 .78680 
Other Neutral 7 5.00 7.00 6.71 .75593 
Table 3. GROUP = Amnesic 
Descriptive Statistics 
Comprehension N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Self Positive 3 5.00 7.00 6.00 1.00 
Self Negative 3 4.00 7.00 5.66 1.52 
Self Neutral 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .57 
Other Positive 3 4.00 7.00 5.66 1.52 
Other Negative 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .57 
Other Neutral 3 5.00 6.00 5.66 .57 
Identification 3 6.00 6.00 6.00 .00 
Self Positive 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .57 
Self Negative 3 6.00 7.00 6.66 .57 
Self Neutral 3 5.00 7.00 6.00 1.00 
Other Positive 3 5.00 6.00 5.66 .57 
Other Negative 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .57 
Other Neutral 3 5.00 7.00 6.00 1.00 
Visualisation 3 4.00 7.00 5.33 1.52 
Self Positive 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .58 
Self Negative 3 4.00 7.00 5.66 1.52 
Self Neutral 3 4.00 6.00 5.33 1.15 
Other Positive 3 5.00 7.00 6.33 1.15 
Other Negative 3 5.00 6.00 5.66 .57 
Other Neutral 3 6.00 7.00 6.33 .58 
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Table 4. GROUP = Healthy Controls 
Descriptive Statistics 
Comprehension N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Self Positive 10 3.00 7.00 5.60 1.50 
Self Negative 10 4.00 7.00 6.1000 1.10 
Self Neutral 10 3.00 7.00 6.0000 1.41 
Other Positive 10 4.00 7.00 6.10 1.10 
Other Negative 10 3.00 7.00 6.00 1.41 
Other Neutral 10 4.00 7.00 6.20 1.03 
Identification 10 3.00 7.00 6.30 1.25 
Self Positive 10 3.00 7.00 6.00 1.63 
Self Negative 10 4.00 7.00 6.00 1.24 
Self Neutral 10 4.00 7.00 5.60 1.34 
Other Positive 10 3.00 7.00 5.20 1.61 
Other Negative 10 4.00 7.00 6.10 .99 
Other Neutral 10 1.00 7.00 5.50 2.01 
Visualisation 10 4.00 7.00 5.50 1.08 
Self Positive 10 4.00 7.00 6.20 1.31 
Self Negative 10 4.00 7.00 5.80 1.22 
Self Neutral 10 4.00 7.00 5.30 1.25 
Other Positive 10 3.00 7.00 5.60 1.42 
Other Negative 10 4.00 7.00 6.10 .99 
Other Neutral 10 3.00 7.00 5.70 1.49 
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D4. Immediate and delayed semantic recall performance by group. 
Confabulat ing A m n e s i c Frontal Healthy 
Refe rence V a l e n c e Reca l l 
M e a n SD /Wean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Sel f P o s Imm 6.1 3.4 4.5 0.5 11.8 1.9 16.1 1.9 
Del 4.5 5.8 0.3 0.6 10.3 2.8 15.8 3.1 
Neg Imm 4.4 3.5 6.0 1.7 11.6 3.5 16.5 1.9 
Del 2.7 3.5 0.0 0.0 10.0 3.0 17.0 2.6 
Neutr Imm 5.7 3.6 6.0 1.8 11.2 2.9 16.5 1.9 
Del 3.5 4.3 3.0 2.6 10.4 2.0 16.2 2.1 
Other P o s Imm 6.5 4.4 7.7 1.5 11.8 2.1 16.8 2.5 
Del 4.5 4.4 3.0 4.4 9.0 3.2 16.6 2.3 
Neg Imm 6.3 4.0 5.8 1.5 10.1 4.0 15.4 2.9 
Del 3.3 3.6 1.0 1.7 8.1 3.5 15.2 3.3 
Neutr Imm 4.8 3.9 2.0 2.2 9.1 2.1 16.2 2.5 
Del 3.2 4.5 0.0 0.0 7.0 3.5 15.7 2.4 
Pos = Posi t ive; N e g • 
Delayed Recal l 
Nega t i ve ; Neu t r = Neut ra l s tory plots. I m m = Immedia te Recal l ; Del 
D5. Laterality Effects on Semantic Recall, Confabulation and Valence 
Scores in the Confabulation Group 
Reference V a l e n c e Laterality S e m a n t i c Reca l l Confabulat ion Va lence 
N Mean SD Mean S D Mean SD 
Sel f Posi t ive Unilateral 3 29.3 13.6 2.0 2.0 5.6 1.1 
Bilateral 9 11.9 8.5 6.4 5.1 5.4 1.3 
Negative Unilateral 3 21.3 16.3 3.3 1.5 3.6 1.5 
Bilateral 9 7.6 5.4 10.7 8.1 4.4 1.2 
Neutral Unilateral 3 26.7 9.0 3.3 3.1 3.7 0.7 
Bilateral 9 10.6 9.1 7.4 3.7 4.2 1.1 
Other Posi t ive Unilateral 3 27.0 11.4 2.0 1.7 6.5 0.5 
Bilateral 9 13.3 13.2 6.4 5.4 4.8 2.4 
Negative Unilateral 3 22.3 14.0 1.7 1.5 2.1 0.8 
Bilateral 9 13.9 8.7 6.8 6.5 1.9 0.7 
Neutral Unilateral 3 18.7 14.5 4.0 1.7 3.5 0.2 
Bilateral 9 9.0 10.5 6.6 5.9 4.0 0.8 
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D6. Additional Examples of Story Recall Protocols 
Self-Referent & Positive Valence Combination 
Plot 1 (see above) 
Normal Control: N7 
Male. Age 57y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall l : 'I I'm an up-and-coming businessman who receives a job offer in Holland, the place he 
always wanted to live. The job is in two weeks time. I send a reply declining the offer... I received a reply with an 
even better offer for a job to start in four months time". 
Immediate Recall 2: "I'm an up-and-coming businessman who receives a job offer in Holland, where I always 
wanted to work. And I feel deep loyalty to the company I'm with...so I send a letter declining the offer. I received a 
reply two weeks later and giving me a better offer for a job starting in four months' time...and... I feel really 
vindicated. That's it". 
Delayed Recall: 1 am an up-and-coming businessman, I've applied and I've got a job in Holland, somewhere I 
always wanted to live...The job is to start in two weeks. I decline because of my dedication to the current job. I 
receive another offer which is to start in four months and praise my dedication. That arrived two weeks later". 
Frontal Control: F2 
Female. Age 55y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "I get an amazing job offer in Holland, somewhere you really wanted to stay. But... but your 
present boss wants you to stay. So they offer you a better job in 4 months time". 
Immediate Recall 2: "This lady...am...it should be me... I... I had a super job but there was one better job 
elsewhere but I get obliged to work for another three months for better pay. The position is in Holland by the way. 
Indeed, I said after I got offered I felt obliged to stay for another three months". 
Delayed Recall: "I am a young lady. I apply for a job in Holland, where I wanted to live, in Holland, did I say this? 
But she felt obliged to this other company for three months. In the end she goes to the new company, it is much 
better pay and in 4 months time". 
Amnesic Control: A2 
Male. Age 63y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "Asked if they could do the job in later date. They said yes.". 
Immediate Recall 2: "The job was starting in three months time...and then something about 4 months time. They 
said I could start in 4 months time. That is all I remember I am afraid" 
Delayed Recall: "Asking for more time to do something". 
Confabulating Patient: CM 
Female. Age 67y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: "Right, there is a firm in Holland and you have applied for a job. Couple of days later you 
receive another reply saying, offering a bigger position which I was glad about. So I accept it". 
Immediate Recall 2: 'And um...You contact them and they said they...I was highly surprised because he was 
offered more in a higher, more consideration of money and she was very obliged. Very... happy about it. Because 
she didn't expect that. So she did accept their job. That's all I can remember about that.., Remember more money 
offered her that he was happy about. Because money doesn't concern, you can't do anything without but it, not 
everything...But without money you can't do anything either because you can't buy what you want to buy... But 
money's the root of all evil". 
Delayed Recall: 'Well, yes I do remember a story about a business woman but...no not really". 
Confabulating Patient: LH 
Male. Age 60y. Plot 1 
Immediate Recall 1: 'You've lost your job, circumstances have changed and your employment is been terminated. 
You are not happy with the idea. You tell them your feelings on it, you tell them that you can do a lot better with 
more time. Nothing happens and you think you are out on your own. And a fortnight later you get a letter from 
them pretty happy chappy, you've been promoted in 4 months time. Living one a very happy chappy!" 
Immediate Recall 2: "You've got a job working in Holland, 3 months left to run another job, you get a letter from 
the company saying thanks very much for your employment you've been a happy chappy but... because of the 
work load the situation will be terminated in 3 months you are a bit... unhappy with this and you write back saying 
look I hope you are not unhappy with my work ,rve done my job the best for you and all that kind of think, (I am 
feel as though I am getting somewhere, with a change to job circumstances I feel I can get a good solution of it, 
this is what I put in from myself because I fancy that bit) (laughs). So if you give me an extension on time I feel I 
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Self-Referent & Positive Valence Combination 
can get a good result for you. You get an answer back saying yes, we've been looking through your papers, well 
they didn't say that but they would have done, ...you've done very well for us up to now and we are offering you a 
new work situation starting in 4 months time. And as long it is a good, you know a well-established company, 
you'd be drafted not to accept it". 
Delayed Recall: "I think I am getting through a story from the last time I saw you. Aiai, the guy got a letter working 
in Holland, saying that ...his temporary contract had three months left on it, then it was going to be terminated, he 
was a bit upset with this so he wrote a exteeeemely nice letter back saying, {he met with this wonderful lady who 
did these surveys, that is true you know (laughs)). Ok, so he says if I had a time extension he could do a 
significantly better job, nothing after a couple of weeks he thought that's it, is blown, I am out of my lawn. He gets 
a letter back, thank you so much for your letter it is really appreciated the concern you are showing about our 
company, leave it for 4 months and will give you another job but increased in importance and salary". 
Confabulating Patient: OT 
Male. Age 40y. Plot 
Immediate Recall 1: "A firm in Holland is looking for new recruits. They ask me to go and work for them. I can't 
understand why they asked me though". 
Immediate Recall 2: 'I've been there for the meeting. I need to get in touch with them. A firm I had applied for a 
job. I got it but then what happened? Since I applied for the job is the first time I had communication with them". 
Delayed Recall: 'I have no recall what so ever" 
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Appendix E 
E l . Levels of Awareness Test (LAT). Patient's Interview 
Awareness 
Domains Awareness Questions Patient's Task 
1 . General 
Condition 
Why are you in hospital? 
Has your brain being injured? 
What is your main concern about your mental or physical state after your injury? 
Are you any different now compared to what you were before your injury? (physically, 
cognitively, emotionally, behaviourally, socially) 
Do you face any problems in everyday living, thinking, coping with different situations and 
people? 
Do people who know you well notice anything different about you since your injury? What? — F-— 
Can you walk? 
Can you stand? 
Do you have good vision? For both sides of the 
space around you? 
Do you have difficulties moving your legs? 
Can you move both anns normally? 
Do you get fatigued (tired) easily? 
2. Physical 
Difficulties 
Walking 
Standing 
Describing objects in room 
Lifting of both legs 
Lifting of both arms 
Responding to example of previous fatigue 
complain read out by examiner 
3. Language 
and 
Communica t ion 
Can you speak normally? 
Can you understand what others say to you, even 
if it is complicated? 
Can you tlnd the words you are thinking ot? 
Do you have difficulty reading? 
Do you have difficulty writing? 
Do you tend to take others comments literally? 
Expressing opinion about the day's weather 
Narrating the gist of long sentence read by the 
examiner 
Naming of 5 objects in the room 
Reading of a short newspaper article 
Writing a sentence 
Interpret the proverb: 'People who leave in 
glass houses shouldn't throw stones' 
4. Memory 
Can you still remember important events of your 
life'' 
Can ym\ learn new information? 
Can you remember historical information as well 
as before? 
Do you sometimes remember things that have 
not actually happened? 
Do you soTiietimes confuse the order of events 
or, do you sometimes mix difterent events 
between them? 
Do you ever confuse your memory with dreams? 
Remembering first day at work or wedding 
day 
Learning 3 new words and retaining in 
memor>' for more than 10 minutes 
What was the D-day? Who is the Minister of 
foreign affairs? 
Responding to a confabulation example read 
out by examiner 
Responding to memory error example read out 
by examiner 
Responding to dream-memory confusion read 
out by the examiner 
5. Executive 
Functions 
Do you have trouble thinking clearly? 
Do you have difficulties in concentrating? 
Can you plan ahead your activities? 
Can you slop repeating doing or saying things 
once started? 
Can you do more than one task at a lime? 
Do you say or do in front of others things you 
know are inappropriate? 
Can you show positive emotions? 
Can voii show neaative emotions'' 
Solving this: 'You have 21 pounds and you 
want to put in your wallet exactly double the 
amount of money you put in your pocket. 
1 low will you divide your money?' 
Deducting 6 from 100, until examiner tells 
you to stop. 
Planning the activities of the next day 
Verbal Fluency task ( F A S ) 
Drawing a llower while counting backwards. 
Responding to example of last inappropriate 
behaviour read out by examiner 
6. Emotions & 
Personality 
Describing your reaction during the last good 
news you've had, or imitating how you would 
react to news of winning the lottery 
Describiiia your reaction during the bad aood 
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Awareness 
Domains .Awareness Questions Patient's Task 
Has your personality changed in any way? 
Can you control your behaviour/temper? 
Do you still enjoy your favourite activities? 
Is your motivation the same as before? 
news you've had, or imitating how you would 
react to news of a relative dying 
Responding to personality changes reported 
by relatives and read by examiner 
Responding to example of outburst read by 
examiner 
Describing recently enjoyed activities 
Describing current goals and plans 
7. Every Day 
Living 
Implications 
Are you able to live independently? 
Are you able to manage your finances on your 
own? 
Can you drive? 
Can you work/study? 
Can you dress yourself^ 
Can you bath yourself? 
Describing abilities necessary to manage 
independent living or respond to counter 
examples the examiner gives 
Performing additions and subtractions, 
retaining the results in memory 
Describing abilities necessary to drive or 
respond to counter examples the examiner 
gives 
Describing abilities necessary to be 
employed/study or respond to counter 
examples the examiner gives 
Putting on a jacket. 
Demonstrating washing hands 
8. Future 
Ant ic ipat ion 
• In 6 months time where do you think you will be? What will be doing? 
• Do you thing your injury will still have an effect on you in 6 months time? 
• What do you hope to achieve in six months? 
• How would you go about changing it? 
• Do you think you will manage? 
Levels of Awareness Manipulation: Administration to Domains 2-7 
Patient's Answer Questions 
1 Could you give me an example of a ta.sk you couldn't do? (prompted with examples 
The problem is , , , 
J T L . • 2. How did you teel about it? 
Identified. The patient is 3 ^^liat did you do to solve the problem^ 
further asked: 4 what else could you have done to compensate for it? 
1. Could you please perform [a task - see abovel now... 
The problem is not 2. I low did you do'' 
acknowledged The Based on this performance do you think you can do this task as well as before? 
patient is further asked' ^ would manage if you had to do [the above task) again'' 
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E2. LH's Detailed Big Five Scores & Factors Description 
This report (Johnson, 1998) estimates LH's level on each of the five broad personality domains of the 
Five-Factor Model. The description of each one of the five broad domains is followed by a more detailed 
description of personality according to the six subdomains that comprise each domain. The numerical 
scores reported and graphed as percentile estimates. For example, a score of "60" means that the level 
on that trait is estimated to be higher than 60% of persons of the same sex and age. 
L H ' s Premorb id Personal i ty - Rated by his Relat ives 
Extraversion 
Extraversion is marked by pronounced engagement with the external world. Extraverts enjoy being with 
people, are full of energy, and often experience positive emotions. They tend to be enthusiastic, action-
oriented, individuals who are likely to say "Yes!" or "Let's go!" to opportunities for excitement. In groups 
they like to talk, assert themselves, and draw attention to themselves. 
Introverts lack the exuberance, energy, and activity levels of extraverts. They tend to be quiet, low-key, 
deliberate, and disengaged from the social world. Their lack of social involvement should not be 
interpreted as shyness or depression; the introvert simply needs less stimulation than an extravert and 
prefers to be alone. The independence and reserve of the introvert is sometimes mistaken as 
unfriendliness or arrogance. In reality, an introvert who scores high on the agreeableness dimension will 
not seek others out but will be quite pleasant when approached. 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
EXTRAVERSION 87 ******************"***********************^****^***************** 
FriBndlinGSS 95 *********************************^^************************************************************* 
..Gregariousness 99 * 
..Assertiveness 58 " " " " " • " " " " " " " " " " " • " * " • • " " " • " " * " • » 
..Activity Level 4 1 ' 
..Exdtement-Seeklng 6 1 ' 
Cheerfulness 81 ******************************************************************************** 
Agreeableness 
Agreeableness reflects individual differences in concern with cooperation and social harmony. Agreeable 
individuals value getting along with others. They are therefore considerate, friendly, generous, helpful, 
and willing to compromise their interests with others'. Agreeable people also have an optimistic view of 
human nature. They believe people are basically honest, decent, and trustworthy. 
Disagreeable individuals place self-interest above getting along with others. They are generally 
unconcerned with others' well-being, and therefore are unlikely to extend themselves for other people. 
Sometimes their skepticism about others' motives causes them to be suspicious, unfriendly, and 
uncooperative. 
Agreeableness is obviously advantageous for attaining and maintaining popularity. Agreeable people are 
better liked than disagreeable people. On the other hand, agreeableness is not useful in situations that 
require tough or absolute objective decisions. Disagreeable people can make excellent scientists, critics, 
or soldiers. 
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Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30- 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
AGREEABLENESS 4g 
Morality 53 ****************************************************** 
..Altruism 77 * * * " * * * * * * * * * * * * * " * * * " * * * " * * " * " * ^ " " " * * * " * * * ' ^ " *» * " * " " * " * * * * * * 
..Cooperation 5"*** 
Modesty 41 *********************"****************** 
..Sympathy 72 ' 
Conscientiousness 
Conscientiousness concerns the way in wtiicti we control, regulate, and direct our impulses. Impulses 
are not inherently bad; occasionally time constraints require a snap decision, and acting on our first 
impulse can be an effective response. Also, in times of play rather than work, acting spontaneously and 
impulsively can be fun. Impulsive individuals can be seen by others as colorful, fun-to-be-with, and zany. 
Nonetheless, acting on impulse can lead to trouble in a number of ways. Some impulses are antisocial. 
Uncontrolled antisocial acts not only harm other members of society, but also can result in retribution 
toward the perpetrator of such impulsive acts. Another problem with impulsive acts is that they often 
produce immediate rewards but undesirable, long-term consequences. Examples include excessive 
socializing that leads to being fired from one's job, hurling an insult that causes the breakup of an 
important relationship, or using pleasure-inducing doigs that eventually destroy one's health. 
Impulsive behavior, even when not seriously destructive, diminishes a person's effectiveness in 
significant ways. Acting impulsively disallows contemplating alternative courses of action, some of which 
would have been wiser than the impulsive choice. Impulsivity also sidetracks people during projects that 
require organized sequences of steps or stages. Accomplishments of an impulsive person are therefore 
small, scattered, and inconsistent. 
A hallmark of intelligence, what potentially separates human beings from earlier life forms, is the ability to 
think about future consequences before acting on an impulse. Intelligent activity involves contemplation 
of long-range goals, organizing and planning routes to these goals, and persisting toward one's goals in 
the face of short-lived impulses to the contrary. The idea that intelligence involves impulse control is 
nicely captured by the term prudence, an alternative label for the Conscientiousness domain. Prudent 
means both wise and cautious. Persons who score high on the Conscientiousness scale are, in fact, 
perceived by others as intelligent. 
The benefits of high conscientiousness are obvious. Conscientious individuals avoid trouble and achieve 
high levels of success through purposeful planning and persistence. They are also positively regarded by 
others as intelligent and reliable. On the negative side, they can be compulsive perfectionists and 
workaholics. Furthermore, extremely conscientious individuals might be regarded as stuffy and boring. 
Unconscientious people may be criticized for their unreliability, lack of ambition, and failure to stay within 
the lines, but they will experience many short-lived pleasures and they will never be called stuffy. 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 -50 60 70 80 90 99 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 6* 
..Self-Efficacy 60 * 1 *****i****i********************t:l!*****t-k*ii**-H!*iHt********** 
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..Orderiiness 3 " * 
..Dutifulness 1 * 
Achievement-Striving 79 ******************************************************************************* 
..Self-Discipline 1 * 
..Cautiousness 29 **•*•—•**••***•**•********' 
Neuroticism 
Freud originally used the term neurosis to describe a condition marked by mental distress, emotional 
suffering, and an inability to cope effectively with the normal demands of life. He suggested that 
everyone shorn some signs of neurosis, but that we differ in our degree of suffering and our specific 
symptoms of distress. Today neuroticism refers to the tendency to experience negative feelings. Those 
who score high on Neuroticism may experience primarily one specific negative feeling such as anxiety, 
anger, or depression, but are likely to experience several of these emotions. People high in neuroticism 
are emotionally reactive. They respond emotionally to events that would not affect most people, and their 
reactions tend to be more intense than normal. They are more likely to interpret ordinary situations as 
threatening, and minor fmstrations as hopelessly difficult. Their negative emotional reactions tend to 
persist for unusually long periods of time, which means they are often in a bad mood. These problems in 
emotional regulation can diminish a neurotic's ability to think clearly, make decisions, and cope 
effectively with stress. 
At the other end of the scale, individuals who score low in neuroticism are less easily upset and are less 
emotionally reactive. They tend to be calm, emotionally stable, and free from persistent negative feelings. 
Freedom from negative feelings does not mean that low scorers experience a lot of positive feelings; 
frequency of positive emotions is a component of the Extraversion domain. 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
NEUROTICISM gO **»**»*...«.**.*.."..»....*.*...*.**.******•.*****.**..*•*.****.*..*.»***.*..*"*****.**. 
^pggj. gg ( H t * * * * * * * « * * * « * * M i H k * * * * * * « i H k * * * * * * * * 
DsprGSsion 67 ******************************************************************* 
..Self-Consciousness 22 ****'*********"****** 
Immodsrstion 94 ********************************************************************************************** 
..Vulnerability 86 • ************************************************************************************** 
Openness to Experience 
Openness to Experience describes a dimension of cognitive style that distinguishes imaginative, creative 
people from down-to-earth, conventional people. Open people are intellectually curious, appreciative of 
art, and sensitive to beauty. They tend to be, compared to closed people, more aware of their feelings. 
They tend to think and act in individualistic and nonconforming ways. Intellectuals typically score high on 
Openness to Experience; consequently, this factor has also been called Culture or /nfe/tec/. Nonetheless, 
Intellect is probably best regarded as one aspect of openness to experience. Scores on Openness to 
Experience are only modestly related to years of education and scores on standard intelligent tests. 
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Another characteristic of ttie open cognitive style is a facility for ttiinking in symbols and abstractions far 
removed from concrete experience. Depending on the individual's specific intellectual abilities, this 
symbolic cognition may take the form of mattiematical, logical, or geometric thinking, artistic and 
metaphorical use of language, music composition or perfonnance, or one of the many visual or 
performing arts. People m\h low scores on openness to experience tend to have narrow, common 
interests. Ttiey prefer ttie plain, straightforward, and obvious over ttie complex, ambiguous, and subtle. 
They may regard ttie arts and sciences with suspicion, regarding these endeavors as abstruse or of no 
practical use. Closed people prefer familiarity over novelty; they are conservative and resistant to 
change. 
Openness is often presented as healthier or more mature by psychologists, who are often themselves 
open to experience. However, open and closed styles of thinking are useful in different environments. 
Ttie intellectual style of the open person may serve a professor well, but research has shown that closed 
thinking is related to superior job performance in police wor1<, sales, and a number of service 
occupations. 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE 4 1 ' 
..Imagination 38' 
..Artistic Interests 28 
..Emotionality 33 " " * " " * " • « " " " " " " " " " 
..Advenlurousness 56 ' — " " • " * " " " * " " • " » " * " " • " " " • " " " " " " • 
..Intellect 44 . « . « . . « . " . . . . . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . . . . « « . • . 
..Litjeralism 66 
E3. Self-Representation in Confabulation 
[ *1i ******* ****** 1rHr**Hl*****-lrHri*****irt 
Life-Story Technique Questions 
(Adjusted from McAdams, 2001) 
Participants are informed that they are going to be interviewed regarding significant events of their lives. 
They will be asked to recollect specific and self-related events of different life-time periods. These events 
should be specific in time and place and as detailed as possible. For each event they will be asked to 
provide a full narrative account of exactly what happened in the scene, who was involved, what the 
participants were feeling at the time and what, if anything, the scene says about their life and character. 
There are no time limits in the test and the participants are free to ask for clarification of the questions, if 
they feel it is necessary and as often as they wish. For each question, the participants will be reminded of 
the above requirements as often as necessary, but no other prompts will be given. 
1. Earliest Memory. Which is your earliest memory? The oldest specific event a participant can 
remember. 
2. Important Childhood Event. Do you remember your childhood years? Can you tell me of an 
event in your childhood that was important to you? 
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3. Important Early Adulthood Event. Do you remember the years of your youth? Can you 
remember of a specific event in your early adulthood (16-30) that was important to you? 
4. Important Adulthood Event. Can you remember an important event of your late adulthood? A 
significant event that took place after your 30's until today? (excluding brain injury) 
5. Other Important Event. Can you chose and describe another important scene from any period 
in your life? 
6. High Point. Can you remember of a particularly pleasant event in your life? A scene of great 
joy, happiness, a positive experience. 
7. Low Point. Can you remember of a particularly unpleasant event in your life? A scene of 
misery, unhappiness, a negative experience. 
8. Turning Point. Can you remember of an event that changed your life? An event in w/hich the 
participant experienced a significant life change. 
9. Episode of continuity. Can you remember an event that displays something about yourself 
that is continuous and stable? 
10. Decision-making episode. Can you remember an event in which you made an important 
decision? 
11. Goal event. Can you remember of an event connected to an important goal that you had or 
still have set out for the future? 
12. Morality event. Can you remember of an event that you faced a moral dilemma? 
E4. Confabulation Examples on the Self-Representation Test 
Recent life: 
"Oh, yeah. A lot of things, aye. You see, I was very looked after when I was a kid, honestly. I was a 
mother's boy, I was so soft it was unbelievable. I was a lad who always got mugged for his sweets. I 
was weak. I had no sort of strong character. Which was very frustrating, because on tine other side of 
the coin, 1 was always at the fop of the class, academically. Um, no just- just... the best things were a 
sort of past me mid-teens. Uh, late teens, when me mother died. Then that just crippled me for, I 
don't know, four or five weeks-1 was just a mess. And then you've got to fight to get over it. And then, 
I don't know if it's connected wflth that, but I started winning things. Races, quizzes, that sort of thing. I 
felt bloody chuffed, 1 was made house captain at school, and uh... yeah. That's- that's- that sort of 
event, that area, um... was the- was the first time 1 had confidence in myself. Because I started to 
believe that other people had confidence in me, because prior to that I didn't think they did. Such a 
whipper. Ever since I've had to take it out on the rest of the world". 
[Corroboration Notes. His mottier did indeed die in tiis late teens and in tt)e long run it seemed to tiave a 
beneficial effect on tiis character but the associated events ('winning tilings' etc) were not corroborated 
by his relatives and although it is true that he became house captain at school, this was in primary school 
and preceded his mother's death. The latter information appears to be a perseveration from a previous 
question] 
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Spontaneous Confabulation: The patient is asked for some personal semantic information, 
e.g. his address. He suddenly says: 
"It's gone. It's6 something... 
[Are things often gone from your memory?] 
No, I'm pretty damn super 
[ok] 
I'm getting done from Australia 
[You're getting done from Australia?] 
Yeah. Look at you, you're well impressed! No, what it is, well 'Newcastle' hospital, it's supposed to be 
the most peaceful, relaxed hospital in the area. So I went there, I weren't to move a plant. I think it, I 
was told it was accidental, and I got hit over the head with a spade. 
[Really?] 
(laughs) I'm fine, I'm really, I'm fine, I'm, going now 
[You are leaving? You are not facing any problems as a result of that event? ] 
I have hell of a job finding me wallet (laughs). No this hospital has a very good reputation. I think all 
hospitals at the moment, I'm probably being very very unfair to them now, but they're not popular. Er, 
because of the pay, the patients and all this sort of thing, but em, do you know I love to say things like 
this despite yourself, intelligent staff and all. I love that. But I promised I would behave myself this 
time. I've got to get out of this sodding place. I cannot keep coming back. 1 only came back for two 
pencils. And that was a fortnight ago. 
[Oh really, is that why you were admitted here?] 
Yeah. I came to return two pencils". 
[Corroboration Note. Ttiis is a spontaneous confabulation regarding LH's reasons for admission which 
arouse during interviewing. It includes a number of false claims: He is not is Australia. His reasons for 
admission do not relate to a plant, nor a head injury, nor the return of pencils. He has mentioned such 
reasons in previous sessions, in various versions. E.g. his conviction that he is in Australia, on holiday 
was common at the time.] 
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I ******************************************************************************************* 
****************************************************************************************** 
Appendix F 
F l . AO's Detailed Big Five Scores & Factors Descriptions 
Premorbid Personality (Relative's Rating) 
(Percentile Estimates) 
Extraversion 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 7 0 ~ 8 0 90 99 
EXTRAVERSION 78 " • " " • " " * " « * " " * " " " " • — " • " * * " " " « " • « " " • » " " • * " » " • " 
Friendliness 
Gregariousness 9 1 ' 
Assertiveness 90 ****************************************************************************************** 
Activity Level 90 
Excitement-Seeking 27 
Cheerfulness 1 ' 
Agreeableness 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
AGREEABLENESS 2 " 
Tmst . |g. . . . . . .«««..«. 
Morality 1 ' 
Altruism 3 1 ' 
Cooperation 1 * 
Modesty 74' 
Sympathy 85' 
Conscientiousness 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80— 90 99 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS 57 *•*************************"*.*************.*.*•***•**** 
Self-Efficacy 85' 
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OrdGiiinGss 87 *****************************^***'^ ***************************^^ 
Dutifulness 80 *"**"************************•************************************************ 
Achievement-Striving 61 
56lf-Disciplin6 64 '^********************''************************************^*** 
Cautiousness 1 ' 
Neuroticism 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 20- 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
NEUROTICISM 91 * * * * * * * " * " * " * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * " * * * * * * * « " * * * * « * ' H t * * * * * * * w » * « i H k * M * * * * * * * * « H H h t * * * * ^ 
Anxiety. 99 ********************************"*****************************"************************•********* 
Anger 97 **"'***********••**«*"»*•*••*""•***""«"••"""•"**•••"•"»•""*««.««»*»»..»«**« 
Depression 90 ****************************************************************************************** 
Self-Consciousness 14 
Immoderation 20 " 
Vulnerability 99 
Openness to Experience 
Domain/Facet Score 0 10 - 2 0 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE 65 **'*****************'******«<**********************.******..***** 
Imagination 39 . * * * . . . * * . * . * . * . . . * » . . * * . * . . . . . . , . . « * . . 
Artistic Interests. 90 ****************************************************************************************** 
Emotionality. 53 ***************************************************** 
Adventurousness 30 ***•*****«*'************•»***• 
Intellect 92 ******************************************************************************************** 
Liberalism 42 *************'******************•********* 
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¥2. Recollective Experience Questionnaire 
Recollective Experience Questions & Response Options 
(Adjusted from Heaps & Nash, 2001) 
1. How much of the event do you remember? 
(amount remembered; 0 = none, 1 = little, 2 = some, 3 = most, 4 = ail) 
2. How much confidence do you have in the accuracy of your memory? (confidence in 
accuracy; 0 = none, I = little, 2 = some, 3 = a lot, 4 = extreme/complete) 
3. How fi-equently have you thought about or talked about this event with others? 
(rehearsal frequency; 0 = none, I = little, 2 = some, 3 = a lot, 4 = extreme/complete) 
4. How typical of your recent life (i.e. how much like other events) is this event? (event 
typicality; 0 = very untypical, 1 = somewhat untypical, 2 = neither typical nor untypical, 
3 = somewhat typical, 4 = very typical) 
5. How important very the consequences of this event? (importance of consequences; 0 
= very unimportant, I = somewhat important, 2 = neither important nor unimportant, 3 = 
somewhat important, 4 = very important) 
6. How intense are your emotions concerning the event? (emotional intensity; 0 = no 
intensity, I = little intensity, 2 = some/moderate intensity, 3 = a lot of intensity, 4 = 
extreme/complete intensity) 
7. How are your emotions best described (negative/positive)? (emotional valence; 0 = 
very negative, I = somewhat negative, 2 = neither negative nor positive, 3 = somewhat 
positive, 4 = very positive) 
8. Does your memory for this event contain visual images? (image presence; yes/no) [If 
the answer to this Question was "no", questions 9-12 were not asked] 
9. How clear is your visual image about this event? (image clarity; 0 = no clarity, 1 = 
little clarity, 2 = some/moderate clarity, 3 = a lot of clarity, 4 = extreme/complete 
clarity) 
10. How much effort did it take for you to recall this image? (recall effort; 0 = no effort, 
1 = little effort, 2 = some/moderate effort, 3 = a lot of effort, 4 = extreme/complete 
effort) 
11. Does your image involve movement? (image movement; yes/no) 
12. Is your image seen from a filed (first person) or observer (third person) perspective? 
(image perspective; field/observer) 
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